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Chapter I: Introduction

A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
Towne v Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)
Feeling the oppression of a remote government, a group of farmers, tradesmen,
merchants, doctors, and lawyers gathered through the summer to draft a constitutional blueprint
for republican self-governance. Having had little voice in their distant government, and
believing that it had ignored their welfare, these settlers boldly declared, “the time has arrived
when our present political condition ought to cease, and the right of self-government be
asserted.” The distant government responded with irritation, denying the settlers the right to selfgovernment and insisting that agents of the distant government continue to rule. The year was
1835 and the place, Detroit, Michigan.1
In response to what he perceived as the challenges associated with republican governance
in the later portions of the nineteenth century, Michigan’s Thomas McIntyre Cooley penned his
treatise concerning constitutional limitations on legislative power. In it, Cooley offered a vision
of government where courts would check government power and would raise constitutional
barriers against the impact of improper influences on legislators. As a student of history, Cooley
grounded his beliefs and doctrines in experience, not philosophical reflections. Believing that
“the fruits of speculative genius in government are of little value,” Cooley submitted that
governing structures and law “must be the work of time and circumstances, must grow out of

1

Preamble, Constitution of Michigan, 1835.
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actual needs, and have their excellencies tested in the practical wisdom of the people from whose
aspirations and exigencies they have sprung.”2 Accordingly, law and governance must evolve
along with political, social, and economic circumstances. This is not to suggest that Cooley
advocated that constitutional structures yield to political shifts or popular passions. Rather, he
proposed that constitutional language should be reinterpreted in order to hold fast to the core of
American constitutional governance – republican, limited-governance. With republican limitedgovernance as their lodestar, courts were to search for new constitutional understandings to
safeguard and advance that governance and, as part of that responsibility, to protect individual
liberties and rights. To Cooley, courts were flexibly to employ and re-interpret constitutional
language to further those core constitutional purposes. This allowed and demanded that courts
reassess legislative powers in light of new circumstances. When a legislature had disused or
misused powers, its authority over that issue would end, particularly when continuing the
legislative practice would undermine republican governance or its associated promotion of
individual liberties. Therefore, what was once constitutional could become unconstitutional as
social, political, and economic forces dictated. Informing that decision, and Cooley’s theories,
was the concern that powerful forces had, and could continue to undermine the legislative
process in order to grant the wealthy improper privileges and the masses inappropriate succor.
Because he believed that judges were cut of a finer cloth and not as subject to political forces as
were legislators, Cooley charged the courts with the responsibility to dispassionately discern
when legislation exceeded republican bounds. In doing so, the judiciary would both maintain
constitutional governance and the rule of law, while pressing the natural advancement of the
individual in American society. Through his advocacy of enhanced judicial review, Cooley

2

Thomas McIntyre Cooley, "Sources of Inspiration in Legal Pursuits," Western Jurist 9(1875): 520-21.
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tendered both the constitutional language and the means to protect against improper influences
and majoritarian impulses . . . and judges across the nation cheered.
Situated in Michigan, this work explores how the state’s constitutional and governing
challenges culminated in a Cooley-inspired jurisprudence where courts would systematically
assert authority to limit legislative power. Beginning with state courts and migrating to the
federal bench, Cooley’s advocacy soon captured the nation. Until Cooley, courts almost without
exception had deferred to legislative power and largely had ignored, or treated on an ad hoc
basis, limitations of legislative plenary powers. As they deferred, judicial roles were shrinking
as statutory law supplanted the common law. With Cooley, courts began to reassert themselves
to limit the perceived excesses of both majoritarian and private-interest protecting enactments,
and did so armed with Cooley’s newly defined constitutional language and theories.
In analyzing his impact, most scholars have focused on Cooley’s elevation of individual
rights as limits on legislative power. But that misses the larger dynamic. In his words, Cooley’s
underlying goal was to protect against “diseases in the body politic,” and to preserve republican
institutions. Individual rights protection was part of that effort, and would be the result of
properly functioning republican institutions, but the underlying goal was to defend and maintain
the constitutional principle of limited, republican governance. Cooley’s story, and this work, is
the story of judicial review, the rule of law, and republican governance.
Cooley scholars place him at the forefront of rights-creating jurisprudence. In the
shadow of the New Deal, Benjamin Twiss and Clyde Jacobs narrowly focused on contract and
property rights, and attributed the rise of laissez-faire jurisprudence to Cooley. Alan Jacobs
rehabilitated him, but mistakenly characterized Cooley as largely deferring to legislative
prerogatives. Howard Gillman attributed a binary class-legislation test to Cooley; an effort that
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was too neat and narrowing. Andrew McLaughlin perhaps best characterized Cooley’s
contribution by suggesting that, over an extensive period, Cooley’s work was second to the
Federalist Papers in importance. Because Cooley’s contributions transcend the limited, albeit
important, role scholars have attributed to him, his legacy is of considerable historical and legal
significance.
Events, and not philosophical musings, shaped Cooley’s constitutional beliefs. He was
neither a constitutional philosopher nor one who culled meaning from dispassionate readings of
constitutional texts. He did not glean constitutional meaning by searching for divinely inspired
principles. Instead, he was a scholar molded by his experiences and driven to overcome the
challenges society faced in response to activist state legislation. History shaped Cooley, but not
in the way nostalgic recollections favor a return to simpler times. He was not a man looking
backward to see the future. Instead, Cooley consciously considered historical developments as
they applied to existing community needs to arrive at contemporary legal and constitutional
understandings.3 Accordingly, his efforts to limit legislative power are best understood by a
discussion of the environment in which he developed his ideas and an understanding of the world
in which he lived. Hence, a bottom-up study of the changing nature of government and
constitutional structures from Michigan’s territorial period through the beginnings of the Cooley
revolution best captures the motivations and intentions of Cooley’s work. This study undertakes
that task.
While located in Michigan this is not simply a local story. Michigan’s nineteenth-century
experiences culminated in the Cooley-directed jurisprudence that courts across the nation
captured as they sought to limit plenary legislative power. Michigan’s experiences were in some
3

Although Cooley is often thought of as a law professor, jurist, and ICC Chairman, he was also an academic
historian. In 1885, Cooley formally took on that role when he became a professor of history at the University of
Michigan’s Literary College.

9

measure a microcosm of broader local and state efforts to employ government to address the
oppressive forces of the day and to release social and market energies in order to advance
general-welfare interests. Because other states had acted similarly, Cooley’s ideas to limit
government power gained prompt purchase in courts across the nation.
While residents of other states engaged in similar activities, Michigan presents a unique
study. It underwent a troubled territorial period, an early state constitutional period requiring
government activism in commercial development, a second written constitutional period seeking
to limit state legislative power, and the Cooley period where courts redefined constitutional
language to limit legislative authority. In each period, this work studies a force that shaped
constitutional understandings and governing structures. In order of treatment, those forces are
political, economic, social, and philosophical. This work focuses on particular events during the
studied periods. Other events, like banking challenges, the Civil War, and race relations also
pressed against Michigan’s constitutional structures and probably influenced Cooley’s theories,
but those forces remain outside the scope of this project. Based on the forces and events studied,
it becomes clear that the doctrinal change – the Cooley revolution – proceeded from the earlier
Michigan periods, and was a reaction to the challenges associated with the legislative activism
from which Cooley believed Michigan, and the nation, suffered. In some measure, therefore,
this work is a study of the road to Cooley.
The First Constitutional Period – Political Forces and Change
Michigan endured a lengthy territorial period from its designation as such in 1805 until
Congress admitted it as a state in 1837. Since it set the governing structure for the territory, the
Northwest Ordinance (the “Ordinance”) acted as a constitutional document for territorial
Michigan, and this work addresses the governance under the Ordinance as Michigan’s first
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constitutional period. The Ordinance provided that a federally appointed group of three judges
and one governor would act as the earliest phase of government for the territory. In response to
their appointment, those leaders answered to the national government, not the residents. In vying
for power, Michigan’s governor and judges, for example, would gridlock government by
engaging in a cycle where the courts nearly automatically would release prisoners that the
governor’s administration had just arrested. With court contempt proceedings and gubernatorial
proclamations demanding disobedience to court orders, Michigan’s governing structure virtually
collapsed.
Resident reactions to the territory’s dysfunction moved from early calls to replace the
offending officials to later rejections of the colonial nature of territorial governance under the
Ordinance. Contrary to popular mythology, those calls were for more government, not less – but
government subject to the direct control of Michigan’s residents. As part of their efforts for
effective and involved governance, municipal governments actively regulated and encouraged
economic and social development. They did so recognizing that many of those activities
encumbered individual rights. Nevertheless, driven by majority goals to advance the general
welfare, local legislatures consciously subordinated the individual to the collective. In doing so,
they felt primarily constrained by a lack of resources and noted that future tax revenues would
allow for greater government oversight and participation in general-welfare building.
To Michigan residents, the territorial period ended in 1835 when they unilaterally
declared statehood, created and approved a constitution, and elected their state government
officials. Unfortunately, the federal government did not agree. Congress refused to admit the
state into the Union and President Jackson threatened to take action should the elected
government interfere with his territorial appointments. Michigan now had two governors and a
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legislature making laws of questionable effect. The constitutional structure of the Ordinance had
broken under the pressures of local political forces.
The Second Constitutional Period – Economic Forces and Change
The 1835 constitution required the state government to encourage internal improvements.
In response, Michigan’s leadership determined the state should build, own, and operate its major
rail lines, and control and significantly invest in the state’s feeder lines. That determination was
of singular importance in Michigan history and in shaping Cooley’s views concerning the
dangers of legislative activism. In response to its leadership’s drive for economic progress, the
state massively borrowed to finance its internal improvement projects. Envisioning rail service
across the state’s inhabited peninsula, the legislature authorized multiple projects believing that it
could mold economic development and provide revenue for future government spending. Those
aspirations proved illusory as the Panic of 1837 along with bank fraud undermined an already
problematic state investment.
Lurking political challenges contributed to the economic forces aligned against a
successful state rail enterprise. Each legislator sought to maximize rail access for his
constituents even when economic forces argued to the contrary. In response to popular passions,
municipalities took up arms against the state militia and disgruntled citizens sabotaged rail
equipment. Unable to raise taxes, the state soon defaulted on its obligations and, with respect to
foreign creditors, repudiated its debts. Although the law favored the creditors, they lacked a
legal forum where they successfully could bring their actions. Their complaints could only be
voiced in the political sphere and then only to partial satisfaction.
The legislature not only ignored legal obligations under the common law, it consciously
violated the state’s constitutional requirements. In 1846, it sold the state’s rail interests and
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ceased involvement in transportation. While acknowledging that such action violated the
constitution, leaders argued that economic forces prohibited compliance or that the divestment
legislation modified constitutional requirements. Cooley, in his Michigan, A History of
Governments, spent considerable ink detailing the era, and concluded that the state’s rail efforts
left “nothing but the debris of our airy castles.” It did result in an effort that Cooley applauded.
The government’s failures resulted in an 1850 constitution that limited state legislative power.
The Third Constitutional Period – Social Forces and Change
Largely as a response to the state’s debts, the embarrassments of defaults, and the
increased taxation associated with the partial repayments, the citizens approved a new
constitution in 1850. That constitution’s governing framework sought to avoid earlier state
excesses by, among other things, curtailing legislative space. In part to accomplish that end,
Michigan pioneered efforts constitutionally to separate its university from legislative oversight or
control. Like other states in the wake of Dartmouth College, Michigan had created a stateowned university. Because of legislative intrusions, an 1840 Select Committee on the Condition
of the University warned that the fluctuating politics of the legislature threatened the university’s
survival. Armed with that report and a distaste for legislative activism, the framers of the 1850
constitution invested a voter-elected board of regents with complete control over the university.
That board was to be independent of the legislature and was to control university funding from
designated sources. Cooley later reflected that that the framers had taken the right course, as the
“popular excitements and prejudices” that animated the legislature would prove dangerous to the
university.
Notwithstanding the framers’ intention to vest exclusive authority in the regents, almost
immediately after ratification the legislature passed a law seeking to direct the university’s
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operations and instructions. Most of the law’s provisions were benign as they merely instructed
the university to do as it already had done. One area differed. The law required that the
university medical school employ a homeopathic professor. Homeopathic medicine was
increasingly popular and the legislature enacted the law in response to public and homeopathic
pressures. Ignoring the law, the regents refused to allow the legislature to direct hiring and
instructional decisions. The state Supreme Court then refused to require university compliance.
Nevertheless, the issue remained as homeopaths and allopaths squabbled, the American Medical
Association threatened to decertify doctors associating with homeopaths, and the public
demanded its university teach the homeopathic medicine it increasingly accepted.
Forces combined after the Civil War, while Cooley sat as the dean of the law school, to
undermine the university’s constitutional independence. With the war’s conclusion, the student
body increased dramatically while inflation required enhanced faculty compensation. By 1867,
the university was unable to operate effectively on only the funds previously designated.
Accordingly, it sought and received an appropriation, but the legislature pressed one condition:
the medical school had to hire homeopathic faculty. The regents rejected the condition and
sought a writ of mandamus to compel release of the funds without condition. The court declined.
Soon university construction halted, the university retracted the promised raises, faculty
resigned, and students, and ultimately the university president, left. Moreover, medical journals
almost unanimously called for Michigan’s entire medical faculty to resign if the university hired
homeopathic instructors. To follow the legislative demands, the university’s leadership
exclaimed, would threaten the medical school’s and perhaps the university’s existence.
Before he left, the university president quietly negotiated with the legislature. In
exchange for multiple appropriations, the regents would create a homeopathic college connected
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to the medical school. This would not end the constitutional issue. Courts would ultimately rule
that the legislature could not interfere in the educational decisions of the university. However,
the legislature held the purse and, with it, could leverage changes in university policy as
demanded by the state’s residents. The constitutional language and the convention debates
establish that the drafters had intended otherwise.
Cooley enjoyed a nearly forty-year tenure at the university and his influence on, and
involvement in, university affairs dramatically exceeded his role as law professor. Cooley’s
writings did not significantly reference the homeopathic controversy, although he was involved
in it, at least before his tenure on the bench. During that pre-judicial time, Cooley had served as
counsel for the regents, as did his associate and future brother justice, John Campbell. Campbell
had acted as the counsel to defend the university’s position during the earlier homeopathic
litigation. While I have uncovered no specific Cooley advocacy for the university position, there
are strong indications he agreed with Campbell and the regents. It is probable that the long crisis
marked Cooley’s thinking and shaped his concerns about legislative overreaching.
The Fourth Constitutional Period – Philosophical Forces and Change
The 1850 constitution had prohibited state involvement in internal improvements.
Despite that language, and fearing that economic advancement would bypass Michigan, the
legislature authorized municipalities to pledge tax dollars to attract rail investment. Local
legislatures could pledge funds to railroads subject to a vote of the taxpayers. That approval was
almost always forthcoming, resulting in popularly approved but burdensome debt. This
majoritarian tendency to employ government in what he deemed inappropriate fashion was the
“disease in the body politic” that Cooley feared. Notwithstanding the expanding government and
personal debts associated with those grants, in the antebellum period courts across the nation
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uniformly upheld the constitutionality of those laws. In each case, the court deferred to the
legislature’s judgment. When, during the war, one court invalidated its state’s law as violating
taxpayers’ property rights, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the ruling on Commerce Clause
grounds and castigated the state court for ignoring settled law.
All of this changed in response to Cooley’s 1868 publication of Constitutional
Limitations. In that treatise, and the cases quickly following, Cooley argued that the legislature
must use taxes to further a “public purpose,” which he defined as requiring a direct value
exchange for projects within government’s historical sphere. Without that public purpose, the
revenue collection would be “plunder,” not taxes, and therefore was unconstitutional. In People
v Township Board of Salem, Cooley argued that grants to railroads did not fit the public purpose
standard and were unconstitutional. Scholars suggest that Salem evidences Cooley’s propertyrights position, but that is not how Cooley viewed his opinion. To him, Salem stood for the
principle that government spending required a government purpose, which he believed did not
include supporting privately owned businesses. The case, and his underlying philosophy, was
about limiting government. “The fundamental maxims of a free government” required limited
legislative power and a respect for advancing individual rights. While few jurisdictions
overturned their rail appropriations, courts across the nation adopted Cooley’s public-purpose
standard to limit other government spending. Soon courts would overturn grants to business,
agriculture, public employees, students, the indigent, and the disabled.
By redefining constitutional terms, a newly energized judiciary acted to limit majoritarian
legislation that it believed inappropriately encumbered individual rights. The impact was most
keenly felt in the regulatory sphere. Cooley argued for a modified interpretation of “law of the
land” and “due process” language to limit legislative power. Those clauses were linchpins for
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the protection of limited government and the advancement of individual space. Using those
clauses, Cooley advanced that courts should intervene when legislatures unduly deprived
individuals of property or contract rights. Through the due process clauses, Cooley sought to
require that legislators work within “settled maxims” of the common law. He incorporated those
common-law standards into his constitutional understandings, and argued that rights protections
and legislative limitations were constitutional memorializations of long-standing republican
principles. Like the common law, constitutional understandings changed to protect those
underlying limited-governance principles. By arguing that due process protections changed with
social and economic changes, Cooley allowed for a continued reassessment of legislative space
and a weakening of stare decisis principles.
While Cooley spoke the language of “rights,” it would be a mistake to focus on the
protected rights rather than the legislative limits. Having been steeped in, and written about,
Michigan history, Cooley understood the challenges of plenary legislative power, especially
when the legislature employed that power to expand government’s scope. Rights were but one
of the tools Cooley submitted as a limit on that power. Accordingly, those who focus only on the
rights language miss the underlying philosophy of legislative limitations, judicial review, the rule
of law, and republican government. Judicial review was to be the mechanism to assure and
elevate republican governance. Because his arguments are much deeper than the protection of
specific rights, which ebb and flow in acceptance, Cooley’s legacy continued (even as contract
and property-rights arguments waned). Cooley’s jurisprudence addressed the tensions between
republican limits and majoritarian rule; issues with which we continue to struggle.
Cooley’s work did not seek to set down binary rules of jurisprudence or to advance
laissez-faire capitalism. Instead, he sought to articulate doctrines and traditions to reinsert courts
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into republican governance in ways that were lost with the rise of statutory law. In a sense, he
reinterpreted a role for courts in a new age by advocating robust use of judicial review and
limited government in response to the negative consequences of plenary legislative power.
Cooley saw his advocacy not as a rejection of constitutional understandings, but an uncovering
of constitutional meaning for a time when, to his mind, republican governance was under siege.
To protect that republican governance and the rule of law, Cooley would capture and manipulate
threads of antebellum constitutional thought that, in reality, had almost only been employed in
dicta. Because that was his purpose and legacy, this work tells an institutional story of changing
government frameworks and rising judicial power.
This work offers a new way of thinking about Cooley and how he led a movement to
check legislative authority through an aggressive use of judicial review. Employing his
doctrines, courts would find new meanings in the word “tax” to imply constitutional restrictions
on the power to spend. They would uncover expanded meaning in the term “due process” and
employ it to limit legislative actions that heretofore had been almost universally accepted. Those
changes were not the stuff of revolutionary advancements of personal liberties or the reactionary
forces responsive to industrial power. Rather, they were part of an ongoing American effort to
adjust constitutional frameworks and understandings to address the forces of their time and
circumstance. In this work, Thomas McIntyre Cooley was the last piece of that continuing
effort. Based upon his experiences in Michigan and his understanding of the larger world, he
advocated an expanded judicial effort to limit activist legislatures. In doing so, he offered a new
constitutional framework to address his era’s needs and to strengthen representative governance.
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Chapter II: The Drive for Self-Government 1805-1836

State power and state laws were thus present at all times, touching the citizen
for his advantage and direction in all his relations: by his fireside as much as in
his business; . . . in nearly everything which had for him and those associated
with him – whether in kinship or socially or in business – an every-day interest.
Thomas M. Cooley
Michigan, A History of Governments4

A Framework for Governance: The Northwest Ordinance
“Detroit is not under government . . . for this reason there were very few Europeans
settled there.” So suggested North-American Governor General Guy Carleton during his 1774
testimony before the British Parliament. Without effective government, Carleton argued, the
Detroit area would never enjoy meaningful population growth, trade, or safety.5 When instituted
decades later, Detroit’s government would lay the foundation for the area’s expansive
commercial and social growth. By 1837, when Congress admitted Michigan as a state,
Michigan’s population and economy had increased tens-of-thousands-fold over its early days
under the British flag. During that time, Michigan’s government played an integral and
welcome, if at times frustrating, role in the social, political, and economic development of
Territorial Michigan.
Pursuant to the Treaty of Paris of 1783, Britain legally ceded to the United States all of its
territories between the Allegheny Mountains and the Mississippi River, south of the lands now
comprising Canada. Those lands, which would be known as the Northwest Territories,

4

Thomas McIntyre Cooley, Michigan: A History of Governments, American Commonwealths (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin, 1888). 223-24. Cooley first published the book in 1885.
5
"Debates of the House of Commons in the Year 1774 on the Bill for Making More Effectual Provision for the
Government of the Province of Quebec. (Drawn up from the notes of the Henry Cavendish, Member for
Lostwithiel)," (London: Ridgway), 142, 146.
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eventually would be carved into the five and one-half states of Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio,
Wisconsin, and the eastern portion of Minnesota. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress
enacted the Ordinance of 1787, which provided for the governance of the territory, and the
standards by which each section of the territory would become a state.6 After the adoption of the
United States Constitution, Congress reenacted the Northwest Ordinance on August 7, 1789
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Ordinance”).7 It did so under the broad powers Art.
IV, §3 granted to Congress to “make all needful rules and regulations” concerning territories. In
enacting the Ordinance, Congress envisioned a transitory status for each territory until
populations had developed sufficiently for self-governance. Evidencing its paternalistic cast,
Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair noted, the “system” of government under the Ordinance “is
temporary only, suited to your infant situation, and to continue no longer than that state of
infancy shall last.”8
Because the territories gradually would move from sparse to more sustainable
populations, the Ordinance allowed for a three-phase progression toward self-governance. At the
beginning of the territorial period, the Ordinance provided for one federally appointed governor
and three federally appointed judges who also would act as legislators to “adopt” “such laws of
the original states, criminal and civil, as may be necessary and best suited to the circumstances of
the district.”9 In appointing the judges and governor as the legislature, in some measure
Congress tabled the well-accepted belief that divided government shielded against despotism.
6

An Ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States North West of the river Ohio, Journals of the
Continental Congress 1774-1789, ed. Roscoe R. Hill (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936). 32:
334. The Ordinance was among the last acts of the New York based Confederation Congress. The Ordinance
passed as the 1787 Constitutional Convention debated in nearby Philadelphia.
7
An Act to provide for the Government of the Territory North-west of the river Ohio, 1 Statutes at Large 50 (1937).
8
Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1987). 69.
9
Michigan defined “original” as all states in the union as of 1805, when it was created as a territory; not 1776 with
the Declaration of Independence, or 1787 with the Ordinance, or 1789 with the Constitution. I have found no case
law challenging that interpretation. The case law suggests Michigan’s interpretation was the accepted one.
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Perhaps to overcome that challenge, Congress retained the right to veto territory legislation. To
access that legislation, the Ordinance provided for a secretary who would transmit laws to
Congress 10 and who also would act as governor in the governor’s absence. As a further check
against tyranny, the Ordinance required that the appointed officers reside in the territory and own
substantial property therein. The governor’s term was for three years, the secretary’s for four,
and the judges held office during good behavior.
When the territory had five-thousand free men, the inhabitants had the authority to elect
representatives to a general assembly (also called a “house of representatives”) and the President
would select a legislative council from a slate of candidates submitted by the representatives.
Those two bodies would make up the territory legislature. The Ordinance required that voters
own fifty acres of land, representatives two-hundred, and council members five-hundred. This
property requirement was more stringent than that of any of the states save for North Carolina,
which had a similar fifty-acre requirement for some voters.11 This legislature could alter the
laws adopted by the previously appointed “legislature,” and make new laws as it saw fit. James
Monroe defended a similar, earlier draft of the Ordinance as “in effect . . . a colonial government
similar to that which prevail’d in these States previous to the revolution.”12 When the territory
reached sixty-thousand free inhabitants, it would enter the third phase and become a state “on
equal footing with the original states.” In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison explained
that the fact that “admission to the union is guaranteed” eased the challenge that the territories
10

Congress never acted to void a Michigan law and, after 1800, never voided the law of any of the Northwest
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would initially be subject to colonial-type rule. 13 At least that was the intention under the 1787
legislation.
While the Ordinance failed to achieve the higher-law status of modern written
constitutions (a simple legislative majority could amend it), it does share space with modern
constitutions in at least one important aspect: The Ordinance set forth the architecture within
which government was to operate.14 In this respect, it carries a family relationship with the
United States Constitution, the state constitutions, and those court decisions addressing the extent
and limits of government power. And just as with those constitutional documents and decisions,
the governing framework established in the Ordinance would suffer erosion, as political, social,
and commercial changes would wash against its structural edifice. In turn, this would require
legislative and judicial modifications to that “constitutional” edifice in order to align previous
expectations with the new, changed realities.
In Michigan, this erosion of the Ordinance’s framework would occur most specifically in
two areas. The first dealt with the Ordinance’s restrictions on legislative power. The Ordinance
provided that territory legislators were to “adopt” the legislation of the original states. They
were not to make law. Underlying that requirement stood a belief that state laws were wholly
applicable to territory needs. That assumption would almost immediately come under attack, as
the territory legislature (the governor and judges) required flexibility in order to address
Michigan’s specific challenges. More corrosively, the Ordinance’s imposition of nationally
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controlled administrators met increasing hostility as those administrators failed to respond to
local interests. Onuf argued that the Ordinance assumed a progression from colonial status to
statehood, ending in “the automatic self-destruction of the temporary government it had called
into being.”15 In Michigan, that progression was toilsome and contentious. That is the story of
the Michigan Territory and the occupation of this chapter.
Many have furnished varying interpretations of the Ordinance, classifying it from a
sacrosanct anti-slavery and rights-guaranteeing document to a governing structure conceived by
greedy and corrupt hands. Although motivations are at issue, most historians view the Ordinance
as a key element in early nation building. Its macro impact of ushering territories from
wilderness to settlements to states largely has been applauded.16 But its mark on the individuals
subject to its rule was not so clear. As Onuf noted, its “constitutional legacy – the history of its
specific promises to settlers in the Northwest – was much more ambiguous.”17
One cannot help but be struck by the similarity of political conditions faced by the
territory’s residents and those complained of in the Declaration of Independence. For example,
the Declaration protested that the crown had “forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of
immediate and pressing Importance,” coerced the people to “relinquish the Rights of
Representation in the Legislature,” made judges dependent on the distant government’s will, and
imposed taxes without consent. All of those situations occurred in the Territories, but
particularly in Michigan, which endured a lengthy territorial period. This is not to say that
Michigan’s settlers suffered similar oppression endured by the original colonies, or that the
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federal government treated the territory as a colonial subject. But, as discussed below, the
parallels existed, and Michiganders increasingly objected to the policies of a distant government
wherein they lacked representation.
Jack Eblen noted that the stages of self-government under the Ordinance mimicked those
in the American colonial experience: The first stage, with governors and judges as the unelected
legislature, was akin to the seventeenth-century period, characterized by a strong executive
appointed by a distant power. The second phase, with its structure for growing representative
government, mirrored the first two-thirds of the eighteenth century American experience, with a
locally elected legislature and an appointed governor. And the last phase of state creation and
self-government paralleled the American revolutionary and nation-building period of the later
eighteenth century.18 Although, the structure may have been gleaned from the earlier colonial
experience, one factor was different: Unlike their colonial forbearers, settlers under the
Ordinance had been steeped in the self-governing environment of the revolutionary and early
national period and now were required to move back to a pre-national era of disenfranchisement.
Under the Ordinance, settlers no longer elected their national leadership and lost
influence over the appointment of federal judicial officials. In the early phases, they also
relinquished control of their local governments, as now the President appointed the territorial
leadership. The Ordinance’s “provision for temporary government authorized the (equally
temporary) degradation of citizen to stateless subject, but the compact articles guaranteed that the
process would reverse itself as the territory crossed successive population thresholds.”19 In this
respect, the Ordinance traded an individual’s self-governing interest for future collective
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benefits. A settler would forfeit his previously enjoyed political rights so that the national
government could build a more stable economic and political future.20
The Confederation Congress surely was aware of, and troubled by, the similarity between
the territory governance and British control over the American colonies. To address this
concern, the Congress “in moving from the denunciation of one empire to the implementation of
their own” legislated “guarantees of eventual partnership in the empire.”21 The key guarantee
was that the territory would be admitted as a state on “an equal footing with the original states, in
all respects whatever.” Doing so promised political parity to future generations but ignored
those settlers residing in the territories before eventual statehood. While Congress may have
considered colonial-like governance a practical necessity in the untamed western regions, the
settlers there (with the exception of the pre-revolutionary French) had been raised with the ethos
of government deriving its powers from the consent of the governed. In the short term, their
consent was considered expendable, or at least shelved.
To compound matters, the settlers suffered the challenges of leadership ill-informed of
the settlers’ needs. Federal appointees seldom hailed from Michigan and answered to a distant
government for their decisions.22 As the territorial period lengthened, Michigan settlers
increasingly recognized and bristled over their incapacity. In 1831, even after Michigan elected
its legislature (but still dealt with an appointed governor and judges), a community of Michigan
leaders would complain of the essentially colonial status under which they suffered. Reminding
Congress that Michigan residents had come from republican states, they protested that, “The
20
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mere fact of their having removed hither should not operate as disfranchisement of their
privileges, or of depriving them, as citizens of the several states.”23 This non-representative
government architecture frustrated settler demands, resulting in growing anger over government
dysfunction and non-responsiveness. The period would end as Michigan moved from
governance under the Ordinance blueprint to one formed by the residents under the Michigan
1835 Constitution. Even that move was met with threats between residents and Washington, and
bullets between Michigan’s militia and Ohio’s.

Early Territorial Life: A Demand for Government
Before Congress carved out a specific Michigan Territory, the inhabitants of the village
of Detroit pressed for a degree of self-governance. Around 1800 nearly all the EuropeanAmerican inhabitants of the area now known as Michigan lived in Detroit. Previously, in turn,
Native-Americans, the French, and the British, had controlled the Detroit area. Although Britain
legally ceded the area in 1783, it retained physical control until 1796 when, pursuant to the Jay
Treaty, it surrendered the area to the Americans. Being a military outpost, the area contained a
fort and, below it, a town. Most of the inhabitants were of French ancestry and spoke French.24
English and Scottish merchants, a few white Americans, some free blacks, and a small
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contingent of black and Indian slaves, made up the rest of the population.25 The Jay Treaty
permitted the British to keep their slaves.26 The treaty also provided that French and British
residents need not become American citizens nor pledge allegiance to the new government.27
The military presence in the town was not without its challenges, as conflicts between
military needs and civilian rights occasioned strife. Military efforts to keep soldiers out of the
taverns in 1798-99 fomented much excitement. John and Jane Dodemead’s home on Ste. Anne
Street housed a tavern and, on the second floor, the town’s court. That soldiers frequented the
tavern upset their fort commander, Major David Strong. Strong felt that soldier drunkenness had
“been the cause of the desertions which have so frequently taken place” and placed the fault at
the door of “those evil-minded persons who are constantly selling liquor to the men.” Strong’s
demands that Dodemead stop serving his men fell on deaf ears. In an effort to impede his
troops’ indulgences, he posted a military guard at the entrance to the Dodemead-owned
home/tavern/court. Dodemead and the town’s judges objected to the guard and wrote to
Governor St. Clair protesting the military’s interference with civilian issues and its obstruction of
court activities. Despite Strong’s objection that the protest was “endeavoring to sour the minds
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of the people,”28 the protest met with success. St. Clair ordered the guard removed from the
house, and Strong removed from command.
It is not surprising that a tavern keeper served alcohol to soldiers, that they drank heartily,
or that the tavern keeper objected to military efforts to restrict that drinking. The twist to the
story is the judges’ protest on behalf of the tavern keeper. They argued that the guard was
disruptive of court proceedings. Since it is improbable that a guard positioned one floor below
the court would do other than quiet a rowdy crowd, the judges’ protest was not associated with
an unease over disruptions of court procedure. After all, one can only assume that drunken
soldiers would be more disruptive than sober ones. It is impossible to discern definitively the
judges’ motivations for siding with the tavern keeper. Those motivations might have been based
on friendship, a desire to support the court’s landlord, their personal distain for Strong, or an
impulse for republican governance and a concern over military interference. Whatever their
motivations, the judges sided with civilian authority over the military. This is not to suggest that
civilian authorities countenanced intemperate behavior. Shortly after civilian control took over,
the town’s Board of Trustees passed restrictive liquor ordinances in response to drunkenness,
idleness, and profanity.29 Dodemead was one of the members of that board.
The objections to Major Strong’s efforts should not be read as objections to government
controls. In 1798-99, the inhabitants of the town petitioned the territory’s “General Court” to
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incorporate the town and invest it with “full power and Authority to make such, bye-laws and
Statutes for the better Government of the Town.”30 The general court was the three-member
Supreme Court of the territory that had the power to act upon such petitions. Unfortunately, the
court traveled to Detroit only twice in six years and the governor never visited.31 Because the
court rarely sat in Detroit, it did not get around to considering the petition before the United
States Congress withdrew its authority in December 1799. In 1800, Congress divided the
Northwest Territory into two parts: The Indiana Territory, which included current-Michigan’s
western lower peninsula and its entire upper peninsula, and the Northwest Territory of Ohio,
which included the Detroit area and much of eastern Michigan. On January 18, 1802, now Ohio
Territory Governor St. Clair, signed legislation incorporating Detroit.32 St. Clair appointed five
trustees to lead Detroit until elections could be held, one of whom was tavern owner Dodemead.
After Ohio became a state in 1802, the eastern portion of Michigan, including Detroit,
transferred to the Indiana Territory, a change not to the inhabitants’ liking.
The move from the Ohio Territory to the more distant Indiana Territory threatened
further to marginalize the inhabited portions of Michigan. Accordingly, in March 1803, over
three-hundred Detroit residents undertook a campaign for local territorial governance. Their first
petition to Congress respectfully requested the creation of local territory governance to avoid the
challenges associated with the “immense distance from the settlements upon the waters of the
Lakes, to the established Seat of Government,” in Indiana. Local government would help
resolve “[m]any important commercial questions,” in ways distant government could not.33
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Hearing no response, in September they reframed their plea, but still treaded gingerly so as not to
offend their assigned leaders. “Your Petitioners are induced to make this request, under a full
conviction of the absolute necessity of the measure, to the promotion of the happiness and
prosperity of this Country; and to remove the many embarrassments under which it has long
groaned, and not from any personal dislike to the Officers of the Indiana Government.”34 Once
again, Congress answered with silence. In frustration, Detroit residents again petitioned
Congress, in October 1804, but this time with more vigor. Finding that their “Situation is too
distressing to justify our Silence upon a subject of Such infinite Consequence to the Government,
to ourselves and to our posterity,” the petitioners starkly set out the issue: A more local territorial
government promised “the happiness, good order, and prosperity of the Citizens of this district.”
A more distant one – like in Indiana – could not “but produce consequences of a Serious and
alarming nature tending to all the horrors of outlawry, oppression, and anarchy.”35 Once again,
Congressional silence. It was time for others to plead the case. In an effort to appeal to party
loyalty, in December 1804 the “Democratic Republicans” of Wayne County weighed in “for the
first time.” Because the residents of Wayne County (wherein Detroit resided) had to “wander
seven hundred miles, thro’ inhospitable deserts,” for the resolution of legal issues, the population
appealed for local government to provide for the “regular and moderate exertion of authority
blended with justice.”36
These four petitions are telling. Contrary to popular culture’s view of rugged, frontier
individualism, the people of Detroit advocated for more government structure and law, and did
so in an increasingly irate fashion. And they did not stop until Congress granted their wishes.
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To the citizens, the absence of government threatened commercial success, settlement progress
and, ultimately, anarchy.
While waiting for the national government to respond to their calls for a more local
territorial governance, the Detroit residents continued to forge their own framework for
municipal governance. The Detroit Charter created by the distant territory government called for
a governing assembly of five trustees. A popular vote of free-holders and renters paying at least
forty dollars a year elected those trustees. At each election, the electors would vote on each law
enacted by the trustees during the previous year. If not approved, the law would become void.
The voters also determined the amounts government would spend, and directed how the tax
assessor could set tax burdens.
Detroit’s incorporation statute (passed by the Territorial government) made clear
government’s responsibility to enhance the general welfare. Detroit’s Board of Trustees was to
“make, ordain & establish in writing Such laws and ordinances . . . as to them Shall Seem
necessary and proper, for the health, Safety, cleanliness, Convenience and good government of
Said Town.” The statute continued, stating that “it Shall [be] the further and particular duty” of
the board “to make, adopt and establish regulations for Securing Said Town against injuries from
fires, to cause the streets, lanes, and alleys of Said town, and the public Commons to be kept
open & in repairs and free from every Kind of nuisances.” The board was responsible “to
regulate markets, and if necessary, to appoint a clerk of the market, to regulate the assize of
bread, both as to weight & price, and to prevent Swine and other animals from running at large.”
Voters had the right to reject those efforts toward “good Government and Well being,” but it is
clear that the enabling legislation presumed a local governance actively involved in public safety
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and commercial markets.37 By investing Detroit’s government with significant regulatory power
over health, safety, general welfare, and economic affairs, the territorial government established
that the board’s core purpose was community development.
Immediately upon incorporation, Detroit’s Board of Trustees embraced those obligations.
Its first task was safety and, on February 23, 1802, the board took up the town’s most urgent
safety concern – fire. The first ordinance regulated the quality and cleaning of chimneys, set
standards for stoves and exhaust pipes, obligated each householder to keep barrels of water in
areas where they would not freeze, to have dedicated ropes, levers, poles, and ladders to fight
fires, and much more. Each shopkeeper had similar requirements. Additionally, the ordinance
required each male to respond to all fire alarms to assist in dousing the flames. The ordinance at
length set forth the inhabitants’ obligations, the penalties for breach, and the government
investigation and enforcement mechanisms.38
The board acted as both legislature and, at least in part, as judiciary. Nearly every board
meeting addressed fines for those individuals violating the fire code, many of whom were town
officials. For example, on March 24, 1802, the board fined four of its members and the Wayne
County jail for fire-code violations. Included among those fined was John Dodemead who was a
town trustee, the owner of the tavern housing the early courtroom, and the town treasurer
assigned to collect the fines. The board assigned inspectors to engage in house-to-house
searches to assure inhabitants honored the code but, apparently, their powers were inadequate.
Frustrated over a lack of compliance, and recognizing the need to “obviate any objection or
excuse” for non-compliance, the trustees tightened the fire ordinance to require the inspectors to
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report when the “ladders, buckets, barrels &c” were not “in perfect order.”39 Residents sought to
excuse their non-performance, but nothing indicates that they objected to government searches of
their private households and businesses. The record discloses no claims of Fourth Amendment
rights against government searches.
The lack of litigation records is not in itself sufficient indication of public acceptance of
the government’s right to enter homes to search for law evasion. That voters accepted those
intrusions is evidenced better by the community’s failure to overturn the invasive regulations.
The sparse records of the time to do not even indicate that voters made an effort to do so. To the
contrary, during times of crisis, they went a step further in subordinating their property and
privacy interests to community needs. When bucket-brigade fire-retardation efforts were
insufficient to quell a fire, the residents would form a battering squad to take up the effort.
“Taking up a green log as heavy as they could carry, they charged at the burning building at a
brisk trot and dashing it against the wall with all their might sent the burning timbers down into
the interior.”40 The squad continued until each wall collapsed – hopefully – into a controlled
bonfire. The issue was not about the homeowners’ property rights. Burning buildings were
pathogens to the community’s health. In that context, individual rights discussions were absent,
or at least unpersuasive. The community faced danger and the response was collective.
One might expect that the board’s next ordinance would focus on safety. After all,
Detroit was located in a hostile environment, with the British across the river, Native Americans
outside the fort, disease a constant threat and its protecting government distantly located. But
that was not the board’s next move. Instead, the trustees focused on market regulations. On
February 26, 1802, the board passed an assize of bread, as required by the incorporation
39
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authorization act. The assize regulated the sizes of bread, and required that each baker stamp his
initials on the bread for the purpose of identification and enforcement. The board would modify
that statute in July, adding a required price for bread.41 Shortly thereafter, the board complied
with another of the incorporating requirements – it created a “well regulated” public market.
Through that legislation, the trustees required that nearly all foodstuffs be sold on Tuesdays and
Friday at the geographically specified market area. The market would open at sunlight and close
at 12 o’clock. Anyone selling outside the market was subject to a three-dollar fine.42 One year
later, the board amended the ordinance to require that foodstuffs be merchantable, and imposed a
significant fifty-dollar fine for non-compliance.43
Soon the regulations increasingly took on efforts to enhance quiet enjoyment. The
ordinances included horse and traffic regulations (no horse racing allowed in the streets),
requirements that property owners provide footpaths, and that homeowners regularly sweep and
remove offensive matter from the streets near their property.44 These efforts to keep the town
clean were not merely advisory. On July 30, the trustees fined the “Widow Abbot, Robt. &
James Abbott, Henry Hyman, James fraser, Widow Callahan, Robt Goure & Ths Nowlen” for
failure to sweep in front of their premises.45 In May 1803, the board would declare “dung &
filth” a “perfect nuisance” and would prohibit deposits of that waste “on the Commons or lanes”
of the town. With its intentions well considered, the trustees granted the alternative “liberty to
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carry & deposit the Same in the dock of the public market.” The river provided a natural sewer
for the town and regulations suggested its use. Protecting the commons not just from filth but
also from capture, the board imposed heavy fines and the possibility of incarceration for those
attempting to enclose the town commons.46
Alcohol consumption was a significant challenge, and the board spent much time on
liquor regulations and enforcement. From the first days of the town, residents applied for liquor
licenses, often unsuccessfully. Even with the board’s stingy grants of licenses, in mid-1803 it
took notice that “too great encouragement is given to drunkenness, idleness, and profanity on the
Sabbath day.” Accordingly, the trustees banned “minors, apprentices, Servants or Negroes”
from frequenting taverns in the later evenings or on or near the Sabbath. Other tavern
regulations included a sliding scale of taxation, depending on the level of decorum exercised by
patrons. Liquor regulations would increase in scope and complexity as government tried to
balance the desire for drink with the desire for a safe environment and for containing publicassistance expenses associated with alcohol consumption.47 The goal was to build a safe,
commercially vibrant community that was welcoming to settlement. The board continued to
regulate, and act as a quasi-court to enforce those regulations. For example, in 1803, the board
passed restrictions on swine and required that owners keep their female dog indoors during her
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“season.”48 Enforcing its nuisance regulations, the board issued numerous fines and ordered
removal of offending agents.
Detroit was not unusual in its commitment to general-welfare legislation, including the
regulation of markets, setting invasive safety measures, and subordinating individual property
interests to the community. Such government economic involvement characterized early
Michigan governance, as it did in the other areas of the nation. As Cooley noted of early
America, local governance was “present at all times, touching the citizens for his advantage and
direction in all his relations: by his fireside as much as in his business.”49 The individual,
market, and state were inextricably interwoven. Public and private, state and industry, and
individual and market were not discrete, insulated units.50
Government actions were not just about the “selves” that made up the resident
community. It was about future – about the residents’ posterity. In reading their petitions and
legislation, one is struck with the community’s concern for the welfare not only of its current
residents, but also for future generations. In 1803, for example, a group of inhabitants petitioned
a Congressional representative to assure that land sales of the commons be handled in a manner
consistent with general population needs to address expected population growth. The petition
asked that the national government use the proceeds of sales of the commons “in public
improvements in the wharves, streets, etc., that it be appropriated to the purpose of schooling and
education of youths etc.” Their interest was not lower taxes, or the price of the marketed parcels.
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Rather, it focused on the need to develop community to benefit “both the health and happiness of
its citizens.”51
With few residents, a mixed French, British, and American culture, and a subsistence
existence, one may wonder why this sense of community. Simply put, individual survival was
tied to community development. The town suffered the consequences of poor sanitation,
crowded living conditions, and a geographic proximity to expansive swamplands. “In late
summer, residents suffered from ‘bilious fevers’ typhoid epidemics, and ‘milk sickness,’
probably caused by lack of refrigeration, unpasteurized milk and contaminated water.
Diphtheria, scarlet fever, measles, mumps, and smallpox were prevalent.”52 Its buildings were
made of wood and most were huddled closely together within or near the walls of the fort.
Either residents together addressed these conditions or they suffered significant consequences. It
is not surprising, therefore, that early Detroit government had actively sought to address these
conditions and did so without the halting voice of individual rights.

Changing Historical Understandings
It is significant that Detroit residents did not object to, or overrule their invasive
government regulatory regime. By the standards of twenty-first century law, government entry
into homes to assure compliance with fire-safety standards would be problematic. It was not so
in the early nineteenth century, when Detroit government routinely entered private spaces for
fire-related inspections, without the din of privacy-rights voices. And yet, the Fourth
Amendment’s language against search and seizure is the same in both periods, having remained
the same since its adoption in 1791. On paper, the “right” is the same. In practice, it is not. This
is best understood by the changing nature of rights. While a library section unto itself, briefly,
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claimed “rights” adjust as society elevates and contracts their importance as perceived needs
change. Richard Primus, in The American Language of Rights, traced those changes and argued
that Americans elevate interests into ‘rights’ in response to perceived needs and priorities of the
time. He noted that the “practice of calling things ‘rights’ to claim priority and protection
regardless of the kind of normative ground offered, and indeed regardless of whether any
underlying norm is articulated, has been characteristic of rights discourse throughout American
history.”53 Primus suggested three periods in American history predominated the shifts in rights
claims as America struggled with new adversities: The founding, the Civil War, and the Cold
War. Others suggest the Great Depression/New Deal era rather than the Cold War. This paper
will suggest that the Jacksonian and Cooley periods together created a post-Civil War
individualistic rights regime, with Jacksonian-era challenges elevating public perceptions and
Cooley establishing legal standards. Others may suggest Ronald Reagan introduced a neo-liberal
rights regime. Whichever period predominated, rights speech and law shifted to address the then
current political, economic, social, and philosophical needs and beliefs.
Increasingly, historians and legal scholars have concluded that rights language employed
in the colonial and early-American periods dealt more with communal rights than they did with
private rights. Gordon Wood argued that American notions of rights evolved from the ongoing
tension between the Crown’s claimed right to rule and the populations’ claimed liberty and
property rights. In that context, British citizens did not consider their liberty and property rights
“private,” as they had little notion of “public” and “private” spheres. “Even as late as the eve of
the Revolution,” Woods submitted, “the modern distinction between public and private rights
was still not clear.” He concluded that, “All of this meant that the colonists were able to use a

53

Richard A. Primus, The American Language of Rights (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
236.

38

great deal of communal or ‘public’ control and management of what we would call ‘private
rights.’”54
Just as “private” rights did not forestall government activism when dangers like fire
threatened, notions of private enterprise did not require, or even advocate for, hands-off
government. Where today we would protest against a government marketplace (especially if it
were exclusive) and a requirement that bread be sold at particular weights and prices, those
government activities were common in the early nineteenth century. Yet the constitutional
language employed to argue against such government activity is largely the same. This is
because modern notions of private rights had not yet gelled in early America and therefore, had
not attached themselves to constitutional language. Instead, society perceived a need for
government involvement in commerce and social development and protests against that
involvement were rare and largely unavailing. As William Novak noted, from the nation’s
founding “commerce, trade, and economics like health and morals, [were] fundamentally public
in nature, created, shaped, and regulated by the polity via a public law.”55 Where Novak dealt
with governing entities in established states, his conclusions also apply to territory governments,
at least Michigan’s. As Willis Dunbar noted of early Michigan, “There was no holding with the
economic doctrine of laissez-faire, for several of the regulations were quite exacting.” 56
Novak and Dunbar’s argument can be taken a step further: Government not only
regulated the market; it actively participated in the market. It helped to develop industry, it
invested in private commerce, and it owned and/or directed internal improvements. As Oscar
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and Mary Handlin observed with respect to Massachusetts, government “would make its
influence felt in every aspect of production, readily adjusting assistance to the needs of changing
industrial, agricultural, commercial, and communications systems.”57 In addition to controlling
society’s excesses, government fed the machinery of commerce to enhance the general welfare.
At its core, the lines between government, industry, and society were deeply blurred. The
interweaving of industry and governance required that individual interests either be subordinated
to the public weal or, more fundamentally, that society concur that supporting the common
welfare, by its nature, advanced individual interests. Kermit Hall characterized this philosophy
as serving the “rights of the public.” He submitted, “This concept meant that the commonwealth,
the public as a whole, had certain rights that had to be placed above private interest.”58 Even
common-law rules that seemingly advance individual interests had their regulatory aspects. As
Jonathan Hughes noted, “The rule of caveat emptor protected the seller from action by the buyer,
but was never meant to sanction business fraud; in the colonial world direct non market controls
buoyed up business probity.”59 Government priorities were group focused. With an
overwhelming amount of evidence of early government involvement in industry, historians now
largely agree that early-American government prioritized group needs over individual needs, and
did so consistently with prevailing opinion.
That is not to say there were no dissenting voices. The Handlins pointed one out in 1819
Boston. At that time, the Boston Commercial Gazette heavily critiqued claims of individual
interest against government commercial activities. Holding to the prevailing opinion, the
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Gazette classified individualistic claims as “manifestly erroneous.” The Gazette was responding
to claims that individuals should be “the judges of their interests, and consequently should be
allowed to regulate them unobstructed.” Such arguments, the Gazette urged, were “subversive to
the end and aim of all governments; and . . . utterly impracticable.”60 This was more than
thirty-five years after the Revolution, indicating that community-rights thoughts were not merely
the momentary esprit of Revolutionary camaraderie. Impositions on what today would be
personal rights were acceptable to, and desired by, the inhabitants of the city that led the call for
independence and self-government. On the surface, there were concerns that selfish individual
interests required moderation in the face of conflicting group needs. But the issue was not
merely a decided preference for the group over the individual, as there was no such simple
dichotomy. Instead, society embraced a symbiotic model where the individual was advanced
through community and commercial development. Government acted believing that community
development and safety facilitated an environment for individual self-creation.
Notwithstanding both the historical fact and logic of government involvement in early
American society, popular belief has promoted an ideology of laissez faire, freewheeling
individualism and weak, almost nonexistent, governance. This individualistic myth has longstanding roots. Writing in 1902, Guy Stevens Callender, a founder of American economic
history, reflected that to the American public, “as to the rest of the world, America is the land of
private enterprise par excellence; the place where ‘State interference’ has played the smallest
part, and individual enterprise has been given the largest scope, in internal affairs; and it is
commonly assumed that this was always so.” But, Callender noted, reality was much different.
America was the one of the first “to extend the activity of the state into industry.” In doing so,

60

“Public Interest”, Boston Commercial Gazette, September 23, 1819, quoted in Handlin and Handlin,
Commonwealth: 52-3.

41

states would create over $200 million of debt purely for commercial development – amounting to
government activity on a scale that dwarfed other nations. Rather than a laissez-faire approach,
American states led the world in state-supported capitalism.61
While Callender as an economic historian analyzed government spending to show
government involvement in economic affairs, early legal historians relied on court records. In
doing so Edward S. Corwin helped popularize the notion that government was legally barred
from too great an involvement in commercial affairs. To Corwin and his followers, law and
constitutions were designed to protect private interests, and did so through a triumvirate of
judicial review, due process, and vested rights.62 In setting vested-rights protection as a linchpin,
Corwin’s analysis suggested that American constitutions necessarily elevated private rights, most
specifically property rights, over conflicting societal interests. In support of that, he and his
followers presented a sizeable lineup of judicial pronouncements touting the sanctity of property
and the advantages of limited government. But court pronouncements and dicta are not
precedents. Decisions are, and antebellum courts almost always found on the side of community
interests over conflicting individual rights. In those relatively rare cases when they did not, the
rulings were narrow and, most often, dealt with separation of powers issues – not limitations on
government.
Corwin’s judicially focused historical world began to unravel as historians studied the
interplay and relationships among society, economy, and government. Starting with the studies
of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, by Oscar and Mary Handlin and Louis Hartz, historians
have increasingly accepted that economy, the individual, and government were not distinct
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entities but, rather, aspects of an organic social whole, with each part influencing and responding
to the other to facilitate general-welfare improvement.63 They found that rather than being a
rigid protector of established interest, law was an accommodating tool of social development. In
that context, Hall related, the “state existed to ensure that the ‘rights of the public’ took
precedence over any individual or group interest.” To accomplish that, legislatures “enacted a
veritable blizzard of economic regulations under the guise of enhancing the rights of the
public.”64 To that, the Handlins would add that government financially supported economic
development by subsidizing multiple trades. Massachusetts, for example, gave financial aid to
its fisheries, agriculture, hemp, silk, twine, glass, cloth, breweries, and salt and sugar trades. It
also enacted legal changes to assist commerce, modifying franchise, corporate and inspection
laws, and provided attractive land grants to business. The goal was to “create favorable
conditions for economic activity.”65 Hartz added, in respect to antebellum Pennsylvania, that
government efforts were involved in “virtually every phase of business activity.” He voiced that
government accomplished this by active participation in economic development, for example
through a mixed corporate model, and by regulations to advance the general welfare.66 Rather
than focusing on vested rights, as had Corwin, Hartz argued that government dealt with a “whole
series” of rights “fathered by the Revolutionary doctrines which it became the duty of the state to
secure.” Included in those were blacks’ right to freedom, debtors’ rights to legal modification,
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children’s rights to education, and laborers’ rights to fair working conditions. These were the
rights that government helped secure in order to enhance general and individual welfare.67 At
the same time, the drive to advance commercial development animated even the highest court.
Marshall and Story historian R. Kent Newmyer noted that “[n]early every one” of Marshall’s and
the early Supreme Court’s decisions “facilitated market development.”68
To this, Willard Hurst introduced an expanded perspective, studying government, social,
economic, and legal dynamics in wilderness Wisconsin. In reviewing the pioneers and early
settlers, Hurst found that government was not a top-down imposition. Rather it arose from
settler efforts to enhance their interest, including in the commercial sphere. Instead of being an
impediment, government was organic to an advancing social and economic society.69
Novak and his followers have furthered the historical narrative by explaining that
government involvement in trade and private lives was extensive and pervasive. Novak
disclosed a world where, rather than acting upon each other, government, industry, and
individuals acted almost as one to advance the general welfare. He urged, “Law and the state
were not simply reflectors or instruments or facilitators of natural evolutions in the market or
civil society. They were creative and generative forces.”70 As the Detroit experience bears out,
government was not an overseer or laid atop society; it was a part of an organic whole. In that
context, resources and not laissez faire attitudes were its limitations.
It seems too obvious to state, but it is important to note that government involvement,
while pervasive, was not uniform as local conditions and needs demanded differing
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governmental responses. As Hartog noted in his study of New York City, “a public institution
could define its goals only in response to the dictates of its varying constituencies.”71 Municipal
leaders saw their role as “creating a stable context for private decision making. That such
planning would necessarily interfere with private property interests and would involve a
significant extension of public power was not of concern, for members of the city government
believed that they were acting under the banner of popular sovereignty.”72 Although government
responses differ from area to area, they also change temporally. Hall concluded that a number of
government entities curtailed some regulatory activities, particularly wage and price regulations,
as economies expanded and capital became more available.73 In that sense, government
withdrew when it was no longer needed. Although the subject of a later chapter, Cooley would
argue that once those regulations fell into disfavor, government constitutionally was barred from
reclaiming that regulatory power. He offered, “whatever power may once have existed for
[regulating prices] has been lost or taken away, and that business in general is protected against
the interference of the state in such matters.” 74 Whatever Cooley suggested for the post-Civil
War era, in the antebellum period regulation and support of industry characterized state and local
governance. Those activities were designed to advance commercial and social development and
were widely accepted as norms of government.
The challenges faced at the founding were different from those during the opening of the
west, just as the challenges were different with the advent of the steamship and those faced
during the development of the railroads. Primus addressed that dynamic in his discussion of
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changing rights speech. This dissertation will argue that Cooley’s arguments concerning new
constitutional meanings in response to changing societal needs aligns with Primus’s finding that
rights change through time. As oppressive forces and opportunities for advancement change, so
too do our understandings of government and its role in facilitating individual self-creation.
Ultimately, that is why Corwin and his followers missed the mark. Government and courts
cannot hold to an immovable star when the heavens and earth are moving.

The Michigan Territory: The Ordinance in Action
Perhaps in response to the multiple petitions for local territory governance, on January
11, 1805, Congress carved the Territory of Michigan out of the Indiana Territory, effective on
June 30 of that year. That act provided for “a government in all respects similar” to the
Ordinance. Hence, the Michigan Territory would be led by a governor, a secretary, and three
judges appointed by the President.75 Jefferson appointed William Hull governor, Stanley
Griswold secretary, and Augustus Woodward and Fredrick Bates as judges. A third judge turned
down the President’s appointment. Jefferson appointed his replacement, John Griffin, in late
1805. None of these individuals hailed from the Michigan Territory.
June 1805 would prove to be a pivotal month in the area’s history. On June 11, a fire
destroyed all but two buildings in Detroit. Lore implicates “segar” sparks in baker John Henry’s
stable for setting the town ablaze.76 The fire devastated the community. Detroit’s first mayor,
Solomon Sibley would write to his wife, "we are without a single exception, unhoused ... in
Short the Town of Detroit was . . . in the course of three hours reduced to ashes."77 Territory
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Governor Hull arrived shortly after the fire. The first acts of his new government were relief
efforts. Of course, the interests were humanitarian – all the homes were destroyed – but they
were commercial too.78 From a national perspective, Detroit furnished an American commercial
alternative to British interests. Britain was America’s main economic competitor and the young
nation needed to maintain a commercial town in the area to prevent trade from moving to the
nearby Canadian territories. Expressing that concern, a resident wrote: “The loss will prove a
serious evil, not only to the individual sufferers, but to the interest of the U. States. Detroit was
the only commercial Town belonging to our Govt. in this quarter and unless it can be rebuilt
shortly the whole trade will centre in the towns in the british province opposite.”79
Local government worked to address those needs it could, but as a territory, it had to wait
for the distant central government to address long-range needs.80 This took time. A personal
appeal to Congress by Hull and Woodward resulted in Congressional 1806 passage of “An Act
to Provide for the Adjustment of Title of Land in the Town of Detroit and Territory of Michigan
and for Other Purposes.” The act provided for the rebuilding of Detroit. It created a land board
to lay out the town and to grant land to each person over seventeen and “not owing allegiance to
any foreign power,” who owned land or inhabited a house during the fire. Tenants and mere
occupiers would now become landowners.81
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The governor and judges sat as the land board. In September 1806, they started their
work, including setting forth an elaborate urban plan for the town, with public squares and
spaces, wide avenues, and an organized structure of streets and lanes. With Woodward leading,
the board based the plan on Pierre Charles L’Enfant’s plan for Washington, D.C.82 The federal
government had allocated significant additional land for the town’s expansion. At first, the
board believed it should sell the best lots at auction, and assign other parcels to those suffering
fire losses. Those receiving land “donations” (the land granted to those losing their buildings to
the fire) believed they should get the prime lots. Gridlock threatened when Hull changed his
position to accept that prior landholders should receive the prime land, while Woodward held to
his position that prime land should be sold. At the same time, Hull would argue that residents
should be allowed to re-inhabit their previous property. Unfortunately, doing so would
undermine Woodward’s grand layout scheme.83 An irascible Woodward “resigned” from the
board in protest, leaving the board without the required membership to continue. On November
10, Hull declared that: “no other course but a suspension of our duties under the law seems to
present itself, however it may impede the progress of the city, whatever inconvenience it may
produce to the inhabitants, or embarrassment to the government, it seems to be dictated by
imperious necessity.”84 Hull’s declaration threatened to undermine Woodward before President
Jefferson. In response, Woodward would eventually moderate his position, and the board would
compromise. The board soon would continue its work, but the newfound tranquility would again
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retreat a few years later, when a Woodward/Hull conflict would again arrest governance. That
struggle also appeared intractable, as the parties seemed to have little interest in compromise and
the public carried insufficient force to require it.
In order to effect the new town plan, Congress necessarily destroyed previous titles to
land. It is not as if those titles were in doubt. The Jay Treaty had required that the United States
honor land rights existing under British rule. In part to accomplish that, in 1804, Congress
required Detroit area landowners to present their claims, whether they had acquired the land
through French, British, or American grants. Before June 1805, an appointed board of
commissioners had accepted or rejected significantly all those claims. Hence, at the time of the
fire, the government had recognized the property rights of many of the inhabitants in the Detroit
area. Yet the statute read that the government would grant land to “every person . . . not owning
or professing allegiance to any foreign power” who inhabited land at the time of the fire. So,
what happened to the property rights of those of age but with foreign allegiances? It appears that
the board attempted to soften the impact on those individuals by loosely defining “allegiance.”
This was particularly important as it applied to the French residents, as many carried significant
influence and wealth. Accordingly, the governor proposed two things: those persons “born in a
foreign country, but having resided in this country since the independence,” could petition for a
donation of land, and that the board would presume allegiance to the United States lacking
specific proof of allegiance to a foreign power.85 The burden had shifted, allowing the board to
apply the law according to needs, not to its strict letter. To this, petitioners responded either by
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proclaiming that they were American citizens or that they had never proclaimed allegiance to a
foreign government.86
The board’s records offer a glimpse of law in action in early Territorial Michigan. For
example, on May 18, 1807, Jean Legard claimed that he was an American citizen, having taken
an oath of allegiance to the United States in South Carolina. Unfortunately, Legard had also
“signed a paper professing himself to be a British subject.” During the hearing, Legard claimed
that he had done so in response to British threats to prevent his family from travelling to the
United States should he not sign the British loyalty papers. In a split decision, the board
accepted his United States allegiance and granted him a donation lot.87
On December 18, 1808, the land board granted a donation to the wife of John Harvey (in
whose stable the 1805 fire started). Harvey was born in England, traveled to the United States in
1792, and did not take an oath of allegiance to become a citizen until late September 1807,
arguably to help obtain a land donation. An after-the-fire shift of allegiance could raise
eyebrows so Harvey argued that he was active in municipal affairs, had served on the grand jury,
and had “offered his house free of cost for the use of the court.”88 Harvey’s contributions moved
the board and they were the focus of the proceedings. Probably in an effort to skirt the loyalty
restrictions, the board granted the donation to his wife instead of Harvey. As it turned out,
Harvey’s new allegiance claims may have been insincere. Harvey soon sold a portion of the
granted land and, in short order, started to return to his home country, England. Mrs. Harvey put
a stop to that plan when they reached New York. She refused to travel the ocean. They then
turned around, and settled in Indiana.89 This is not to say that the board had been duped.
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Instead, its interests were community development and not esoteric issues surrounding
allegiance. Detroit’s leaders had advanced social and economic concerns over legal niceties.
Detroit was a small, diverse community that could ill-afford alienating or displacing its foreignborn residents.
That government was reallocating property did not seem to trouble the residents, but
when they deemed those allocations unfair, residents voiced their discontent. Their objections
took several forms including challenges over the proofs necessary to establish claims, complaints
over limitations on the size of replacement parcels, and the available uses of abutting property
(such as claims for wood and/or grazing rights).90 Fairness was not the only grievance. The
greatest dissatisfaction concerned the slow pace at which government acted. Five years after the
fire, in 1810, a grand jury presented “that the poor of the territory are, and have been for the
greatest part of the present year, unprovided for; and that the roads bridges and public high-ways,
are almost impassable, with imminent danger to the lives of the good Citizens.” It also accused
the territory government of a “wanton violation and breach” of its duty to replace the jail and
courthouse lost in the fire.91 To the grand jury, government had failed because it had failed to
act.
As mentioned, Detroit government had settled the real estate ownership issues before the
fire. The fire did not destroy those interests: it destroyed buildings – the land survived.
Accordingly, government could have done nothing with respect to specific property ownership,
just as it would do today if fire destroyed a home or business. But Congress and the
Detroit/Territory governments did act – and massively changed property interests. Government
destroyed owners’ rights in distinct parcels and granted them rights in alternative parcels. It
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created property rights by granting ownership to those who merely had inhabited a house, it gave
property to organizations that had neither owned nor rented property – such as churches,
nunneries, and religious schools, and it even granted and/or changed property rights to those who
did not fit within the text of the law. During the long process of reallocation, government
prohibited landowners from building on their (pre-fire) property. “The inhabitants who remained
were actually obliged to live the whole of 1806 in bark shanties, tents, or other shelter, and the
next year there were only nineteen deeds issued and less than half as many houses built.”92
One might legitimately ask from whence the government derived the power to take
property and to change property interests. Thomas Cooley, the great advocate for limited
legislative power celebrated the fire as “providential” for allowing government to set up a
“suitable plan” for land use,93 but the Michigan Supreme Court in 1858 was not quite certain. In
People v Jones, the court would attempt to reconcile private property rights with the government
alteration of those rights94. It did so facing the world where Detroit was a very different place
than fifty years before. Much of the city’s foundation now rested on the earlier reallocation of
property and any change would be extraordinarily disruptive. On the other hand, the court was
troubled by the prospect “that rights existed, both individual and public” that the land board had
destroyed.95 The court escaped that eventuality by creating a fiction – it assumed individual
consent. It found, 1) that land claimants voluntarily exchanged their property for the newly
granted real estate, and 2) that the governor and judges would not act in arbitrary and tyrannical
fashions in accepting and rejecting claims. The facts in the case were consistent with those
92
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assumptions, so the court avoided sacrificing justice in the case to the practicality of social and
economic needs. In the end, crisis conditions eclipsed (at least later understood) limitations on
government power. 96
As a consequence of the fire, the territory governor and judges took control of Detroit’s
government and the previous town trustees relinquished their posts. Not all were satisfied by this
imposition of national control. As late-nineteenth-century Detroit historiographer Silas Farmer
related, the rule of the governor and judges “designates a form of government unlike anything
afforded by the history of any other place in the United States.” To him, the territory governance
was both despotic and corrupt. “An irresponsible and uncontrolled autocracy fastened itself
upon the people and for a long series of years this anomalous government, a strange compound
of legality and assumption, held absolute sway over the lands and laws, the persons and
properties of the town.”97 Residents accustomed to controlling their local government now
complained that the territory government voided prior law and replaced it with newly
promulgated statutes and the common law.98
The governor and judges tightened their control of the area when, in September 1806,
they passed an act incorporating Detroit as a city. Under that law, the governor appointed a
mayor to a one-year term. That mayor had veto power over legislation of the popularly elected
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city council and the council had no power to override that veto. With the short-termed mayor
appointed by the governor and judges, and exercising a strict veto over the popularly elected
council, democratic governance in Detroit effectively ended. In response to the autocratic nature
of this new municipal governance, “the residents of Detroit refused to vote in the first elections
under the statute,” and the first few appointed mayors promptly resigned, believing Detroit’s
government powerless in relation to the territory governance.99 This pretense of democratic
governance would continue until February 24, 1809 when the judges and governor repealed the
statute framing Detroit governance.100 At that point, the governor and judges would take direct
control of the city.
In response to the governor and judges’ high-handed treatment of the Detroiters, about
300 inhabitants (a sizeable percentage of the population) in 1807 signed a petition to President
Jefferson, claiming that “the history of William Hull, and Augustus B. Woodward since they
took upon themselves the Government of this Territory is a history of repeated injuries, abuses,
and deceptions.” Central to their complaint was the “slow and novel mode” of adopting laws,
and their failure to address the pressing needs of the territory. Included in that concern was the
slow process of awarding land tracks in the wake of the fire, which “prevent[ed] those naked and
houseless sufferers by the conflagration, from accommodating themselves with buildings.” They
sought responsive governance and found it lacking.101 Hull’s response demonstrated that his
audience was the President and not the people over whom he ruled. Grousing that most signers
knew nothing of the petition’s content, Hull protested that he had “perhaps done more than
99
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candor itself would require, to preserve harmony and that it has been met only by base artifice
and mean deception.”102 Neither the petition nor Hull’s response addressed the governmental
structure that had given rise to, or at least encouraged, the residents’ protest. One might have
expected the residents to object to the autocratic mechanisms of governance, particularly as the
recently enfeebled city council seemingly had piloted the petition. Instead, the residents asked
the President to remove Hull and Woodward, and replace them with “men of honest and upright
principles.” Perhaps the council and residents were resigned to the Ordinance’s structure, or
perhaps they accepted the structure but rejected its application. In either case, they did not seek
to change the government blueprint. They only sought to change those responsible for affecting
its aims.
Although controlled by the governor and judges, Detroit’s municipal government prior to
the territory takeover in February 1809, had the task to regulate in support of the general welfare.
The council was “to prevent and remove nuisances,” “to provide for the health of the city,” and
“to establish and regulate markets.” Those powers included regulating transportation, building
codes, weights and measures, fire codes, building materials, standards for weighing coal, hay,
and wood, inspecting food, tobacco, and potash, and controlling the public wharfs.103 Local
government structure had changed, and would consistently change, but the goal of local
government continued. It was to regulate and spend to enhance the general welfare.
All governmental power in Territorial Michigan ultimately devolved from the
Ordinance’s blueprint. As such, the territorial government could adopt the laws of the states but
could not make laws. The question soon became whether and how the territory government
could parse state laws to adapt them to Michigan’s conditions. The judges advocated a loose
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construction of the Ordinance to allow them to adopt portions of laws from various states, while
Hull, to his regret, felt the Ordinance required a nearly word-for-word adoption of a state’s
law.104 In a report to the President, Hull and Woodward bemoaned the problems a strict
construction of the Ordinance’s “adopt” provision would cause and asked for relief from its
restrictive language. They explained that even if Michigan had access to all state legislation
from which to draw its laws, (which it did not, due to inadequate communications, reporting, and
publishing of laws), many of those state laws did not fit Michigan’s needs. Claiming that, “a
strict precedent will be searched for in vain,” Hall and Woodward argued that they would be
hard pressed to handle even the simplest business of government, like regulating ferries, erecting
public buildings, or establishing schools.105 Legislation needed to fit Michigan’s specific needs,
and judicial interpretation had to fit the particularities of local conditions, not that of distant
states.106
The issue of territorial legislative power garnered serious discussion, and those
discussions offer an insight into government and society’s response to legislation that was set
down by colonial governance. Not accepting that the governor and judges as a legislature had
any power beyond wholesale adoption of particular state statutes (they could not parse language),
Detroit inhabitant John Gentle protested:
They parade the laws of the original states before them, on the table,
and cull letters from the laws of Maryland, syllables from the laws of Virginia,
words from the laws of New York, sentences from the laws of Pennsylvania,
verses from the laws of Kentucky, and chapters from the laws of Connecticut –
104
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jumble the whole into such form as they conceive the most suitable to facilitate
their schemes of peculation, and then call it a law.107
Gentle’s ire may have been animated by Woodward’s and the land board’s refusal to grant
Gentle citizenship so that he might enjoy a land grant under the Detroit fire-relief legislation.
Gentle was born in Scotland, immigrated to Montreal in 1783, and moved to Detroit in 1790.
The land board had denied his application for a land donation, with Woodward voicing the
board’s opinion. Feeling spurned by the Territory government, Gentle moved to Canada and
fought on behalf of the British in the War of 1812.108
Despite his motivations, Gentle’s point was well taken. If the governor and judges could
dissect and reconfigure statutory language as they saw fit, they were making law, not merely
adopting it. The legislation may have fit the territory’s needs but the Ordinance forbad the
territory’s appointed leadership from legislating. Congress believed this task should only be
performed by democratically elected legislatures, which were found in the states. As an
unelected legislature, the governor and judges lacked the legal authority and republican
credentials to make law. Hence Gentle’s point: Legislatures are the people’s representatives and
speak for them. The people did not select Michigan’s governor and judges and, accordingly,
they lacked the democratic legitimacy with which to make law.
Under normal circumstances, courts would hear matters addressing the limitation on
legislative power. But under the Ordinance, asking the Michigan judges to rule on their power as
legislators would be a fool’s errand. The surviving court decisions disclose no effort to take on
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that task. The issue did arise in New York in a case concerning the enforceability of a
promissory note to the Bank of Michigan, an entity created by the governor and judges. In
incorporating the bank, they had taken portions of state laws and adopted them to Michigan’s
particularities. The New York Supreme Court, recognizing that Michigan had no laws “which
[were] a literal transcript from the laws of any State,” ruled that the Ordinance only required that
territories retain the “substance” of a state’s law and convey the phraseology of that law “in all
essential respects.”109 At least one member of the affirming higher court had “serious
objections” to that reading of the Ordinance. Nevertheless, he declined to vote to invalidate the
Michigan law, stating that “we cannot shut our eyes upon the fact that [the law] has been in
operation within the Territory nearly 14 years, without it having been annulled or disproved by
Congress,” (which, as mentioned, the Ordinance allowed).110 The judge presumed that
Congressional inaction constituted tacit approval of the statute. Of course, invalidating the
actions of a bank in operation for 14 years would have resulted in serious financial upheaval,
especially if the court applied its ruling beyond the four corners of the case. Other territories had
similarly parsed language, so the upheaval may have affected other jurisdictions.
Only after Michigan became a state would the Michigan Supreme Court consider the
issue. The court would offer that, “The governor and judges were, by the ordinance of 1787,
invested with the authority to adopt laws of the original states, but were not clothed with
legislative powers.” Having bowed to the statute’s language, the court then expanded. The
governor and judges could “make such changes in the language [of state statutes] as their taste
might suggest. The authority to adopt a law does not necessarily imply that precise words of that
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law are to be adopted.”111 Hence, to the Michigan court, adopting laws meant adopting the spirit
of a state’s (or multiple states’) legislation.
Well after all the Ordinance states, including Michigan, had moved from territory to state,
the federal courts considered a territory’s right to modify state statutes through parsed language.
In Peck v Pease, the circuit court determined that the Ordinance granted, “no legislative power
[to the governor and judges] consequently they had no power to modify or alter the laws they
adopted.”112 By that logic the governor and judges must adopt laws wholly, and any alteration
would render the statute unlawful. The court, and an affirming Supreme Court, did not address
whether the law, taken from Vermont, violated the “original state” provision. (Vermont became
a state after the founding.) But these mid-century courts had the luxury of legal purity without a
concern over the impact of invalidating a significant body of legislation. The ruling occurred
well after the first-stage period and after subsequent legislatures adopted, modified, or rejected
the law in question. In the end, the governors and judges had modified the state laws in probable
violation of the Ordinance’s language but did so to address local needs. The courts demurred to
that governing need at least for as long as general-welfare concerns dictated.
Under the Ordinance, the governor held expansive authority. Classifying that power as
“staggering,” Eblen concluded that the governor, through the first two stages of territorial
governance, held nearly unchecked powers, even in relation to the judges.113 Michigan’s
situation was different, either because of the personalities involved, or because Eblen considered

111

Hulburt v Merriam, 3 Mich. 144 , 151 (1854).
Peck v Pease, 19 F. Cas 81(1853); Pease v Peck, 59 U.S. 595(1856). The controversy concerned the statute of
limitations on a debt issue. The Vermont law, from which the Michigan law was taken, exempted from the
limitations “persons imprisoned, or beyond seas, without the United States.” The Michigan law provided “persons
imprisoned or beyond seas or without the United States.” The missing commas and the insertion of “or” before the
last condition changed the meaning of the Vermont law. This was the language submitted to Congress, and
Congress did not object. Confusing the matter were archives that suggested, contrary to the statute books, that
Michigan had adopted exactly the Vermont language.
113
Eblen, The First and Second United States Empires: 49-51.
112

59

statutory power, not on-the-ground activities that could undermine planned governance. An
example of those dynamic limits on the governor’s power occurred starting in 1808, as the
judges and the governor struggled over the control of Michigan law. The earliest of the statutes
“enacted” to address Michigan’s needs were referred to as the Woodward Codes. Woodward
was a brilliant but somewhat odd character, considered by many as caustic and unsuitable for
leadership.114 His earlier threat to resign from the land board, and thereby halt progress on
assigning land to fire victims, was an indication of his temperament. With time, he and Hull
again became antagonistic rivals. Trouble was brewing in 1808 when Woodward determined to
travel east. Before leaving to spend the winter in New York and Washington, Woodward, a bit
ungraciously and certainly unwisely, publicly put forward a series of resolutions to the remaining
judges and governor, many of which were deeply critical of Hull. He also urged that it would be
“expedient to revise all the laws which have successively been in force in the Territory.”115
Woodward then left town and, more importantly, left the legislature without a balance of votes in
his favor.
The governor and remaining judges appointed Hull to lead a committee to respond to
Woodward’s departing “proposals,” including the accusations against Hull. The committee
accepted a few of Woodward’s proposals, most notably that the legislature re-write the legal
code.116 It then returned Woodward’s antagonistic attitude in kind, observing that the committee
would be happy to consider the bulk of Woodward’s resolutions if they would “produce the least
possible benefit.” It insisted that his proposals were “unfounded in principle or in truth,

114

Territory Secretary, and later Governor, William Woodbridge became so frustrated with Woodward’s
eccentricities that he wrote “[o]ur chief Judge is a wild theorist, fitted principally for the ‘extraction of sunbeams
from cucumbers.’” Chardavoyne, "The Northwest Ordinance and Michigan's Territorial Heritage," in, Finkelman
and Hershock, The History of Michigan Law, 23.
115
Michigan Pioneer Collections and Historical Collections, (Lansing: The Society, 1886). XXII: 464-65.
116
Ibid., XXII: 466-67.

60

irrelevant to the duties or powers of this legislature, calculated to destroy the energy of the
government, to insult the patriotism of the people, excite insubordination in the militia, and to
deprive families of those comforts which flow from the dearest of all connections.”117 In other
words, they heartily disagreed.
The governor and judges (without Woodward), then took action on Woodward’s proposal
that the laws be re-codified, but did so in a manner Woodward would not sanction. They voided
much of the Woodward Codes and introduced an interpretation of the Ordinance that would give
the governor veto powers.118 They then significantly rewrote the laws. The replacement statutes
are commonly referred to as the Witherell Codes.119 One of those acts changed the method of
appealing from the district court to the Supreme Court. Shortly thereafter, the “legislature”
passed an act declaring “that all acts or laws” passed before the Witherell Codes shall “cease to
have any force or operation within this Territory.”120
Woodward reacted with profound displeasure. With Woodward back, all legislating
ceased. By October, the mechanics of justice jammed when Woodward and Justice Griffin, in
their judicial capacity, joined in voiding the Witherell statutes. The Court invalidated the statutes
in several cases, most notably in an appeal from James McGarvin against a judgment for James
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Wilson on a promissory note. In appealing his district court loss, McGarvin followed the
procedure set forth in Witherell’s February 21, 1809 statute. Woodward, writing for the court,
dismissed McGarvin’s appeal because his pleadings did not conform to the recently voided
Woodward Code procedures.121 The record indicates that Witherell dissented. If he left an
opinion, it does not survive.
A mêlée ensued. On October 19, 1809, an incensed Governor Hull quilled a
proclamation in English and French challenging the court’s authority to void laws.122 He
rejected that the court’s word was final. Accordingly he “require[d] on this more than
extraordinary occasion all civil and military officials to be vigilant in enforcing the laws of the
Territory and he urge[d] all good citizens to strictly and uniformly observe them.” 123 The laws
to be enforced were the voided Witherell Codes. Pursuant to the governor’s instructions, the
magistrates then enforced those laws, and arrested inhabitants according to the Witherell Code’s
procedures. The Supreme Court (the judges) responded, releasing those prisoners under writs of
habeas corpus because the Witherell Codes were invalid. The ruling affected other areas, as
courts attempted to operate without accepted procedures and standards. Tensions heightened and
invectives flew. Meanwhile, the public floundered between two different legal codes – one
invalidated by the court, the other invalidated by the legislature.
The problem remained unresolved for some time. Perhaps frustrated with the gridlock, a
party in the case of re Solomon Sibley and Christian Hoffman, Executors of the Last Will and
Testament of George Hoffman, asked the court to put in writing its reason for denying that party
a writ of mandamus. In that, and in succeeding matters, Woodward would offer the reasons
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behind invalidating the Witherell Codes. In the Hoffman Estate case, Woodward opined that the
Witherell Codes violated the Ordinance because they were adopted and signed in violation of the
Ordinance’s requirement that “the governor and judges, or a majority of them” shall adopt the
laws of the states.124 To Woodward, a majority of a quorum of three must adopt and sign all new
laws. Woodward further clarified why that was important in In the Matter of Andre Colhoun. In
that case, the court released Andre Colhoun from prison pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus.
The disagreement ultimately concerned the placement of a comma in the Ordinance. That
placement affected the governor’s powers and the makeup of a quorum. Nevertheless, the court
consisted of three judges and two of them disfavored the new laws. Since Calhoun had been
arrested under the invalid Witherell Codes, he was released from imprisonment. In separate
actions, the court also released prisoners Isaac Burnett, Jacob Smith, William Biggelow, John
Connelly, and perhaps more.125 On July 23, 1810, Woodward sent a letter to Hull explaining
why the new statute violated the Ordinance’s requirements. Never wasting an opportunity to
give offense, Woodward attacked Hull, accusing him of engaging in a “storm of indignation” and
classifying Hull’s October 1809 proclamation as “calumnious and inflammatory.”126
The controversy went beyond statutory interpretation. It also concerned the respect
required of the territory highest court’s pronouncements. Woodward argued that neither the
executive nor the legislature had the power to reverse an erroneous or even corrupt court
decision. The legislature could change the law, but it could not act retrospectively. Since “the
Validity of this Section of the Said bill, and of forty four other bills [the Witherell Codes] has
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been impeached in the Supreme Court of the territory of Michigan,” the law was settled – the
Witherell Codes were void, and Hull’s pronouncement that the rulings be ignored was improper.
Not all agreed. Jacob Visger, the chief judge of the lower court, took great exception to
Woodward’s voiding the Witherell Codes. So serious was his distress that “he would prefer
death” before complying with the higher court’s order.127 Of course, Woodward believed that
the enhanced court fees under the Witherell codes motivated the lower court judges siding with
Hull.128 Witherell classified Woodward’s opinions overturning the laws as “the most
extraordinary and unwarrantable stretch of power ever attempted to be exercised by the judiciary
over a legislature and free government.”129
While the governor and justices clashed, the population became increasingly frustrated,
not just with the gridlock but also with what they perceived as corrupt governance. An 1809
grand jury commented that Hull abused his authority and acted in his self-interest. It chastised
Hull for releasing John Whipple “illegally and without any colour of authority” from his courtimposed sanctions. The court had imposed those sanctions because Whipple called Woodward
“a damn’d rascal.” Siding with the Woodward, the grand jury expressed “confident hope that the
Supreme Court will carry into effect their own Judgments.” This same grand jury also accused
Witherell of actions unbecoming a judge for introducing legislation to fund a road-surveying
venture in which Witherell financially participated. Further, it declared an act of Congress
“unnecessary, nugatory, and a nuisance” as well as “unconstitutional, and a gross violation and
infringement of the unalienable rights of the Citizens of this Territory.” It then grieved that
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members of the Supreme Court were often absent from their tasks.130 Both sides used the grand
jury for their ends, with Woodward going so far as to badger grand jury members about their
votes relating to his nemesis, Hull.131 The territory’s commercial center and capital city no
longer had its own city government and the territory government was dysfunctional. Frustration
abounded. As Michigan historian William Jenks noted, “virtual anarchy existed.”132
The judges and governor would enact no legislation until September 1, 1810, having
gone more than 16 months without agreement. On that day they passed An Act declaring any
and all bills, acts, laws, enactments, or regulations whatever, heretofore existing, or supposed to
exist, relating to the manner of authenticating the legislative acts of this government, to be null
as to future operation.133 Jenks provided a nice history of the negotiations, describing the
“general spirit of pugnacity manifest” at their meetings. In the end reason prevailed and a hybrid
of the Woodward and Witherell Codes would pass.134 With that, this crisis passed.
In his Outlines of the Political History of Michigan, future Supreme Court Justice, and
member of the Cooley Court, James Campbell would chasten Woodward for his disruptive
judicial activism. Mocking his judicial forbearer, Campbell voiced, “His personal habits were
slovenly, and his room was conspicuous for disorder.” If that were not enough to indict the man,
Campbell continued, “His worst habit, however, was that sort of audacious impudence which,
under the name of eccentricity, has sometimes characterized men of mark, and even made them
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to be imagined greater than if they had behaved themselves with more civility.”135 All that being
said, given today’s understanding of court authority, Woodward was correct. The court had
determined laws in violation of the Ordinance’s requirements. It was then incumbent on Hull to
challenge that opinion in federal court or, in the alternative, to honor it and press for new
legislation.
The story of the gridlock over the Witherell Codes offers more than a whimsical look at
government foolishness. As the residents of the territory recognized, dysfunctional governance
encumbered commercial and social development. About a week after Hull’s proclamation
calling for public dismissal of Supreme Court rulings, a citizen’s committee, with Woodward
attending, petitioned Congress: “That it is expedient to alter the present form of government of
this Territory, and to adopt a form of government by which two bodies, elected annually by the
people should make the laws, instead of the executive and three judicial magistrates, appointed
by the general government, adopting them.”136 The committee believed that a government
institutionally subservient to the national government and relying on distant legislatures, could
not be, and was not, responsive to the people. The residents had experienced a government that
governed least, but, to their minds, had not governed best.
That call for change entered the nation’s capital as Washington increasingly focused on
the challenges that would lead to the War of 1812. Accordingly, Congress did not respond to the
Detroiters’ petition. That war was a disaster for Michigan. Governor Hull became General Hull,
a task for which he was ill suited. Hull may have been the worst general of the war. Without a
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shot being fired, he surrendered Detroit while holding a fortified position and enjoying an over
three-to-one manpower advantage over British forces.137 With the surrender, American
governance ended, only to return after the war. When returning to the city, government officials
found the buildings torched by the British and the surrounding farms and their animals destroyed
by Indians. Few crops were available, as the war interrupted plantings. Woodward wrote to
Secretary of State James Monroe, “The desolation of this territory is beyond all conception. No
kind of flour or meal is to be procured, and nothing for the subsistence of the cattle. No animals
for slaughter, and more than half the population destitute of any for domestic or agricultural
purposes.”138 The situation was desperate. “Food for humans and livestock was lacking, fences
had been destroyed, clothing plundered and River Raisin inhabitants were eating boiled hay;
there was little prospect for the future since seed grain was lacking.”139
The national government soon responded. President Madison reported to Congress that
“the inhabitants [of Michigan] were left in so destitute and distressed a condition as to require
from public stores certain supplies essential to their subsistence.” He advised Congress that the
War Department would request aid to support the Michiganders.140 The federal government
authorized the governor to “issue to the indigent and distressed people of the Territory such relief
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of provisions from the public stores as their necessities may require.” The letter approving the
assistance cautioned, however, that “improper persons not receive relief.”141 While federal relief
was slow, it was forthcoming. Detroit historian David Poremba suggested the aid included not
only food, but also seeds and livestock.142 Congress also expressed an intention to compensate
some war victims, passing legislation in 1816, 1817, and 1825.143 Those acts were limited and
the required proofs were, at times, difficult. When that compensation proved inadequate or slow
to materialize, Michigan leadership called for congressional assistance.144 As late as 1834, the
Michigan Legislative Council sent a memorial to Congress, complaining that many had in vain
sought relief under the statutes. “Justice and equity” required that Congress give “equable
compensation” for wartime injuries.145
The bitterness residents felt over slow or cumbersome government was part of a growing
agitation. After the 1805 fire, residents complained not about their loss of democratic rights, but
the government’s delay in responding to their needs. After the War of 1812, the complaint
similarly was that government did not sufficiently address the injuries suffered. That complaint
would continue in various forms and over various issues through the remainder of the territorial
period. The residents’ discontent, therefore, was not about government action or presence – it
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was about government inaction and absence. In that context, it is a bit surprising that about sixty
years later, courts would find prompt government responses to crises exceeded legislative power,
for example when legislatures provided seed-aid to farmers and loans to businesses destroyed by
fire. In that later period, constitutional interpretation of the blueprints of government, demanded
a more restricted government framework, where courts acted to preclude government from
offering the assistance that, in the earlier period, the people required and the government
provided. That is the concern of later chapters. Before the courts would seek to limit
government, Michiganders would demand greater government.

The Move toward Increased Democratization
Lewis Cass became Michigan’s governor in the aftermath of the war. William
Woodbridge became the secretary (and Collector of Customs in Detroit), and Woodward,
Griffin, and Witherell remained the judges. At the time, about eight hundred fifty people resided
in Detroit, with the Michigan Territory housing less than five thousand. In 1816, the then
territory laws were compiled and published as the Cass Codes. In addition to setting out the
organs and powers of government, those laws regulated and spent to support the general welfare.
The territory laws provided for schools, illegitimate children, internal police, and roads and
bridges, as well as set rules of trespass and enclosures. They protected and regulated the poor,
and set rules for the common and private areas of Detroit. They also regulated, among other
things, ferries, taverns, and auctioneers.
All of those laws were adapted from state laws. Of course, laws on the books and law in
action often diverge, and they did so in Michigan. Courts interpreted statutes in relation to
Michigan conditions, and introduced English common and statutory law as they determined
appropriate. Such “[f]reedom on the part of the court to adopt, adapt, or reject common law rules
69

and decisions (including British statutes) made it possible for the court to mould the nonstatutory decisional law into a system suited to frontier conditions.”146 That interpretive
flexibility afforded another opportunity to shape pre-existing state law to fit territorial needs. In
doing so, the judges were able to effectuate Woodward’s early claimed goals: to adjust state laws
“in order to render it, in any respect, suited to the circumstances of the district.”147
Under Cass’s leadership, in October 1815, Detroit recovered its home-rule authority from
the governor and judges. The city’s new charter largely reenacting the government structure of
the 1802 Charter. The voters would again approve or disapprove of legislation passed by the
city’s Board of Trustees. There was no mayor. The electors also set the budget. Not
insignificantly, the territory’s first newspaper, the Detroit Gazette would start publication in July
1817. Around the same time, steamboats began to travel the Great Lakes and Woodward laid the
cornerstone of the University of Michigan in Detroit. The first bank was organized in 1818 and
started operations on January 1, 1819. The national government sold more land to the public,
allowing for population expansion. Burton, in his History of Detroit, reflected on the values land
provided. “A turkey was worth one acre of land; two pigs equaled an acre; two geese equaled
one acre, two bushels of potatoes equaled one acre; four bushels of turnips or two bushels of
beets equaled one acre.”148 Land was cheap and opportunities abundant. To be sure, Detroit was
a small city. Its 1819 census showed 1,110 people lived in the city, exclusive of the fort; 1,040
were white – 596 men and 444 women – and 70 were “colored” – with no sex given.149 Despite
its small numbers, the population was moving toward self-governance and growth. So too, the
Michigan Territory moved toward increased representative governance.
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As noted, before the War of 1812, Detroiters had petitioned Congress for enhanced selfgovernment. The war had interrupted that call, but it did not end it. The Detroit Gazette would
take up the drive.150 In 1817, it advocated for more local, democratic governance with the goal
of “encouraging immigration, inducing settlement, and developing the resources of the
Territory.”151 The Detroit citizens’ address to President Monroe upon his 1817 visit similarly
called for representative government: “But, accustomed to the exercise of their elective
franchise, the American People will rarely select a country as their residence, in the government
of which they have neither voice or participation – in the form of which they have neither will or
control.” They then called for both representation and government activism, arguing that, “A
law of Congress, empowering the citizens of our territory to enter upon the representative grade
of government, contemplated by the ordinance of ’87, the establishment of permanent national
roads, and an exposure of our valuable public lands in the market would be productive of
immediate and beneficial results to our territory.”152 The residents had adopted the position
articulated by Governor General Carleton in 1774, but with an important twist. Government
alone was not sufficient for commercial and social development. In the United States, that
government must be representative of the interest of the people it governed.
In 1818, Cass proposed that Michigan enter the next phase toward self-governance under
the Ordinance, and called for an election to determine public support to move to an elected
legislature. Entering that phase would have required residents to bear increased financial
burdens for their governance. His proposal failed as many voters believed that a government
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largely paid for by the federal government was preferable to a legislature paid for by the
territory’s inhabitants. Those voting against taking on the burdens of representative governance
were thought to have come from French backgrounds where they had not been infused with
American ideals of self-governance.153 The issue, however, may have gone beyond taxpayer
frugality. Michigan residents no longer felt the press of distant governance as they had under the
Hull/Judges regime. Cass governed according to Michigan’s needs and seemed unconcerned
about courting Washington’s favor.154 With no kindling for change, voters were loathe to take
on additional governance and financial responsibilities. But Michigan already was the slowest of
all the territories in moving to the second stage of territory governance, having gone fourteen
years since its creation as a separate territory in 1805. In some measure disregarding the vote, in
1819, Congress gave Michigan a non-voting seat in the House. Electors for that seat were white
male residents who had paid a county or territorial tax.155
Notwithstanding 1818 voter sentiment, the central government control inherent in the
Ordinance would increasingly clash with rising calls for democracy and representative local
governance.156 A paramount concern was the “vacillating policy” inherent in the laws created by
the governor and judges system. Accordingly, a January 1820 Grand Jury Presentment declared
that the “Grand Jurys are aware that nothing but a legislature constituted by the people, can be a
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radical cure for the evils complained of.”157 In 1822, a committee of inhabitants petitioned
Congress to separate the legislative from the judicial. In January 1823, they sent Congress a
statement setting forth their concerns over the Territorial legislature’s actions. The statement
complained of the secretive and almost despotic nature of law creation under the Ordinance. The
committee urged that they had “no guarantee by the ordinance of 87” that the governor and
judges could be responsive to the needs of the people. Given their “distant and ineffectual
Responsibility,” the committee feared the abuses would not abate. 158
These pleas were different from the petitions and grand jury reports of the first decade of
the century. Whereas before, residents had complained of persons, they now complained of
systems. Now, the form of government did not fit their needs. In response, Congress, in 1823
created a legislative council to assume the territory’s lawmaking authority.159 Michigan had
taken nineteen years to get to this stage. This compares to a total of eleven years for Ohio (the
first territory to move to statehood), five for Indiana, and three for Illinois and, under related
laws, four for Tennessee, two for Mississippi, and eight for Louisiana.160 The President
appointed its nine members of the council from a slate of eighteen popularly elected candidates.
Through this act, Congress also separated Michigan’s legislative and judicial spheres, and
changed the judges’ terms from the Ordinance’s “during good behavior” to four-year terms.161
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A distant federal hand still largely steered the territory’s governance, but now the
legislature germinated in Michigan soil and was chosen from those elected by Michigan voters.
Under the 1823 law, the President appointed the governor, secretary, and the judges, although the
judges were no longer both lawgivers and deciders. In a further effort to cleanse the governance
of its overly autocratic past, the President did not reappoint Woodward or Griffin, but he did
reappoint Witherell.162 The legislative council first sat on June 7, 1824 and quickly reorganized
the court system, limiting the Supreme Court largely to appellate issues. The justices sat on
circuit courts but did so as appellate judges.163
With population growth, in 1825 Congress increased the council to thirteen members and
authorized the governor and council to divide the territory into townships. All township officials
except for court personnel and sheriffs were popularly elected.164 Governor Cass went a step
further by appointing those “unelected” officials according to the results of local advisory
elections. Government was now institutionally more sympathetic to local concerns. This
governance facilitated a “more mature and stable society [that] helped attract a wave of
immigrants.” In response to that stability, Michigan’s population increased from twenty-eight
thousand to over two-hundred thousand between 1830 and 1840.165 This is not to suggest that
government alone facilitated that growth. The land was rich and the climate conducive to
agriculture, and transportation mechanisms, particularly the Erie Canal, made Michigan more
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accessible to settlers.166 Nevertheless, government was instrumental in unlocking the area’s
potential by addressing the security, capital scarcity, transportation, and environmental
challenges that encumbered development.
Representative governance grew in Detroit as well. In 1824, Detroit adopted a city
charter providing for a mayor and five council members. The council quickly took up its task of
regulation in pursuit of general-welfare concerns. It ordered the marshal to examine the bread in
the city’s bakeries “tomorrow morning” to assure that all bread matched the “weight last
prescribed by the Common Council.” It passed a new assize of bread, appointed fire safety
inspectors, and set fees and fines concerning the sale of foodstuffs. The detail of the council’s
involvement in the market is notable. For example, on December 13, the council considered
whether the “Clerk of the market [should] be directed to procure four convenient chains to fix
and suspend four staples at the four corners of the market, of convenient length and strength, for
the purpose of” weighing large quantities of provisions. That same day, it considered whether
James Woodward could move his grocery shop and whether Edward White could trade as a
baker. It then took up bills for regulating taverns, retailers of foreign merchandise, commission
merchants, and ferries.167
The council would soon take up regulations concerning the measuring of wood, and the
“manner of using the sidewalks,” the transportation and storage of gun powder, and the rules on
“shows, plays, games, theatrical and all other exhibitions.” The council considered and passed
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ordinances controlling nuisances, prohibited swine and stud and wild horses from running at
large, and regulated dogs. Finding it the duty of the city to improve the public grounds, the
council provided for planting trees in the public yard.168 As new challenges arose, the council
enacted new ordinances, or modified established ones. It routinely reconsidered the assizes of
bread. It legislated against “the firing of rockets or other fireworks,” and it regulated the
cleaning of fish. It also punished vendors of “unwholesome liquors and provisions,” modified its
theatrical regulations, and it set fees of ferriage.169 In short, local government was both part, and
a regulator of the relations of its population. As Cooley noted, government was involved in “all
that infinite variety of rules and regulations known as laws of police, which are ever present and
all about the citizen, his business and his property, prescribing limitations and setting bounds to
the use and enjoyment even in respect to that which is unquestionably his own.”170 Local
government regulation intertwined with the day-to-day in an effort to organize and control
individuals, property, and commerce. That was the norm.
It is important to note that government activity was not just about regulation. City
government also became involved in advancing commercial development. In March 1827, the
council determined that the “erection of a steam mill is among the most important improvements
projects in the City.” Being “apprehensive that it will not be effected by enterprise and
individuals only,” it proposed to later consider whether community aid was appropriate. In
reality, the question was not whether, but how government would help develop the mill. Council
agreed that the city would “furnish such aid, either in a site for building, or in stock, or in both,
as circumstances may render proper.” It explained that it was government’s role to further
projects that would “contribute to the health and comfort of our citizens . . . give activity to
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business and enhance the value of property . . . and to furnish employment.” The council
believed this obligation extended not just to current residents but to future generations as well.
By properly employing its limited resources, it could help build a community where “in a few
years our population and wealth will enable us to meet any public demands which may be
necessary.”171 This was government dedicated to advancing the public welfare by regulating
behavior and spending to advance commercial development. It took this role not as an external
marionette-master pulling strings. Instead, government was an integral part of the society and
economy, working as an aid as much as a regulator. It keenly felt the responsibility to fill that
role, as the city’s population was growing, having more than doubled in the five years between
1830 and 1834.172 Government was no night watchman. Rather, it fancied itself a social
watchmaker, and acted accordingly.
Municipalities, like Detroit, were the government entities most involved in the regulation
of the community and the support of commercial development. In large measure, this reflected
the local nature of life.173 This does not mean, however, that the territory government did not
regulate or support commercial development. It did so when local regulation or expenditures
would prove insufficient. (The most telling example of this related to the support of internalimprovement, infrastructure programs, discussed in the next chapter.) Of course, the decision as
to when to regulate at the territory level and when to defer, was left to the discretion of the
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territory legislature and governor. For example in 1827, Cass vetoed a bill to allow
municipalities to regulate through licensing billiard tables, because billiards was “injurious to the
habits and morals of the community.” To Cass, this form of gaming was beyond municipal
discretion and such decisions should be territorial. On the same day, Cass vetoed legislation
requiring state inspections of provisions, fish, and whiskey. He did so because he felt that local
government should regulate such matters.174 It is hard to discern a difference between the
regulation of snooker and scrod but, notably, the issue was not whether to regulate. It was who
should do so.
James Willard Hurst helped usher in historian efforts to debunk the popular
characterization of an early American governance premised on laissez-faire principles. He
argued that where “regulation or compulsion might promote the greater release of individual or
group energies, we had no hesitancy in making affirmative use of the law.”175 Detroit proved no
exception to Hurst’s perception and, as importantly, it consciously subordinated private to public
interests when regulating. Detroit’s 1834 efforts to regulate liquor provide a telling example,
particularly because those efforts were led by the then Territory Secretary (and Detroit
Alderman-at-Large) Stevens Mason.176 (As governor, Mason would later lead Michigan’s
efforts for infrastructure and commerce building efforts – a story for the next chapter.) At
twenty-two years old, Mason, as secretary and city alderman, pushed city council to tighten
Detroit’s liquor ordinances. Mason argued that, “the drinking of ardent spirits . . . leads to form
intemperate habits and appetites, and . . . it causes a great portion of pauperism, crimes and
wretchedness of the community; increases the number and violence of diseases, fills our prisons
174
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with convicts and malefactors; deprives man of reason and brings thousands to an untimely
grave.” He recognized that his call to restrict alcohol sales ran against the philosophy of “let
every man think for himself,” but rejected that in the face of overarching community interests.
To Mason, good citizenship required individuals “to sacrifice present private interest to the
public good.” In so arguing, Mason took on powerful economic and freedom interests. Detroit
had one liquor-selling grocery store for every thirteen families in the city. Those stores existed
because Detroiters consumed their products, and Mason proposed to limit those businesses.177
Council agreed and passed the restrictive law.178 The city would limit the individual discretion
and economic interests of much of its population in order to advance collective needs.
The number and breadth of the regulations and the efforts to develop commerce tell only
part of the story. Law-in-action was the daily business of municipal governance and Detroit’s
Common Council routinely worked to shape its municipal world. Reviewing its activities on any
number of days demonstrates that philosophy but, for the sake of brevity, I here list the council’s
proceedings for only one day – May 9, 1832. On that day the mayor and four alderman
considered, 1) a claim of A. M. Hurd for $34.71, 2) James Young’s application to keep a bakery
at the corner of Randolph and Woodbridge, 3) James Fraser’s request to keep a grocery at
Strykie and Taylor, 4) whether to request that the Secretary of War further open Cass Street, 5) a
proposal to sell city lots from the former military reservation, 6) leasing the “public or steam mill
wharf” but reserving a portion for a potential public market, 7) determining whether a public
market would be closed if fees were not forthcoming, and 8) establishing a committee to set
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market fees.179 Most importantly, this was not an unusual day – the record is replete with
council deliberations that blended day-to-day commercial and social practicalities with legal
enactments. No laissez-faire sentiment arrested government efforts to enhance the general
welfare. As Novak noted, “on the contrary, the fundamental social and economic relations of the
nineteenth century – the market, the city and the countryside, the family, the laborer, the
proprietor, the good neighbor, the good citizen – were formed and transformed in this period as
the constant objects of governance and regulation.”180
This is not to say that all Detroit residents agreed with the scope of government
involvement in their lives, or that all council action met with universal applause. Concerns over
local regulation of the central market increasingly percolated among the populous. In 1835,
some protested not only the wisdom of the market ordinance, but common council’s power to
regulate market hours. A letter to the editor of the Democratic Free Press asked “what right the
common council possesses” to limit market hours so that he and other laborers could not attend
the market? He argued that council assumed powers “not delegated to them.” The editor of the
newspaper agreed, stating, “We know not what right the common council possesses to pass such
an ordinance.” Perhaps in response to public dissatisfaction over market availability, by 1837,
the city had established three markets, one of which was on the first floor of City Hall. By
advertising in its official Directory that the city markets “are kept in good order by the inspector
of provisions, and well supplied with everything that can be desired at similar places,” the city
suggested that trade was not restricted to city-owned markets, but city markets still thrived.
Further, government had not forsaken control where its leaders believed that government best
enhanced welfare. In that same Directory, the city boasted that it had acquired the previously
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privately owned water-works company in order to “afford a more abundant supply, and to insure
purer water.”181

Advancing to Statehood
Cass’s drive to support local government had quelled many of the hostilities and
problems associated with distant governance. Those concerns would re-emerge as Andrew
Jackson’s spoils system would use Michigan government positions to reward his political
supporters.182 With the exception of Cass, those beneficiaries resided outside the territory. As
soon as the judges’ four-year terms ended, Jackson appointed judges from outside the territory.
Similarly, when Cass left to become Jackson’s Secretary of War183, Jackson appointed an
outsider as governor. In response, resentment “was widespread and general; for the first time the
Territory became keenly aware of the dependent character of its government.” A local paper
claimed that Jackson’s appointments left “no identity of interest nor community of feeling which
should inspire confidence.”184 The fervor over the loss of local control, however, did not
immediately translate into action. An 1832 election on the statehood question garnered only
181
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3007 total votes, with a small majority in favor of statehood. Residents remained reticent about
bearing the cost of governing a large area with relatively few taxpayers. With that lack of
enthusiasm, Congress failed to take up Michigan statehood and territory leaders dropped the
issue for a short time.
From 1831 to 1836, the office of the governor changed hands in interesting fashions.
Jackson appointed George Bryan Porter to serve as governor in 1831. Porter was from
Pennsylvania and hailed from a political family. One brother would become Pennsylvania’s
governor, and another the Secretary of War. Before his appointment, Porter served as a
Democratic Representative in the Pennsylvania House. Porter was often absent from Michigan
and, during those times, Stevens Mason was acting governor. Porter’s tenure as governor was
shortened when, in 1834, he succumbed to cholera and died in office.185 Territory Secretary
Mason again became acting governor. Mason’s earlier appointment to the secretary’s position
created concerns in large measure because this Kentucky resident was nineteen years old at the
time of his appointment and, hence, lacked both knowledge of Michigan and the experience
typically beneficial for higher office. His appointment as governor at the age of 22 created even
greater anxiety. A meeting of concerned Detroit citizens characterized his appointment as “in
every point of view, so injudicious and objectionable as to make it improbable, if not
impossible.”186 That he was a political appointee without grounding proved troubling. That he
barely shaved proved infuriating.
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Mason soon won the residents’ support and would eventually become Michigan’s first
elected governor. Before he could be elected, however, Jackson fired Mason for supporting
Michigan’s territorial claims on land that is now part of Ohio.187 Ohioans could vote in national
elections and its representatives could vote in Congress.188 Michigan’s could not, so political
forces drove Mason out. In his place, the President named John Scott Horner of Virginia to the
governor’s seat. (Jackson had first appointed Pennsylvanian Charles Shaler, but he declined the
appointment.) Horner followed Jackson’s lead in offering a conciliatory position toward what
Michigan residents considered an Ohio land grab.
It was their militancy over Ohio’s perceived arrogance that drove Michiganders’ desires
for statehood. So intense were those feelings that Michigan tried to shorten the traditional route
to statehood. Most territories seeking admission received Congressional enabling legislation at
the beginning of the process of state formation. Congress did not respond to Michigan’s request
for that legislation, so state advocates took the task upon themselves. In 1834, the Territorial
Council enacted legislation calling for a census to determine if the territory had surpassed the
60,000 population required for statehood under the Ordinance. That census showed the territory
held 87,273 people. In January 1835, the council called for an election of delegates to a
constitutional convention, and on May 11, those delegates met in Detroit.
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The delegates promptly set forth their goal in the preamble to the eventual constitution:
“the time has arrived when our present political condition ought to cease, and the right of selfgovernment be asserted.”189 The delegates were largely former residents of New York and New
England. (The Erie Canal success would animate their governmental vision.) They represented
a cross-section of residents, with delegates coming from rural and urban areas. They were
tradesmen, timber men, farmers, merchants, educators, doctors, and lawyers. This group had
little constitutional law or drafting experience and “were little concerned in the proposed
constitution beyond the bill of rights and the suffrage provisions.” In the end, however, they left
the legislature largely free from restraints, as “the delegates evinced no distrust of legislative
assemblies.”190 The constitution went to the people for approval. Although few voted (7,658),
this time the residents overwhelmingly approved the constitution (6,299 – yes, 1,359 – no)
The militancy that animated the drive to statehood also helped drive Horner from office.
Almost immediately following his appointment, residents vocally expressed dissatisfaction with
his Ohio position and proposed that Horner “return to the land of his nativity.” Mason was their
man as he had “an open, fearless” policy against the marauding Ohioans.191 Distaste with
Horner ran deep and soon a group of residents welcomed Horner to a local tavern by throwing
rocks through the tavern’s windows. To avoid the projectiles, Horner slept on the floor of the
tavern, as it afforded the safest location. Apparently unsympathetic with his guest’s plight, the
tavern owner then charged Horner for the damage done to his building.192 Future State Supreme
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Court Justice Campbell classified Horner as “rather more preemptory and assuming than the
people were accustomed to find their public officers, and more dictatorial than they were
disposed to submit to.” Accordingly, government officials granted him little respect.193 Horner
stayed in Michigan until May 1836, when Jackson reassigned him to act as governor of
Wisconsin.194
While an interesting vignette, the episode casts light on the underlying settler drive to
gain republican self-government under the Ordinance. In 1835, Horner wrote to Secretary of
State John Forsyth to express relief over the settlement of the Ohio/Michigan border issue.
Horner suggested Michigan’s concerns were part of “strenuous efforts to embarras [sic] the
Administration . . . and also to drive from the Territory any Executive who designed to carry out
the only salutary and tranquilizing measures the Government could prescribe.” His focus was on
national priorities, applauding the “increasing popularity” of the national administration’s
efforts.195 Horner wrote this letter on November 25. Interestingly, three weeks earlier, on
November 3, Mason had sent a letter to the Secretary of State informing him that earlier that day
he had “taken the oath of office as Governor of the State of Michigan.”196 Michigan had two
governors.
Michigan voters had approved the state’s constitution in 1835. Acting as a state,
Michigan then held elections under that constitution even though Congress had not yet accepted
it into the Union or released it from its territorial status. Accordingly, Mason and Horner both
were acting as governor, one popularly elected the other appointed, one claiming to govern a
Brown’s orders.” Buley, The Old Northwest Pioneer Period, 1815-1840: II: 197. Apparently, nineteenth century
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state the other a territory. If one construed the Ordinance as a constitutional document, then
Michigan should automatically have become a state equal to all other states. After all, the
Ordinance provided that when a contemplated state “shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants
therein” it would be admitted on “an equal footing with the original states, in all respects
whatever.” Those accepting the election results, and Mason’s authority, believed that the
Ordinance required that the nation accept Michigan as a state as soon as it had fulfilled the
requirements of the Ordinance.197 Having achieved that, they would argue, Michigan was like
all other states. Classifying this legal position as a collective political right, the elected state
legislature offered that it had,
acquired rights, of which no human power could divest them, and in full and
ample authority to form and establish for themselves, a Constitution; and
having performed that act, they became a State, from that moment; and if a
State, then the Territorial government must necessarily cease, and the people
assume and exercise all the rights, privileges and immunities, that belong to the
people of the older States.198
Believing Michigan had the full powers of a state, the Michigan Legislature passed laws
dismantling the Ordinance’s structure and erecting a locally elected government blueprint,
according to the terms of the new constitution. 199 Michigan had entered uncharted space, as
Congress had almost automatically admitted the other states of the Northwest Territories. Not so
with Michigan. Because Michigan and Ohio claimed common land, Congress refused to admit
Michigan pending resolution of that dispute.
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In Washington, national government actions evidenced a belief that congressional power,
and not the Ordinance’s language, determined when and if a territory were admitted into the
union. Accordingly, at the same time Michigan acted as a state, the national government treated
it as a mere territory. An irate President Jackson warned that Michigan’s elected leadership
should exercise caution when interfering with his appointed government. He had his Secretary
of State write that the President would not interfere with the newly elected government “so long
as such proceedings do not interfere with the due administration of the laws of the United States
for the establishment and Government of that territory, and with the rightful exercise of the
functions of the officers appointed under their authority.” In other words, if the elected
government refrained from governing, all would be fine. To Jackson’s mind, territorial
appointments ran the legitimate government “until it is terminated by Congress.”200 Federal law
prevailed and any actions that undermined that law were invalid. Not surprisingly, Michigan’s
pro-state leadership was deaf to Jackson’s counsel. The Territorial Council had disbanded, at
least with respect to the territory now comprising Michigan. In what must have been perceived
in Washington as a bold move, the state legislature severed from its jurisdiction the territory west
of Lake Michigan. It also enacted laws not applicable to the severed territory – the area now
constituting Wisconsin and part of Minnesota.201 All this was done ignoring governmental
responsibilities and power under the Ordinance.202
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Michigan had organized a government, which appointed senators, elected representatives,
passed laws, and adjudicated disputes. It elected a governor, lieutenant governor, and legislature,
and set up a court system. It had acted much like a state before becoming one and did so,
arguably, without legal authority.203 The leadership of the constitutional government knew that
others disputed their authority. Accordingly, the state legislature and executive started slowly,
hoping that Congress would soon admit Michigan into the Union. As time passed, the state
government increasingly addressed the administrative and substantive needs of governance, but
did so in a cautious fashion. It incorporated entities, set rules for elections, and organized towns.
In doing so, territory and state government, at times, conflicted. Somewhat akin to the
challenges presented when Woodward and Hull battled over the Witherell Codes, government
became dysfunctional. Unlike that earlier challenge, between 1835-37 the leaders were not at
loggerheads. Nevertheless, Michigan’s government inhabited a mesophase; neither admitted
state nor functioning territory. That situation would only stabilize when Horner left for
Wisconsin and, in January 1837, when Congress admitted Michigan into the Union.204 Politics
had clarified the situations, but legal issues would remain.
The courts would consider whether laws passed by the “state” legislature were
enforceable in the case of Scott v Detroit Young Men’s Society’s Lessee. In March 1836, (after
the constitution but before admission) the state legislature (sitting under the constitution)
incorporated the Detroit Young Men’s Society. Several months later, the territory judges (sitting
under the Ordinance) granted land to the Society pursuant to their responsibility to allocate land
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after the Detroit fire of 1805.205 When a dispute arose over the Society’s right to lease the land,
the courts were presented with issues concerning 1) the legitimacy of laws enacted by a
legislature that, without Congressional approval, had supplanted the territory council, and 2) the
legitimacy of a body acting under the Ordinance where the existence of a “state” seemingly
would dissolve territorial governance. The dispute raised issues of sovereignty, state creation,
and congressional power. Perhaps more importantly, it threatened to unravel the multiple court,
executive, and legislative decisions Michigan entered into over a fifteen-month period, which
would then result in a significant disruption of numerous activities and lives.
Seemingly, the challenge could only be resolved if the courts found the state and
territorial government could simultaneously rule, and that was the course it took. It found that
the territorial government retained authority over issues concerning congressional legislation
(here, land grants under the fire-relief statute), whereas state government held jurisdiction over
state activities (here, incorporation statutes). After all, the court reasoned, “The change, from a
territorial to a state government, was not, and from necessity could not be, instantaneous.”206
Unsatisfied, the plaintiff then filed for a writ of error with the United States Supreme
Court, claiming that the court held jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act. That act provided that
the Supreme Court could exercise jurisdiction over actions of states. With a sleight-of-hand, the
court dismissed the claim. If Michigan was defined as a state, then the state had authority to take
the action it did. If it was a territory, as the court believed, then the Supreme Court had no
jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act. In dicta, the court questioned whether a political entity
could turn itself into a state through mere self-declaration – hence its belief that Michigan was a
territory. The court was off the hook in either case. If a state – the act was appropriate; if it was
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a territory – no jurisdiction. Employing another jurisdiction-limiting tool, the court declined to
hear the matter because the case presented problems that should “be discussed before the proper
political tribunals.”207 The Court had ducked, and in doing so took the practical course of not
invalidating about fifteen month’s worth of Michigan’s governance. It had also avoided
addressing the relationships of states to the national government – an issue that could raise
unsettling nullification issues.
Justice McLean, in dissent, was perhaps more intellectually honest but practically
deficient. He reasoned that, “No act of the people of a Territory, without the sanction of
Congress, can change the territorial into a state government.” That was exactly what Michigan
had done. It had operated as a state in violation of the practice of awaiting Congressional
approval. By exercising sovereignty outside the scope of national laws, pre-admission
Michigan’s legislative acts were “repugnant to the constitution” and to the acts of Congress.208
Certainly, to McLean, and perhaps to the others, the Ordinance was a mere statute, and its
automatic statehood provisions were not binding on later congresses.
The Court’s refusal to take jurisdiction and instead to leave the issue to the political
process, in significant measure, was a recognition of the bind courts found themselves when
governance rules and public needs clashed. A rejection of state legislative power would have
forced the unraveling of the multiple acts and transactions upon which society now relied.
Further, a rejection of state legislative power would have required a declaration that Michigan
207
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citizens could not act to create democratic governance without the approval of a distant
government in which they had no voice and little power – perhaps not a legally based concern
but, nonetheless, real. Those residents, upset over the governance imposed under the Ordinance,
had forced out an appointed governor, enacted a constitution, elected a legislature, and sought
national government approval. The people had employed law to undermine the governmental
structure designed in the Ordinance. The Michigan Supreme Court’s finding of dual sovereignty
and the United States Supreme Court’s refusal accept jurisdiction amounted to tacit recognitions
that when structure clashes with need, structure will, or at least can, yield. Now Michigan had a
new structure, designed to accomplish needs as perceived in 1835. That structure too would be
forced to yield to changing circumstances.
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Chapter III: Infrastructure and Economic Development 1837-1850
Individual effort alone is not adequate to so great purposes; it is to man in his
social capacity – to communities of men – to governments, to whom only the
power and the high privilege is given of effecting them, and thus of ameliorating
the condition and augmenting the happiness of men.
Report of the Michigan Senate Committee on State Affairs, Relative to Donations of Land by
Congress for Works of Internal Improvements
March 2, 1838

From such [corrupting] influences, unsafe in a free government, dangerous to
the purity of our institutions – destructive to civil liberty – a sale of our public
works would set us free.
Report of the Michigan Senate Finance Committee
January 23, 1846

The Drive for Internal Improvements

Michigan was still a territory when, in 1825, New York opened the largely state-financed
Erie Canal, which transversed 350 miles from the Hudson River to Lake Erie. The Canal not
only fulfilled the dream of cheap, effective transportation, it furnished a means to deliver the
interior’s surplus crops to the population centers of the east.209 It also promised to aid
immigration into the nation’s interior, as potential settlers could now travel to Michigan by water
rather than by the relatively impassible roads of the day. As New York built the Canal,
Michigan Territory Governor Lewis Cass hailed, “That great artificial river, which is about to
unite the Lakes with the Ocean . . . has brought us almost in contact with the Atlantic border,
and furnishes a communication with the commercial metropolis of the nation, with an economy,
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safety and facility which have almost annihilated the intervening distance.”210 This early
celebration of the Canal’s potential would open a chapter of government spending that would
transform political and legal positions concerning government’s general-welfare responsibilities,
individual-property rights, and majoritarian-democratic principles.
Cass’s dream was not unique, as the Canal opened vast commercial and social
opportunities to the areas making up the Northwest Territories. In 1825, the United States was
largely a seacoast-focused nation, with a developing but commercially limited interior.211
Effective internal improvements (the common phrase for nineteenth century efforts to build a
transportation network) were required for commercial and social progress, particularly as the
nation moved from its seaboard beginnings. Nineteenth-century British historian William
Barrows noted that “grains, meats, hides, ores, coals, timber, and wool [had] practically been
waiting for their opportunity in the great North American West a thousand years,” for the ability
to effectively bring them to market.212 Canals, and soon rail, allowed for that opportunity by
providing cheap and rapid transportation and by enhancing property values in an expansive
swath of interior lands.
Prior to those transportation improvements, the early nineteenth-century landscape was
characterized by vast territories and, at least in the non-seaboard portion of the nation, widely
dispersed populations. Since roads were often little more than paths, commercial expansion
hugged natural water routes.213 Efforts to trade outside those routes were lengthy and expensive.
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Even within those routes, travel times were uncertain as currents and weather strongly affected
voyages. Accordingly, internal trade primarily was regional.214 Canals and, more significantly,
railroads would extinguish the natural barriers to economic growth, and open the west to
population and commercial expansion. That expansion required government, as government
could raise capital in ways the then-infant private markets could not. Rather than focusing on
limiting government involvement in industry, as Hurst noted, early Americans “had no hesitancy
in making affirmative use of law” to advance commercial opportunities. Hurst classified this
affirmative use of law as a means to “enlarge men’s range of choices.”215 By employing its tax
and spending powers, government shaped the commercial environment and released individual
energies to conquer scarcity. It invested in developing infrastructure, allowing commerce to
move from local to regional, and ultimately to national and international. With the Canal and its
progeny, residents of the Northwest Territories now were but a week away from the population
bases of the east. The transportation revolution would change those residents from self-sufficient
pioneers into settlers fully integrated into the national economy.
The term “internal improvements” is telling. To the nineteenth century American,
internal improvements were much larger than transportation developments. Internal
improvements promised social, economic, and political progress. As Carter Goodrich noted,
they were integral to “the exercise of pubic spirit.” The drive involved significantly more than
individual prosperity. The promise of the improvements introduced a new responsibility for
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action. Goodrich continued, “To improve the country’s natural advantages by development in
transportation was, in the eyes of Washington and many others, a duty incumbent both on
governments and individual citizens.”216 Given the individualistic traditions upon which much
of our neo-liberal philosophy relies, it may seem surprising that nineteenth-century internal
improvements depended on government largess and direction (and, at times, control). Yet,
Americans turned to government to effect the political, economic, and social progress
transportation promised. They did so employing whatever model of government/industry
relations would best suit that end. Most of those efforts took place on the state and local levels.
Because rail was not limited to connecting water routes, it soon eclipsed canals as central
to the nation’s transportation fabric. To put rail’s importance in perspective, before the Erie
Canal, moving a barrel of flour from Buffalo to New York City would cost $10. With the Canal,
that cost had dropped to $2. With rail, it dropped to $0.35.217 Rail provided an additional benefit
not enjoyed by canals or other forms of overland transportation: it extended the selling season
through the winter months. Prior to rail, farmers could not ship late-harvested crops until spring,
reducing their value and increasing storage costs. Rail helped overcome the obstacles of space
and time by narrowing the gap between producer and consumer, but it only did so for those
connected to the transport network.218 It threatened to marginalize those not connected, and to
undercut those existing commercial centers that did not augment their infrastructure with rail
and/or canal development.219
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The benefits went far beyond transportation efficiencies. As Daniel Walker Howe noted,
If the railroads did not initiate the industrial revolution, they certainly speeded
it up. They stimulated the mining, processing, and importing of iron and steel
(and, after the eventual switch in fuel, coal). They created vast primary
industries in the manufacture of rails, locomotives, and rolling stock. They
encouraged the workforce to continue to leave agriculture and move into other
occupations. They multiplied new jobs as engineers, firemen, brakemen,
switchmen, conductors and roundhouse mechanics.
The impact was not merely economic. Howe submitted that rail changed the nation’s landscape.
Because “public subsidies so often took the form of land grants, railroads became large-scale
land speculators, promoting settlement along their routes and urban development at major
railheads.” 220 Commerce moved from local to interstate, and mobility and communication
exploded. If progress was a central idea of the nineteenth century, then railroads provided the
path to that goal.
Along with opening a new world, the Erie Canal posed a dangerous temptation. While
New York had anticipated paying for its canal though increased auction fees and salt taxes, as
well as taxes on lands along the route, the state found that revenues from the Canal completely
serviced the debt and, as a bonus, New York was able to suspend the state property tax in the
later 1820s.221 That realization gave rise to a general (but not universal) expectation that internal
improvement projects could be self-funding.222 As Larson noted, “it was hard to resist the
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conclusion throughout the rest of the country that wealth and power flowed to those who seized
that kind of initiative.”223 That possibility, along with optimism associated with growing
populations, commerce, and wealth, and a recent history of federal budget surpluses, combined
to promise a self-funding, fiscal nirvana.224
To enjoy that progress, state and local governments aggressively embarked on internal
improvement projects and, in doing so, exploded public debt. For example, Pennsylvania’s debt
rose from $6.3 million in 1830 to $24.33 million in 1837 and Ohio moved $0.4 million in 1825
to $5.5 million in 1836.225 In all, aggregate state debt more than tripled from $60 million in 1835
to $183 million in 1839. (By way of comparison, total annual federal spending averaged a bit
less than $27 million in the 1830s.226) About sixty percent of that debt was for canals and
railroads with about thirty percent for banks. (Northern states focused on internal improvement
projects and Southern states focused on banks.)227 The debt was public, not private, because
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government largely drove early rail and canal development.228 This was not odd, as before 1840
there was “no prejudice toward state activity of this nature.”229

A Call for Government Aid
As in other states and territories, Michigan’s early leaders wanted to engage in
infrastructure building. However, the territory suffered the disadvantage of a modest population
base and meager government revenues. Even with the most cost effective transportation system,
without people or commercial development, a rail project would not be self-funding. Without
the promise of a self-funding system, and given its low tax base, Governor Cass sought federal
financing to achieve Michigan’s development goals (and to keep up with its more advanced
neighbors). Realizing that the national government had rejected requests to fund the Canal, Cass
framed his argument in terms of national security. British North America remained a threat and,
“In a state of war,” a Michigan rail system would preserve “the necessary intercourse between
Lake Erie and the country upon the Upper Lakes . . . without incurring the danger of passing
under the guns of a hostile shore for many miles.”230 Cass’s pitch failed, as the federal
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government was loath to support internal improvement projects. Within a few weeks after
Cass’s request, Jackson would veto the Maysville Road bill as an unconstitutional extension of
federal power. On policy grounds, he planned to use government surpluses to bring down the
national debt, not to invest in infrastructure. Moreover, concerns over slavery lurked. As
Virginia Congressman John Randolph warned in 1824, the government that could build
highways could free slaves.231
Notwithstanding Cass’s failed pitch, local officials and citizens petitioned Congress in
1831 for assistance for a canal or railroad between Detroit and Chicago. Acting as chair for the
citizen group, Detroit Mayor Marshal Chapin framed the project as a national concern, and not
merely a Michigan Territory issue. The petition argued that transportation improvements would
raise land values, “accelerating the sale of public lands,” owned by the federal government, and
would “inure to the benefit of trade and manufactures of our Great Atlantic markets.”
Accordingly, the group requested 1) a survey of the coasts of the Great Lakes, 2) a canal between
each of those lakes, 3) the completion of a road between Detroit and Chicago, 4) improvements
on the St. Joseph River, and 5) surveys for canal and rail development.232 This early request for
government assistance is telling. Michigan’s population originated with residents of states
determining to resettle in what, in the day, was the far west wilderness. Rather than reveling in
their independence from government, the people of Michigan were petitioning government to
actively support their commercial development.
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The petitions are telling in another respect. Self-interest underlay each of the petitions,
but the mechanism to address those interests was communal. No individual or gathering of
individuals had the resources to build a road, canal, or railroad upon which they could take
product to market. Only collective participation would accomplish that end, and that collection
could either take the form of a business venture or a government program or both. Particularly in
times of capital scarcity and underdeveloped corporate entities, government necessarily became
involved in the answer. Even if a corporate entity could form, the probable return on early rail
investments was so small or so far in the future that sustained private efforts were unlikely (as
would later be the case in Michigan’s early private rail experience). So, even as the petitioners
were motivated by individual interests, those interests required collective action. Government
was to be the chosen and necessary vehicle for individual self-creation.
Michigan’s government was not by itself able to respond to its residents’ petitions.
Accordingly, it too continued to press the national government for aid. Wishing a different
answer than his predecessor received, Territory Governor George B. Porter changed the official
approach. Porter proposed that federal land sales in Michigan fund the development of rail lines
connecting the eastern seaboard with the Mississippi. Porter was candid. The goal was
economic development. A railroad would boost land values, sales, and “numerous other
advantages that would result as well to government and individuals.”233
To the federal government the issue went beyond Michigan’s needs. It involved that
government’s constitutional authority. Many (including President Jackson) believed that
Congress’s spending power, as delineated in Art. I, § 8, prohibited spending to advance local
infrastructure projects. Proponents of federal aid sought constitutional authority elsewhere.
Some sought to aid local infrastructure by exercising federal power under Art. IV, §3 “to dispose
233
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of . . . the territory or other property belonging to the United States.” Congress attempted to
exercise that power in the 1833 Distribution Bill by earmarking proceeds from the sale of public
lands to support “internal improvement and education projects.” Jackson vetoed the bill, arguing
that Congressional involvement in local projects exceeded its constitutional authority. Jackson
believed that the constitution required vigilant protections against federal incursions into state
prerogatives. To Jackson, even disbursing federal funds to the states was fraught with danger, as
state governments “would lose all their independence and dignity” at the trough of federal
largess.234 Jackson’s position was consistent with his Maysville Road veto and the long-standing
argument that the federal government could not, and should not, spend on local projects. To
him, the national government enjoyed limited powers and Congress could only employ federal
resources, – be it tax revenue or federal land – for national purposes and pursuant to Art. I, §8
limited powers.235
That view of federal power limited but did not completely forestall early federal internal
improvement efforts. If direct involvement raised constitutional and political barriers, indirect
efforts seemed more palatable, and Congress increasingly found ways to employ them. In the
early period of rail development, the federal government worked around the barriers in two
ways. First, it provided surveying assistance to the states and territories, to the tune of about
$75,000 (about $1.5 million today). That assistance demanded engineering knowledge as it
applied to rail-required topography. The federal government justified that aid by referring to its
authority under the navigable waters, post office, or war powers clauses.236 While that amount
234

Andrew Jackson Veto Message, December 4, 1833. "Messages of the Presidents,"
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pip=67041#azziuV489paM.
235
David Currie related that Henry Clay argued to the contrary by referring to earlier land grants to support asylums.
Clay and his followers believed Congress held virtually unlimited power to dispose of federal properties. David P.
Currie, "The Constitution in Congress: The Public Lands, 1829-1861," U. Chi. L. Rev. 70 (2003): 793.
236
See, for example, An Act to procure the necessary surveys, plans, and estimates, upon the subject of roads and
Canals, wherein Congress authorized the President to make surveys “of national importance in a commercial or

101

may seem trivial, rail-engineering skills were sparse and in high demand. A snippet from the
103 page engineering report sent to the 1838 Michigan Internal Improvement Commissioners
gives an indication of the type of expertise surveyors provided. The report suggested that, when
choosing an appropriate rail route, the legislature and commission needed
to consider an increase of the rate of inclination on a mile of road, from twenty
to forty feet per mile, equal to reducing the rate of curvature from two
thousand to five hundred feet radius on a level grade, and a decrease of radius
would be equal to an addition of one mile to the whole distance; the additional
mile on an inclination of twenty feet grade, and either the increase of grade or
decrease of radius, or increase of distance, would be equal to an extra
expenditure in the cost of grading of twenty thousand dollars.237
In the 1830s, such analysis was critically valuable. Federal expenditures may have been small
but were significant.238 In providing that assistance, at least with respect to its efforts in
Michigan, the federal government bypassed Article I §8, and supported internal improvements
notwithstanding the concerns voiced by Jackson and those similarly inclined.
Congress also employed its power to regulate tariffs as a means to support internal
improvements. Between 1830 and 1842, the federal government maintained low tariffs on
British bar iron, the product used for iron rails. British manufacturers produced low cost, but
low quality, iron. American rail developers preferred this iron because they were interested in
initial costs and deferred concerns over maintenance.239 Congress implemented the low tariff in
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an effort to support rail development (and against the protest of Pennsylvania’s iron industry). 240
This reduced the cost of rail by about $6 million during that period.241 While not a direct
subsidy, that tax relief significantly contributed to the period’s drive for internal improvements.
By keeping the tariffs low, Congress had employed its taxing power to accomplish ends it could
not achieve employing its spending powers.242
The limited federal involvement assisted, but did not drive Michigan’s efforts. The
territorial, and later state, government would now take on the work, and would do so in an
intensive fashion. A letter published in the Carrier, dated November 13, 1833, furnished among
the first recorded calls for government rail ownership. The writer advocated building a 175-mile
line from Detroit, in eastern Michigan, to Berrien County, in the west of the territory. He
proposed, “there would be 10,000 farmers reached by such a road” who would each have a
bounty of pork, wheat and other grains to transport, thereby enriching the territory. The
government could sell land on each side of the tracks to pay for construction. In the end “the
railroad would become the property of the territory and the tolls could be made very low.”243
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Government was to support industry by building infrastructure and then operating the business at
low cost to the consumers. The territory’s entire population at the time was around 32,000 so the
author seemed to expect the rail development would facilitate a sizeable population increase. In
addition to presuming dramatic population expansion, the plan promised a self-funding
enterprise. Residents would pay nothing while enjoying substantial economic benefits.
Soon, petitions for government action intensified. While the arguments varied according
to the interests of the listener and speaker, underlying under each petition sat a concern that rail
not bypass Michigan. Should that happen, Michigan would remain commercially and politically
disadvantaged. For example, a December 1833 petition to Congress noted the advantage of
including Detroit in a proposed route connecting the eastern United States to Chicago and St.
Louis. To accomplish that, the petitioners appealed for both direct and indirect aid. An
“enlightened bounty of Congress in aid of important works of internal improvements,” along
with land grants, would move the project forward.244 They couched much of the petition in
terms of interstate commerce and mail delivery, but their interest went beyond mail delivery to St
Louis. With a rail line came communication, commerce, population, influence, and a place in
the nation. Without rail, progress would stop – or at least slow. The drive for widespread
commercial development – and the fear of being left behind – drove this demand for robust
government involvement.
Another request for rail assistance was more narrowly motivated. A group of residents
located in the western agricultural region petitioned the government to help them find “an out-let
to our abundant harvest.”245 They enjoyed fertile land and abundant crops, but produced inland
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from the lakes. Accordingly, they lacked a means to market, and government was the answer.
The national government could own the rail, invest in the rail, or establish a private rail
company. The means were secondary to the goal of facilitating transportation infrastructure.
Similarly, in 1835, a group of petitioners argued that the federal government, as owners of ninetenths of the territory’s lands, would profit from the income generated by higher land values
associated with transportation access – and subtly argued that the government owed Michigan
residents an obligation because of the amount of federal land in the territory. The petition
recognized that although the route these settlers requested was longer, it would support the
commercial and social interest of the territory as well as the military needs of the nation.246 In
each of these petitions, and the several more reviewed, settlers commonly looked to government
as the mechanism through which to develop commerce, increase land values, and incorporate
Michigan residents into the larger nation.

Parallel Private Efforts
While ideas of self-funding and federal projects percolated, private parties attempted to
develop rail enterprises. By the time Congress admitted Michigan as a state on January 26,
1837, the legislative council had chartered twenty-five railroad corporations, although only seven
to nine actually had begun construction.247 Even as private, fledgling entities, these corporations
carried significant burdens to benefit public interests. Most of the incorporation statutes required
exclusively local stock ownership and capped the profits the corporations could enjoy. Excess
profits would revert to the government. Typically, the charters provided that government
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retained the right to purchase these railroads at a set formula over cost. Through such legislation,
the government sought to employ corporations to encourage economic development while
simultaneously attempting to minimize concerns over monopoly control of infrastructure. 248
The legislative council granted the first of those special-corporation rail charters to the
Pontiac and Detroit Railway Company in 1830. This was also the first rail charter in the
Northwest Territory.249 The owners never started construction and that charter lapsed.250 The
legislature next chartered the Detroit and St. Joseph, which would run along the Huron River two
miles west of Ann Arbor. It granted the railroad a strip of land and gave it eminent-domain
privileges to condemn property.251 The rail investors held to a grand vision. They sought $1.5
million in capital for a line traversing the territory. Based upon federal surveys suggesting an
appropriate route, they first solicited funds for the Detroit to Ann Arbor portion. At first blush,
their efforts were successful, with Michigan inhabitants committing to nearly all the outstanding
shares of stock. Unfortunately, few honored their commitments, and few dollars came in. The
investors then solicited subscriptions from those residing along the proposed route. Those efforts
proved insufficient. Ineffective in the private sphere, the investors turned to government. At
first they requested federal financial assistance; a request the federal government declined. 252
They soon turned to the city of Detroit. In 1836, the Detroit Common Council subscribed
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$10,000 to the effort. When that proved insufficient, the investors asked for and were granted
another $40,000.
The territory legislative council intervened to address the insufficient capital challenges
faced by the Detroit and St. Joseph, as well as that of the other embryonic lines. In 1835, the
legislature amended several rail corporate charters to encourage those entities to enter banking.
Some did so, but those efforts extended little benefit and, at times, created greater financial
difficulties.253 Not reading those financial difficulties as a portent of rail’s economic instability,
Michigan’s government would soon move to a more involved rail platform, and would do so
believing the projects self funding.

The Threat of Corporate Power
In 1834, Michigan entertained the strong government rail-support of two governors.
Porter, an enthusiastic advocate of agricultural development, could conceive no “subject more
worthy” of the territory’s attention than building a railroad. He envisioned a system initially
financed by the sale of public lands. Any “small expense” the government would incur would be
reimbursed by increased land sales and “the numerous other advantages that would result as well
to the government as to individuals.”254 To realize that ambition, government would build a
railroad from Detroit to Lake Michigan. The land, and most of the funds, would come from the
national government. Succumbing to cholera in July 1834, Porter was unable to effect his dream.
Jackson then appointed his Territory Secretary, 22-year old Stevens Mason, as governor of the
Michigan Territory.255 Almost immediately, Mason unleashed surveyors to map the landscape
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for rail. Although authorized by the Secretary of War, to Mason the project’s object was the
general prosperity of the territory.256 Mason called for subscriptions to defray non-subsidized
survey expenses. In doing so, he invited business to participate in the infant stages of rail
development. This view of the private sector soon would change. Within a year, Mason would
display his disinclination to involve private corporations in internal improvement projects.
With his first annual address before the legislative council, Mason revealed that aversion
to private involvement. To Mason, corporate power threatened democratic governance.
Michigan would be better off relying on “individual effort and capital” to accomplish its
commercial goals. For that reason, he “would with diffidence, but with a conviction of the
importance of the subject,” call to the legislature’s “attention to the impolicy of granting acts of
private incorporation.” Mason believed that private corporate charters had “been already carried
to such an extent, that if persevered in, it cannot fail to fill our territory with an innumerable
multitude of irresponsible companies.”257 He was speaking of special corporations – entities
created by legislative acts that typically granted monopoly rights in exchange for services and
restrictions deemed to be in the public interest. His concern was common in its day. Hendrik
Hartog explained, “many American lawyers and legislators viewed corporations with distrust
even as they relied on them as instrumentalities of public initiatives.” They were unavoidable,
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“perhaps justifiable by the exigencies of the times but indefensible as a natural part of the
political order.”258
Mason’s address was a warning shot for actions that soon followed. On February 11,
1835, Mason began to execute his emerging vision of a state-controlled infrastructure system.259
The legislature had sent him a bill granting corporate status to the River Raisin Steam Boat
Company and the St. Joseph and Chicago Steam Boat Company. This was not unusual because,
as mentioned, since 1830 the territory had granted corporate charters for twenty-five railroads.
Arguably, the governor would welcome the companies, as financiers had been shying away from
investing in Michigan because its infrastructure projects were financial losers.260 Nevertheless,
Mason vetoed the measure, vigorously objecting to the exclusive privileges taken by
corporations:
The creation of innumerable incorporated companies in the midst of
society is a departure from the principles of republican government.
Government is intended for the benefit of the many not the few, and where the
people are the original of government, legislation should be adopted with a
regard to their welfare. Acts of incorporation are aristocratic in their
tendencies. They give exclusive privileges to a few, bestow partial benefits
upon a favoured class, and [are] detrimental to the general interest of the
public.261
Mason continued his passionate objection by claiming corporations “if not checked, must soon
entail upon the territory the curse of monied monopolies, which will ultimately impoverish and
then control the wants of the great body of people.”262 The veto presaged his soon to be
announced system of almost exclusively state-controlled infrastructure. Unlike many of its sister
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states, Michigan would shy away from involving corporations in its major internal improvement
projects. In espousing that position, Mason would advance a classically republican critique of
capitalism’s corrosive influences.
Corporations during this period were significantly different from those today. With a few
exceptions, in the first half of the nineteenth century state legislatures specifically incorporated
each of those entities. In Michigan, their creation required a two-thirds majority of the
legislature.263 Special corporations enjoyed the new concept of limited liability and indefinite
lives, unlike the other business entities of the time. They also received legislatively granted
monopolies, where others could not compete in their fields or along their routes, and with respect
to railroads, often also enjoyed eminent domain powers. Hall noted, “Antebellum legislatures
embraced eminent domain because it was a means to protecting venturing capitalists who could
achieve a public purpose through private profit.” 264 Harry Scheiber reported that government
granted eminent-domain power to private transport companies “in every state.”265 While
eminent domain grants and the other powers induced investors to risk significant capital, the
grants themselves often were considered anti-democratic receipts of privilege that were
aristocratic in nature. Because of their special treatment, popular opinion held corporations in
low regard. Daniel Raymond, one of America’s first political economists, perhaps best reflected
that opinion in 1823:
The very object then of the act of incorporation is to produce inequality, either
in rights, or in the division of property. . . . Every money corporation,
therefore, is prima facie, injurious to national wealth, and ought to be looked
upon by those who have no money, with jealousy and suspicion. They are, and
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ought to be considered, as artificial engines of power, contrived by the rich, for
the purpose of increasing their already too great ascendency, and calculated to
destroy that natural equality among men, which no government ought to lend
its power in destroying.266
Those beliefs continued through much of the mid century. John D. Pierce, a father of
Michigan’s educational system concluded:
The spirit of aggregated capital is aggressive. It has no limit, no bounds.
Controlling the legislation of the world, it has been resistless in its sway. It
never tires, it never sleeps. Soulless, heartless, remorseless, conscienceless, it
presses onward, regardless of the dying or the dead. It produces nothing, but
watches with an eagle-eye all the products of labor. It taxes all classes. It
watches the wheat grower, the wool grower, the cotton grower, the laborer, the
spinner and the washer-woman, and is never satisfied except with the lion’s
portion. Robbing labor of its reward, it reduces to, and leaves the man and his
family in, abject poverty; not satisfied, it takes his cot, and turns him, wife and
children out.267
Hartz captured the era’s tenor. “An anti-charter philosophy emerged which became one of the
most powerful, repetitious, and exaggerated themes in the popular literature.”268 Nevertheless, in
a capital-poor nation at the beginning of its market-economy experiences, those special
corporations presented the ability to accumulate capital to advance commerce.
To facilitate that in the rail sphere, the Michigan legislature at times granted those entities
not only monopoly power, but extraordinary protections of corporate property. For example, the
1837 statute incorporating the Detroit & Shiawassee Railroad provided that anyone impairing the
road’s property or impeding the work of the engineers was liable to the company for treble
damages.269 Damages to an individual’s or unincorporated business’s property carried only
ordinary damage remedies. By granting treble damages to railroads, the legislature not only
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created extra-normal disincentives to lawbreakers, it granted a windfall to railroads in the event
of damage to their property.
Because these corporations enjoyed special powers, the state sought public benefits from
them, and imposed obligations to curtail their monopolistic tendencies. It would do so by
retaining the power to set rates, providing for limited life spans, requiring personal liability of
corporate officers, and by providing that the government could purchase the corporation after a
set period. So important was this requirement that Territory Governor Porter repeatedly vetoed
special incorporation statutes that failed to include the governmental purchase option. In 1832
he asked, “whether in all grants of this kind, there ought to be a proviso by which the Territory or
county may, at any time, become entitled to” the corporation (in this case a bridge proposed to be
built and operated over the St. Joseph River.)270 Those clauses were common in legislation
creating private rail corporations,271 and not just in Michigan. Hurst noted that “[w]ith little
question or exception, in the very act of providing franchises for private capital development,
state constitution makers and legislators developed the practice of including in their grants the
standard reservation of legislative authority to amend or repeal what they gave.” This
reservation was not simply to maintain legislative prerogatives in the aftermath of Dartmouth
College. As Hurst continued, the reservations allowed the states to “provide a framework within
which many may venture, rather than a favored few, and it must take care that future release of
creative energy is not barred by the rigidity of old concessions.”272 Embedded in Michigan’s
grants sat a philosophy of governance. In order to release the residents’ commercial energies,
government would retain the right to take over private infrastructure if that would enhance the
270
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general welfare. It was about public gain, not private, but more fundamentally, the state believed
that it should participate in, and even dominate, its transportation industry.
The reservation of power over corporations evidences a concern that accumulated wealth
could undermine American governance. Michigan Justice Charles Whipple took notice of that
concern in Green v Graves, a case dealing with the constitutionality of banking entities created
with less than the two-thirds majority required by the state constitution. He reflected, “The
community were alarmed at the vast increase of corporations. They feared the power that such
institutions were capable of wielding. The belief was entertained that this power had actually
been wielded for bad purposes. It was argued that all corporations were, in a greater or less
degree, monopolies, and hence the prejudices of the community were arrayed against them.”273
In invalidating Michigan’s law allowing for the creation of bank corporations without the twothirds vote, the Court cited Justice McLean of the U.S. Supreme Court in Beaty v Knowler: the
“exercise of the corporate franchise is restrictive of individual rights.”274 Those opinions voiced
the same concerns Mason had regarding corporations; corporations threatened individual rights
and republican governance and were, therefore, to be employed only where necessary, and then
with due caution.275
Underlying much of this unease was a concern that private ends could overwhelm pubic
goals. Many feared that the baser, selfish nature of man would eventually undercut American
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freedoms. To Mason, only the state, as the embodiment of the people, could guard against the
dangers of individual self-interest. He warned, “there is yet an insidious and secret foe the
American people should guard against.” That foe was the self-concerned individual. Mason
predicted that the “imperceptible but all absorbing desire lurking in the heart of man to
aggrandize self and promote private ends; which is too apt to forget country, and which, if
indulged and encouraged, must prove the undoubted cause of a premature national
degeneracy.”276 Given those concerns, placing economic power in the hands of the
democratically elected government seemed the answer. To Mason, doing so assured a
continuation of American democratic principles, the protection of the sovereign people from
themselves, and the development of the coveted rail system.

The Promise of Robust Governance
With a palpable fear of corporations and a trust in democratic governance, Michigan
citizens began drafting the state’s first constitution. The lessons gleaned from the Erie Canal’s
success were so strong that, in framing their constitution, they “took pains to impose upon the
legislature the duty of following the example of New York.” 277 Accordingly, Michigan’s first
constitution obligated the state to facilitate internal improvements. To accomplish this, the
constitution provided in Article XII, §3 that:
Internal improvements shall be encouraged by the government of this State:
and it shall be the duty of the legislature, as soon as may be, to make provision
by law for ascertaining the proper objects of improvement, in relation to roads,
canals and navigable waters; and it shall also be their duty to provide by law
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for an equal, systematic, economical application of the funds which may be
appropriated to these objects.278
The language was not merely empowering; it was demanding.279 The constitution placed on the
legislature the affirmative obligation to act – and time was of the essence. The federal
government’s continuing sales of land in the territory threatened to undermine the state’s ability
to lay out appropriate routes. The territory’s delegate to Congress, John Biddle, fretted that those
sales were often for “lands lying in the direction of the proposed railroad.” Accordingly, “the
time has arrived, when a long cherished scheme of internal improvements may be
commenced.”280
It is worth briefly laying out the structure of Michigan’s early state government. The
constitution provided for a strong governor with significant appointment powers. It called for a
bicameral legislature. Elections were to be held annually for representatives and biannually for
senators. The governor was to be elected every two years. The constitution called for an
energized government that supported industry, agriculture, and education by providing that the
“legislature shall encourage, by all suitable means, the promotion of intellectual, scientific and
agricultural improvements.” It set specific educational funding sources and limited the
legislature’s ability to divert funds from the educational mission. It called for libraries in each
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township and for the support of a state university. 281 The framers had advanced an activist
government model, designed to facilitate societal development and welfare. Voters
overwhelmingly approved this constitution by a six-to-one margin. This is not surprising. As
Hurst noted, governments of the time were “dominated by the virtue of overcoming scarcity,”
and Michigan’s government planned to do so by aggressively educating its people and by
building an infrastructure that would allow sales of the state’s bounty to an increasingly
expanding nation.282
Historians often associate government support of rail as the consequence of scarce private
capital. For example, Goodrich suggested that in most of the nation, “popular desire for internal
improvements was so strong and the inability of private business to raise sufficient funds for the
major projects was so manifest that methods of mixed enterprise and public work” were strongly
encouraged.283 At least insofar as Michigan was concerned, that correlation is incomplete.
Michigan’s leadership visualized internal improvements as the very essence of government’s
mission, even to the point of disdaining privately capitalized projects as at odds with democratic
needs. Railroads in Michigan, as in other areas of the nation, were viewed as a means to a more
democratic and egalitarian society. It was believed that, “There is no truer, more honest,
unterrified democrat ‘than the railroad, for the moment steam entered, aristocracy was doomed
and the final enfranchisement of society, from artificial distinctions, absolutely and effectively
secured.’”284 This new transportation system offered Michigan residents not only routes to
commercial markets, it promised to raze the walls of aristocracy.
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With a history of failed private rail-enterprises and a concern over the threat successful
corporations posed to governance, the state’s leadership proposed a state-focused rail system
where Michigan would own its major lines and exercise significant control over its feeder lines.
An 1838 Senate Committee on State Affairs report voiced that republican ideology. It started by
suggesting that it was government’s role to supplement private capital, but then quickly shifted
to a vision of robust democratic government. “[I]ndividual effort alone is not adequate to so
great purposes; it is to man in his social capacity – to communities of men – to governments, to
whom only the power and the high privilege is given of effecting them, and thus of ameliorating
the condition and augmenting the happiness of men.” Rail was a community need – a public
utility over which government must exercise control. The committee proposed that it was “the
appropriate duty then, and the natural province of government, and it is therefore fit and proper
that government should be armed with adequate power, so to control and, in just proportion, so
to apply, all the wealth and latent resources of the country over which it obtains . . those high
purposes.”285 Developing the infrastructure for community advancement was a core incident of
governance, and doing so democratized state commerce.
Michigan was not an outlier. Nationally, the early nineteenth century calls for
government economic activism responded to the anti-charter philosophy of the time. Those fears
of corporate monopolies led to the widespread belief that, where expedient, the state should
influence major infrastructure and banking enterprises as part of the nation’s concept of the
community. This notion is contrary to popularly held beliefs regarding early American
government and industry relations. As Hartz posited, the anti-corporate doctrine of the period
“assumes a role which is in many respects the precise antithesis of that in which the ‘laissez-fire’
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interpretation has traditionally cast it.” 286 And that responsibility went beyond internal
improvements. In Michigan, Mason told the legislature that it was their responsibility to develop
“a prudent and judicious system of legislation for the development” of agriculture and
commerce.287 Anything less was an abdication of the responsibilities of democratic governance.
Mason called the legislature to action during the 1835-1837 period, when Michigan was
neither fully a territory nor a state. As part of his advocacy for admission to the Union, Mason
requested that the federal government “extend a liberal and fostering hand” to Michigan as it had
with all the other newly admitted states. That assistance should include “large donations of land
. . . for the purpose of effecting their systems of education and internal improvements.”288 As
part of its submission for statehood, the Michigan legislature requested the federal government
appropriate land for schools, state buildings, salt springs, and five-hundred thousand acres
specifically for internal improvements. The proposal also requested that the state retain 5% of
the proceeds generated from the sale of federal lands, 40% of which would be earmarked for
internal improvements. Michigan proposed to embark on the internal improvement projects once
Congress approved statehood. It believed it could do so in an equal, systematic, and economical
way.
The fact that Michigan was not yet admitted only slowed implementation. After
bemoaning that thus far Michigan’s “application remains without final action of congress,”
Mason advised the legislature that, “among the first subjects which will naturally occupy your
attention . . . will be that of internal improvements.” He proposed that government’s job was
more than facilitating private initiatives. It was to drive that development through “liberal
legislation” that “should embrace within its range” rail and canal development in “every section
286
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of the state.” Along with his belief that government was actively to develop infrastructure,
Mason pressed that there was little space for privately controlled infrastructure projects. Where
private industry developed internal improvements, he proposed private projects “should never be
beyond at least, the partial control of the state.”289 He proposed, “So important is [infrastructure]
construction to the permanent interest and prosperity of the state, that I would recommend the
passage of a law, authorizing a subscription in behalf of the state, to a large amount of the capital
stock vested in the companies which have these roads in progress of completion.”290
On July 12, 1836, Mason crystallized his message. Expressing the state’s obligation to
advance the general welfare and his fear of monopoly power, Mason vetoed a bill to incorporate
the St. Clair and Grand River Railroad Company. In an almost frenetic attack on private rail
development, he argued that the state should construct and own the main railroads.
A grant of corporate powers to private companies for the construction of
railroads through the unsettled and unsold lands of the state, struck me as a
doubtful policy; the wants of the public could not absolutely demand the
measure; and the time was not distant when the state could with greater
security to the interest of the people, take the improvements into its own
hands.291
Accordingly, the state should predominate the railroad business. Private companies, with state
stock ownership, could develop only feeder lines. Even then, corporate charters should severely
restrict their latitude.
Mason explained why the state should be loath to employ the mixed corporate model that
other governments had employed – private corporations were hostile to the people’s interests.
Using what today would be considered startling language, Mason opined, “These profits from
the lands of the company, must be taken from the pockets of the people, who are the actual
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settlers of the country. . . . [E]xperience teaches us, that the interest of all incorporated
companies, are generally at war with the interest of the people.”292 Mason’s stated concern was
that the profits would go into private hands rather than state coffers. He believed that citizens
needed protection from the high fares charged by monopoly railroads. Moreover, high freight
costs would encumber commercial development and stifle population growth. Mason’s position
was rooted in a belief that democratic government could better advance and protect the people’s
interest than private industry. Underlying his thought was a belief in taxless finance.
Government would develop infrastructure, offer low fares, avoid threat of accumulated wealth,
and do so without taxation.
The goals did not stop there. Mason thought government ownership of rail would also
fund government itself. His dream of state-owned businesses financing government extended to
the legislature. In 1837, Michigan’s House Committee on Ways and Means recommended, “it
would seem desirable to invest” future surplus revenue as well as the 5% proceeds Michigan
enjoyed upon the sale of federal lands in the state, “in such a manner as to produce the greatest
possible revenue.” As an investor in business, the state would be able to “greatly lessen, if not
entirely relieve, the people from the burden of direct taxation.”293 Government ownership of
industry not only protected democracy, it promised the equivalent of a perpetual motion machine
– one able to provide governance at no cost.294
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Mason also voiced an underlying belief that all who enjoyed the benefits of rail should
pay for it, and only government could make that so. He took an expansive view, positing that
benefits were societal, not just to those employing rail services. Rail’s benefits included
improved property values, commercial development, and communications. With private
ownership, those indirect but real beneficiaries would enjoy an economic free ride while only
those directly employing rail services, most typically farmers, would pay for that development.
Mason thought this unjust: “I would respectfully ask then, if even a direct tax, levied for the
construction of the road, would not be more equal and less oppressive than this tax upon the
settlers on the line of the contemplated railroad.”295 That tax on settlers was the transportation
fees farmers paid. Public rail ownership allowed for equal enjoyment of, and equal burdens for,
the blessings of prosperity. Four days later, the legislature joined Mason’s crusade. To set the
legal framework for future internal-improvement legislation, on July 16, 1836, the Senate
assigned the Committee on State Affairs “to inquire into the expediency of adopting such
measures as will enable the state to assume and complete all the internal improvements within
the state.”296
The House soon weighed in. Such a system was, to the House Committee on Internal
Improvements “the great lever which [was] opening the sealed up fountains of national wealth
and civilization.”297 Through state control, Michigan could parry the efforts of competing states,
like Ohio, to take away Michigan’s rightful commercial space. In the event a private corporation
operated a rail line, the state must maintain controlling influence. Simple stock ownership was
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not enough to maintain control because of the ability of corporations to issue additional stock.
Accordingly, legislation required that corporate charters must contain language restricting the
share dilution.298 It also required that charters oblige private rail to operate in the public
interest.299 Both the executive and legislature still preferred direct state ownership, at least over
the major rail lines, but where private lines could enhance the public interest they were welcome
to do so, subject to continuing state control.300
Up to this point, most state government action was anticipatory. Michigan had not been
admitted into the Union and the legislature was reluctant to commence work before the state’s
status was clear. As soon as that admission seemed imminent, Mason requested legislation
creating state ownership of the major lines and state control over privately owned lines where
they existed or might become necessary.301 He would not approve private lines where they
would compete with public lines. Most significantly, he sought to borrow five-million dollars to
construct a state owned rail and canal system.302 The legislature seemed ready. The House
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committee responsible for the bills framed future spending as an “investment” and “not an
expenditure.”303
Immediately after Congress accepted Michigan into the Union in late-January 1837, the
legislature went to work. The Michigan House Committee on Internal Improvements reported
that internal improvements would attract settlers, industry, and wealth. In rejecting the prior
generation’s Jeffersonian ideals, the committee looked forward: “It has ceased to be a question,
whether the calm and peaceable occupations of a pastoral and agricultural life, are more
conducive to human happiness than the excitement and activity of commerce and manufactures.”
Michigan’s “future prosperity” would be “inseparably interwoven with the progress of internal
improvements,” and it would become the link between the Mississippi and the Atlantic.304 The
choice was simple and obvious. The state could energetically build her infrastructure as “vast
viaducts of wealth and prosperity” or stand by and watch as internal improvements “swell[ed]
the power and abundance of her wiser neighbors.” Moreover, all of this could be achieved using
the income from the rail lines, without any tax contributions. Rail would bring a 10% return and,
with 5% bonds, would add $250,000 annually to government coffers. Personal taxes would then
go down. Lest one think that government alone was caught up in this frenzy, the Detroit
Advertiser suggested that the state raid the education fund for seed money to develop railroads
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and canals. The infrastructure improvements, according to the article, would net between 10%
and 20% annually.305
In one sense, the committee had diverged a bit from the governor. It proposed employing
private corporations to help complete the infrastructure network. Its reasoning was practical:
Michigan could not undertake all aspects of the project. Speaking almost regretfully, the
committee submitted that an “attempt by the state to grasp the entire control of all such works,
[would] of necessity impede the progress of the whole.”306 Accordingly, the committee
suggested allowing private industry to construct and operate local feeder lines to the state’s
major lines. This does not mean that the committee eagerly embraced private corporations. Had
the state the wherewithal, government ownership was preferred. Maximizing state ownership
not only would allow Michigan to fulfill its vision of becoming the throughway to the
Mississippi, but it promised the panacea of low tax rates.
The legislature answered the call by authorizing the governor to borrow $5 million for the
purpose of constructing a state owned and led internal improvement system. It pledged the
state’s credit to buy the bond loans, and authorized the governor to contract on behalf of the
state. It provided for a sinking fund, financed by the proceeds from the state’s rail and canal
operations and dividends from bank stocks to pay off the interest and principal on the
indebtedness.307 The committee reflected that the state’s internal improvement project was “an
investment which will afford an ample profit; and that profit, instead of swelling the wealth of
individuals and companies, will be equally divided among the whole mass of our population, by
305
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creating and maintaining public revenue, which in the process of time, will materially lesson the
public burden.”308 The committee report, and the passage of the $5 million loan authorization,
demonstrated that the legislature and Mason carried the same anti-corporate, pro-state ownership
philosophy.
“It might be imagined,” Carter Adams commented, “from the proceedings of her early
legislature, that the purpose for which [Michigan] sought the privileges of a state was to build
canals, railroads, and turnpikes, and to improve rivers and harbors.”309 Whigs and Democrats,
legislators and the governor all agreed: public ownership of the rails was optimal and, where that
did not occur, strict public controls of private rail companies were required. As Robert Parks
noted in his study of Michigan’s early rail experience: “the major difference between opponents
[in the legislature] was not over the desirability of roads, but in their number [and] location.”310
Legislators resolved those differences by giving something to everybody. Mason had proposed a
sizeable but limited rail and canal program. By the time all sectional interests were heard, the
internal improvement project significantly exceeded the governor’s proposal. This project
expansion met with nearly universal acclaim. As the Detroit Advertiser noted in 1842, “the
system was the embodied wish of the people. It was their wish and met their undivided support.
True some thought we were acting too rapidly, but still they acquiesced. The system was not the
offspring of party but of the whole people.”311 At that moment, Michigan’s constitution, its
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executive, legislature, and people aspired to the same end. The state would develop the internal
improvement system.

Troubled Implementation and Broken Promises
At first, the project’s finances seemed promising. The state would enjoy $382,000 of
federal assistance, when the state received funds in 1837 as part of the distribution of $28 million
of national surplus funds. (Michigan’s share was so low because of its small population).312
Having witnessed the Canal’s success, the Michigan Legislature believed (or at least hoped) that
the project would be self-funding, and taxation would never be required. Accordingly, they
legislated that the revenues earned would service the debt. The Internal Improvement Act called
for three trans-peninsula rail lines. The Southern rail line would extend from Monroe to New
Buffalo, the Central line from Detroit to St. Joseph, and the Northern line from Port Huron
through Grand Rapids to Lake Michigan. The legislation also financed three sizeable canal
projects, loans to four private railroads, six river-improvement projects, and two salt facilities.
Knowing that it had granted monopoly rights to a number of private rail companies, the
legislature also provided that the newly formed Board of Commissioners could buy those lines
should the state lines “materially injure” the private lines’ rights.313 Michigan sought to
undertake these expensive projects despite its small, economically undeveloped population of
only 175,000 inhabitants and total assessed values of less than $43 million.314
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Advancing the general welfare in this fashion assumed the state had or would develop the
resources to implement its design. It also assumed it could build an effective system without the
corrosive force of sectional influences. Those assumptions would quickly prove misguided.
Sectional differences would soon arise and would eventually weigh heavily on public support for
Michigan’s state-owned system.315 Notwithstanding that significant difficulty, finances would
present the biggest challenge: by the time Michigan could start selling its internal-improvement
bonds, the Panic of 1837 had set in, European investors had balked, and Michigan’s population
growth had slowed. In the meantime, the legislature had set about spending the money,
purchasing existing rail lines, and authorizing expenditures on newly planned lines. Justice
Campbell later would characterize the young state’s efforts as “like an heir just emancipated,
[launching] into the most lavish display of her new freedom, and fancied opulence.”316 The
constitution’s design for a robust governance would soon begin to fray.
Almost from the beginning, sales of the bonds proved difficult. Mason soon learned that
the authorized 5% interest rate and the statute’s limited payment locations effectively thwarted
efforts to sell the bonds. In response, the legislature raised the interest rate to 6% and allowed
payment in Europe (but set the exchange rate at $4.44 to the Pound). As European financers
balked at those enhanced terms and Mason caught wind of proposed side dealings, Mason
negotiated an agreement with Edward Biddle of the Morris Canal and Banking Company.317 The
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company agreed to act as agent to sell the bonds for the state and to pay $250,000 upon
execution of the contract, $1,050,000 as Michigan required for construction, and quarterly
$250,000 installments starting in mid 1839. The agreement provided for a two and one-half
percent commission, meaning that Michigan would receive less than par value – a probable
violation of the legislation. Initially, Michigan would turn over bonds as they were sold. That
soon changed. Morris Bank and Mason would soon agree to involve the United States Bank of
Pennsylvania. (That bank was the successor to the non-renewed Bank of the United States.) The
terms largely were the same, with one exception: Michigan would turn over the remaining
$3,700,000 worth of bonds, and received no collateral in exchange.318 In doing so, the state
became dependent on both the banks’ continuing, solvency, integrity, and their ability to sell the
bonds for cash.
That reliance soon proved unfortunate. As a consequence of the Panic of 1837, the
nation and Michigan suffered from collapsing land prices, reduced tax revenues, multiple bank
failures, agricultural price declines, and currency collapses.319 “Bank notes became so valueless
that in grim humor some investors who but a little while before were supposedly rich used them
for wall paper.”320 In 1839, Alexander Trotter, of the London Stock Exchange, warned investors
that state internal improvement projects would not be able “to produce a revenue sufficient to
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keep them in repair and to pay the interest on the cost of their construction.”321 Despite Trotter’s
warnings, some British banks continued to lend, in part based upon America’s history of
repaying its national debt and in part based on a misunderstanding of the relationship between
federal and state governments. A Baring Brothers’ circular issued during the depressed 1839
actually encouraged loans for American internal improvement projects. Believing that the states
would “faithfully meet their engagements with their creditors,” Baring expressed “confidence
[that] the resources and the national honor of the United States remain undiminished in this
country, as well as the conviction that by such investments England employs her annual surplus
of capital both safely and profitably, encourages her best customers, and binds more closely the
ties of mutual interest between the two countries.”322 Several British banks were excited to lend
capital to American states. The investments tendered high returns along with, many believed,
little risk.
As British banks saw security in loans for state internal improvement projects,
Michigan’s financial condition (and that of other states) continued to deteriorate. So serious was
the crisis that Mason began to slide on his commitment to a self-financing system. While, in
1838, he had commented, “It will never answer to think of relying upon direct taxation for means
to meet these obligations,” by the end of 1839, Mason grumbled, “It will require the most
prudent and careful legislation, to prevent an ultimate appeal to direct taxation.”323 The
challenge would transcend an ability to sell bonds or a shortfall on projected rail revenues. The
banks would soon suffer financial distress and default on their obligations to pay the state. In
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response, Mason suggested that the legislature look for new sources of revenue, request aid from
the federal government, and consider modifying the breadth of railroad programs.
The election season of 1839 introduced caustic criticism of Michigan’s rail efforts. The
state’s Whig convention denounced the Democratic administration’s rail efforts, declaring that
“the history of our state government, brief as it is, has been one of official stupidity, fraud, and
corruption.”324 With politics in the air, the legislature looked for scapegoats. In 1839, the House
formed a committee to investigate corruption in rail construction and payments. In what the
committee classified as a “somewhat exciting investigation,” it uncovered numerous allegations
of fraud and misdeeds. After finding that an early leader of the Central rail line squandered “two
to three thousand dollars!!,” in a “profuse and profligate system of expenditure of the public
funds”, the committee outed a real culprit, John Beech, a disbursing agent for the Central line.
The committee accused the Central’s leadership of hiring a man “advertised as a public defaulter,
or fugitive from justice from the state of New York,” who, in his three months on the job, used
his skills to embezzle $8,405.14 (about $160,000 today).325 The committee also accused both
acting commissioner Colonial James B. Hunt (the man who hired Beech) and General L. S.
Humphries of “a desire to subserve his own interests” and “intending to deceive the board of
internal improvements.” The committee’s tone suggested that political posturing tinted its report
with an unfairly dark hue. Most claims of impropriety, when investigated, seemed unfounded.
Nevertheless, when combined with the state’s financial difficulties, the committee’s allegations
undermined public confidence in government control of rail.326
324
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It is worth stepping back a moment to reflect on why the leadership had been blind to the
challenges associated with the massive internal improvement project. To inhabitants of 1830 and
1840s Michigan, rail progress opened new and exciting worlds. The completion of lines thrilled
residents of newly served areas and opened possibilities heretofore only imagined. The opening
of Detroit (and the lakes) to Ann Arbor is one such example. With construction of the line
between Detroit and Ann Arbor significantly behind schedule in early 1839, tensions frayed and
recriminations flared.327 Those feelings quickly evaporated when, in October, Ann Arbor
received rail service. There was a “party feeling” associated with the completion of the line to
Ann Arbor. “All was gaiety and delight.” Pageantry abounded and toasts to the state’s and
communities’ success were the rule of the day. Cheering residents toasted to “The State of
Michigan – Internal improvements necessary to the development of her abundant natural
resources,” and to “Railroads and Canals – The business of months is now done in a day; if they
do not lengthen our years, they enable us to live in the same time.” Taken by the celebration,
one toast boosted, “Railroads and Steam Power – A Yankee’s notion of the Utile cum Dulce,”
(the practical with the sweet).328 On the day before the rail line opened, it took farmers thirty-six
hours to move their crops the thirty-eight miles to the Detroit market. With the opening, it now
took two and one-half hours.329 These were exciting times of economic and social advance.
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But not all were excited. Earlier that year, a farmer had set fire to a rail bridge,
seemingly to protest the state’s failure to compensate him for livestock lost to oncoming
locomotives. The destroyed bridge had delayed the connection between Detroit and Ann Arbor
and an incensed lieutenant governor extended a $1,000 reward for the arrest of the culprit. Judge
Cyrus Howard, having learned the name of the culprit, perhaps at a trial of an accessory, helped
facilitate the arrest of Nelson Cochrane. The judge then sought the reward, only to be frustrated
by the Senate Committee of the Judiciary. The committee, fearing the “charge of corruption”
determined that “the dignity of the bench” would suffer if the state paid bounties rewarding “a
judge of the conviction of a person who may be tried before him.”330 The story offers more than
a peek into earlier judicial temperaments. It suggests a bubbling discontent associated with the
introduction of industrialized risks into a pre-industrial world. There were few barriers between
livestock’s historic grazing lands and the rail lines. As a result, livestock perished and farmers
financially suffered. The state would pay for lost livestock (and endure claims that perhaps
exceeded real losses) but, as rail increasingly became privately held, those private entities would
be more reticent to pay for livestock losses. In response, violence would erupt between rail lines
and farming communities. As those issues flared, society, government, and law would struggle
to reconcile long-standing farming traditions with the dangers of industrialization. That struggle
is discussed later in this work.
Ann Arbor’s celebration of rail access was also a celebration of government:
Government had brought the rail, and all its benefits. Across the nation, state governments acted
to advance rail development. To varying degrees, every state chartered rail entities with
monopoly and other powers. Contrary to the laissez-faire myth, each of those states facilitated
330
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and participated in the accumulation of capital to advance general-welfare interests. In addition,
they became significant investors in those entities. These were not de minimis efforts. “In the
years 1836-38 alone, states accrued more debts than they had over the previous fifty years.”
Foreign banks provided much of that capital, with most of it employed for internal
improvements.331
Government contributions to internal improvements took various forms, with most
adopting models different from Michigan’s pure ownership. In most cases, government assisted
private corporations by granting eminent domain powers so that routes effectively could be laid,
by offering land grants, tax exemptions, and banking privileges and, in many cases, by investing
in those corporations.332 The rail corporations would then give stock in exchange for those
government cash investments. The government as an investor presented interesting legal
questions, as sovereign states have rights and responsibilities different from those of private
corporations. To reconcile those challenges, investor-states would not be clothed as sovereign
entities even though they might hold a majority interest in a corporation.333 At least under
Michigan law, when the state outright owned and operated its railroads, those roads were akin to
auxiliaries of government, functioning as government itself; but if the state was a mere investor,
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corporate-liability rules applied.334 More importantly than the legal rules, public expectations
differed between state-owned and state-invested lines. Outright ownership lengthened the touch
points for resident critique, and opened the legislature and executive to intensified pressures that
would have been more muted under the government-as-investor model. Dissatisfaction over
routes, construction timetables, and resource allocations would translate into a distaste for
government itself. As importantly, an owner-state did not enjoy the same ability to walk away
from a failed investment as it would with a more limited private investment. That state
ownership carried a deeper, long-term commitment.
By mid-1839, Michigan was constructing a financially burdensome, government-owned
rail system. Almost immediately, costs outstripped revenues, construction proved more
expensive than expected and, as explained below, receipts on the bonds woefully missed
expectations. Recriminations were rampant, as politicians sought to distance themselves from
prior positions. In response to Whig arguments that Michigan’s internal improvement challenges
were the “evil effect of bad legislation,” the Democratic Free Press reminded its readers that all
had agreed to the system. The sole issue had been the details of the system, not its wisdom or
scope.335 The newspaper’s point was well taken: during the debates over the legislation, Whigs
had expressed concern over the placement of the rail lines, not the prudence of the projects.336
Rather than debating the enterprise itself, legislative logrolling presented the challenge.337
Legislators advanced projects to support purely local interests, and compromises tended to offer
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something to all, including offering loans to private rail lines.338 The legislation had passed with
only one dissenting vote.
The poisonous political atmosphere led to Mason’s decision not to again run for office.
In his last address as governor, Mason reflected, “after months of warfare, between conflicting
local interests, a conference between the two houses of the legislature, result[ed] in the
unanimous adoption of the present system of internal improvements.” Rather than assigning
responsibility to one party, he blamed “that false spirit of the age” where Michigan had
“overtasked her energies and resources.”339 The Senate Committee on Finance disagreed: It was
Mason’s fault. The committee insinuated that “matters, dark and mysterious” characterized
Mason’s handling of the railroad loans and that private interests swayed his dealings. It then
proposed a stinging resolution: “That we do hereby solemnly protest against the powers
assumed, and the acts committed by our agent and declare them to have been, not merely
unauthorized by law, and in violation of constitutional and legal provisions, but also of the
obligations imposed by honor, and moral honesty.”340 Mason did not testify before the
committee. The new Whig legislature had refused even to receive Mason’s final message before
he left office. Mason shortly would leave the state. He died three years later at the age of 31
years.

An Eroding Constitutional Mandate

Soon the state was unable to meet its obligations to its contractors, and stopped work on
all but the Southern and Central lines, two canals, and one river project. Even then, those nonrail projects would halt with the exhaustion of previously allocated funds. Next, the battle turned
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to apportioning resources between the Central and Southern. The projects were woefully
underfunded and the economics demanded that only one line proceed at a time. However, the
constitution demanded an “equal” application of state funds, resulting in a clash between
constitutional mandates and economic realities. As the Committee on Internal Improvements
noted in 1843, despite the “mandate of the constitution” and “the purest motives of patriotism
and an ardent desire early to provide for every portion of the state . . . time and experience has
conclusively proved to us that their anticipations were too sanguine, and the resources . . . too
inadequate” to achieve government’s aspirations.341 Just a few years before, the governor, the
legislature, and the constitution promised railroads in every section of the state. Now, the
government recognized that it did not have the resources to honor those commitments.
The state’s second governor, the Whig William Woodbridge entered office in 1840
facing enormous budgetary challenges. Before assuming office, Woodbridge approached
advisors for their thoughts on the railroads. Woodbridge was considering shutting down or
stopping expansion of some or all of the lines. H. B. Lathrop, an official of the Central Railroad
agreed with Woodbridge, and proposed the best vehicle to financial stability required a focus on
the his rail line. He asked if it was prudent to abandon or suspend the most lucrative of the state
lines. “Shall over $1,000,000 be lost to the state when a further expenditure of $250,000 will put
the works in such a state that they will pay interest on the whole sum in addition to the great
convenience it would be not only to this county but to the two counties west of us?”342 To
Woodbridge’s request for advice from the state’s auditor general, E. P. Hastings responded that
the state should focus on one line. He then addressed the mothballed remainder. “To the
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question what shall be done with the works which it is proposed to abandon? I would suggest for
the present a recommendation only to suspend their present construction.” Selling the other lines
was ill advised. “The reasons for this must be apparent to everyone. . . . It might save the State
from a present cost to sell the works to companies to be incorporated – but should the other
works be completed, they would come into competition with the State works and materially
effect the income of the State.”343
Woodbridge’s search for advice had uncovered two issues but, interestingly, neither
advisor had challenged the state-ownership model. Both advisors suggested focusing the state’s
efforts on particular lines. In that sense, practical economic considerations had overwhelmed the
constitutional mandate of even construction to benefit all. Hasting’s advice suggested an
additional concern – a shifting threat associated with corporations. In advocating a state-owned
system, Mason and the legislature had voiced concerns that corporations would exercise their
monopoly power to overcharge customers. To Hastings, that was no longer the problem.
Instead, it was that those corporations would compete with the state’s monopoly and thereby
diminish the government’s assets. Hasting’s approach was that the government must be
protected from competition: a significant departure from some of the anti-monopoly reasoning of
a few years earlier.
In 1840, rail problems provoked a governmental financial crisis. Rail expenses continued
to exceed the underwriters’ bond payments, work slowed, and needed repairs were absent. In his
first message to the legislature, Woodbridge observed, “This scheme, so bold in its conception,
so splendid in its design, so captivating to a fervid imagination, but yet so disproportioned to our
present local wants, and so utterly beyond our present means, must, I fear, as a whole at least, be
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given up.” One challenge was that the national government owned four-fifths of the land the rail
line covered. As idle lands, they presented no freight possibilities; as national lands they
furnished no tax income. Woodbridge proposed that the state limit its efforts to nearly finished
projects whose costs of completion would be repaid through tolls. With respect to canals (and
perhaps with a nod toward rail) he proposed that private industry might better complete the
projects, “as the avidity of private gain leads to a more scrupulous and sharp sighted economy
than is found ordinarily to flow from the colder dictates of public duty.”344
The legislature responded with politics rather than solutions. It attacked the efforts of the
former administration, and was unwilling to follow Woodbridge’s advice on privatizing canals.
It prohibited new work contracts including repair efforts needed for existing operations, while
allowing existing operations to continue notwithstanding the need to focus resources.345 The
legislature expressed concerns that the rail projects suffered from inefficiencies and, perhaps,
corruption. In response to those concerns, it now required monthly contractor reports, fines for
delayed work, procedural impediments to fraud, and surety bonds to protect against
impropriety.346 In that sense, the legislature addressed waste but not the core challenge of a
vision that exceeded practical economics. Meanwhile, state residents continued to press for state
internal improvement efforts affecting their municipalities, and government officials faced a
choice between realistic spending and constituent satisfaction.347 It was at about this time that
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the Morris Canal and Bank Company again defaulted on its quarterly principle and interest
payments.
The state’s options were becoming increasingly limited. Taxation of the state’s few
residents seemed untenable. Woodbridge bemoaned that the rail efforts resulted “in the
exhaustion – alas, of our means; – in the prostration failure of our hopes; – in the humiliating
failure of this undertaking!” 348 Without the ability to spread the tax burden to the state’s largest
landholder – the federal government – the rail program’s dream of lowering taxes and raising
land values evaporated. It was replaced by a reality of looming default, state bankruptcy, or
heavy taxation.
A year after he had taken office, Woodbridge formally declared the railroad projects to be
a failure.
And in truth, the plan originally devised, was altogether disproportionate to
our means; it was gigantic and visionary. I suppose it to be part of wisdom, in
private life to do one thing first. It cannot be otherwise with states. It can
never be either expedient or wise, to undertake more than can be fitly and
within a reasonable time, accomplished. But with us in Michigan, we have
many things begun, but nothing finished. We have nothing yet productive!349
Woodbridge continued by suggesting that, had the project been undertaken in a systematic way,
it would have been successful. He proposed to become more systematized by focusing on the
Central route as the most likely to bring the return necessary to continue state internalimprovement efforts. Meanwhile, the legislature continued to struggle with the political
challenges associated with limiting rail development to profitable ends. The Whigs and
Democrats, the state’s residents, and newspapers agreed that the vast internal improvement
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efforts were unsustainable. The problem was that they each advocated a plan that would work to
their favored benefit. Lost in the discussion was Article XII, §3’s constitutional requirement that
the projects be “equal [and] systematic.” Financial realities had drowned out constitutional
requirements.
In 1841, local interest clashed, almost violently, with state efforts to allocate resources to
their best statewide advantage. The flare-up occurred in response to an internal improvement
commissioner’s determination to divert rail iron from the Southern line to the Central. There
should not have been a problem moving the iron from Monroe, Michigan to the Central as that
iron was surplus and was rusting away. The commission believed that the use of the iron would
increase the Central’s revenue by 20%, a much-needed infusion of cash, and would do nothing
for the Southern.350 Indeed, under the legislature’s restrictions on new contracts, there was no
planned (legal) use for the Monroe-located iron, except for its use to complete the Central line’s
contracts.
John Van Fossen, a newly appointed internal improvement commissioner, gave the
instructions for a removal crew to travel to Monroe to remove the iron (this was after several
unanswered request to the Monroe authorities). That decision excited residents’ fears that the
state would abandon their favored Southern line in favor of the Central. Monroe Mayor Dan
Miller signed the handbills posted around the city warning of “evil disposed persons and
depredators on public property, actuated by the devil and [the commissioner] are prowling about
the streets preparing to steal the iron rail and spikes.”351 With the courthouse bell ringing its
warning, the removal crew arrived in Monroe. There they faced a crowd ready to defeat their
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intentions. Outnumbered, the removal crew backed away and contacted the rail authorities, who
called up the militia.
Having won the first round, Monroe’s residents planned their next steps, as troops
gathered so that they might enter the city the next morning. Determined to forestall those efforts,
residents gathered in the dark of night and loaded the iron onto freight cars for removal. After
attempting to pull the car with horses and men, residents convinced a rail engineer to hook up a
locomotive to move the heavily loaded car outside of town. After going about 4 miles, the
residents dumped the iron into a nearby ditch and covered it with wood. The next morning, the
removal crew and the militia searched in vain for the iron. They left town, their plans defeated.
The city then employed its political power to discharge Commissioner Van Fossen, and to hire a
commissioner more sympathetic to the Southern line.352
It might be worth here considering the challenges associated with state ownership of rail
that would not be faced in private or mixed-ownership models of corporate governance.
Corruption charges were rampant and each decision to invest in one location met with
disapprobation in the other areas of the state. The results combined an unhappy citizenry with a
government seeking to invest according to popular will rather than economic need.353 Almost
immediately after approving a state rail project, the legislature had become involved in setting
rates. In 1838, it reviewed how rates should differ between movements of tools for agricultural
uses, versus rates for iron, slat, and roofing materials, versus stone and wood, versus liquor and
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hides and more.354 In other words, public officials ill versed in the economics of profitable
enterprise were making decisions based upon political and social needs.
Bleak state finances, the poor return on the bonds and slow, unprofitable rail
development mixed to require hard decisions on future rail work. In a private corporate model,
whether mixed or purely private, management would make asset allocation decisions according
to expected returns on those investments. Public ownership, on the other hand, invited political
involvement down to the smallest detail. A portion of the 1843 law regarding state rail
expenditures demonstrates a difficulty of public ownership.
The board of commissioners of internal improvements are hereby
authorized to purchase for the use of the state, a sufficient quantity of railroad
iron and spike, to iron the central railroad to the village of Marshall, and the
southern railroad to the village of Hillsdale; and the said board of
commissioners are hereby authorized to pledge for the payment of said iron
and spike the nett proceeds of the public works of this state. 355
If circumstances changed, the rail management would require further enactments to address the
changing reality from a legislature that may not be sitting when time-sensitive decisions were
required. More importantly, each decision the legislature made carried the flavor of local
political interests.
One solution mentioned, but not yet widely supported, was to privatize the lines. To the
contrary, leadership still believed state ownership preferable. Even as the financial picture
dimmed, the state advertised that rail “Built by the State of Michigan” was safer than the
alternatives. The government took “great care . . . in keeping this Road in good repair, thereby
avoiding accidents similar to those occurring upon other roads almost daily, jeopardizing ‘life
and limb.’” One might consider this the hyperbole of marketing were it undertaken by one
354
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private company over another. But this is the state elevating its safety record over private
industry largely owned by Michigan citizens. It was not the message of a government seeking to
exit in favor of that private industry.356 With this notion of the state protecting the public
interest, it is not surprising that Woodbridge’s solution to the debt crisis did not include the
possible sale of the projects to private or mixed corporations. He was not alone. Even facing
financial disasters, the members of the legislature believed support of industry was a government
obligation. In suggesting bounties for the sheep and wool industry, the Senate Committee on
Agriculture stated, “The encouragement of home industry by the fostering care of government, is
a duty of the first magnitude; and more especially does it appear to your committee, that such
obligation is imperative on the part of government situated as are the republican institutions of
the United States.” 357
With the rail project a recognized financial failure, and the state unable to pay for
contracted work, in January 1841 Senator Benjamin Witherell proposed legislation “to inquire
whether it is not for the interest of the state . . . to lease, under proper restrictions, the railroads
of the state.”358 It was not surprising that the Senate rejected his request, given the faith still held
in the efficacy of government commercial enterprises. Senators viewed state government both as
a facilitator of the people’s interest and as the people’s protector. Suspicion of corporations still
haunted the citizenry. In 1842, the Michigan Supreme Court voiced that common sentiment. “A
corporation is an artificial being, created by law with limited powers, and for specified purposes;
and there is a tacit condition annexed to its charter, that it shall exercise its franchises in the
manner and for the purposes, and in no other manner; and every abuse of its powers is a violation
356
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of the law of its being, and a forfeiture of its franchises.”359 Two years later, the court would
offer, “The demand of us, and of all concerned in the administration of the law, the greatest
vigilance in detecting, and punishing in the most exemplary manner, those who can and do wield
so much power, when that power is so exerted as to be productive of evil instead of good.”360
American governance required a relative equality of voice, and concentrated wealth threatened to
undermine that governing principle. Accordingly, Michigan simply could not trust private
corporations with so urgent a program as its rail-transportation network, nor could it allow
private hands to wield excessive influence over political, social, or economic issues. But, as
government efforts failed, the anti-corporate position began to lose its grip. As Larson noted, the
failure of public rail programs in the aftermath of the 1837 Panic, along with the ability of
private lines to take advantage of opportunities, set the stage “for a marked shift in the popular
conception of railroads, from public works (internal improvements) to private business
ventures.”361 Soon that position would more effectively enter the Michigan discussion.
The notion of privatizing Michigan’s rail had not yet ripened, leaving Woodbridge to
weigh his two options – raising taxes or declaring bankruptcy. “The sad alternatives then have
presented themselves, of a course of heavy taxation to pay the semi-annual interest upon the
public loan, on the one hand, or a decayed credit, a forfeited faith and a blackened reputation on
the other.” Holding to the notion of state ownership, Woodbridge relied on hope. He again
proposed completing the line most able to pay the interest, and suspending work on the other.
Recognizing that focusing on one line violated the commitment made to benefit all citizens
equally and, perhaps more importantly, threatened local interests, Woodbridge called upon the
“intelligence and sound judgment and patriotism” of the citizens to accept the need for such
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action.362 He thereupon proposed a tax increase to pay for the one line and he called on the
federal government for assistance. The Whig Woodbridge asked Democratic Secretary of the
Treasury Levi Woodbury for financial assistance. He premised his request on the increased
value the transportation system brought to the national government’s large land holdings in
Michigan.363 The record discloses no response.
As the federal government remained silent, the state legislature began to respond. It
converted the Northern line into a wagon road (the Northern had never been pursued with vigor).
Work would continue only on the Southern and Central lines. While that lacked the depth of
action the governor suggested, the legislature did defeat numerous efforts to support local pet
projects. To restrict the state’s liability, however, the legislature directed the Commissioners of
Internal Improvement to make all contracts subject to payment by the Morris Canal Bank. If the
supplier did not accept those terms, “the commissioners [were] hereby directed to make no
contracts.”364 Public reaction to the contraction of the undertaking was mixed, with residents in
underserved areas loudly objecting to potential tax liabilities for projects that now would bypass
them.365
The numbers surrounding the state’s predicament speak loudly of the impending financial
crisis. The 1841 Report of the Board of Internal Improvements showed that Michigan had
expended $669,000 on the Southern line and, in that year, had earned only $2,300. The annual
debt for the line, at 6% was $40,150. As for the Central line, the board expressed confidence that
it would soon bring more passengers and profit. Although the Central appeared to be the only
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internal improvement project likely to show a suitable future return, that confidence may have
been optimistic. The state had spent $1,065,000 on the Central and earnings in 1841 were
$25,660. Interest alone would equal $63,800. The following year, the board again expressed
confidence in the Central, calling it, “the only work from which the state can reasonably expect
to derive a large revenue immediately.” By that time, it had spent $1,175,000, with an income of
$72,100, an amount that would just cover interest, with no reserve for repairs, expansion,
improvements, capital purchases, or servicing the principle that the state would owe.366 In 1843,
the Committee on Internal Improvements recommended extension of the Central, with the
expectation that when completed, it would bring a 7% return.367 Given the 6% notes, at first
blush a 7% return seems advantageous. However, the Central was an element of an entire
project and carried a return barely enough to pay interest on its capital. The total internal
improvement principle amounted to $5,200,000, with an annual interest charge of $312,000.368
With its profits from the Southern and Central consumed by the expenses and interest charges of
the entire internal improvement debt, Michigan could not service its interest obligations.369 And,
of course, improvements and repair costs threatened to increase as the rails, locomotives, and
cars aged and technology improved. Looming in the background was Michigan’s distant but
Substantial obligation to repay the principle.
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With his election to the United States Senate, Woodbridge entrusted this financial
predicament to his lieutenant governor, James Wright Gordon. Gordon served from February
1841 until January 1842. On April 10, 1841, Gordon reported that the United States Bank had
failed to pay its April installment. He warned of “disastrous effects” to the state and its citizens
should a cure not be found. In July 1841, the state delayed making some interest payments, as it
had run out of cash. The legislature issued state treasury notes (script) in an amount not
exceeding the amounts due on the banks’ next four installment payments. (In an interesting
twist, the Board of Internal Improvements later sought to deny passengers and shippers use of
that script to pay for rail services. The Michigan Attorney General forced the board to accept it,
as the legislation provided that paper was good for all state debts.)
On October 1, 1841, the second shoe dropped as the United States Bank completely
defaulted, owing Michigan $1,087,500. It made no further payments.370 With both underwriting
banks in default, Michigan had received only $2.6 million of the $5 million it now owed. 371 (As
noted below, the banks had pledged the notes as collateral for their credit.) Moreover, in 1842, a
new $25/ton tariff on railroad iron increased the cost of construction. Congress had increased the
tariff in response to protectionist complaints associated with depressed sales of domestic railroad
iron. The Board of Internal Improvements classified the new tariff as “a serious obstacle” to
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making the lines financially viable.372 The drumbeat for change grew louder, as members of the
legislature began to question the soundness of government ownership of industry.
When considering a proposal by State Senator Benjamin Witherell to lease the Central to
private industry, a senate committee recognized that “It is a well established fact, that cannot be
controverted, that a state government can never compete, (either with honor or profit,) with
individual enterprise.” The committee claimed that,
The state must employ more, many more agents, with higher salaries, with
more restricted powers, governed as it were by the square and rule, compelled
to follow in the precise line of duty and action marked out by the law, never
permitted to swerve therefrom, whatever may be the result, and, consequently,
totally unable to conform to ever varying circumstances.
It then reflected on the beauty of self-interest that drives industry to curtail expenses; a drive
missing in the public sphere.373 Accordingly, that committee recommended leasing the road to
private enterprise, subject to state oversight and controls. Not all agreed, including the influential
Senate Committee on Internal Improvements. After recognizing that “a slight glance at the
downward progress, and present condition of our affairs, will satisfy the most superficial
observer, that we live in evil times,” the committee recommended the state continue its course
and press forward with the Central and Southern lines.374 With leasing and privatization not yet
palatable or politically acceptable, the legislature adopted the Internal Improvement Committee’s
recommendation. The state would continue to own the main lines and control the feeder lines.
After all the efforts and all the special incorporations, only five railroads operated in Michigan
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and construction had stopped on all but the Central and Southern.375 As the clouds darkened
over the state’s internal improvement project, bondholders looked to Michigan for full payment.
With this as their legacy, the Whigs lost the gubernatorial election to Democrat John
Barry.376 Barry proposed that the nearly finished projects be completed if funds could be found.
The state should abandon the rest.377 Barry’s motivation was primarily financial and not
premised on a notion that government should avoid financing commercial development.378 He
believed that government could only assist industry in minor ways, as major financial support
required government beyond appropriate levels. He bemoaned the state’s inability to subsidize
smaller projects. For example, the governor lamented “that our present financial difficulties”
impeded the state’s ability to significantly financially support agriculture. Even with limited
resources, the state should enact “some appropriate legislation . . . to put into the reach of the
husbandman the improvements and discoveries made in his art by the researches of science.”379
The legislature followed his lead by authorizing counties to require minor taxes in support of
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local agricultural societies.380 Government was the answer, but sadly lacked the resources fully
to fulfill its mission.

Pushing Legal Boundaries: Partial Repudiation
Not opting for privatization, Barry put forward the pragmatic – a partial repudiation of
the debt. The notes were in excess of $5 million but the state had received only about $2.6
million. Barry wished to protect the residents’ “rights and interests . . . against impositions and
unjust extractions.” Accordingly, he proposed that the state pay the “just claims” against it,
which he defined as those claims for which the state had received funds. If the banks had not
forwarded funds on a particular bond, the state would not pay.381 The House soon followed, with
legislators arguing that the limited repudiation honored the state’s legal and moral contract
obligations. Still, they were reticent to enact mechanisms to fund payments, as that might
require taxation. The legislators merely resolved that all “just demands” would be paid at “as
early a date as possible.”382 On February 17, 1842, the senate followed, again with no
mechanism for funding enacted.
The state had succumbed to what it perceived as the lesser of two evils: it chose partial
repudiation over heavy taxation. In paying only according to the amount received from those
first holding the instruments, the legislature disregarded whether a holder was bona fide without
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notice.383 The only just demands were those upon which the state had been paid. Most of the
repudiated bona fide holders were British and had purchased the bonds as part of the lending
programs promoted by banks like the Baring Brothers. The proceeds of those bonds were lost
when the underwriting banks failed.
Publications in New York and London promptly denounced Michigan’s actions, with the
New York American protesting that “to borrow money and then refuse to acknowledge the debt is
sheer robbery; and for that the laws of the State and the United States will furnish redress.” The
state was denying liability rather than insolvency, and that was immoral. 384 Whatever the
morality underlying the state’s action, the New York American incorrectly promised a legal
remedy. As would soon become clear, injured bondholders held legal rights without legal
remedies.
Unlike several other states, and despite constituent pressures, Michigan did not simply
repudiate the loans. Instead, its leadership based their decision on arguable, albeit weak, legal
grounds. The Morris Bank, as its agent, probably had breached its fiduciary obligations to the
state. It and the United States Bank had improperly pledged the bonds as collateral in violation
of their understanding with the state, and the bond agreements provided the payment would be
from the revenues generated by the internal improvements. None of those arguments likely
would hold legal water against bona fide holders without notice, but they were colorable
arguments. With the belief the state had been swindled (and perhaps because of political
pressures), on April 27, 1842 Barry declared that the state would issue $2,342,960 of new bonds
to replace the non-repudiated notes and would cancel $2,857,040 worth of bonds for which the
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state had received no consideration. He also offered ownership of the railroads to bondholders in
payment of their debt.385
The issue was not one of debt evasion, as the alternative of heavy taxation probably was
unworkable. An 1843 Congressional report on state debts classified Michigan as one of the
states “most embarrassed with debt” and unable to raise taxes to service that debt. An increase in
taxes would make land ownership “a burden rather than a blessing,” resulting in emigration from
the state and a reduction in tax revenues.386 Hence, increased tax burdens would not help finance
debt repayment. With a lack of practical alternatives, Michigan’s government suffered the moral
indignity of default and repudiation. It had received about one-half of the expected funds for a
project that was underfinanced from its inception. A dearth of rail profits had resulted in the
state’s inability to pay even interest on its loan obligations and threatened the state’s ability to
“keep in motion the wheels of government.”387
As the state was buffeted by the challenge of poor investment returns, it suffered another
blow to its rail hopes – the winter of 1843. Northern winters can challenge even the most
advanced transportation systems. They particularly stressed early rail systems, and the winter of
1843 (starting in 1842) resulted in significant financial losses for Michigan’s rail. The winter
that year was particularly harsh, culminating in a bitter March 1843. That month has been
classified as “the most anomalous month in recorded history” with temperatures in the central
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and eastern United States “more than 25F (14C) below normal,” a situation not expected to
return for thousands of years.388 The cold was so deep and long lasting in Michigan that lake
navigation proved impossible for almost five months. Trains could not move during much of
that time, as snow and ice blocked the roads. Michigan was isolated. In January through April
1843, rail receipts were down on the Central line about 43% over the previous year’s period, yet
expenses increased as time and dollars were spent to free the rails. Of course, the calendar drove
interest expenses, and those obligations continued to mount. Spring came and, along with it,
warmer weather that freed rail and water travel. Unfortunately, there was little freight backlog
for the rail lines, as during the winter agricultural commodities went to market by either sleigh or
rotted for lack of market access.389 To make things more critical, the partially completed rail
lines were in need of upgrade and repair. Revenues were already insufficient to service the debt
and, if improvements and line extensions lagged, the revenues would not increase as hoped.
Meanwhile, bondholders shuddered, and not just over Michigan’s plight. A number of
other states had borrowed heavily and the prospects of their default and repudiation rumbled
through the infant financial markets. Fearing the impending crisis, in 1840, the British Barring
Brothers Bank urged Congress to guarantee the states’ debts. Congressional support was
particularly important, as the Eleventh Amendment barred the banks from filing suit in federal
courts against defaulting states.390 By 1842, the Florida Territory and the states of Mississippi,
Arkansas, Indiana, Illinois, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana joined Michigan in full or
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partial default,391 with other states teetering on the financial edge.392 Politics, anti-Semitism, and
xenophobia led some politicians to advocate repudiation. Mississippi Governor Alexander
McNutt attacked foreign creditors, in particular the Rothschilds. “The blood of Judas and
Shylock flows” in their veins, he proclaimed, and warned of a Rothschild conspiracy to
“mortgage our cotton fields and make serfs of our children.”393 Foreign capital had funded
significant portions of the debt, and those foreign lenders and their political leaders did not
understand the difference between state and national debt. Accordingly, state repudiation
undermined national borrowing and standing, as well as the creditworthiness of all states.394
In response to state defaults, threatened repudiations, and political hard-line positions, a
member of the Rothschild family advocated ceasing loans in the United States. He declared “let
us get rid of that blasted country . . . it is the most blasted & the most stinking country in the
world.”395 British romantic poet, William Wordsworth’s, family had invested in Pennsylvania’s
now threatened $36 million worth of bonds. In 1840, he scolded Pennsylvanian’s for betraying
their commitments:
All who revere the memory of Penn
Grieve for the land on whose wild woods his name
Was fondly grafted with a virtuous aim,
Renounced, abandoned by degenerate Men
For state-dishonour black as ever came
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To upper air from Mammon's loathsome den.396
State defaults and the threat of repudiation promised relief to the states, but presented the specter
of financial ruin to wealthy and ordinary investors alike.
Even those the state promised to repay faced the prospect of financial difficulties.
Although the state had acknowledged its debt to this group, it provided nothing but a vague
promise of repayment. To protect the interests of those largely economically and politically elite
bondholders, a series of American investors in Michigan’s bonds hired Charles Butler, a
politically linked attorney, financier, and bond expert from New York, to represent their
interests.397 His task was to turn the promise of future payment into a tangible reality. To
accomplish that, Butler proceeded to Detroit, and did so in the difficult winter of 1843 that had
shut down all but sleigh transportation in Michigan.
Butler’s travails during his journey underscore both the seriousness of the creditors’
concerns and the need for enhanced rail facilities. After one false start, he travelled from New
York to “Boston, about twenty-four hours’ journey, and thence going to Albany by rail. Beyond
Albany it was rail to Rochester; then to Niagara by stage; then across the river on the ice, and so
on by stage and cart through Canada to Detroit.” Butler traveled those last two-hundred miles in
an open wagon. One night that wagon broke down at 2 am, forcing Butler to walk in the dark to
a one-room log-house tavern. He then took a dirt cart into Detroit. With the dust of arduous
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travel on his shoulders, Butler began to plead the bondholders’ case to the governor and the
legislature.398
Butler faced a sympathetic but determined audience and, as he related in a letter to his
wife, his coming “all the way from New York, through the mud, on purpose” allowed him to say
things that others could not “without being charged with treason.”399 To Butler’s mind, the
“simple truth” was that “sound principles of democracy” required “payment of the public debt.”
Framing debt payment as a moral imperative, he urged that, “whereas a good citizen should be
ready always to lay down his life in defence of his country against an invading foe, so he should
always be ready to give up his property to preserve and defend the honor of his country and pay
it debts.”400
Butler’s arguments persuasively moved legislators away from the lingering temptation of
complete repudiation and inspired the legislature to finance paying the just claims. The Report
of the Joint Committee reviewing bond payments recommended that the state pay those bonds
“for which we have received consideration.”401 The amount was $2,518,699, which included
unpaid interest. The legislature determined which bonds were due and which were not. Further,
the committee recommended that a future legislature consider raising taxes in the event rail
revenues were insufficient to service the chosen bondholders. This almost created a stumbling
block as some protested that only rail assets and revenues should be employed. Nevertheless, the
legislature enacted a bill calling for taxes in the event of a revenue shortfall. The governor then
threatened to veto the bill, objecting to the tax provisions. Recognizing that the lack of the tax
provision could cripple his clients’ interests, Butler protested that the provision “was the only
398
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feature of the bill worth saving.”402 So persuasive were Butler’s arguments (he drafted the
legislation), that the legislation was referred to as the Butler Act and the committee posted his
comments along with their report.403 The governor signed the act.404
With the Butler Act signed, the issue moved to those bonds Michigan chose to repudiate.
Future United States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis, at the secret behest of British
bankers, argued there was no lawful basis upon which the state could distinguish between any
bona fide purchasers. He protested that it was, “universally admitted, that, whenever a purchaser
of property acquires a title from the seller, which he can transmit, although that title be tainted
with fraud, if he sells to a bona fide purchaser, who parts with his money, or any other thing of
value, on the faith of the property, such purchaser obtains a valid title, purged of the fraud.”
Claiming that, “society could hardly get along without” such a rule, Curtis continued, “It would
be monstrous to say, that, because property bought on credit has not be paid for, the holder
cannot give good title to it.”405 He “entertained little doubt” that Michigan would treat all
bondholders “in the same just and honorable” fashion, notwithstanding whether the state had
received funds for the particular bond. The law was on Curtis’s side, at least insofar as one
defines law as the rules written in statutes, treatises, and court opinions. However, the foreign
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bondholders could not sue Michigan in federal court (the Eleventh Amendment precluded such
suits), and state court remedies were unlikely. Under those circumstances, “law” provided
inadequate shelter. Meanwhile, the public protested for repudiation, for fear of ruinous taxes,
while bondholders clamored for payment, for fear of extensive losses.
Morality was a larger issue than legality, and Curtis believed that morality also required
reduced government and smaller debt loads. Curtis would protest in the Christian Review that
the “universal effort to carry a railroad or a canal to every town, and almost every man’s door
was destructive to the nation’s wealth and, because of the risk of default, destructive to its moral
center.” To Curtis, the nation was deeply in debt to the houses of Europe, but could not default
for fear of driving Europeans “to beggary by the misfortune” and causing the credit of the United
States to become “shivered to atoms.” He continued that “as men of integrity and honor and
above all, as Christians,” taxpayers must practice self-denial and take on every burden in order to
pay the debts.406 It mattered little that Europeans had few legal remedies. Prudence and
Christian values required taxation, self-denial, and repayment, notwithstanding the belief that
such repayment would cripple several states.
Despite the protests, the Michigan legislature specifically repudiated those primarily
foreign bondholder notes in 1842 and 1843, and did so expressing indignation over the
underwriting bank’s defaults on their obligations to the state. Debate continued and those
advocating partial repudiation knew they stood on tenuous legal and moral grounds. In 1846, the
legislature proposed to settle a portion of the European notes. The London Times admonished
British bondholders to refrain. “It is hoped,” the Times declared, “that European creditors will
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have firmness to refuse any terms short of their payment of their entire principle.”407 Ultimately,
in 1859 the state paid a portion of the foreign debt and left the bondholders to look to the
defaulting banks for the remainder. When finally forced to surrender their bonds for reduced
compensation, George Peabody, the noted philanthropist and founder of the banking firm,
George Peabody & Co, of London, voiced the frustration of those bondholders. We “do hereby
Solemnly protest and declare that we” surrender our bonds at “such reduced rates . . . only
because, under the laws of said state, we have no other means of obtaining any payment or
satisfaction in part or in whole.”408 With legal rights but no legal remedies, Europeans had
turned to the political sphere to press their rights.409 With their debts only partially honored, they
left unsatisfied.410
Notably, the courts were absent in resolving these matters. Given established legal
doctrine, bondholders were in equal positions regardless of the underwriters’ payments to the
state. Despite a legal right to payment, bondholders had no recourse to the federal courts, as the
states could not be sued there, and Michigan state-court actions most likely would have proven
futile. Bondholders turned to the political sphere, where legal rules merely influenced, but did
not control, the outcome. Instead, pragmatic considerations controlled, with some bondholders
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satisfied and others less so.411 Those not fully compensated objected but ultimately accepted the
partial payments.412

Federal Aid Efforts
With all the challenges associated with government financial support of rail, internal
improvements remained a central component of the drive for progress and general-welfare
enhancements. To further those ends, Congress again attempted to assist several states,
including Michigan, to overcome the financial burdens of their internal improvement projects.
In 1841, Congress passed another distribution act, commonly referred to as the Preemption Act.
That legislation sought to relieve the states’ burdens in several ways. First, it granted each of
eight states 500,000 acres of federal land, which they could sell with the proceeds earmarked for
internal improvements. (The act was called the Preemption Act because it gave existing
squatters the right to buy 160 acres before the land went up for public sale.) Second, it provided
the eight states with 10% of the sale price of federal land sold in their boundaries. It then paid all
states a share of federal land sales according to population.413 Congress placed no restrictions on
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the use of those funds. President Tyler signed the law, believing the legislation would relieve a
significant portion of the debts incurred by states attempting to develop commerce.414
The grant was controversial, even in the receiving states. Michigan’s Governor Barry
complained that federal land in Michigan ought to, and did, belong to the state so it should
receive all sale proceeds. He also argued that Congressional grants tended “to make the
sovereign states pensioners” to federal largess. This was not unlike Jackson’s argument in
vetoing the 1833 Distribution Bill, in which he believed that state receipts of federal funds would
cause a loss of independence and dignity. Despite Barry’s concerns, the sums provided some
relief. Accordingly, the legislature accepted the land and funds, and directed the governor to
employ the land according to the congressionally mandated requirements.415
While those grants did not last long, they evidenced continued federal legislative
determination to advance social and commercial goals in the face of constitutional impediments
to the contrary. To be sure, the shared dollars were not earmarked. Earmarking those funds
arguably would have run into the constitutional barriers that animated Jackson’s Maysville Road
and 1833 Distribution Bill vetoes, as well as Madison’s 1817 veto of the Public Works Bill, and
Monroe’s 1822 veto of the Cumberland Road Bill. Tyler took a different tack. In approving the
legislation, he advanced that Article IV, §3 gave Congress unlimited power over the federal
lands themselves and, therefore, the act was constitutionally secure, or at least defensible.416
While that position was not universally accepted, it opened the door to later legislative action.
414
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Congress’s use of the public domain in the Preemption Act to advance rail development in some
measure foreshadowed later legislative efforts to grant land and/or funds directly to the
railroads.417 For the time being, however, Congressional action was constitutionally suspect.
Believing the act unconstitutional, James Polk, the next President, killed future disbursements
altogether.

Building Toward a New Constitutional Model
The Preemption Act, while helpful, “aided more in saving past investments than in future
expenditures.”418 To newly elected Barry, fiscal responsibility required a different approach. He
classified the state’s internal improvement projects the result of a “general delusion” and
questioned both the wisdom of government ownership of rails and of its anti-business
philosophy. With those concerns animating his policies, in his first annual address, Barry spoke
of the limits inherent in republican governance. “The true aim, indeed, of a republican
magistrate,” he argued, “is to refrain from the exercise of power not delegated; to abstain from
all interference with the pursuits of the private citizen, and to give full scope to the inexhaustible
energies of a free people.” Government was to set the framework to facilitate individual
enterprise. He voiced that, “[t]he main design of a republican government is to protect the
citizen in the enjoyment of his liberty and the property his own industry has acquired.” In the
end, Barry argued, “the people will take care of themselves.”419
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As Barry advanced that vision, the Board of Internal Improvements continued to express
optimism that time, improved economics, and line enhancements and extensions “will for the
future, give an income that, it is believed, will relieve the state from the liabilities incurred for
construction.” To the board, the answer to the economic challenge was to continue building,
particularly on the Central line. If the state did that, rail receipts would pay the interest due in
January 1846 (of course that interest was on the now lower, non-repudiated bonds). The
requested construction required further financing and, while the board favored further
development on the other multiple projects, it suggested waiting “until our resources are more
ample.”420 Neither the governor nor the legislature agreed, and no appropriation passed to
expand the Central.
Instead, Michigan’s government moved to erecting constitutional barriers to curb future
state financial support for internal improvements. Barry sought to change the government
blueprint though a requirement that voters approve government borrowing. His proposal of a
majority vote for government spending was short of his philosophical goal, however. To Barry,
internal improvements were not “connected with the legitimate wants of government.”421
One month later, a joint resolution of the legislature called for the Barry-proposed
constitutional amendment to require voter approval of state borrowing or pledging the state’s
credit. In doing so, the legislature and governor tendered an interesting flip to the logic of
republican governance. The proposed amendment offered that government required the public’s
steadying hand to retard overzealous legislative spending. The people would now check the
420
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passions of government – a notion at odds with theories of republican governance. In 1843, a
joint resolution proposed sending the amendment to a vote of the people.422 The required twothirds of the legislators agreed to the amendment, and the voters ratified it in November 1844.423
By the time the amendment passed, the legislature had dramatically curtailed construction on the
Southern line and cut the proposed length of the Central.424 Even with the cutbacks, by 1845 the
rail interest charges were three times the highest tax level ever paid, and rail incomes
increasingly were inadequate to pay those debts.425
The state had invested in rail in accordance with the positive governance ideologies
reflected in its founding constitution. That 1835 constitution had required the legislature to make
provision for an “equal, systematic, economical application” of funds to support internal
improvements. The constitution did not require state ownership or particular levels of
involvement but, given the intentions and beliefs of the time, it assumed significant state
participation. As that ideologically driven program proved too significant for state resources, the
legislature became increasingly pragmatic. It trimmed active state participation in rail, and
focused on particular lines in violation of constitutionally required equal building requirements.
Constitutional and statutory law diverged, as aspirations of governance conflicted with pragmatic
realities. The erosion of the constitutional requirement of equal support required a choice
422
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between ignoring and changing the blueprint. Through the 1844 amendment, the state stepped in
the direction of governmental restructuring but, as will be seen, did not go far enough to gain
state fiscal order. Meanwhile, Barry’s beliefs of government’s appropriate sphere were gaining
purchase. Those beliefs would further push against the 1835 Constitution’s activist blueprint and
again require constitutional choices.
This is not to suggest that practical realities uniformly or completely supplanted
aspirational goals to drive commerce through public spending. In the period between Barry’s
proposed amendment and the ratification of that amendment, the legislature remained busy. A
partial list of its spending tells the story. Between 1842 and 1844, inclusive, the legislature
appropriated money from the defaulting internal improvement fund to support the state’s salt
springs. It required the state-owned Central line to run on Sundays, thereby increasing
operational costs. It provided for the purchase of iron and spikes to expand the Central and
Southern lines and it paid expenses on the Clinton and Kalamazoo Canal. It required that public
officials exercise responsibility over repairing the Detroit and Saginaw Railroad from “Detroit to
John Davis’s tavern in the Town of Royal Oak.” It passed a joint resolution seeking expert
guidance on building a branch of the Central Railroad to connect to the Detroit River. It
authorized communities to tax to support agricultural societies and it allocated land to be used
for the clearing of the Flint River or, in the alternative, to be used to improve a canal there. And
in multiple acts, it provided for the building and maintenance of roads.426 In boxing parlance,
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state efforts were knocked down but not out. Lacking funds, the legislature curtailed state efforts
but it did not abandon its aspirations of advancing public welfare through public spending and
leadership.
Proposals to sell the roads and remove government from internal improvements initially
fell short. While a bill to privatize the railroads cleared one house, the legislature was unable to
gather the two-thirds vote to create a private rail corporation. Barry put forward a compromise,
advocating that “associations of individuals” complete the state’s unfinished rail lines, and that
the legislature could later buy those railroads back.427 This seeming caveat was in reality a
restatement of the railroad incorporation acts already in place, for each of those acts provided
that the state could purchase the corporation. Of course, given Barry’s belief that government
space did not include rail ownership, the buyback proposal was likely politically, rather than
philosophically, inspired.
The state’s debt challenge provided the crisis through which Barry communicated his
new vision, but that vision of a separation between public and private spheres stood on its own
philosophical legs. In his last formal speech to the legislature during the first of two Barry
administrations, Barry elaborated on the limited-governance model he had urged at the beginning
of his administration. “In extraordinary cases only,” he advised, “and when public good clearly
demands it, should a state undertake the construction of public works, and then only when such
works, from their magnitude, cannot well be undertaken by individuals.”428 Government was to
act only when needs demanded and private vehicles were unavailing. The governor’s office had
travelled far since Mason’s declaration ten years earlier that corporations were at “war with the
interest of the people.”
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Barry’s thinking was part of a growing national trend. Larson suggested that by this time
political thought had moved away from energized governance toward a reliance on the “natural
laws” of the market. Larson wrote that, “Habitually distrustful of their representatives, tutored
constantly on the dangers of big government and public power, and unable to perfect a system of
democratic politics they truly believed in, Americans reached for the doctrine of liberal political
economy to revise their own hopes for liberty and equality.”429 Economic historian John Joseph
Wallis agreed, arguing that the debt associated with state internal improvement efforts led to
widespread constitutional reforms that changed the nature of corporations and the nature of
government-industry relations.430 That rebuilding of constitutional structures to remove states
from active commercial involvement started in 1842, with Rhode Island’s constitutional
restrictions on public borrowing. Soon states across the nation began to amend earlier
constitutional encouragements of state commercial involvement.431

Divestment, Legislative Limits, and Corporate Ascendancy
Detroit-area newspapers soon advocated a sale of the railroads.432 Eastern financers
expressed interest in purchasing the Central Railroad, and hired Detroiter James Joy (the future
president of the Central) to lobby that private management of railroads was the superior
option.433 In that environment, Alpheus Felch was elected governor. Despite Barry’s frugality,
Felch inherited a $4.1 million debt, and a minimally profitable, but increasingly antiquated rail
system. His inaugural message set the tone that the state would soon follow: the state should sell
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the railroads.434 Felch stated, “The first [object of the sales] is to separate the government from a
business which has usually been the subject of individual enterprise.”435 Felch’s history lesson
was mistaken, as government everywhere had played a role in rail development. Nevertheless,
his politics were increasingly accepted. Felch preferred that government not be involved in
business when private industry could better manage the enterprise. Notwithstanding his
privatization beliefs, Felch held to (or at least voiced) earlier beliefs that corporate ownership of
rail remained vexing. He reflected, “The reluctance of many of our citizens to see these
important works fall into the hands of corporate bodies, has occasioned some opposition to the
proposed sale, and it must be admitted that this objection is not without weight.”436 Because
corporations were entities with special rights, their unregulated existence violated the equality
notions of democratic government. Even to Felch, failure to regulate would “violate one of the
plainest principles of that form of government which seeks the independence and the equality of
all who are subject to its laws.”437 Government needed to be present to control the perceived
excesses of capitalism. Nevertheless, government ownership went too far. It occasioned
partisan rancor, absorbed the legislature’s agenda, and was ineffective.
By 1846, the state’s rail finances were desperate. After all the effort, money, and time,
only 279 miles of track were complete.438 Even that limited system was in poor shape.
Maintenance suffered, the iron rails needed replacement, and bridges needed rebuilding. Interest
payments were in arrears and the state owed $4.1 million. Despite predications to the contrary,
the rail revenues “yielded no surplus to be applied in discharge of the interest” on even the bonds
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accepted for payment.439 Growing interest obligations again threatened state bankruptcy.440 The
alternative – taxation – was unpalatable. Servicing the debt though taxation would have required
a 93% tax increase.441 Yet, the alternative was “the disgrace and self-abasement of
repudiation.”442
The state owed $4,121,720.79 in principle and interests as of July 1845. Claiming that
the Board of Internal Improvements had camouflaged the financial crisis, a minority report of the
Senate Finance Committee expressed shock that all profits had been absorbed in operations,
construction, and repairs. There was no surplus with which to pay creditors, leaving the
government with a serious political challenge. From the beginning, it had reported that the
state’s rail ventures were a success and that future profits would sustain and improve the lines.
That was not the case and trouble loomed. Exasperated, a member of the committee protested,
there are no nett proceeds, and when in the revolution of one short year, they
are officially informed that their roads, reported in good order at the
commencement, have not only swallowed up the nett proceeds, but have
become entirely inadequate for the transaction of business, and are in great
measure useless and worthless to the state, unless speedily and entirely rebuilt,
our citizens will most assuredly exercise their right of demanding an
explanation.443
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On this issue, the committee majority agreed: the roads were “in a dilapidated and almost ruined
condition,” and any excess revenue would be swallowed by repairs and required
improvements.444
After speaking of the financial concerns, the Senate Finance Committee submitted that
the “corruption, intrigue and deception” of “half starved political hacks” had run rampant in
massive public enterprises like rail. The committee then urged the opposite view of political
freedom that had animated Mason and the 1837 legislature. “From such [corrupting] influences,
unsafe in a free government, dangerous to the purity of our institutions – destructive to civil
liberty – a sale of our public works would set us free.” Government was corrupt, inefficient, and
incompetent.445 Most importantly, it was out of money. As the committee noted in a connected
report, “It has ceased to be a question of policy, and has become one of absolute necessity. The
financial condition of the state present and prospective, leave us no option in the matter.” That
financial challenge occasioned a reconsideration of corporate appeal and the place of free
government.446 The committee was “satisfied that the best interest of the people in every point
of view, political, social as well as pecuniary, demand an early and entire separation of the state
from works and pursuits more legitimately belonging to individual, or corporate enterprise.”447
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It was time to privatize, perhaps because there was little alternative. In early 1846, the
legislature authorized the sale of its best road – the Central, for about $2,000,000. It had spent
$2,238,920 on that road.448 The newly formed corporation was private but, like the other special
corporations of its day, the entity carried significant obligations and grants of power.449 The sale
was accompanied by twenty-eight pages of legislatively required commitments, including
construction requirements, rate structures, tax obligations, and corporate governance rules. The
state even retained the right to repurchase the line after 1867.450 Shortly thereafter, the state sold
the Southern line, for $500,000, under similar conditions.451 It had spent $1,125,591 on that line.
In short order, the legislature would abolish the office of Acting Commissioner of Internal
Improvements. Before ending his tenure, the Acting Commissioner was to largely “dispose of
all the personal property appertaining to the business of internal improvements.”452 Cooley
quotes “one familiar with the whole history” as expressing the belief “nothing but the debris of
our airy castles remained, and that only to plague our recollection.”453 Cooley neglected to
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mention, however, that the sale of the roads and ceasing support of internal improvements
probably violated the state constitution. (However, as discussed below, he would have
responded that such actions were consistent with protecting the core constitutional principle of
republican governance.) The 1844 amendment modified but did not eliminate the requirement of
state support for internal improvements. But, in a very practical sense, public opinion and
financial challenges either changed constitutional understandings or made them irrelevant.454
Article XII, §3’s requirement of state action was inconsistent with changed understandings and
practical realities.
In 1849, Governor Epaphroditus Ransom suggested just that in his veto of legislation
seeking to modify the payment schedule for the purchase of the Southern. He advanced that
through their “singular unanimity” in favor of the sale, the public had demanded “an entire and
lasting separation of the state from all schemes of internal improvement.” Believing that
withdrawal had “its origin in the spontaneous movements of the people themselves,” Ransom
suggested an almost constitutional barrier to further state rail support, notwithstanding the
unamended constitutional language to the contrary.455 The legislature disagreed with Ransom’s
approach and overrode his veto, thereby granting relief to the Southern.456 The difference from
earlier action was that government now was subsidizing a private entity without seeking to
control its activities.
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Non-financial Public Assistance
With the exception of episodes like the payment extension, the state had discontinued its
practice of direct financial support of rail, and moved away from involvement in internal
improvement projects. Nevertheless, its efforts continued in a subtler and less public fashion. In
its sale of the Central, the legislature bestowed state-like eminent domain powers to the private
corporation. As in earlier special rail corporation statutes, the legislature granted that power not
just over real estate but for “the obtaining of stone, sand, and gravel,” of entering private
property “to fell and cut down timber” or to obtain “any articles whatsoever, which may be
wanted in the construction or repair” of the line. The statute set forth the process required to
value the property but, even on the sale of personal property, the unwillingness of the seller was
not a barrier. These extensive powers were in many but not all acts of special rail incorporation.
Moreover, the legislature passed, and the governor approved, taxes to support subsidies to
agricultural, manufacturing, and mechanical arts societies.457 Governors Barry and Felch had
advocated a private/public wall. Their administrations, however, displayed a facility for ignoring
that barrier when commercial needs dictated.
One might legitimately argue that rail development required corporate use of eminent
domain powers. Railroads need efficient routes or they, and the public benefits they brought,
would suffer. Nevertheless, grants of that power to private entities were akin to assigning public
power, which is controlled by the democratic process, to private individuals, with little or no
public control. Landholders would object to this private taking, and took their complaints to
457
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court. In 1852, the Supreme Court would consider the propriety of those takings in Swan v
Williams.458 That case would set Michigan’s early legal standard on the public versus private
nature of corporations.
The case arose from powers granted early in Michigan’s rail history. In 1834, the
territorial legislature incorporated the Detroit and Pontiac Railroad, granting the rail line the
territory’s eminent domain power.459 Landholders objected, arguing that any taking under the
legislation was for private, not public, benefit. The court disagreed, but did so by classifying
corporations not by ownership, but by public benefit. In rejecting the landholders’ claim, the
court declared that railroads “might with far more propriety be styled public than private
corporations,” that they were “essentially the trustee of the government,” and “a mere agent, to
which authority is delegated to work out the public interest.” 460 In answer to the landholders’
complaint that the control and profits of the railroad were exclusively private, the court answered
that “it is obvious, that the object which determines the character of a corporation is that
designed by the legislature, rather than that sought by the company.”461 The public was the
primary beneficiary of rail development and private industry’s gain was only secondary. The
court essentially measured utility – with the public deriving most of the gain. Accordingly, the
delegation of eminent domain power was valid. This should not surprise. Railroads required
effective routes and society required railroads. Rather than foregoing the welfare-enhancing
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activities of rail, society’s leaders, including its courts, shaped doctrine to make the private
public. To grant public power to private entities, the courts reclassified those entities as public.

Republican Government and Private Space
In 1847, Felch proclaimed that the state should recognize a stronger barrier between
private rights and government action. Direct government involvement in industry breeched that
line in unacceptable, antidemocratic ways. Felch voiced his opinion on the “genius and design
of a republic government.” “To avoid being governed too much, is one of the objects of a
representative form of government, and to secure the good of community in this regard, all
authority in matters not immediately connected with the public weal, and indispensable to the
welfare of the body politic, should be withheld.” He then set forth his vision of a liberal
republic. “It is among the encouraging signs of the present time, that the public mind is
demanding a more definite limitation to the powers and duties of government, and a
relinquishment of all unnecessary interferences with the free actions of the individual citizen.”462
Felch had urged a vision very different than that which characterized the early State of Michigan
or, for that matter, the nation during its first six decades. Rather than as an aid to individual
enterprise, he viewed government as an impediment to personal freedom.
The challenge was in the interpretation of Felch’s vision: What constituted “unnecessary
interferences,” and who should decide? Several months before his above-referenced defense of
individual liberty, Felch signed legislation enhancing Detroit’s ability to regulate hours, wages,
and working conditions of the city’s “porters, cartmen and draymen, owners and keepers of
livery stables, hackney coaches, carts, dray and carriages of every description.”463 While Felch
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apparently did not consider those restrictions improper, later courts would find otherwise.
Felch’s and, I would argue, the nation’s wall between public and private was permeable. As was
the case throughout American history, government did not withdraw from commerce and
industry. Instead, it adjusted and tempered its philosophy with new understandings concerning
the challenges of government involvement in business.
In the wake of its rail experience, Michigan was moving toward and demanding a
structure of government that would exercise a lighter touch on commerce. State senator and
future lieutenant governor William Fenton expressed that goal in a colorful, if somewhat peculiar
fashion: “The wheels of government which should roll quietly on in an unimpeded track in their
onward course towards civil, social and political improvements – will be clogged by the crash of
locomotives, and the strife of aspirants for the loaves and fishes which fall from the tables of
those in power.”464 Mason had argued that private wealth could subvert republican governance
by holding and exerting extensive power. His solution was government control of the state’s
most important industry. The challenge, however, was that government faced institutional and
political impediments to effective control of internal improvements. This led to public distrust of
government as well as to a poorly constructed business. That failure and the associated distrust,
threatened to subvert the political process and, accordingly, established that industry
development was an inappropriate space for the state. Perhaps the practicalities of economic
realities drove the changing political philosophies, but those realities animated deeper reflections
about the role of government and the dangers of subverted republican governance.
This is not to suggest that all aligned on government’s role. Many legislators still
believed that, but for the want of resources, government was the appropriate vehicle for internal
improvement development and ownership. In 1848, the House Committee on Internal
464
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Improvements bemoaned the state’s inability to press forward with a trans-state canal that would
have “become to our growing State, what the Erie Canal had proved to New York.” That
inability did not descend from changed philosophies of government or the growth of private
corporations. Instead, it came from a lack of funds. That lack, according to the committee,
undermined commercial development and population growth. The committee reported that the
legislature “would willingly listen to the cry for help, and cheerfully come to the rescue, did
circumstances permit or reason approve the attempt.” The state’s financial condition prohibited
construction, thereby undermining efforts to help inland farmers bring their products to market.
The answer to the problem, the committee agreed, was government in the form of federal aid. 465
It was not about private versus public spheres or the withdrawal of government. Rather, to the
committee, the issue concerned which government could, and should, act.
Two months after voicing his bold reassessment of government, business, and freedom,
Felch became a United States Senator. Epaphroditus Ransom, Felch’s successor, almost
immediately displayed an antagonism to overactive governance. Declaring, “Excessive and
hasty legislation are the most serious evils we have felt under our present system,” Ransom
proposed to shorten the legislature’s term by two-thirds and to render legislation passed after a
certain number of days in session automatically invalid.466 He wanted smaller government, and
rejected calls for loaning money or pledging credit to railroads. Ransom believed that the state
had appropriately adopted a policy of liquidating and ending all involvement with the railroads
and that the people had insisted that government severe all financial ties with rail.467 He rejected
not just government-owned railroads, but railroads run by mixed corporations. Loans and
465
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subscriptions had “almost universally proved disastrous,” and this was the case broadly across
the nation. Ransom reasoned that if the projects for which the railroads requested state financial
support were so important, private markets would provide the necessary capital.468 If private
markets found the project too speculative, then the state should not risk its capital.
The governor did not advocate complete abandonment of a state role in internal
improvements. He supported construction of plank roads, with indirect government funding.
Instead of direct capital insertions, government would offer land grants to private plank road
companies that they could then sell to raise capital. The legislature passed a general plank-road
incorporation statute, allowing corporate creation without specific approval by the legislature,
and without corporate responsibilities to the state.
Michigan was not alone in its growing disquiet over government ownership of rail or in
the mixed corporate model. Failing enterprises and rising public obligations strongly contributed
to a shifting view of government and private spaces. Henry Carter Adams explained, “as the
people had driven their representatives to enter upon internal improvements without caution, so,
when taxes began to press, they censured them without justice, and disowned the policy.”469
Larson noted that in the wake of the financial crisis, “American’s faith in government itself –
never high –collapsed.” Perhaps nostalgic for what might have been, and despairing of the
results, Larson wrote, “the founders’ hope of wielding power for the common good receded into
memory: a distant possibility once (perhaps?) within the grasp of revolutionary statesmen, but
unlikely (if not unimaginable) in the hands of their shortsighted, self-serving offspring.”470
Whether appropriate or not, public desire for and trust in government was shifting, both in
Michigan and around the nation.
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Corporate Success and Rising Individualism
In government’s place stood private corporations. As John Barry, reelected governor in
1849, advanced: “Associations of individuals with corporate powers, in many cases, possess
advantages that materially aid in the prosecution of some legitimate enterprise, which, without
such powers, could not be undertaken with prospect of success.”471 By 1855, a treatise on
corporate law commented, “There is scarcely an individual of respectable character in our
community, who is not a member of at least one private company or society which is
incorporated.”472 By mid-century, the American population was moving toward an increasing
dependence not only on the leadership of private economic development but also on the
acceptability of corporations as an integral part of the economic landscape. Those corporations
then, would provide the means to construct the infrastructure required by an advancing American
economy. The state and society that had earlier viewed corporations as “at war with the interest
of the people,”473 now viewed corporations as desirable, tax-paying contributors to the state.
In that shift, hero status soon replaced corporations’ earlier villainous image. As early as
1839, the English Civil Engineering Journal had been arguing that government simply was ill
suited to control the rail industry. The journal proposed that only private control of rail created
incentives for creativity and competitive advances, and public ownership stifled those traits.
Picking up on that theme, the American Railroad Journal pronounced that ‘“all the canals and
railroads of this country would have been . . . better executed by private enterprise,” that “all
such matters should be left” to private enterprise “which alone possesses the means, skill and
integrity indispensable to success”’ and, finally, that “all we require in this country, to secure the
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construction of all really useful works is to be ‘let alone.”’474 It is not clear whether the
American Railroad Journal’s distaste for government control extended to an aversion to
government funding, eminent domain assistance, or land grants, or as Horwitz noted, commonlaw modifications to facilitate rail development.475 Certainly, railroads continued to take
advantage of government largess and in that sense the term “private” requires a bold asterisk.
Notwithstanding their demand for government favor, supporters of private industry continued to
employ laissez-faire language. But, in truth, they fell far short of that standard.
Whether “purely private” or not, privately held corporations succeeded in furthering
Michigan rail projects. The eastern investors who purchased the Southern and Central lines
invested private funds in the lines’ upgrade and expansion.476 British interests financed the
previous Northern line, and incorporated a faltering Detroit & Pontiac line into the system in
order to include a Detroit terminus.477 The purchasers of the Central immediately began
upgrading and expanding the rail system.
[O]ld oak and iron strap rails were torn up and replaced with new “T” rails
made entirely of iron, roadbeds were surveyed and cleared, new track was laid,
new engines and freight and passenger cars were ordered, and, after an active
lobbying effort in Lansing [the new state capital], the legislature issued
variances enabling the two lines to build farther southwest and eventually forge
a rail link with the growing city of Chicago by 1852.478
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The re-invigorated railroads spurred economic development, driving the growth of commercial
farming.
Using the Michigan rail system as a metaphor for the benefits commerce and wealth
could bring to the developing nation, Ralph Waldo Emerson exclaimed in his essay Wealth that,
A clever fellow was acquainted with the expansive force of steam; he also saw
the wealth of wheat and grass rotting in Michigan. Then he cunningly screws
on the steam pipe to the wheat crop. Puff now, O Steam! The steam puffs and
expands as before but this time it is dragging all Michigan at its back to hungry
New York and hungry England.
Emerson’s applause should not be taken as a comment on the benefits of private rail ownership
as there are indications that he wrote early versions of the essay in 1844, and some suggest 1841,
before the sale of the rail to private ownership. Instead, Emerson advanced wealth as a vehicle
to move humanity to an elevated plane. He explained the “bread he eats is the first strength and
animal spirits; it becomes, in higher laboratories, imagery and thought; and in still higher results,
courage and endurance.” Emerson concluded the essay extolling the use of wealth to expand the
moral and philosophical nature of man. “The true thrift is always to spend on the higher plane;
to invest and invest, with keener avarice, that he may spend in spiritual creation and not in
augmenting animal existence.”479 Accordingly, wealth for its own sake accomplished little. Its
higher use was to advance the individual and his society spiritually, intellectually, democratically
as well as materially.
In itself, Emerson’s views on wealth and society bear no special discussion in this paper.
Most probably, they did not reflect the thinking of the time and those listening to Emerson’s
lectures on wealth heard them to propound a material-seeking life rather than the spiritual
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message Emerson intended.480 Even with that as the individual goal however, Emerson would
argue, capitalism creates social benefit without regard to, and in spite of, the intentions of the
captains of industry. In his essay Considerations by the Way, Emerson recognized that the
benefit of the western railroads,
is inestimable, and vastly exceeding any intentional philanthropy on record.
What is the benefit done by a good King Alfred, or by a Howard, or Pestalozzi,
or Elizabeth Fry, or Florence Nightingale, or any lover, less or larger,
compared with the involuntary blessing wrought on nations by the selfish
capitalist who built the Illinois, Michigan and the network of the Mississippi
Valley roads; which have evoked not only all the wealth of the soil, but the
energy of millions of men.
Perhaps recognizing the irony of great gain through selfish motives, Emerson concluded with “a
sentence of ancient wisdom that ‘God hangs the greatest weights on the smallest wires.’”481
Musing, writing, and speaking on the new industrial society, during the 1840s and 1850s
and publishing in 1860, Emerson tendered a vision of a society driven by individual capitalist
impulses, but improved by the changes those impulses wrought. The individual was central, and
government posed a risk to individual self-creation. He wrote:
The only safe rule is found in the self-adjusting meter of demand and supply.
Do not legislate. Meddle, and you snap the sinews with your sumptuary laws.
Give no bounties, make equal laws, secure life and property, and you need not
give alms. Open the doors of opportunity to talent and virtue and they will do
themselves justice, and property will not be in bad hands. In a free and just
Commonwealth, property rushes from the idle and imbecile to the industrious,
brave and persevering.482
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This acceptance of the value of the individual, working his self-gaining plan, would animate
legal thought in the later portion of the nineteenth century. New constitutions and judicial
doctrines would soon enshrine those ideas into a changing governmental framework.
Private industry was successful in completing Michigan’s rail lines where state
ownership was not. The cause may have been economic – Michigan’s entry into rail
development coincided with a dramatic economic downturn; it may have been political – states
have multiple priorities and constituencies requiring non-economic decision-making; and it may
have been managerial – states lack the singular profit-motive that drives private industry
efficiencies. Whatever the cause of failure, selling the railroads to private industry changed the
economic and legal atmosphere of the state.

Corporate Growth and Public Dissatisfaction
Rail brought more to Michigan residents than transportation, communication, and land
value. It also brought dangers to livestock and the threat of ember-induced fires. The previous
chapter touched on some of those injuries as free-grazing livestock fared poorly against
oncoming rail cars. Resident dissatisfaction occasionally triggered a violent response. One such
flair up in 1839 resulted in farmers burning bridges, derailing trains, and threatening physical
violence.483 Largely, state government’s willingness to compensate farmers for their losses
would mute the anger and calm those situations. That would change as the state exited the rail
business. Private rail owners were not as charitable – offering only partial compensation.484
Private rail leaders claimed that farmers placed their infirm livestock on the tracks in order to
win compensation while farmers claimed that the railroad destroyed prized stock, causing
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grievous financial loss. Lawlessness resulted, with farmers destroying tracks, greasing inclines,
and derailing engines. In one incident, arsonists struck and largely destroyed the Michigan
Central’s new freight depot in Detroit. In 1850, an insurrection broke out with arson, undercover
operatives, and conspirators. The antagonism included differing characterizations of private
corporations with both sides claiming divine support. Whether or not God took sides, the
transfer of rail from public to private entities had consequences beyond the economic. One
celebrated event led to the controversial convictions of farmers for rioting and destroying rail
property. Townsend Gidley, the 1851 Whig candidate for governor, pledged that he would
pardon those convicted. State senator, Free Soil governor candidate, and future Michigan
Supreme Court Justice I. P. Christiancy thought such a pardon would bring about “an evil day for
Michigan.”485
The underlying dispute concerned residents’ grazing privileges. Farmers claimed
traditional open-range rights over the lands the lines travelled. If the railroads wished to limit
grazing on their lines, the railroad should fence the land. John D. Pierce, the intellectual force
behind Michigan’s innovative public school and university system, agreed: “No heathen altar
ever smoked more continually with the blood of its victims” than did the roads of the Michigan
Central. He continued, protesting that the rail lines “force their way through our farms, leaving
our fields, meadows and pastures all open as commons, and yet we are the trespassers if our
stock pass over the road from their high-mightiness, and liable to them for damages. The road
must be fenced, in the meantime, something near the value of the property destroyed must be
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paid.”486 On the other hand, rail owners thought their land private, and not a public common or
highway. Accordingly, the cattle and horses grazing on the tracks were trespassers against which
the railroad owed no duty. Traditions were changing rapidly; so rapidly in fact that by 1851, the
Michigan Supreme Court would declare the idea that horses and cattle could graze on lands now
owned by the railroad as “absurd – preposterous in the extreme.” Private industry owned the
property surrounding the line and was entitled to protection from customs that had been a central
understanding of the earlier agricultural world.487
Feelings of helplessness in the face of absentee owners fueled resident dissatisfaction.
With state ownership, residents held a voice. With absentee owners, they carried little sway.
Even as late as 1877, inhabitants complained about the futility of dealing with agents rather than
owners of rail lines. The editor of the Osceola Outline expressed his community’s frustration
with distant rail owners who, “having no interest whatever in the State’s welfare further than will
put money in their pockets, the people somehow have got the idea that a nest of tarantulas in the
shape of eastern capitalists have spun their iron webs across the country in all directions and then
slipped back into their holes in the Eastern cities to lie in wait for the flies to come in.”488
Popular response spanned from resignation to violence. Rail was changing their lives in
wonderful but often frustrating ways.
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A footnote to the rail story is the chronicle of Michigan’s entry into and withdrawal from
the salt processing industry. As part of its petition for statehood, the drafting convention
requested ownership of the territory’s salt springs. Congress awarded the state six salt springs
along with attached lands.489 As mentioned, the Internal Improvements Act of 1837 provided for
government development of a portion of the state’s salt resources, and starting in 1838, Michigan
began developing those resources.490 After much legislation and numerous efforts to
commercially extract and commercialize the salt, Governor Barry in 1844, threw up his hands,
declaring that the “immediate prospect of manufacturing salt extensively and with a profit is by
no means flattering.” Accordingly, he suggested, “that no further expenditures be made on the
state owned and operated salt project.”491 The legislature soon passed a resolution requesting
that Michigan’s congressional delegation seek federal approval for the sale of the lands granted
upon the admission of the state into the Union.492
Government efforts did not stop when ownership ended. After selling off the assets and
getting out of the business, in 1859 the legislature decided to encourage the salt industry. It
determined that the state should pay a 10 cents per bushel bounty for extracted salt, and to forego
taxation on the associated manufacturing property.493 At first, the legislation called for a bounty
of 10 cent per barrel (a larger unit of measure. There are 3 bushels to the barrel). A senator
thought the bounty idea so outrageous that he suggested that the state pay by the smaller measure
of a bushel. To his surprise, his sarcastically drawn proposal passed and was signed into law.
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A few years later, in 1861, believing that the “appropriate encouragement [of salt
manufacturing] is wise,” Governor Blair expressed concern that the bounty covered 100% of all
manufacturing costs and was therefore excessive.494 In response, the legislature cut the bounty
by two-thirds. The state then paid the salt companies according to the lower rate, even for the
period between the first statute and the statute reducing the payment. Litigation ensued. In a
one-sentence ruling, the court found that the East Saginaw Salt Manufacturing Company had a
vested right in the higher bounty for the period before the legislative adjustment and that the state
could not retroactively divest that right.495 The court discussed no constitutional concern over
the legislature’s power to offer a bounty. In itself, the state salt efforts and the case concerning
vested rights to state payments are not particularly novel. However, the issue would rise again
when the Michigan courts would modify understandings of the constitutional blueprint. In that
later period, courts would deem similar bounties beyond legislative power, and would declare
unconstitutional previous traditional government activities.
Thomas Cooley led those redrafting efforts, and he was joined by his judicial brother,
James Campbell. When authoring his Outlines of the Political History of Michigan, Campbell
declared that these types of investments, in the form of “bounties and loans to encourage new
branches of industry were not extravagant,” and were “probably well invested, even where the
object did not succeed.” He discussed two of those investments, silk manufacturing, and private
poor houses. The state had invested in silk raising and the associated mulberry tree
development.496 (It was one of at least nine states that did so in the 1830s and 40s.)497 That
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investment failed. The state also donated moneys to Reverend Martin Kundig to support his
ministrations to cholera sufferers. With the funds, he “made a poor-house a charming place of
resort for visitors.”498 Campbell did not object to those expenditures, in large measure because
they provided seed money for the introduction of new industries and methods. His objection, at
least as reflected in his Political History, concerned the pragmatic challenges associated only
with extensive government investments. Massive railroad assistance was objectionable.
Silkworm-raising grants, salt and sugar bounties, and indigent relief were not. But, as will be
discussed in Chapter VI, the stated constitutional principles espoused by those advancing a
negative governance model did not allow for pragmatic lines between effective experimentation
and significant government involvement.499 However, a deeper consideration reveals that such
experimentation may have been permissible, at least to Cooley.

Judicial Responses to Regulation and Government Spending.
Up until 1850, the Michigan Supreme Court’s record is largely silent about the legality of
employing public resources to develop private industry and the nature and breadth of the
constitution’s requirements concerning internal improvements. To some extent, that silence may
have been the result of an incomplete historical record, as the court did not publish its opinions
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before 1843.500 The court’s probable position, however, can be gleaned from its later related
holdings, which suggest that the court would have sustained legislative initiatives and rejected
challenges to energetic governance and the reallocation of tax dollars to support private or public
industry.
Most of the cases coming before the early Supreme Court were of minor legal
significance and, in those cases of larger significance, the court conservatively followed the
precedent of other jurisdictions.501 It is unlikely that the court would have taken issue with
continued government support and regulation of industry, as that was the historic norm. There
were some exceptions, however. At times, the court would eschew the mechanical application of
law to fact in order to advance perceived community and commercial-development needs.
In facilitating community, the surviving court opinions suggest a court inclined to support
regulations and to limit what it considered the corrosive influences of individual rights claims
when those claims threatened to undermine the community. Some of the controversies
concerned regulations born of the land-planning efforts associated with the 1805 fire. In
response to the fire, the city drew up plans for roads, highways, and buildings. Over the years, it
modified those plans but never abandoned the object to regulate the city’s design.502 In early
1844, William Carpenter constructed stairs adjoining his building on Woodward Avenue in
Detroit. The city claimed those stairs infringed on the public highway and were a nuisance.
Much of the Supreme Court’s review of the case concerned legal nuisance standards but the
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court’s dicta in People v Carpenter opened a window into its interpretation of rights in midnineteenth century Michigan. Writing for the court, Chief Justice Charles Whipple submitted
that both individuals and the community held rights with which government could not interfere.
He then took a further step, arguing that the legislature was “to some extent the guardian of those
rights,” and that it had an affirmative “duty to employ all the powers” to protect them. In this
case, however, individual and community rights clashed. In response, Whipple argued
government must protect the community against individual intrusions. It was government’s
obligation to “remedy the mischiefs that have grown up under a course of legislation by which
the rights of the public have been made subservient to the convenience or cupidity of
individuals.”503 While individual rights were important, they should not defeat community
rights. Accordingly, it was government’s affirmative obligation to protect the collective interest
from the individual.504 The court’s fear that individual rights claims would eclipse collective
needs was very similar to Mason’s 1838 concern that there was an “all absorbing desire lurking
in the heart of man to aggrandize self and promote private ends; which is too apt to forget
country, and which, if indulged and encouraged, must prove the undoubted cause of a premature
national degeneracy.”505 Voicing thoughts that are foreign to today’s neo-liberal, individualistic
philosophy, mid-nineteenth century leaders often held to notions of collective rights and needs,
protected and fostered by government action.
Whipple applied his rights theory beyond public spaces. As mentioned in Chapter II, one
of the first regulations promulgated by Detroit’s legislature involved the creation of a central
market. The 1839 case of Henretty v Detroit addressed the city’s right to punish meat sellers that
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did not lease stalls from the market. Unfortunately, the majority opinion in the case is lost, but
Whipple’s dissent survives. His dissent makes clear that the majority had affirmed Henretty’s
conviction for violating the central market law. Whipple dissented, arguing that Henretty should
not be liable for the violations because the ordinance was void for being unreasonable and in
restraint of trade. He acknowledged the public’s health and convenience interests associated
with the public market, but believed the regulation gave too much power to city government,
created a monopoly, and divested choices from buyers. In sum, the central-market ordinance
unreasonably “puts the whole community in the power of the few.” While his opinion focused
on individual rights, Whipple’s logic was not about hampering an individual’s trade-related
property or contract rights. Instead, it was about impeding consumer choice and convenience.
Accordingly, the ordinance was “manifestly unreasonable and not for the common benefit: It
being essential to the validity of a by law that it should be reasonable, and for the common
benefit – not for the benefit of the few.”506 Whipple would force traders to operate in the market,
but would not require they rent a stall from the city. It is hard to draw too great a conclusion
here, as Whipple’s opinion was in dissent and we do not know the basis of the court’s argument.
Notwithstanding that, it is interesting that Whipple would invalidate legislation based not on the
encumbrances to the individual but rather on how those encumbrances undermined public rights.
Simply put, democracy required that government provide equal access to all and that the best
way to protect the public interest was for government to provide an open marketplace not
restrained by monopolizing influences.
In speaking for the court a few years later, Whipple expanded on that philosophy in
Godfroy v Brooks. In that case, the court rejected common-law dower standards that would have
required a surviving spouse to maintain wooded land as she had received it. To the common
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law, clearing woodlands was “waste,” and that was something forbidden during a life estate. To
the court, that rule made no sense in Michigan because, “Here the hand of industry has been at
work leveling the forest and reclaiming the wilderness.” “By clearing the land of its surplus
timber and converting it into a beautiful farm,” the surviving spouse enhanced the estate and
helped drive commercial development.507 General welfare needs – society’s interest in
advancing commerce – resulted in an elevation of the current owner’s rights over that of future
owners.508 Public needs had changed the balance from the common-law standard that
maintained the rights of future heirs to one where law supported current owners and immediate
economic development. When established law encumbered commercial development, as it did
here, the court adjusted its reading of that law.
To Whipple law should promote economic energy. The legislature could not exclude
people from the market, time-honored waste and dower principles could not forestall economic
development, and individuals could not stand in the way of community development.
Underlying all three cases was a drive to enhance the public interest. Whipple either spent little
ink on private rights or warned that those rights could not be used to defeat public needs.
Development interests drove the court’s thinking and it changed the law to facilitate current use
and community development. The focus was on group progress. And this was the drive of the
courts, the legislature, and the executive. In short, it was a governing philosophy.
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Considerations of group needs predominated in early Michigan but they did not drown
out considerations of individual rights, particularly when government threatened those rights
employing criminal law. In two cases, again written by Whipple, the Supreme Court voided
sections of Detroit’s ordinance for improperly restricting individual rights. Both cases, Slaughter
v People and Welch v Stowell, dealt with Detroit’s efforts to suppress houses of ill fame.509 The
only surviving record of Slaughter is its republication as a footnote in Welch. From it we learn
that the Detroit Mayor’s Court convicted John Slaughter for keeping a house of ill fame in
violation of a Detroit ordinance. Violation of that ordinance subjected the offender to fines or
imprisonment. The city brought the matter by complaint, not by presentment to a grand jury.
The court found that the action against John Slaughter was criminal in nature and required a
constitutionally guaranteed grand jury process. Accordingly, it struck down Slaughter’s
conviction on procedural grounds. However, its dicta went further, offering a glimpse perhaps of
the increasing importance of individual liberties. In discussing the 1835 mindset of the framers
of the Michigan constitution, Whipple offered, “In the most modern of the Constitutions of the
states of the Union, there is a manifest inclination, not merely to enlarge but to guard with great
strictness the liberty of the citizen.” In sympathy with that policy, Whipple declared that the
Detroit ordinance was “repugnant to all notions which we have formed of the nature of
institutions under which we live.” To Whipple and his brethren, procedural guarantees of
individual rights and freedoms must be honored, and the courts were to actively protect those
rights.
Whereas Slaughter dealt with the rights of the individual’s body, Welch dealt with the
individual’s property. In that case, Whipple considered the limitation on the Detroit City
Council’s power to “pull down or remove” the bawdy house itself. To further its efforts to limit
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red-light district challenges, the council provided that the city could destroy the involved
property in addition to criminally prosecuting offending individuals. Their target was Elizabeth
“Peggy” Welch, a “notorious character and an offense to the neighborhood in which she
resided.”510 The court was uncomfortable with this “new and unusual remedy” of property
destruction and, accordingly, sought to interpret narrowly the ordinance and the state’s
empowering legislation. “We think the act of the legislature,” Whipple wrote, “should receive a
more reasonable construction – a construction which will protect, as well the public against the
evil complained of, as the rights of property, which should be held sacred.” One might double
take at the court’s characterization of a bawdy house as “sacred” but there is more here than an
unfortunate use of terms. The court’s language is emblematic of a growing attention to the rights
of property. Because of the concern for private property rights, Detroit could fine and imprison
those engaged in prostitution (subject to guaranteed procedural protections) but the house itself –
the property – could not be destroyed, at least given the summary proceedings set forth in the
statute. If the house were a nuisance threatening immediate and continuing harm (as with a
house containing cholera, for example), the summary proceedings, and the property’s
destruction, would be appropriate. Without that danger, the protection of individual property
rights required more significant judicial process. Peggy Welch’s house of ill repute should
remain untouched.
The tension between the government’s obligation to regulate in support of public welfare
and the individual’s right to property again presented itself in 1863 in Brady v Northwest
Insurance. In its effort to protect against fire, the Detroit City Council restricted the construction
of wood buildings in certain areas of the city. As part of that restriction, it forbade the repair of
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“any wooden building partially destroyed by fire.” Samuel Brady, the owner of a warehouse
affected by the ordinance, sought recovery on his insurance policy for the full value of his
building after extensive fire damage. His insurer, Northwestern Insurance, sought to pay a lesser
amount, based upon the cost of repairing the building to its previous state. To do so would
require rebuilding a wood structure, in violation of the ordinance. The majority of the court
considered the insurance contract in light of the regulation and determined that Northwestern
must compensate Brady for the larger amount.
Justice Campbell disagreed. Campbell asserted the city had no power to require owners
(or insurance carriers) of wood buildings to repair those buildings in forms safer than they were
before the ordinance. The city could regulate the construction of future buildings but it could not
do so with existing structures “without violating the rights of private property.” Campbell
employed the underlying property-protecting principles of Welch v Stowell (the house of illrepute case) and Williams v Michigan Central (cattle on the tracks) to support his legal
position.511 To Campbell, those cases emphasized the importance of protecting property against
intrusion – governmental or otherwise. Cooley, who would soon join Campbell on the Court,
would cite Brady’s majority opinion as reflecting the state of the law, but he did so a bit
sardonically. Cooley wrote, “The establishment of limits within the denser portions of cities and
villages, within which buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected or
repaired, may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property; but
regulations for this purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result.”512 Campbell’s
opinion was contrary to the then legal standards although, perhaps, not against the coming wave
of property-protecting jurisprudence.
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It should not surprise that mid-nineteenth century Michigan law both argued for the
protection of the public interest as against the individual and for the individual interest against
the public. The Panic of 1837 undermined a faith in government. On the national side, President
Martin Van Buren furnished no relief. Instead, he explained that the public could expect a “strict
economy and frugality” and, in a statement that would be equally at home in the gilded age, he
cautioned not “to substitute for republican simplicity and economical habits a sticky appetite for
effeminate indulgence.”513 While such a message might seem quite harsh to those Michigan
inhabitants who lost dearly from a spate of bank defaults, collapsed farm prices, and a failed
internal-improvements program, government intervention may not have seemed a panacea. The
state had defaulted on loans and repudiated some principle obligations. By mid-century, political
forces differed, with one group arguing for an expanded market economy while the other
envisioned a more cooperative social structure. As Martin Hershock noted in his study of
nineteenth century Michigan, Michiganians were frightened and began to strike out “at the
potential threat of unbridled economic and social change. . . For some, the pace of change was
too fast; for others it was not fast enough. Yet in the early 1850s, most state residents agreed that
their freedom was imperiled.”514 The political and economic climate was uncertain, and
individuals in part looked to government as both the cause and the cure of their distress.
Perhaps because of its constitutional requirement to support industry or because of the
Michigan’s system of state ownership, legal challenges to the use of an individual’s tax dollars to
support infrastructure were not considered (or at least there is no record of such consideration)
by the Michigan Supreme Court. Other state Supreme Courts, however, were beginning to hear
complaints that the legislature could not mandate transfers from taxpayers to private
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infrastructure companies. Early court decisions on this issue rejected those complaints. Such
transfers were within the legislature’s mission to enhance the general welfare. Similarly,
legislatures could extensively regulate, to the same end. After all, the decision as to what
constituted support of the general welfare resided in the people’s representatives – the
legislature. As government involvement in industry increased, and tax burdens and regulations
threatened to proliferate, courts increasingly considered the “rights” of individuals to be free of
such majority-approved burdens. That argument is the story of Chapter V. Before we turn to
those issues, however, this work addresses how Michigan’s residents attempted to reign in
legislative excesses while maintaining a faith in representative democracy. The challenges those
efforts engendered would help pave the road to Cooley and its associated judicial activism.
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Chapter IV: Refocusing and Shifting Governmental Responsibilities
“Constitutions and laws, usually placed as permanent landmarks on the civil
estate, appear and disappear like species in the organic world. Even our
constitutions of government prove the law of evolution.”
Francis Newton Thorpe, (1898)
“A Constitutional History of the American People,”
1898
In the summer of 1850, one hundred delegates from across Michigan travelled to
Lansing, the new state capital, to draft an entirely new state constitution. This dedicated group
travelled on paths more akin to Indian trails than to developed roads. Lansing was not yet a city
(that happened in 1859), but was a town carved out of the wilderness. Three years before, the
town – then called the “Village of Michigan,” – was a sparsely inhabited woodland. In 1847,
lumbermen and construction workers started burning trees and brush to make way for the capitol.
Visitors knew they were approaching the area when they saw the smoke from the fires during the
day and the glow of the bonfires at night.515
The construction efforts were emblematic of the state’s drive for constitutional change.
The 1849 House Select Committee recommending a constitutional convention did so in
celebration of the state’s march to social progress. It listed the state’s goals as “a continual
tendency to improvement in every land, to better systems of government; to better practice under
those systems, to increase in physical well being, to more enlightenment in morals, more
cultivation of intellect, to improved and therefore more beneficial social arrangement, effecting a
more equitable distribution of labor, possession and enjoyment.”516 To the committee,
government was to facilitate social and individual progress, and when that required that the
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system of government change, constitutional change was appropriate. Importantly, the
committee did not perceive government as an impediment to individual progress. Instead,
government and the individual shared a symbiotic relationship, whereby government was to
release Hurst’s energy to facilitate individual and social advancement. It was all about progress.
The delegates represented a cross section of Michigan’s population. Almost half (48)
were farmers, with the rest including lawyers, merchants, doctors, and millers. Only one was a
native Michigander, with most originating from New York (43) and New England (38). By
August 15, they had agreed upon a new constitution that diffused governmental power by
stripping the state’s executive and legislature of much of their authority and placing that power
with local government and directly elected special-purpose bodies. Some, including many who
attended, argued that their proposed constitution limited government and curtailed tax burdens.
This was an often-voiced intention. Despite that purpose, those characterizations missed the
mark as the delegates shifted powers but did not diminish “government.” Their new
constitutional blueprint curtailed some activity, expanded others, and repositioned much. In the
end, it allowed for, and even facilitated, active government.
In its aftermath, local governments assumed activities previously directed by the state,
and the state moved its focus from the economic to the social. As Francis Newton Thorpe noted,
“The experience of fifteen years had proved that power might be safely exercised by the people
in local government and it was now proposed to leave a large share of power in the counties and
townships.”517 To accomplish that, the constitution was the first in the nation to require
township governance. It required a township supervisor, highway commissioner, treasurer,
school inspector, and constables. Even as the framers stripped the legislature of oversight and
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appointment powers, they granted many of those powers to directly elected officials. Instead of
government withdrawing, it restructured, refocused, and reassessed areas of concern and
responsibility. Even then, in practice, the legislature refused to yield reallocated powers and the
people’s representatives would work around constitutional barriers to press the public’s agenda.
It would be a mistake to understate the delegates’ spirit for limiting government and
government spending. Delegate William Norton MacLeod of Mackinac County captured the
concerns over the needed government changes: “The inhibitions of the [1835] constitution were
so scant, general and easy to be avoided that they served for no other purpose than as so many
beacon-lights to warn of the quicksand and the shoals, without imposing a single restraint upon
the free-roaming sea.”518 The convention was a response to the challenges associated with
majoritarian legislation, most significantly the state’s rail experiences. The delegates worked
under the belief that the 1835 constitution had failed to check excessive public and legislative
exuberance. The resulting debt and embarrassments were legacies against which the delegates
sought to protect.
Even minor concerns over spending animated convention debates. The convention’s
first dispute concerned hiring a doorkeeper to help clean the meeting room and the convention’s
authority to buy stationery and pens. With the opening of the convention, Delegate Henry
Fralick argued that he and his fellow delegates “had been elected here because taxes are too
high,” and that the convention could only spend according to specific authority, which certainly
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did not allow for custodial services or pens and paper.519 The delegates rejected his position on
those minor expenditures, but did not reject his message.520 To control taxation and to forestall
profligate spending, the delegates would draft a constitution that, among other things, would
provide for biennial legislative sessions, protect against earmarks, forbid special corporations,
dramatically reduce allowed state debt, and prohibit state internal improvement expenditures and
pledges of the state’s credit. It constitutionally created township governance and separated
control of the state university from the legislature and governor.521 The constitution removed
much of the legislature’s power to spend to advance economic development. With its previous
major focus diverted, the state legislature turned its sights on social concerns, and did so in ways
that would challenge the state’s new constitutional structure.
This chapter focuses on one of the legislature’s social efforts – education. Particularly in
the area of university education, Michigan pioneered state efforts. Cooley participated in the
controversy over the implementation of the state’s higher education policy and participated in the
struggle over legislative activism in a realm seeming carved from legislative control. The
development of education policy thus was an important chapter in the development of Cooley’s
legislative-limiting philosophy. By focusing on education, I do not mean to argue that other
519
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social concerns were unimportant or that they did not influence Cooley. To the contrary, areas
such as temperance, capital punishment, and race relations were also important and deserve
attention in future works, but only temperance is addressed in this work, and then only in limited
measure. That discussion is in Chapter V.
The delegates at the 1850 convention believed that free public education advanced not
only individual interests, but also provided a bedrock for democratic governance, economic
development, and social peace. To the delegates, free education both advanced and was a
symbol of equality, where the “barefoot urchin” and the “most fortunate heir” could stand as
equals.522 State controlled university education would elevate those of applied merit (as opposed
to inherited position) and promised to advance the entire state economically and socially. To do
that, the new constitution sought to wrest control of the University of Michigan (“the
University”), one of the nation’s first public universities, from the politics-infused state
legislature, and place it under the control of a directly elected board of regents. Michigan was
the first state to place constitutional authority over higher education in a board free from
legislative control – essentially establishing the University as a fourth branch of government. As
it would turn out, however, the legislature refused to leave the field, and tried to push its agenda
against a resistant faculty and board of regents. The legislature was responding to public
pressures, something against which the constitutional framework sought to protect. After years
of struggle between the branches, the constitutional framework would buckle in response to
legislative power and popular demands.
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Limiting the Legislature – Michigan’s 1850 Constitution
James Bryce, in his The American Commonwealth, noted that American state
constitutions, particularly in the mid-nineteenth century, did more than create governing
frameworks. They pursued “topics into a minute detail hardly to be looked for in a fundamental
document.”523 Constitutions took on this legislation-like characteristic in an effort to avoid the
earlier challenges associated with government support of commerce, and internal improvements
in particular. Michigan’s 1850 constitutional convention was part of this multi-state trend to
restrict the perceived legislative overreaching of the 1830s and 40s. As Larson noted, even in
New York, the state with the highly successful Erie Canal, the state began “sliding steadily away
from its public works tradition toward a liberal separation of government power and private
enterprise.”524 Hurst noted, “Soon repenting the broad authority given the legislative branch in
our earliest state constitutions, substantial interests pressed successfully for limitations written
into constitutional form.”525 An Ohio constitutional delegate encapsulated the feelings of the
period: “I wish to see the State government brought back to its simple and appropriate functions,
[leaving] railroad, canal, turnpike and other corporate associations, to get along upon their own
credit without any connection or partnership with the State whatever.”526 Where earlier
constitutional structures granted legislators broad discretion, in mid-century the “peoples of the
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States have come to distrust their respective legislatures.” Hence mid-century framers across the
states would not chance future legislative excess and decided “to narrow as far as they
conveniently can (and sometimes farther) the sphere of the legislature.”527
Michigan’s 1850 constitution would adopt the same narrowing focus as did that of its
sister states. Michigan Justice Campbell (during whose tenure the 1850 Constitution applied)
critiqued the constitution by offering “The most unpleasant features were a too great attention to
details in grants and limitations of power, which have on some occasions endangered the public
welfare for lack of discretionary authority in the Legislature.” Almost incongruently given his
later legislative-limiting judicial philosophy, Campbell continued, “But a thing which struck
many persons unpleasantly was the number of provisions which seem to indicate that it was
supposed the people could not trust their agents and representatives.”528 The agents and
representatives to whom he referred were the legislators and governor. It was not that the
delegates rejected representative governance. To the contrary, they attempted to reframe it to
avoid what they believed was self-interest, greed, and the challenges of more distant and
unconnected legislators. In their efforts to facilitate representative governance, they increased
the number of elected representatives, as judges, regents, and departmental leaders now were
directly elected. So far had the convention’s direct-election philosophy been pushed that one
delegate sarcastically moved that the constitution require direct election of university faculty.529
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Limiting the Michigan legislatures’ authority decidedly flowed from the challenges
associated with government rail ownership. Governor Ransom suggested that a quasiconstitutional limitation on legislative authority had occurred in 1846 with the privatization of
the rail lines. In response to legislation that would, in effect, grant further credit to the privatized
Southern railroad, Ransom protested that such acts were “entirely at war with the policy adopted
in 1846, when our public works were sold, which received the undivided approval of the
people.”530 The legislature, governor, and most importantly, “the people” had instituted a new
governing policy. Ransom argued for limiting legislative authority to aid infrastructure,
notwithstanding then applicable constitutional language requiring that the state develop internal
improvements. To Ransom, circumstances and public acclaim had both supplanted
constitutional requirements and placed implied limitations on legislative power. Whether he felt
those forces changed the constitution itself, or were extra-constitutional limitations, is unclear.
To Ransom, however, the experiences associated with the state’s rail failure resulted in a
limitation on legislative power.
Ransom’s successor, John S. Barry, felt the same way about activist legislatures. A few
months prior to the delegates’ 1850 journey to Lansing, Barry set the tone for the upcoming
convention by chastising the legislature. “Excessive and unwise legislation has, perhaps more
than any other cause, retarded the prosperity of the State; and protracted sessions of the
legislature have caused a great and wasteful expenditure of public money.” Claiming a
“progress made in the science of legislation,” Barry furnished his solution – constitutionally
limiting legislative power. He then ended his address by telling the legislators that the state
required “only a short sacrifice” of their time, as Michigan required little new legislation. Pass a
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few pieces of legislation and go home. Barry was expressing what many felt: the legislature
threatened state advancement. In Michigan’s short history, its professed governing philosophy
had traveled from a desire “to meet any public demands which may be necessary”531 to a feeling
that government hindered progress.
The formal change of constitutional structures had begun on March 12, 1849 with a
legislative joint resolution supporting a vote to approve a constitutional convention. With the
electorate’s overwhelming approval (33,193 yeas and 4,095 nays), the convention met in July
1850. Its records evidence an overwhelming distrust of the legislature and a commitment to
avoid the perceived mistakes associated with government involvement in the economy (internal
improvements, special corporate charters, and lending of credit, for example). According to
Cooley, the 1848 European Revolutions also contributed to the distrust of the legislature.532 He
offered that, “radicalism was in the air the world over, and discontent with existing institutions
was rife in every civilized country.” He noted that, “everywhere the aspiration of the people was
for greater liberty and more privileges to the individual and less power to the rulers.”533 In some
measure, Cooley’s statement evidenced a belief that power was a zero-sum game: Grant power
to the government and thereby take it from the people.
The infectious ideas about American state excesses and European revolutionary liberty
animated Americans’ thoughts about their government. In response to historic domestic
challenges and the seeping ideas of individualism, the Michigan drafters proposed, and the voters
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approved (by a margin of 26,736), among other things, biennial legislative sessions, limits on
legislator pay, limits on bill introductions, prohibitions on special corporate creation, limits on
state debt, prohibitions on state internal improvement participation and, as discussed below,
revamping the state’s educational system.
A spirit of liberty and equality underlay much of the discussion and many of the
provisions of the constitution. The goal in limiting the legislature was to expand and protect
liberty and equal opportunity by averting short-sighted and self-serving legislation.”534 The
delegates were products of their time and, accordingly, they focused on the liberty and equality
interests of adult white males. They failed to afford the same level of concern to African
Americans and women (although they expanded married women’s property rights).535 That
equality concern played a significant role in the state’s education efforts, particularly with
respect to primary school education. As later chapters will address, those equality concerns
would join with bubbling liberty and rights concerns to help forge judicial doctrines that sought
to limit what the courts construed as legislative overreaching.
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The Rise of Public Education in Michigan
The previous chapter discussed early Michigan efforts to develop and support the state’s
internal improvement system. As noted, at first the executive, legislature, and residents felt the
transportation system was too important to be left to the hands of private industry. That
experiment in government economic control did not pass the test of experience. Notwithstanding
that failure, Michigan’s government pressed for government control of one other major sector,
and did so with great success – education. Particularly with respect to higher education,
Michigan was a national leader in providing education opportunities to its residents. Its
successes were not a foregone conclusion. The private sector could provide, and had provided,
effective common and higher education in other states. Moreover, Michigan’s politics and
economic scarcity erected roadblocks to education advancement. Notwithstanding those early
challenges, Michigan would develop a publicly funded and controlled education system,
spanning from common school to university.536 Where the notion of public funding and control
had died with respect to internal improvements, it thrived in the education sector, as legislators
and constitutional framers toiled to advance the general welfare and equality interests of
Michigan’s citizens.

Early Education Efforts
Modern general education significantly predated Michigan. As Lee Soltow and Edward
Stevens noted in their The Rise of Literacy and the Common Schools in the United States,
536

Burns classified the nation’s efforts to publically educate its youth as “an experiment in pure socialism.” Burns,
Vineyard of Liberty: 501. Soltow and Stevens explained that the laissez faire education model did not fit society’s
needs. Reformers, and with them government leaders, believed common school education could ameliorate the
negative impact of rapidly changing demographic, economic, and social change. In essence, they saw the “common
school as a means to the acquisition of basic literacy, and as the panacea for social ills.” Given those goals, a laissez
faire system of individually financed and controlled education would not work. Lee Soltow, Edward Stevens, The
Rise of Literacy and the Common School in the United States: A Socioeconomic Analysis to 1870 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981). 142.

208

religious concerns and the associated drives for social control drove early-modern education
efforts. In the early American republic “as in Great Britain, the most notable examples” of the
rise of literacy for social control “occurred as part of the sweeping missionary activities of
evangelical Protestantism.” To those religiously motivated educators, literacy promoted respect
for property rights, social stability, crime prevention, and moral development. In the 1820s, the
Sunday school situs of instruction began to move to government-supported schools, open to all
children in the community; and the central focus of education began to change from religion and
morals to nation building, cultural integration, and advancing democratic and economic
development.537
Universities and common schools are connected. If students are not provided appropriate
basic education, few will develop the intellectual basis upon which to address the substance of
higher education. That does not mean, however, that public support for these two educational
phases aligned, as the argument for public financing differs between common schools and
universities. As one delegate at the 1850 convention described it, primary education concerned
equality of all people while university education concerned elites.538 Both systems are addressed
here, but particular focus is placed on the University, as Michigan was the leader in public
university education. More importantly, the state’s efforts to develop the University exposed the
challenges faced when majority will and constitutional structure collide.
In 1850, Michigan took a unique step in developing its educational system. It gave
constitutional grounding and independence to its university. While its mechanism of
constitutional separation was innovative, the idea that higher education should be separate from
political forces was longstanding, going back to the ninth century. According to Lyman Glenny
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and Thomas Dalglish, in most matters medieval universities were left to govern themselves.
That space between the university and the governing powers – the church and the state – was a
“social fact” premised on the nature of the university, but was not a structural separation. That
de facto separation, however, often suffered as church and/or state pressured for control,
particularly when they struggled against each other for governing control of their followers.539
Notwithstanding the social fact of separation, both the state and church provided support for the
development and operation of universities, with great universities in such places as Bologna,
Cambridge, Leyden, Oxford, Pavia, and Paris all receiving considerable government and/or
church patronage.
During the American colonial period, religiously focused private interests most
frequently created and ran the universities. The first, Harvard College, trained Congregationalist
and Unitarian clergy as its earliest priorities. Despite its private nature, the college was
dependent on public funds. From Harvard’s beginning in 1636, the Massachusetts legislature
taxed residents to support the college. The first appropriation of £800 required a tax of one-half
dollar on the 4000 Massachusetts inhabitants. The legislature also earmarked ferry incomes to
provide funds to the college.540 Dartmouth College, the subject of John Marshall’s landmark
opinion in Dartmouth College v Woodward, also enjoyed extensive public support.541 Despite
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that support, Marshall expressed a concern that with further influence, politics could corrode the
higher education mission of universities. He protested that the legislature had reorganized the
university’s governance “in such a manner, as to convert a literary institution moulded according
to the will of its founders . . . into a machine entirely subservient to the will of the
government.”542 With that decision, state efforts to democratize existing private universities
ended. In response to that inability, states began to create public universities. In the wake of
Dartmouth, the states soon created the Universities of North Carolina, Vermont, Indiana,
Alabama, and Michigan. The University of Virginia was created the same year as Dartmouth.543
Even as Marshall suggested that public control could undermine higher education,
governments were pressing forward to support education on multiple levels. With its first efforts
at national governance, the Confederation Congress advanced government support of education.
The 1785 “Ordinance for ascertaining the mode of disposing of lands in the western country” set
aside lot number 16 in every township in the Northwest Territories to support schools.544 The
Northwest Ordinance provided “Religion, morality and knowledge, being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged,” a phrase inscribed on a central building at the University.545 Ten days after
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passage of the Ordinance, Congress provided that lot 16 “be given perpetually for the purpose
and maintenance of the public schools within the township.” Washington’s Farewell Address
urged the people to promote “as an object of common importance, Institutions for the general
diffusion of knowledge.” He then tied education to an enlightened electorate, required for
democratic governance. Jefferson, in his Notes on the State of Virginia, sought “to provide an
education adapted to the years, to the capacity, and to the condition of everyone, and directed to
their freedom and happiness.” He proposed public education from grammar school to the
university as a requirement of democratic governance.546 He later voiced, “If a nation expects to
be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be.”547
To early leaders, education was both a requirement for and of American democratic governance.
Aspirations and achievement often diverge, and they did with respect to public education.
On the collegiate level, interest group politics were the primary barrier. Strong church-focused
organizations controlled higher education in the East. Unable to finance colleges in the South,
churches worked to inhibit the development of secular state institutions. Governments in the
areas of the Northwest Territories lacked the controls, sophistication, and funding to overcome
church concerns over secular institutions of higher learning. “Thus, almost everywhere, active
sectarian opposition proved for many years the most effective factor preventing any great degree
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of college and university support by the states.”548 Even when government could support
universities, throughout most of the Northwest Territories, religious interests pushed those
universities to adopt a religious cast. Sectarian pressures certainly played a role in the muted
beginnings of the University (and the constitutional decisions of 1850) but Michigan’s early
focus on a state-controlled, secular university forestalled many of the denominational challenges
that elsewhere undermined the government efforts.549 As it turned out, Michigan’s biggest
encumbrance was funding. Educational plans exceeded financial means.
In 1817, the year the University claims as its founding, Woodward proposed and the
governor and judges adopted, “An Act to establish the Catholepistemiad, or University of
Michigania.”550 The act was impractically grand; calling for an educational system led by a
university fed by public schools (those schools were referred to as “common schools”).551 The
system conceived of a centralized educational system directed by a few appointed officials that
was to be paid for by a 15% tax increase. Another act in 1821 established the University of
Michigan, supplanting the 1817 act. All of the judges and the governor signed the act, except for
Woodward. He perhaps preferred the more aristocratic requirements of the Catholepistemiad
act. An appointed board of trusties was to control the University. Government had few
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resources, the territory had few people, and little was done to implement the statutes.552 The
“actions by the territorial government were, as a matter of fact, little more than stage settings for
future educational developments in Michigan.”553 But they, and a series of territory and national
laws that granted lands to endow the University and common schools, led to the first, completely
non-sectarian, state-educational system in the nation.554
Recognizing that the “wealthy will provide for their own children,” Territory Governor
Cass petitioned the legislature in 1826 to develop a publically supported common-school system
that would serve “all who require instruction, and who have not the means of obtaining it.” To
Cass, free governance required such public action.555 In 1827, the legislative council responded.
It provided that townships of a particular size should provide for common schools, teach certain
subjects, and employ instructors of a determined quality and morality. The legislature authorized
residents to vote for taxes to build and maintain schoolhouses. Parents of students were to
provide wood (called a “fuel tax”) as their fee for attending, although inability to pay would not
prohibit a child from attending. The act, however, provided only the structure and rules around
education. Its last clause provided “nothing in this act contained shall be construed as to make it
obligatory” for a township to construct and operate a school.556 The law, like many of the time,
was grand in design but short in practical application, and it is unclear whether any school was
created under it.
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A revised law was passed in 1829, but it was unsatisfactory – at least to Cass. Believing
that the education law was “too complicated for practical operation,” Cass proposed statewide
taxes to support common schools. To him, the “preservation of morals and religion,” and the
“cultivation of the heart and intellect” required government action. He believed that informed
public opinion and democratic governance relied on universal education.557 In 1833, the
legislature replaced the 1829 law with a more modest common education requirement.558 Even
then, public common schools developed slowly. In Detroit, the state’s then capital, the first fully
public school was organized in 1838, and then in only one ward. Until 1841, the other wards
refused to tax themselves to provide for schools. At that time, about two-thirds of Detroit’s
school age children went without any formal education.559 Even then, the schools most often
still charged tuition to families attending the schools. Buley explained that collecting financial
tuition often was difficult. Accordingly, “Three or four raccoon skins, a calf, a barrel of
whiskey, or a half-dozen well cured hams were, directly or indirectly, currency of the realm in
the marts of Latin and moral philosophy as well as at the general store.”560
In practical effect, Michigan started its long-lasting efforts to establish public education
with its 1835 constitution. The state faced significant impediments to developing a coordinated
education system. Michigan’s deep wilderness made an integrated, or even standard, public
education system difficult. As John Pierce, one of the founders of Michigan’s education system,
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recalled, “We had no canals, no railroads; even the old slow coach was scarcely to be found. We
had the lumber wagon and the Indian trail. We forded rivers, waded marshes, and when night
came, if we found a shanty with a piece of old carpet for a door we turned in for the night, and all
were satisfied.” Nevertheless, the thirst for education was palpable. Pierce continued, “But,
notwithstanding all this, the people then here came mostly from the region of school-houses, and
were anxious for schools.” And, he suggested, as these schools developed, Michigan became
more attractive to settlers.561
Given the population’s drive for education, Pierce and Isaac Crary (the convention’s
chairman of the committee on education, Michigan’s first representative to Congress, and
founder of Michigan’s educational system with Pierce) proposed, and the drafters of the 1835
constitution accepted, an education system premised on the Prussian system – with a central
authority coordinating educational policy from the primary levels through the university. 562 To
accomplish that, the constitution provided for a superintendent of public instruction (the first
constitutionally created education leader in the nation), and instructed that the legislature shall
promote “intellectual, scientific and agricultural improvements.” It provided for a “system of
common schools,” funded by the revenue from the sale of federally granted lands. The
561
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University similarly was to be funded by interest on the proceeds from the sale of lands granted
for the University’s support.563 That meant the funds would go to the one state university rather
than be parsed among multiple institutions of higher learning. Further, by calling for a statecontrolled system, the constitution infixed a secular direction on Michigan’s educational future.
In consequence, instruction would move away from moral and biblical studies.564
In establishing a state fund for common school education (the “Primary School Fund”),565
Michigan through its constitution and through the federal legislation admitting it into the union,
had done something unique. Other state admission statutes provided that townships control the
proceeds from the education-dedicated land in their borders. As a state, Michigan controlled
those funds, which derived from a donation of over one million acres. This presented several
distinct opportunities. First, centralized decision-making allowed for greater control on the sale
of land, allowing Michigan to enjoy greater financial returns from those sales than did its sister
states.566 Second, funds could be disbursed based on need. As noted by Francis Shearman, the
superintendent of public instruction from 1849-54: “In taking the grant to the State, there was a
higher principle of equity involved in relation to the whole people” than would have been the
case if the funds had been distributed to townships in relation to the amounts received from land
sales therein.567 Moreover, the system allowed for “a state school system rather than a series of
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local systems of schools.”568 Those results were to prove important as Michigan could strive to
provide equal educational opportunity to a disparate population.
In his first annual address as an elected governor, Mason in 1836, set the tone for the
state’s future educational philosophy and, with time, efforts. Education was about democracy
and equality. He urged, “Here the right of all are equal, and the people themselves are the
primary source of all power,” and continued, “Public opinion directs the course which our
government pursues; and, so long as the people are enlightened, that direction will never be
misgiven.” Accordingly, Mason proposed development of a “uniform and liberal system of
common schools . . . open to all classes, as the surest basis of public happiness and prosperity.”
As with his efforts on internal improvements, the answer was a statewide, government directed
program – and like the internal improvement projects, Mason believed that the young state had
resources “ample for all our [education] purposes.”569
With its admission in 1837, the legislature accelerated the state’s involvement in
education. In March, it authorized the superintendent of public instruction to sell the land
designated for schools and to allocate the proceeds to the townships to build and operate schools.
The legislation set forth the roles and obligations of primary school officials and those of
township officials. The Primary School Fund was apportioned based upon the number of
students in each district (not the revenue received, as in other states). The legislature also
authorized the University regents to begin construction of the University in Ann Arbor, and
granted the University a $100,000 loan for that building.570 University operations were to be
funded from the interest on the proceeds from the sale of the donated lands (the “University
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Fund”), which would finance nearly all university functions until 1869. The legislature also
enacted an organic law to create and operate the University. The constitution had left complete
power in the legislature to create and operate the University, and the legislature pursued that
effort.571 At its core, the legislation demonstrated the state’s interest in educational opportunity.
Section 12 read, “The fee of admission to the university shall never exceed ten dollars; and it
shall be open to all persons resident in this state, who may wish to avail themselves of its
advantages, without charge of tuition.” 572 The school largely was non-sectarian, as the
legislature had forbidden any exclusion of administrators, faculty, or students on religious
grounds.573 The act created a board of regents, with a chancellor who would be the board’s ex
officio president. Those regents, nominated by the governor, would strive to build a first class
university. However, the appointees largely were political and lacked the knowledge, or the
focus, to achieve that objective.574
The regents held their first meeting in 1837 and, envisioning multiple branches, they
authorized eight university sites. (The University was the only body that could grant college
degrees). Funding challenges eventually forced the closure of the branches save for the Ann
Arbor facilities. The regents appointed Asa Gray as the University’s first faculty member.
Lacking buildings or students, Gray left for Europe to collect books for the not yet built
university library. After he had collected about 3,700 books, Gray returned to a destitute
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university and state. Soon, Governor Woodbridge proposed that Gray accept a one-year
suspension of salary. Gray declined the offer and left for Harvard, having taught no classes.575
In some measure, Gray was a casualty of a state that had financially overextended itself,
particularly because of its internal improvement projects. But he was also a victim of a
geographically distant and inattentive board of regents. Their priorities lay elsewhere.
In 1840, Woodbridge entered office and, in his first message to the legislature, warned of
“the startling fact, that, from the period of its commencement, our expenditures for the ordinary
operations of the government have far exceeded its fixed and ordinary income.”576 In aligning
expenditures with revenue, one-month later Woodbridge proposed to cut education expenses by,
among other things, offering “that the salary of the Superintendent of Public Instruction should
be greatly reduced,” and transferring the collection of the University and Primary School Funds
to the state auditor general and the state treasurer.577 Like Gray, the superintendent of public
instruction resigned. Whether motivated by the need for fiscal retrenchment or by the desire for
political control over education, Woodbridge’s actions accomplished both goals. The governor
now had effective control over education policy and spending.
Construction of the University continued and in 1841, the University opened its doors. It
did so without much fanfare or enthusiasm. As Governor Barry (Woodbridge had become a U.S.
Senator), declared “Well, we’ve got buildings . . . I don’t think they’re good for anything else, so
we might as well declare the University open.”578 Not surprisingly, a select committee of the
legislature found government support for education lacking. Its report, especially concerning the
University, set the foundation for later constitutional changes designed to free the University
575
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from political influences. That 1840 report’s conclusion, submitted before the first student
attended class, was startling: Political interference undermined university development and
threatened the very possibility of effective public higher education. Starting with the board of
regents, they submitted:
A new board of trustees not knowing well what to do, generally begins
by undoing and disorganizing all that has been done before. At first they dig
up the seed a few times, to see that it is going to come up, and after it appears
above the surface, they must pull it up to see that the roots are sound, and they
pull it up again to see if there is sufficient root to support so vigorous branches,
and then pull it up again to see why it looks so sickly and pining, and finally to
see if they can discover what made it die.579
The committee suggested something more nefarious than an uninitiated board. It warned that
those “many who would hope to profit from despoiling the University of its lands, and its funds,”
posed a threat to public higher education. This could not be allowed as “the university is a trust
too sacred to be made the foot-ball of party” and accordingly needed to “be cut loose from all
connection with politics.”580 It then proposed that the University be run by a “permanent board
of well known individuals [given] the entire responsibility” of running the University.581 The
dissenting report accepted nearly all the conclusions save for the committee-recommended life
tenure for regents. All agreed, politics and higher education poorly mix.
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As noted, most of the Northeast’s institutions of higher learning were founded by or in
support of religious organizations. This was not the case in Michigan. As Pierce advocated in
1838, Michigan’s leaders designed the University “be such as to secure the confidence of the
liberal minded of all denominations, and then it might be expected that they will give it
countenance and support.”582 That support was not commonly forthcoming, as advocates of
secular higher education protested that non-affiliation would undermine needed enthusiasm for
the school. Not with the hoped-for applause, clergy responded with disdain to a secular
university. Protesting that the governor had failed to appoint clergy to the board of regents, “the
university was accused by church people of being ungodly.”583 In response, the University set
up a faculty house for each of four denominations – Baptists, Episcopalians, Methodist, and
Presbyterians – and frequently hired with an eye to distributing faculty seats to each
denomination. In turn, each denomination would have a member sit for a one-year term as
university chancellor. Inevitably, this effort to appease (and to avoid the domination by one sect)
resulted in discontinuous leadership.
With challenges rising, the superintendent of public instruction convened a board of
visitors to review the state of the University. Its 1847 report suggested changes in governance in
order to reach the highest level of achievement (it used Yale as that benchmark). The committee
urged that the government “must in no case allow political considerations to make merchandize
of the interest of the University.” That its focus distilled to the financial is no surprise. In 1847,
Michigan remained in its financial crisis. It had just sold the railroads, and with the battle over
bond default and repudiation still ripe, the state was searching for revenue sources. With this in
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mind, the committee warned against government invasion of the University Fund. “Let the hand
that for sinister purposes would lay hold of that or any other fund set apart to the education of
our youth, be palsied in the touch; let the tongue of him who would thus betray his trust and his
country, cleave to the roof of his mouth.”584 With the legislature responsible for the funds,
University education faced the risk of differing legislative priorities.585
At about this time, the University faced an internally grown crisis that would pit student
calls for liberty against traditional faculty prerogatives. That crisis – commonly called the
“fraternity war” – began largely in consequence of faculty’s belief that its responsibility included
assuring student morals and values. With that mission in mind, one day in 1846 Andrew Ten
Brook, Professor of Morals and Intellectual Philosophy, covertly followed students living with
him into the woods surrounding Ann Arbor. (Some faculty members supplemented their income
by boarding students.) The students were sneaking away to a cabin hidden in those woods. Ten
Brook and others questioned the students about their activities. At first, the students refused to
disclose what they were doing but it soon came out that they belonged to fraternities that, to the
faculty’s mind, violated University Rule 20. That rule required faculty approval of all student
organizations. Faculty did not approve of fraternities as they believed that fraternities threatened
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the University by employing “the despotic power of disorder and savagism” that could bring a
plague of “debauchery, drunkenness, pugilism and dueling” to the University. 586
The University demanded that the students withdraw from fraternity membership and
activity, but without strong University leadership, (the chancellorship shifted every year), the
faculty was unable to force compliance.587 Instead, it demanded that the fraternities admit no
new members, thinking that by force of matriculation, the threat would subside in the coming
four years. Upon learning that underclassmen continued to join these societies, the faculty on
December 19, 1849 issued an ultimatum – either renounce fraternity membership or stay home
after the Christmas break. The students regarded the ultimatum with some disfavor, a mood
sensed by the faculty. As Ten Brook noted, “the occasion, it must be admitted was not marked
by quiet and respectful attention.”588 Students noisily protested, setting outhouses and
woodshops ablaze. The faculty responded by expelling those who failed to renounce
membership. Soon students and their families expanded the conversation by publicly protesting
that the University had violated their speech and assembly rights.
Faculty disagreed, believing that the University should be a sacred space for learning and
that students, by their presence, had agreed to the school rules. Ten Brook argued that the
students had been stirred up by “influences especially, coming from abroad” (these were the
times of European revolution) and, in an aristocratic fashion, blamed increased student unrest on
the expanded admission of students.589 A committee of regents agreed and argued “obedience on
the part of students to the laws enacted by the Regents is as necessary to the existence of the
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University as obedience to the laws enacted by the Legislature.” That committee expressed
concern that an absence of strong supervision would allow students of “ripened intellect and
loose morals” to influence the “minds of those of tender age.”590 Essentially, it argued that the
University sat in loco parentis to attending students (a position later revisited in discussions over
admitting female applicants).
Nevertheless, the faculty, or at least Ten Brook, understood that as more students entered
the world of higher education, calls for individual freedom would increase.591 The students
posited such an argument in their petitions to the legislature. Students had, they argued, natural
rights to join together; rights that other universities respected through their unwillingness to
enforce their similar anti-secret society rules. The solution to the University’s intransigence was
structural change. A memorial drafted by students suggested that the regents, “and through them
the faculty, be brought nearer to the people, and more immediately amenable to them.” The
memorial continued, “Let some distinguished man be placed at the head of the institution as
chancellor who can give it character and standing.”592 Ann Arbor State Senator William Finley
proposed legislation for an independent, directly elected board of regents, but the bill failed to
pass. With the legislature unwilling to act, the people, through their constitutional convention
delegates did. Soon University governance would change along the lines suggested by the
students.
Ultimately, the university reinstated the fraternities, although many of the expelled
students never returned. Many of the faculty, like Ten Brook, held to their paternalistic and
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authoritarian positions, while the students would continue to embrace the individualistic ideas
that had animated their conflict with the faculty.593 As a postscript, three members of the faculty
joined to force Ten Brook to resign, a capitulation Ten Brook later classified as “a great blunder
and an act of injustice to the University.”594 Other faculty members would then force those three
to resign. Ten Brook would later return to the University as its librarian and historian. The
home from which he followed the students to the cabin eventually was leveled. In its place
resides the Phi Delta Theta fraternity.
As the university students claimed liberty interests, those advocating common school
development pressed equality principles. To some extent, the development of those common
schools was the responsibility of the University, pursuant to the Prussian educational principles
advanced by Pierce and Crary and propounded in the 1835 constitution.595 In that capacity, the
University was to help establish the common schools.596 Much of the day’s discussion
concerned the inability of the University to thrive without strong basic education. For example,
the board of visitors commented, “In vain do you fill your Professors’ chairs with men of the
highest eminence, if the youth who resort to them for instruction must be fed with milk instead of
meat.”597

593

Shaw, The University of Michigan An Encyclopedic Survey, I: 37.
Ten Brook, American State Universities: 208.
595
Cousin’s Report, which introduced the Prussian system into the United States, allowed those “struggling to
reduce the rampant district system to some semblance of order, and who were trying to organize the thousands of
little community school systems in each State into one state school system” to form some educational order.
Cubberley, Public Education in the United States: 273.
596
Ten Brook wrote that the belief was “higher education must, in the end, direct and control the lower, and it ought
to do so; for while the latter employs itself mainly with simple facts in detail, the former teaches the principles or
theories into which accumulated facts have been generalized.” Ten Brook, American State Universities: 99.
597
Documents Accompanying the Annual Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, Report of the Board of
Visitors, 1848 Journal of the Proceedings of the Board of Regents of the University of Michigan: Doc. 5: 8.
594

226

The Drive for Free Common School Education
The central focus of common school education was how lower-level education facilitated
the equity needs of democratic governance. This equity concern did not start in Michigan nor
was it one of recent vintage. William Manning, a Massachusetts farmer, tavern keeper, and
political author during the early years of the republic, captured the equality principles underlying
public education. ‘“Larning is of the greatest importance to the seport of a free government,” he
wrote, “& to prevent this the few are always crying up the advantages of costly collages, national
acadimyes & grammer schools, in ordir to make places for men to live without work, & so
strengthen their party. But are always opposed to cheep schools & woman schools, the ondly or
prinsaple means by which larning is spred amongue the Many.”’598 To Manning, education was
the right of every citizen, not just the affluent. Those same equity principles informed early
Michigan education efforts. Not surprisingly those principles drove other governmental
objectives as well. It is worth recalling Mason’s belief, and the legislature’s concurrence, that
private capital could not be trusted with so important an effort as internal improvements. It was
incumbent on government to provide transport services to all state residents and to assure that
those services were affordable to all. Internal improvements, like education, would be a
fundamental component of republican governance, driven by and for the interests of all citizens.
As Pierce noted, to advance that equity principle, early education efforts “not only
contemplate[d] but attempt[ed] to provide for the extension of education to every individual in
the republic.” He continued, “as the desire of improvement is universal, why not extend the
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blessings of education to every individual in every class?”599 But ambitions and achievements
diverge, and did so with respect to early Michigan education. The new superintendent of public
instruction, Franklin Sawyer, noted in his 1842 report to the legislature that public schools were
not universally available across the state.600 Only 1486 of 2300 districts (about 65%) had those
schools. The reasons involved economic challenges. Michigan government’s contribution for
the common schools was the Primary School Fund, an insufficient fund that Sawyer
characterized as a “doubtful reed to lean upon.”601 To make up the deficiencies, schools charged
the parents of students according to the number of days they attended school.602 This charge,
called a “rate bill,” could present a challenge particularly to non-affluent families. In 1850,
across the nation, these rate bills accounted for about twenty percent of public school funding.
Given that economic burden and that school attendance was not required, the equalizing impact
of education suffered as families failed to avail themselves of educational opportunities. 603
Nevertheless, the aspiration was strong, and as the 1850 constitutional debates will demonstrate,
was widely accepted across the state.

Education and the 1850 Constitution
Education issues occupied notable space during the 1850 constitutional convention.
During their deliberations, the delegates debated over common school education’s impact on
equality, democracy, taxes, and personal and economic advances. The delegates agreed about
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the need for free public education.604 E.S. Moore, a merchant from St. Joseph spoke eloquently
not only of the equalizing possibilities of education, but also about education and democracy.
Where on earth is there such a practical demonstration of the doctrine that ‘all
men are born free and equal,’ as in the school house under a free school system
– where every barefooted urchin may have the same teacher, the same books,
and sit on the same seat with the most fortunate heir in the town – may stand at
the head of his class and take the precedence over all that wealth and rank can
array against him, if only God has given him the better mind, or the more
diligent disposition?
Moore continued, discussing how education promotes self-esteem and reflection. “It ennobles
and encourages the poor boy, and fires him with such thoughts of the dignity of a human soul
that tyrants can never after oppress him with impunity. It corrects, too, the thoughtlessness of
the rich by the standard of mind, and teaches them to recokon rank by the Roman rule of
merit.”605 Others weighed in, speaking about the advantages to society. “It is cheaper to provide
schools than penitentiaries;” “the money spent on education will be saved by the less demand for
penitentiaries, alms houses, and the expense of holding courts;” and “Education . . . has opened
every avenue to industry; suppressed crime; and expanded the energy of all.”606
It was important that all, especially the unwilling, be educated. As miller Joseph
Williams urged: “Now, if we need and want a free school system at all, we want it most for
those districts that would meet its requisitions with the greatest reluctance. The most backward,
the most ignorant, the most indifferent, are the very portion of the population we wish to
enlighten.” He then spoke in a way that would later become anathema to state policy, “The State
wishes to stretch its paternal arm around them. It wishes to educate all, willing and
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unwilling.”607 In the end, it was the state’s responsibility to provide free and public common
school education, not only to advance the individual and the cause of equality, but to support
commerce, safety, wealth, and general social development. The delegates agreed – the state’s
youth must enjoy free public education.
Thomas Cooley did not participate in the convention but, as Cooley scholar Alan Jones
noted, he followed and accepted the equal rights views flowing through much of the convention
debate. Jones referenced Cooley’s speech in 1851 where he commented on the importance of
public education:
The first and the most important of these [reforms] is the establishment of a
system of education of all classes of all the people – of a system which does
not say to the people, “you shall be furnished with the means of education if
you have the wealth to purchase them” – but which says, “The interest, the
safety, the glory of the state demands that she furnish the means of instruction
to all, and especially that in her institutions of learning, the distinctions of
wealth shall be broken down, and they shall thus become the schools of a true
democracy.”608
Jones gleaned from the above-stated equality argument that Cooley then held to principles
requiring limited government that did not have the power to redistribute wealth.609 Here, he may
have missed the mark. In some measure, public education by its nature demands wealth
redistribution. It requires that a large pool of taxpayers pay regardless of their status as parents
of schoolchildren. That requires not only a redistribution of wealth, but also a fairly robust
government structure. As James McGregor Burns would not of public education, that was “pure
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socialism.”610 Of course, “free” education meant that taxpayers must pay. That burden fell
mainly on property owners. On this issue, delegate consensus ended as questions of educational
equality clashed with property interests. Some, like farmer Nathan Pierce, from Calhoun
County, argued for a statewide property tax, allowing government to provide equal funding and
equal education across the state. He posited, “If there are one hundred children to be educated in
Barry County, and if there are four times that number in Lenawee County, with no more means
to be taxed, then I say that the country of Barry should contribute her part; and I think that a
different course would be improper and unfair.”611 D. C. Walker, a lawyer from Romeo agreed,
suggesting that education was a statewide burden to which all should contribute. Otherwise, “It
might be said that the man who had ten children should work ten times the highway tax as the
man who has not children, He travels the road ten times as much. So with poor house; so with
courts; so with prisons; for the wealthy, honest man, with no children, might say, I don’t intend
to commit crime; I want no poor house; I have no trials in the courts; let them support them that
may use them.” He believed education provided “a general benefit to the whole community,”
and the whole community must pay based upon property ownership.612
Others, particularly those representing large landholders in sparsely populated areas, did
not wish to support lower contributing city dwellers. J.W. T. Orr, a farmer from Barry,
represented a township of few residents but valuable property. He framed the issue as “rob[bing]
the new and sparsely populated counties of this State of a portion of the money raised in such
counties, for educational purposes, and giv[ing] it to the older and more densely settled portions
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of the State.” Orr classified that transfer as “unjust and oppressive.”613 Others agreed, pressing
local funding and completely local school systems. Just as with pauper relief and criminal
prosecutions, J. G. Cornell, a physician from Jackson argued, schools should be locally financed
and controlled. He was skeptical of the poor who were “universally in favor” of taking the
property from the wealthy to benefit their schools.614
If preferences can be gleaned from the number of words employed and speeches given,
then delegates preferred a statewide tax with equal educational spending and opportunity for all
students. But another issue intervened and forestalled adoption of specific constitutional
language on common school funding and control. Underlying much of the debate, including on
common schools, was the state legislature’s role in future governance. As Justice Campbell
noted, the belief that “the people could not trust their agents and representatives” animated many
of the 1850 constitution’s provisions.615 John Pierce applied that distrust to the common school
debate: “We have so much distrust of future legislators that we cannot adopt a system that will
be satisfactory” for how to pay for the schools.616 Despite that distrust, he then suggested that
the constitution require free schools and leave the financing mechanism to future legislatures.
Unable to agree on funding, the delegates did just that. They proposed, and the voters approved,
that “The legislature shall, within five years from the adoption of this constitution, provide for
and establish a system of common schools, whereby a school shall be kept without charge for
tuition”617 The funding and control issues remained open.
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Recognizing the leadership obligation to provide free education in five years, in his 1851
Annual Message, Barry called the legislature to action. Advocating education for all, Barry
noted the challenges for the poor. “Though hitherto the charge of tuition has always been
remitted to those not able to pay, yet, for a sentiment of delicacy or pride, the poor have not, in
all cases, sent their children to school.” He then sought to shrug aside the biggest challenge -taxation. Barry argued that a “complaint of taxation, for the purpose of education, has scarcely
ever been made,” claiming “all residents know that education protected property.” His proposal –
a statewide tax.618
The legislature responded by providing that common schools would be financed through
1) income from the Primary School Fund (it held about $811,000 in 1852), 2) a two mill tax on
the property in each township, and 3) an additional tax to raise one dollar per student, if
approved by district voters.619 An 1852 law also provided for a rate bill to make up any
deficiency and, in that sense, ignored the free-schooling intent of the constitution. In that
respect, the 1852 law would require change in the next three years to honor the constitutional
requirements.620 The state set the obligation, but the locality set policy. Equality interests for
statewide equal education deferred to local property interests. Tax money collected in a district
stayed in that district, so education eventually was provided for all, but not equally.621
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The debate over common school funding and control unveiled several mid-century
tensions. At the same time many called for government activism to create equal educational
opportunities, a rising chorus sought to define “equality” within narrower geographic bounds.
Those providing the wealth wished to employ that wealth to advance local interests. To be sure,
their tax payments were higher, as the property taxes required that large property holders pay
more. The result of local use was that students in wealthy districts would enjoy greater resources
– and by extension, educational opportunities – than students in the densely populated, less
property-affluent areas. The debates also suggest an older-urban, newer-rural split, with the
newer-rural areas protesting against taxes that benefit the older-urban areas. To the newer/rural
residents, statewide educational equality interests were secondary to their liberty interest
associated with private property. To those newer affluent residents, group needs should not
overwhelm individual rights, and equality principles should not subordinate liberty interests.
Localized school financing especially affected poorer rural areas. Those districts could afford
only one-room schoolhouses, which limited educational opportunities in comparison with urban
and/or affluent rural schools that enjoyed larger tax bases.622 It is not surprising that children in
less populated and less affluent areas suffered the lack of common school education. Soltow and
Stevens’ study found those two factors were significant indicators of literacy levels in mid
nineteenth-century America.623
Those delegates who wished to constitutionalize a statewide method of education funding
and control were somewhat vindicated, although certainly disappointed, by the speed at which
education would become “free.” Michigan lagged other states when, in 1869, it finally
the revised statutes of eighteen hundred and forty-six, and the acts amendatory thereto, relative to primary schools.
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accomplished that end. It was not until 1871 that the state compelled school attendance. It was
not until 1859, that the legislature authorized school districts to establish high schools.
Financing for those schools came from taxes and, where insufficient, rate bills. In 1873, three
Kalamazoo residents brought suit arguing that the district’s high school curriculum taught
subjects not promoting the public’s benefit and, therefore, public funding was inappropriate.
While there is some indication that the case was brought as a test case by those favoring publicly
funded high school education, the named plaintiff, former U.S. Senator Charles Stuart, believed
that government’s right to tax for education ended with primary school. To Stuart, primary
school was all the preparation needed “to make a Congressman or President.” Those wishing
more education for their children should pay for it themselves. To Stuart, this was a
constitutional issue, as the legislature had no power to tax for non-public needs. Since high
school education, in his view, was generally unnecessary, legislation concerning it was beyond
the legislature’s reach.624
The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed. Cooley, writing for the court in Stuart v School
District, concluded that providing high school education was a proper role for government and
ruled in favor of the school district. Cooley’s opinion aligned with the public purpose standard
he articulated in Constitutional Limitations (1868) and Salem (1870), discussed at length in
Chapter VI. Rather than quickly accepting that educational policy was the province of the
legislature, Cooley started his analysis by setting forth his philosophy on judicial oversight over
legislation that employed tax dollars. Seeming to invite challenges to such legislation, he wrote,
“It can never be unimportant to know that taxation, even for the most useful or indispensable
purposes, is warranted by the strict letter of the law.” Those objecting to government spending
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“may well be justified by his doubts in asking a legal investigation.” Consistently with his
public purpose doctrine, Cooley focused on historic government spaces to determine whether
taxes for high school spending were appropriate. Finding that Michigan had historically
supported secondary education, he found the Kalamazoo School District’s spending
constitutional. While Cooley did not specifically employ the term “public purpose,” its
principles oozed in this opinion.625 Despite his close scrutiny of legislative space, Cooley’s
opinion is marked as a pivotal point in the dramatic expansion of high school education in the
later portion of the nineteenth century.626

Struggles over Constitutional Separation – The University
Despite differences over funding, wealth transfers, and control, almost all agreed that
publicly funded common schools advanced the state’s interest and that education should be
available to all the state’s children. Delegates looked at the University differently. Whereas
common schools sat on the “popular side” and advanced the democratic cause, higher education
sat on the “aristocratic side” and was not for all.627 Even though the governance of the state
university directly affected few, that governance captured much of the delegates’ attention.
Ultimately, that discussion incorporated many of the ideas earlier noted and elevated University
governance to a fourth, independent branch of government – at least constitutionally speaking.628
In accomplishing that, the delegates suggested, and the voters approved, creating a board of
regents directly elected by the people and investing that board with control over operations and
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educational policy of the University. Doing so stripped the legislature’s legal authority over the
school. Cooley reflected, “This was felt to be a most valuable and important change: it secured
steadiness in plan and conservatism in management, and it placed the university beyond the
dangers that might spring from popular excitements and prejudices, and from political
overturns.”629 This did not mean that the legislature remained remote. To the contrary, the
legislature seemed institutionally incapable of withdrawing from directing higher education
policies and actions. As it did so, constitutional conflict arose, resulting in a tense relationship
over competing educational and social values. That conflict nearly crippled the University of
Michigan and raised deeper concerns about the viability of state universities generally.
The 1840 Select Committee on the Condition of the University reported that “when
legislatures have legislated directly for colleges, their measures have been as fluctuating as the
changing materials of which the legislatures were composed.”630 That sentiment aligned with the
convention’s general desire to restrict the legislature’s power and gave rise to the nation’s first
constitutionally independent university. Late in the convention delegate J. H. Bagg, a physician
from Detroit referred to legislative control over the University as the only remaining “blot and
blemish, savoring federalism,” to be addressed in the new constitution. That blot could not “be
permitted to reign.”631 The delegates agreed that political winds could not be allowed to affect
the University but some questioned whether alternative forms of governance avoided those
storms. If the legislature suffered from political inconsistency, they asked, did not the general
population also suffer that malady? And if so, how is the popularly elected leadership of the
University protected from the fluctuations of public sentiments?
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There was no recorded discussion of granting regents life tenure as suggested by the 1840
select committee report. Instead, the delegates discussed two options. Robert McClelland, a
member of the state house of representatives and a University regent (he was also elected
governor in 1851) believed the status quo worked best. He criticized the efforts to marginalize
the legislature and mocked the move to direct elections by moving “to make professors of the
University elective by the people.”632 Bagg took exception, characterizing McClelland’s proposal
as “like the embrace of the night-mare.”633 In response to McClelland’s underlying concern,
Bagg and others proposed that regent elections take place at a less politically charged time than
the general election. Accordingly, regent elections were to be held at the same time as the
election of Supreme Court judges. Those elections were to be held every six years on the first
Monday in April.634 By removing the election from the autumn political season, and by granting
extended terms of office, the delegates hoped to shelter the regents and, with them, the
University from shifting political winds.635
Michigan was the first, but not the only state to seek to remove political interference from
its public universities. Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, Nevada, and Oklahoma,
at various times and to various degrees, have constitutionalized the governing boards of their
universities. They did so, according to Elliot and Chambers, with the intent of avoiding “the
fluctuating political fortunes of parties and individuals,” and overcoming the challenges of “short
and crowded sessions usually only at biennial intervals.” The states’ constitutional framers
concluded that legislatures could not “give the continuous study and whole-hearted devotion
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which is requisite to the development of a wise educational policy for the state.”636 That was the
case in 1850 Michigan. As delegate Charles Whipple, a Michigan Supreme Court justice
submitted, “There is no gentleman, I suppose, in this Convention disposed to put [the University]
within the grasp of either political party of the state, or to bring it under any improper
influence.”637 With the goal of avoiding political influences, the delegates and voters
constitutionally sheltered the University from the legislature. It was now up to the regents and
legislature to honor those intentions.
The 1850 constitutional changes took place in a time of peril for the University. With the
challenges presented by revolving-door chancellorships, state financial pressures to invade the
University Fund, and the fraternity wars, students and faculty had started leaving. By 1852,
enrollment had dropped about 30% from its 1848 high.638 As it turned out, the new constitution
provided the path to avoid the earlier challenges and to facilitate University health. As part of
the new constitution, the regents were to “elect a president of the university” who would “be the
principle executive officer”639 Francis W. Shearman, the then superintendent of public
instruction in 1852 wrote of the hope that change engendered.
That [the University] has not accomplished all that could be desired, is beyond
question; but with future good management, by the exercise of prudence,
wisdom, and discretion on the part of the Regents in the appointment of a
president, and the re-organization of the department of literature, science and
the arts, there is no reason why it should not be filled with students, and fulfill
the objects of its high mission with the most abundant and satisfactory
success.640
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The University could now look to one man – the university president – as its policy focal point
and as a director of university operations.
As the regents began their search, the legislature repealed the past acts concerning
university governance and, in 1851, enacted legislation largely in line with existing university
practice, including listing the schools the University should employ.641 Since the University
already had the departments and plans the law required, no issue publicly was raised over the
legislature’s right to command the academic areas the University would pursue. All that
changed in 1855, when the legislature amended the 1851 act to provide “That there shall always
be at least one Professor of Homoeopathy in the department of medicine.” Not satisfied to list
that position within the list of schools in the 1851 act, the legislature placed the requirement as a
modification of the language “granting” authority to the regents. It then went a step further to
assure the regents understood its intentions. It repeated the requirement by stating, “so that the
said section when amended shall read as follows: “The Regents shall have the power to enact
ordinances, by-laws and regulations for the government of the University . . . Provided, That
there shall always be at least one Professor of Homoeopathy in the department of medicine.”642
The legislature said what it meant, and then repeated it so that all understood. The legislature
required a homeopathic position as a condition of regent power. The regents paid no heed.
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Even before the 1855 legislation, the issue had haunted the University, as homeopathic
medicine had become increasing popular among the population and the legislators.
Homeopathic medicine had curried favor during the cholera outbreaks of 1848 and 1852, as its
treatments seemed more effective than those of allopathic (traditional) medicine. In response to
that and homeopaths’ lobbying for inclusion in the state’s medical school, the legislature
unsuccessfully had pressed for homeopathic instruction at the University.643 Those efforts were
ineffective. Homeopathy was not popular with the medical faculty and they vocally expressed
concerns over seating any faculty candidates in any departments who had any homeopathic
sympathies. In 1849, the regents considered hiring Henry Tappan as a faculty member. (He
later would become the University’s first president.) Tappan was a noted scholar, with five
degrees, two of which were doctorates. He was considered among the finest intellects and
innovative educators. Unfortunately, he had once visited a homeopathic physician and members
of the new medical department pressured the school to forego offering him a position.644
Homeopathic advocates understood that homeopathic instruction required dedicated
faculty positions to teach the materials. Accordingly, starting in the 1840s they petitioned the
legislature to add a homeopathic professor to the planned medical school. At first, those
petitions resulted only in legislative advocacy, but no laws passed. Even the legislatively
appointed regents were unresponsive. Allopathic physicians populated the medical school
faculty and allopaths considered homeopaths as charlatans. Dr. Zina Pitcher, an outgoing regent,
member of the medical faculty (and two times mayor of Detroit and future president of the
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American Medical Association (AMA)) composed his thoughts for the incoming regents. His
comments instruct on the bitterness allopaths felt toward homeopaths:
[S]hall the accumulated results of three thousand years of experience be laid
aside, because there has arisen in the world a sect which, by engrafting a
medical dogma upon a spurious theology, have built up a system (so-called)
and baptized it Homeopathy? Shall the High Priests of this spiritual school be
specially commissioned by the Regents of the University of Michigan, to teach
the grown up men of this age that the decillionth of a grain of sulphur will, if
administered homœopathically, cure seven-tenths of their diseases, whilst in
every mouthful of albuminous food they swallow, every hair upon their heads,
and every drop of urine distilled from the kidneys, carries into or out of their
system as much of that article as would make a body, if incorporated with the
required amount of sugar, as large as the planet Saturn? 645
Many held the medical faculty in very high regard, and its vehemence in objecting to anything
associated with homeopathy was taken very seriously.646 Accordingly, the regents again
investigated Tappan’s homeopathic connection when, in 1852 they considered him for the first
president of the University. A letter from H.N. Walker to a University faculty member (and later
chair of the chemistry department) advised against rejecting Tappan on the homeopathic
grounds. He warned of unintended consequences should Tappan be made a martyr of the
homeopathic movement.647 Ultimately, the regents hired Tappan, but did so over the medical
faculty’s objection (and because their first choice had turned the regents down). 648
Given the difficulties associated with hiring a person who had visited a homeopath, one
can understand the challenges associated with the 1855 legislation requiring a homeopathic
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position among the medical school faculty. The issue, however, went beyond a disinclination of
faculty. The AMA placed extreme pressure on schools, treating homeopathic training as a
contagion to scientific medicine. It resolved,
That any such unnatural union as the mingling of an exclusive system, such as
homoeopathy, with scientific medicine in a school, setting aside all questions
of its untruthfulness, cannot fail, by destruction of union and confidence, and
the production of disunion and disorder, unsettling and distracting the mind of
the learners, to so far impair the usefulness of teaching as to render every
school adopting such a policy unworthy of the support of the profession.649
Following the legislature’s requirements, therefore, would sentence students and faculty to
professional ostracism.
Forces were gathering on each side. On one side, the allopathic faculty, the medical
student body threatened with professional irrelevance, those concerned about the medical
school’s standing among its sister schools and, in a subtle but real way, Tappan, fought against
accepting a homeopath on the faculty. Although having personally utilized a homeopath,
Tappan certainly risked his standing among the University’s faculty if he capitulated to popular
sentiments on this issue. On the other side stood a legislature that had prodded and legislated for
homeopathic instruction and a growing public chorus for professional training in what was then a
very popular form of medicine. (One cannot discount the ire of ignored legislators.)
Homeopathic advocates argued that the University was a public institution, giving the public not
only an interest in its programs, but a right to help professionalize an area of medicine they felt
important.650 Leading that effort were the Michigan Institute of Homeopathy (founded in 1847)
and its successor, Homeopathic Medical Society of the State of Michigan (1870).
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When the regents did not hire a professor of homeopathy as “required” by the legislation,
Elijah Drake, a private citizen petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the regents to comply
with the 1855 statute or to show cause for not doing so. Among other defenses, the regents
responded that the court could not enforce the statute as the legislature lacked the constitutional
power to compel university action. The court denied the petition but did so on procedural
grounds. Even thought it ruled that the citizen had no standing to bring the action, the court
declared that it “thought it would be proper” to respond to the regents’ constitutional claim. But
it then waffled about, restating issues but never resolving them. At first, the court drifted toward
supporting the regents’ claim to constitutional separation, acknowledging that the board was
responsible for the fiscal, operational, and educational aspects of the University. It then hesitated
and wrote with approval about the University’s efforts to determine whether it could add a
homeopath to its medical faculty, as if doing so made the issue not yet ripe. Instead of ruling on
the constitutionality, the court chose to applaud the regents’ good faith efforts even in light of
“much uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the law.” Even that nod to the constitutional
separation suffered when the court suggested it might employ its mandamus power if “it is made
apparent that [the regents] seek to evade the law.”651 The regents had won the case, but given the
court’s vacillation, the victory was narrow, and the core issues remaining unresolved.
The good faith investigation of the University went nowhere (even though top
universities in Europe taught both allopathic and homeopathic medicine without challenge), and
it placed no homeopathic physician on faculty. In the meantime, homeopathic medicine gained
increasing popularity and public pressure on the University grew. In response, the AMA
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intensified its efforts. In addition to its undertakings to block homeopathic education at the
nation’s medical colleges, the AMA would now require that allopaths refuse any contact with
homeopaths and their patients. Starting around 1855, branches of the AMA instituted policies
threatening membership if physicians as much as consulted a homeopath or non-regular
practitioners. The message was clear, including:
Have nothing at all to do with [quacks] professionally or socially, whatever be
their name – whether followers of the more crude systems which have sprung
up amongst ourselves, or dreamy stupid impostures of Europe. . . . Do not
argue and debate with homeopathic patients; let them distinctly understand that
you cannot alternate with a charlatan as their physician.652
So serious was the loathing for homeopaths that the AMA’s Vice President William Mussey
demanded that Surgeon-General Joseph K. Barnes be censured for attending to Secretary of State
William Seward after he had been stabbed three times as part of the Lincoln assassination plot.
Barnes had worked with Seward’s personal physician – a homeopath – in his successful effort to
save the Secretary’s life.653
Despite this effort to shun homeopathic physicians, public support for homeopathic
medicine increased. Homeopaths rejected bloodletting, mercurial medicines, and other orthodox,
but disfavored remedies. Homeopathic procedures and philosophies seemed more patient-centric
and appealed to the clergy, women, and the press.654 Despite the protests of traditional doctors,
the homeopathic movement gained legitimacy and power.
During this time, the University administration and regents did little if anything to modify
the medical school faculty’s singular adherence to allopathic medicine. Tappan’s
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correspondence during the time reveals no clues of any University inclination to hire
homeopaths. For reasons unrelated to the homeopathic challenge, the regents forced Tappan’s
resignation in 1863 and named Erastus Otis Haven his successor.655 Notably, none of the
multiple newspaper articles I reviewed concerning Tappan’s firing mentioned homeopathy or his
failure to press its teaching. In Haven’s first formal report to the regents, he advanced only, “Our
greatest immediate necessity is a new, enlarged building for the Department of Medicine.”
Haven continued, advocating for a Hebrew and Oriental language professor, a professor of
political economy, and the establishment of a gymnasium, but he did not mention a homeopathic
appointment.656 From a University standpoint, the legislature’s homeopathic law was dead letter.
The issue largely sat dormant through much of the 1860s, with the legislature
ineffectively prodding and the regents and University president focusing elsewhere. During
those early years, the legislature lacked any real leverage with which to effectuate its
homeopathic will. That would begin to change, as University needs began to outstrip Universitycontrolled resources. Haven first publicly mentioned the challenge in his 1864 address, when he
declared that the University could not reach its potential “without additional public aid, and also
donations from the friends of education, such as have been received by Harvard, Yale, Princeton
and other of our ablest Universities.”657 As he tendered this request for enhanced public support,
Haven was careful to remind his listeners that, for the University to remain “strong and
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permanent, [and] not torn by political factions,” it must remain independent.658 Suggested was a
concern that legislative dollars often came with legislative demands.
In mentioning the need for funds without the insertion of political agendas, Haven was
almost certainly referring to the homeopathic issue. In his address to the graduating medical
class of 1864, he boasted, “It is the glory of your profession that it is exclusively and strictly
scientific.” He continued, employing language that separated allopaths from other medical
practitioners, particularly homeopaths. “The mysterious nature and origin of disease is
investigated with observation, experimentation and analysis, in the fond hope that some remedy
may be discovered, and the constant abmition [sic] is to alleviate the sick and lengthen the life of
man.”659 Whether this was Haven’s core belief, or he adjusted his remarks to his audience,
Haven had planted his flag with the allopaths.660 Unfortunately, the legislature envisioned a
different future for the medical school, and it would soon have the capacity to press its case.
Prior to the Civil War, the University had lived within the means provided by the
University Fund.661 Faculty salaries had been constant and inflation negligible. With the rapid
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inflation associated with the war, as well as a large influx of students at its conclusion, fiscal
embarrassment threatened.662 To avoid that, Haven and the regents in 1867 requested that the
state help finance the University. Either it could do so with a block grant of $200,000 “or what
would be better, grant a small annual income by tax.”663 The House unanimously tendered a
vote of thanks to Haven for the report requesting assistance.664 It then promptly passed a onetwentieth mill property tax to support the University; but it did so with one caveat: “Provided,
That the Regents of the University shall carry into effect the law which provides that there shall
always be at least one professor of homeopathy in the department of medicine . . .” The law also
required that the homeopath’s salary equal that of other faculty members and that “the State
Treasurer shall not pay to the treasurer of the Board of Regents any part or all of the above tax
until the Regents have carried into effect this provision.”665 In response, every member of the
medical school faculty threatened to resign.
To the public, the battle was more than the struggle between a university and the
legislature. It captured the discussion of the day, as to one side, the legislature threatened
progress and the distinctiveness that the University brought to Michigan. An editorial in the
Detroit Free Press submitted:
Now every man knows that the two systems of medicine, if the one can be
called a system, are as diametrically opposed as fire and water. It is
unnecessary for us to express any opinion on the merits of the two, for it is
admitted by all candid and fair men that both cannot be right – both cannot
stand. So strong are the prejudices of regular bred physicians, that they will
not even counsel or associate with homeopathists. The introduction, therefore,
of such a professor, forced upon the University by law, is the equivalent to
striking out the existence of the entire medical department, and to that extent
destroying the University.
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The paper then called on the regents to reject the aid and to support a constitutional convention
that would provide “permanent relief” to the school. While in retrospect this may seem to be an
interesting vignette, at the time it was anything but theatre. To the Free Press, the legislature
threatened a cherished asset of the people and did so in violation of reason. Though many
supported homeopathy, to others the legislature had become an intermeddling villain.
Haven would soon plead against such legislative conditions. Given the “unparalleled
prosperity” and high esteem of the medical school and its graduates, he warned it would be
“inexcusable and suicidal to admit any radical changes” into the medical school. His concern
was that the homeopathic requirement was “of such a nature as to render it doubtful whether the
University can consistently accept [the aid] – not withstanding its wants.” He appealed to the
purposes of independent regents and the fear that an intervening legislature “will peril and
perhaps destroy the prosperity of this State Institution.” He then suggested that the University
would have “to decline most respectfully” to accept the funds given the conditions offered. 666
Haven did float an alternative, which the regents would soon consider. The University could
create a separate homeopathic department, independent of the medical school. This proposal
satisfied few, angered many, and failed to dampen rising passions. A regents’ letter to the
legislature in 1873 explained the problem. No professor could teach with a homeopath “without
absolute professional ostracism” and graduating medical students would not be admitted to
practice medicine.667 The legislature’s demands had placed the University in an untenable
position. If it accepted the legislature’s conditions, the medical school would close. If it rejected
them, the University would face financial ruin.
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In an effort to avoid a maelstrom, the board of regents on the evening of March 25, 1868
attempted to compromise along the lines suggested by Haven. They accepted the aid offered by
the legislature and, hoping to honor the legislation’s requirements, the board provided that a
“Michigan School of Homeopathy” be “located at such place (suitable in the opinion of the
Board of Regents) other than Ann Arbor.” They provided for two professors for that school and
hired one, at a salary less than that that enjoyed by the medical faculty.668 They then requested
that the state pay a portion of the tax revenues.
The state auditor general refused the University’s request for the millage funds, arguing
that it had failed to meet the conditions of the legislation (a decision in which both the state
treasurer and attorney concurred). The regents then sought a writ of mandamus to compel the
auditor general’s payment. In essence, this mandamus request was cut of the same cloth as
Drake’s 1856 demand that the University comply with the earlier homeopathic law.669 As
before, the Supreme Court denied the writ request. However, in one important practical aspect,
the cases differed. Here, the legislature offered funding, and the University needed those funds.
In the earlier case, no funds were offered and none were needed.
In Regents v Auditor General, the justices published three separate opinions.670 (The
fourth justice, Cooley, did not offer an opinion.) Two of the three agreed that the regents had not
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met the terms of the legislative condition and, therefore, the court could not issue the writ. To
reach that conclusion, they needed to consider whether the legislature could place that condition
on the regents. Unfortunately, the justices discussed the issue without sufficient briefing, as the
University failed to argue that constitutional issue and, instead, relied on a claimed compliance
with the statute. Notwithstanding that failure, each justice discussed whether the legislature
could place restrictions on its funding, and thereby affect education policy. Christiancy quickly
declared that the legislature had given the regents a choice they could accept or reject, “thus
avoiding all question of constitutional power.”671 Graves was more circumspect, mentioning that
the regents had failed to argue the constitutional issue and, accordingly, the sole issue was
whether the University had complied with the condition.672 Since the University did not comply,
it deserved no writ. Campbell quickly disposed of the constitutional issue, finding that “of
course” the legislature could place conditions on its funding. Unlike the other justices, he
believed the University had complied but, lacking a majority on that issue, the court refused to
issue the writ.
Campbell’s opinion is interesting in light of his advocacy on behalf of the University in
the earlier 1856 case. In his legal brief in that case he argued that 1) adding a homeopathic
position to the medical school would “utterly destroy the harmony and usefulness, and probably
the existence of the medical college,” and 2) the constitution left no room for “legislative
interference” in the University. He asked, “if their powers were to be left at the control of the
legislature, and [the regents] to be its ministers merely, in carrying out legislative provisions,
where was the propriety of saying anything about them in the constitution.”673 Yet, Campbell’s
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opinion in Regents v Auditor General suggested that the regents were ministers to carry out
legislative directions, and that the University deserved the funds because it had complied with
legislative demands. To be sure, Campbell acted in 1856 as an advocate, not as a judge, and he
may have attempted to deflect the constitutional issue by holding that the University had
complied with legislative demands. But his opinion makes no effort to discuss the
constitutionality of the legislature’s purported control of higher education policy. Campbell had
hidden behind contract principles to ignore, or perhaps to unravel, constitutional intentions.
Missing in all the discussions (although thought important by at least Graves) was the
constitutional goal of an independent university. In changing the constitutional structure from a
university dependent on the legislature to one acting as a separate branch of government, the
1850 constitutional delegates 1) wished to create a university separated from legislative political
maneuvers, and 2) assumed the University Fund would finance the University. When it enjoyed
sufficient funding, the University was able to implement policy in ways that differed from the
political and social winds of the day. At that point the constitutional framework held. When the
presumed funding source proved inadequate, the legislature inserted itself and the constitutional
edifice began to buckle. The court chose not to tackle the issue or, as an alternative explanation,
chose to address the events as contract issues. If the University required funds beyond the
constitutional delegation, it would receive them subject to the legislature’s conditions.
Unfortunately, as framed, the choice was to accept the homeopathic offer and thereby undermine
University educational independence or reject the offer and threaten the University’s survival.
This funding went to the heart of university control and existence.
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Soon after the ruling, Haven expressed dissatisfaction with the legislature’s interference
in hiring and educational issues. After calling on the legislature to reconsider, Haven in
September 1867 suggested that the University might consider capitulating. He wrote, “I allow
that the Regents ought to respect the will of the people and must in the end accept the aid
tendered by the State on the conditions insisted upon.”674 They did not, and the state did not pay.
By June 30, 1868, the Finance Committee of the Board of Regents declared the University
“destitute” and recommended that all expenditures be “confined to matters absolutely
necessary.”675
With the University’s courtroom efforts to force payment frustrated, it was now the
legislature’s turn to try to compel adherence. In January 1868, it filed for a writ of mandamus to
compel the University’s compliance with the 1867 and 1855 homeopathic laws. It argued that
the laws compelling a homeopathic faculty member were within the legislature’s constitutional
prerogatives. To the legislature, the constitution merely gave the regents general powers of
supervision over the University and such a grant did not strip legislative power. Instead, the
regents were agents for the legislature, much the same as was the superintendent of public
instruction. As proof, it argued that a legislature heavily populated by members of the 1850
convention passed the 1851 legislation setting forth regental responsibilities over the University.
Significantly, the University had been acting under that law for eighteen years. The legislature
argued that the regents had even professed to be following the 1855 law with their claimed “good
faith” efforts to install a homoeopathic chair. Of course, the regents took exception to each
point, raising the underlying issue – the framers’ intention to separate the University from the
legislature and other political forces. Graves, writing for the court, declared that there was an
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even split among the justices but declined to elaborate beyond that. Without a majority, this
mandamus petition too failed.676
While the legislators’ action was before the court, the winds of compromise began to
blow. In February 1869, the legislature amended the 1867 law to provide the University $15,000
per year with no conditions on the funds.677 That legislation followed an appeal by Haven on the
floor of the House and with members of both chambers. With grace, Haven declared that this
was “one of the noblest acts for higher education ever passed by the Legislature of an American
State.”678 (And with the funds, the University put steam heat into the law school.) He made this
statement before the Board of Regents on August 19, 1869, his last formal message to the board.
According to Michigan historian Kent Sagendorph, Haven had suddenly resigned, having tired of
the conflict surrounding the homeopathic issue.679
In a sense the legislature had capitulated, or at least wished to avoid the challenges of an
underfinanced university. However, the homeopathic issue did not go away. In 1871, the
regents issued a memorial in response to a house passed bill demanding a homeopathic
professor. It suggested that the regents or another board lead the construction of a homeopathic
school anywhere in the state save Ann Arbor. After receiving that memorial, the senate dropped
the bill. But passions remained over connecting it to the medical college. On June 26, the
regents reviewed two petitions – one from fifty-three representatives, the other from twelve
senators – requesting that the medical school hire a homeopathic professor. Regent Edward
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Walker then proposed that the University open a homeopathic branch in Detroit. Several private
citizens were willing to fund that endeavor and the regents approved that action.
Foregoing immediate hopes to attach homeopathic instruction with the University, in
1872 homeopaths opened the Detroit Homeopathic College. There is some evidence they did so
with the regents’ blessing,680 and the regents had previously suggested this solution.681
Nevertheless, the tone in Ann Arbor remained harsh, as the student newspaper reported that the
homeopaths threatened “to endanger the very existence of [the University’s] most flourishing
department, by the introduction of elements so incongruous and irreconcilable.”682 In 1873, the
legislature passed another statute requiring homeopathic faculty in the medical school. No
funding accompanied the legislative command.683 The regents soon commented that the
legislation would cost three thousand dollars to implement and that such funds were lacking.684
They did not acquiesce. The attorney general then petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel
compliance. Once again, the court could not arrive at a majority and, therefore, denied the
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petition.685 With the court leaving the field, the various interests sought resolution in the
political and social arenas.
Perhaps in response to the deteriorating financial condition of its educational gem, the
tone from the legislature began to moderate. Soon the legislature started to support the school in
ways it previously had not. In 1873, it granted $25,000 for a university hall.686 This was an
outright grant, with no conditions except that the funds be used for the designated purposes.
Even with those earmarked funds, University finances were dire. The 1873 Regent Finance
Committee warned that, “For the next three years . . . the University will barely keep running
and out of debt, and it will be necessary to observe the most rigid economy in the disposition of
funds.”687
In March 1875, two non-medical faculty members – one in chemistry the other in
anatomy – proposed to instruct homeopathic students to avoid forcing the medical school from
compromising its position. Kaufman suggested that they did so in response to their fear that “the
state might withdraw financial support. It was better to admit homeopaths, they argued, than to
let their own intransigence destroy the school.”688 Soon the regents’ committee on the medical
department would propose that the University establish a homeopathic school in Ann Arbor. It
did so, not only in response to fears about general university funding, but also in response to a
senate bill appropriating funds to create a homeopathic college in Ann Arbor as a part of the
University. So why did the regents switch? Why accept legislative instructions to place a
homeopathic department in Ann Arbor in the face of its long-standing argument that doing so
685
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would destroy the medical school? The answer was money. As the committee would offer in its
next report, the “naked facts” were that the University required significant funds to build or
upgrade a hospital.689 Underlying their concern was the fiscal inability to advance the medical
school and hospital without state aid. Accordingly, acting “in the interest of humanity,” the
regents requested a $10,000 appropriation because the “cause of humanity imperatively
demands” that they do so.690
The legislature responded with a bill that “authorized” the regents to establish a
homeopathic school in Ann Arbor.691 That language appealed to the regents. Rather than
commanding their compliance, the suggestive law allowed the regents to maintain their claim to
constitutional independence. The legislation promised a perpetual six-thousand dollars for the
school and in doing so both paid for university expansion and created a cooperative atmosphere
between the legislature and the regents. It also did not threaten all university funding for one
desired project. Even though Abram Sager, a founder of the medical school and its first dean,
resigned in protest, the University’s medical education system moved forward. Soon,
homeopathic students would receive instruction in the University’s homeopathic medical
college. Where curriculums allowed, homeopathic students would attend medical school
classes.692 The legislature also responded favorably to the request for financing hospital
construction and equipment. It furnished $8,000 for that end, if the City of Ann Arbor
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contributed an additional $4,000. The regents did not stop there. They determined to establish a
dental school within the medical school and tied construction of a homeopathic lecture hall with
the dental school. The University also established a school of mines, something advocated by
Upper Peninsula members of the legislature. In a spurt of support, the 1875 legislature would
appropriate $5,000 to bring water to the University, grant $13,000 to wipe out University
indebtedness, appropriate $3,000 for two years for the dental school, appropriate $10,500 to
support the school of mines, grant $6,000 for the homeopathic school, and $8,000 for the
hospital.693 As part of some of its appropriations, the legislature required specific faculty
positions, something the regents steadfastly had rejected in the past. The University
administration applauded those appropriations, with University President James Burrill Angell
declaring the “Legislature at its last session treated us generously.”694
Angell tried to justify this seeming change in policy from regent control to legislative
direction or, perhaps, control. He suggested that a separate homeopathic school was acceptable,
whereas previous proposals that had the department as part of the medical school were not.695
Missing from his discussion were the early concerns over placing the school in Ann Arbor or
sharing faculty. In exchange for their capitulation, the regents received funding and an expanded
university curriculum. To receive that, at least in part, they gave up an unblemished claim to
constitutional independence. Angell seemed to acknowledge that new constitutional order when
he commented that, “The aid which the Legislature gave us last winter must be regarded as of
693
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great importance, not only because it secures an immediate enlargement of the scope of our
work, but because it seems to promise yet larger help in the future.” He saw that aid as
foundational. “We trust that we are not over-sanguine when we say that we now start upon a
new era in the history and work of the University.”696 That change was significant. When
Angell first arrived as the University’s president, the school’s income was $76,700. By the time
he left office in 1909, it was $1,200,000.697
The need for funds had changed University governance in ways not foreseen by the
framers of the 1850 constitution. The story of homeopathic medicine at the University did not
end with the 1875 compromise, nor did the issue of legislative overreaching into university
affairs. Former Medical School Dean Sager, who had resigned over the controversy, soon
became the leader of a group condemning the regents and the faculty, classifying the homeopaths
as the “arch-enemy of rational medicine.” A group of students also protested the taint they
would suffer from associating with homeopathic students. “Our alma mater,” they said, “must
be like Caesar’s wife, above suspicion.” A struggle within the various medical communities
ensued, with many allopaths believing that the medical faculty had violated their oaths and were
subjecting the students to quackery. They argued that the regents had allowed an
unconstitutional intrusion into the University’s prerogative. Tensions also arose between
allopathic and homeopathic faculties, culminating in a brawl and choking incident between the
dean of the homeopathic college and a faculty member of the allopaths.698 Soon, however,
passions cooled, at least for a time.
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The issue of legislative versus regental control of the University resurfaced outside the
homeopathic crisis but, by coincidence, involved University hospital construction. Julius
Weinberg, a subcontracting provider of stone and gravel suffered financial injury when, in the
early 1890s, the contractor failed to pay him for work and materials on the University hospital.
Weinberg sued the University and its officers, claiming that they failed to obtain the surety bond
required by statute of government actors contracting on behalf of the state. The regents argued
the University was not subject to that law due to its constitutional independence. The Michigan
Supreme Court’s opinion shed little light, and introduced much confusion. Justice John
McGrath’s opinion for the court stated that individuals and not the University were liable under
the statute. He reasoned that state funding, together with the understandings of “most residents
of Michigan” meant that University building projects were state building projects. Arguments of
separation of the University from the state were “altogether too technical.” Justice Claudius B.
Grant in his concurring opinion argued that the regents were not subject to legislative
requirements. “Under the Constitution, the State cannot control the action of the Regents. It
cannot add to or take away from its property without the consent of the Regents.” Grant
submitted, however, “In making appropriations for its support, the Legislature may attach any
conditions it may deem expedient and wise, and the Regents cannot receive the appropriation
without complying with the conditions.” With the University now dependant on state financing,
Grant’s dictum opened the University to expansive legislative involvement in university
affairs.699
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Whether emboldened by the Weinberg dicta, or responding to public pressure or both, the
legislature again waded into the homeopathic issue. In response to proposals to merge the two
medical schools and local pressures to place the school in Detroit, in 1895, the legislature
required that the University move its homeopathic college from Ann Arbor to Detroit. The
regents declined to do so (even though that was their compromise position in 1867 and 1871).700
Thereafter, a private citizen petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel University compliance
with the statute. As with the 1856 Drake v Regents matter, the court questioned the petitioner’s
standing to bring the action. Unlike that case, the University did not raise the standing issue, so
the court in Sterling v Regents of University of Michigan, decided to consider the underlying
issue – whether the University was bound to comply with legislation concerning university
governance.
Where the court had previously avoided the issue of constitutional intent, this court,
through Grant, clarified his dicta in Weinberg and directly addressed the issue. He noted that, “It
is apparent to any reader of the debates . . . in regard to the constitutional provision for the
University that they had in mind the idea of permanency of location, to place it beyond mere
political influence, and to intrust it to those who should be directly responsible and amenable to
the people.” He was “unable to find a single utterance” that advocated legislative involvement,
(there were a few), and that the regents for 46 years had “declined obedience to any and every
act of the legislature” with which they disagreed. The court took notice that the legislature
probably never thought the University would require appropriations and that the framers never
control of the college, or any of its activities.” State Board of Agriculture v Auditor General, 226 Mich. 417, 425
(1924).
700
In their argument before the court, the regents argued that common instruction for the homeopathic and medical
school students created efficiencies that the state would not enjoy with separate facilities. Accordingly, they argued,
“great advantage arises to the University as a whole, and to the students in the various departments of the University,
that all the branches of the University are located and maintained at the proper seat of the University, at Ann Arbor.”
Certainly, the regents had changed their position since their 1855-74 arguments against a homeopathic school in
Ann Arbor. Quoted in Sterling v Regents of University of Michigan, 110 Mich. 369 (1896).

261

intended to grant the legislature control over the University Fund. But, the issue of leveraging
appropriations to control university policy remained. Court dicta suggested, “by no rule of
construction can it be held that either [branch] can encroach upon or exercise the powers
conferred upon the other.”701 Left open was the extent of legislative power to condition
appropriations. More specifically, if the legislature had that power, it was undecided whether it
could assume control over university policy in this new world where greater percentages of
university revenue came from tax dollars.
Politics and practicalities ruled, with law setting a framing rather than deciding role.
Financial needs played a heavy and pragmatic role. The revenue from the University Fund
remained relatively stagnant as the needs of the University grew. The regents requested, and the
legislature passed, increasing taxes to support the University so that by 1893, the one-twentieth
mill had been increased to one-sixth mill (and in 1921 it became one-quarter mill). It may be
that the legislature could premise an appropriation on university adherence to a particular policy,
and that the University could refuse to comply. Even were the courts to rule a particular
appropriation must be condition-free, legislatures could withhold future appropriations pending
University acceptance of legislative desires. Accordingly, when the University struggled to
survive without appropriated funding, the barricade of constitutional separation seemed poor
solace.
Strict reliance on the framers’ intentions, even when as evident as here, was not enough.
Social forces had pushed against the constitutional structure, with the Civil War both increasing
the cost of and demand for education. The intended funding source, which had supported
constitutional separation, no longer was relevant or effective. The framers’ assumed barriers
against short-term political winds did not protect against economic realities created in the wake
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of the Civil War. And, as feared, legislative thirsts to advance popular interests drove politically
inspired demands that would threaten the state’s educational plans. The result was crisis. In the
end, legislatures could not be expected to appropriate without conditions and the University
could not be expected to abandon its educational independence to a politically driven body. The
solution, however, was not found in the courts – which deals with one narrow subject at a time –
but in compromise. In that case, the constitution informed, it did not control.

Cooley’s Exposure
Cooley enjoyed a nearly forty-year history with the University, as a law professor, legal
advisor, and friend of University presidents. So strong was his attachment that Cooley declined
an 1880 Johns Hopkins University offer of a $5,000 salary to leave the University and teach
there. That salary amounted to more than Cooley’s combined judicial and University pay.
Although Cooley sat as law faculty during much of the controversy, he wrote little about the
homeopathic crisis. There are, however, a couple of indications of his support for an
independent University administration. In People ex rel. Leroy v Hurlbut, a case dealing with
state legislative power to appoint members of a municipal water board, Cooley associated state
control over local administrators to the “despotism” of European “monarch or commune.” After
drawing that stark comparison, he wrote of the 1850 constitution’s effort to “confide more power
to the people” by among other things providing for the election of regents of the university.702
His interest was avoiding legislative centralization; a challenge he certainly felt as a result of the
legislative demands that threatened university existence, or at least vitality.
Cooley also wrote with pride of Michigan’s education efforts and of the state’s status as a
model for newer states. “No commonwealth in the world makes provision more broad,
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complete, or thorough for the general education of the people, and very few for that which is
equal.” He then applauded the use of public funds to accomplish educational aims. Given his
support for education, his belief that the University should be “beyond the dangers that might
spring from popular excitements and prejudice, and from political overturns,”703 and his advisory
role to the regents, one can safely surmise that the homeopathic crisis helped shape and
strengthen Cooley’s legislative-limiting philosophy. While there is no direct evidence of that,
any other result would surprise.
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Chapter V: Regulations, Spending, and a Search for Judicial Grounds to
Limit Legislative Authority

The Courts often find themselves unable to set aside Acts of the Assembly on
Constitutional grounds, which they would be glad to repeal if they had a
constitutional veto.
Justice George Washington Woodward (1858)
Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v Commissioners of Allegheny County704

From their inception, state governments supported internal improvements and continued
to do so even after their constitutions sought to restrict such support. Government support was
so extensive throughout the 1830-1870 period that private rail companies received government
financial assistance “so long as there was a mile of American railroad track to be laid.”705 That
support increasingly came under attack as rising public debt and taxes caused legal and political
reassessments of legislative largess.706 Despite that rising cacophony of complaints, legislators
and the public continued to vote to publically support rail construction. Failing to convince the
704
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majority about the challenges of public largess, disaffected taxpayers turned to the courts for
relief. In the antebellum period, those efforts uniformly failed, as courts deferred to legislative
discretion. At the same time, however, taxpayer and judicial discontent intensified with the
courts and litigants developing legal doctrines that Cooley would employ to change judicial
deference to judicial review and, with it, the acceptable to the prohibited.
Michigan’s experience during this period was much like that of other states. As
elsewhere, the framers of Michigan’s 1850 constitution worked to change the nature of
government’s relation to commerce. The Senate Special Committee on the General Revision of
the State Constitution set the tone. It declared that the practice of loaning state credit or dollars
“should be terminated and entirely prohibited by constitutional law.”707 Gone were appetites for
state-supported industrial and infrastructure development. As Cooley reflected, “Having all their
bitter experience with internal improvements fresh in mind, when they formed a new
Constitution, in 1850, the people resolved to put it out of the power of the legislature again to
involve them in extravagant projects.”708 To accomplish those goals, the new constitution
limited state debt, prohibited the state from pledging its credit, made state support of local or
private projects more difficult, prohibited state ownership of corporate stock, and prohibited
financial involvement in internal-improvements projects.709 It also prohibited the creation of
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special corporations, instead providing for the legislature to authorize general corporate entities
that would owe no inherent duty to, and gain no favors from, the state.710
With the state now constitutionally out of the internal improvement business, private
corporations would respond to the public demand for rail services and development. However,
this did not mean that government completely withdrew. Notwithstanding the drafters’ intent,
several forces coalesced to bring government back into the picture – but this time it would be
local government. Because municipalities required rail service to enhance their economic,
social, and political relevance, railroads could leverage where they built in exchange for local
financial support. In response, municipalities sought to shape rail routes through financial grants
for building within their borders. Because their powers were limited, those municipalities
required state legislative approval to tax for the funds needed to do that. All the state
legislatures, including Michigan’s, responded by enacting “nearly 2200 special laws” between
1830 and 1889 to authorize government financial participation in local rail development.711 In
the end, state legislatures were authorizing municipalities to grant aid to private corporations
where the state itself was constitutionally barred from doing so.
As a general practice, taxpayers voted to approve the local rail grants and, by extension,
the need for tax assessments to pay for them. Despite numerous challenges, during the
antebellum period courts unanimously affirmed both the early subscription regime and the later
municipal grants. Notwithstanding that unanimity, majorities and dissenters expressed concern
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over the propriety of such transfers of wealth. The dissenters linked their objections to vested
rights, natural law, and republican-governance principles, as well as specific language in their
states’ constitutions. At its core, the issue concerned government’s power to transfer, and
thereby destroy, property interests. At the same time, residents increasingly complained about
regulatory legislation that encumbered property and/or advanced governing power. There too,
court decisions almost without exception deferred to legislative power. However, in both areas,
court dicta suggested that there were limits on legislative power to tax, spend, and regulate. But
dicta do not decide cases – holdings do. And, with only a few exceptions, court rulings affirmed
legislative power . . . that is, until Thomas Cooley entered the picture. He enters in 1868, as
discussed in Chapter VI. Before that entrance, however, this chapter focuses on pre-Cooley
judicial concerns over legislative activism.

A Changing but Determined Support
Public desire and need for an enhanced transportation network did not end with the
privatization of Michigan’s rail lines or with the erection of constitutional barriers.
Notwithstanding that need, direct state subsidies, subscriptions, and other forms of aid took a
decided rest in the mid 1840s, and rail development precipitously slowed as investors sought
safer harbors for their capital. Following the sale of the Central and Southern lines, until 1855,
the Michigan legislature only chartered seven new railroad companies, and those only created
extensions or branches off existing lines. In a later assessment of Michigan rail development, the
Michigan Public Utilities Commission in 1919 reported that, “During these years no active
governmental financial support of railroads seems to have been given by the state, and evidently
railroad enterprise was largely regarded as purely private enterprise.” That was true, at least with
respect to direct financial support. However, government remained involved in other respects.
268

The federal and state governments granted extensive public domain lands to railroads, and that
sort of aid “was a forerunner of the later policy of grants to corporations to accomplish the same
purpose.”712 By 1863, those public domain grants largely ended. To fill the gap, local financial
grant would become major facilitators of rail development. In 1863, Michigan’s legislature
passed three acts to allow municipal aid, in 1864 twelve acts, and in 1865 eight acts. In 1869,
the legislature passed a general authorization for municipalities to grant aid to rail, without
specific approval from the state. Where the state had left the field of direct financial aid, it
continued its efforts by allowing municipalities to enter the game. The goal was progress and
railroads advanced industry, trade, and communication. Rail was a key to the future and
government found new ways to prod their development when previous avenues of support were
rendered unavailable.
This was a national phenomenon as multiple states granted municipalities the right to act
when the state could not directly do so.713 The drive primarily was economic. Cities and towns
recognized that rail access provided routes to market and, on the flipside, that lack of access
threatened local decline. New York, for example, a state that had constitutionally prohibited
state involvement in 1847, had authorized its municipalities to grant $30 million to railroads by
1879. Before New York’s constitutional prohibition of state support, those municipal grants
amounted to a relatively meager $9 million.714 Whereas before government subscribed to
corporate stock, now municipal aid typically took the form of grants to rail lines, paid upon
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completion of construction milestones – a less risky strategy.715 Generally, municipalities
floated bonds to finance that aid and paid for those bonds by increasing tax obligations. This
created a considerable burden, as those obligations fell on landholders whose property values
may (or may not) have increased, but who often lacked liquidity. Unfortunately, those “who had
no cash simply mortgaged their farms” in order to pay the rail-created taxes. Accordingly, the
move from state obligations to individual obligations made the financial transfer to the railroad
seem more direct and the impact more immediate. The taxpayer was no longer cushioned from
tax liability by the wider assemblage of residents associated with state obligations, or by the
possibility of a state default on its bond obligations. In essence, local assessments moved the
risk of bankruptcy from the state to the individual taxpayer. Despite this risk and the general
requirement of a taxpayer vote, this form of municipal financing became so pervasive that it soon
dwarfed previous state and federal financial assistance to rail.716
In the early stages, these municipal grants were widely accepted by the taxpayers. Voters
accepted that local rail advanced economic and social interests and facilitated population growth.
As importantly, failure to promote local rail could economically devastate a municipality vis a
vis its participating neighbors.717 This is not to suggest that these forms of government transfers
of wealth met with near universal acclaim. They did not, as many citizens expressed concern
over government actions that encumbered property interests – most specifically by taxation and
regulation. An article in the 1843 American Law Magazine entitled “The Security of Private
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Property” protested that property was at such risk that it was “in need of every parchment barrier
which has or can be thrown around it.” The problem was democracy. “In an republic, where the
legislature . . . is annually elected, and where . . . the legislature . . . partakes . . . of the passions
and impulses of the moment, it is important to inquire into the extent of the power possessed by
the majority, to encroach upon the fruits of honest industry, or interfere with the proprietor in his
free and undisturbed possession and enjoyment.”718 The author’s disquiet evinced a growing
concern rising in some measure from the largest transfers of wealth of the day – rail subsidies.
The unanimity of court rulings accepting the wealth-transfer legislation was part of the
general-welfare supporting paradigm of the early and mid-nineteenth century. Taney’s 1837
Charles River Bridge opinion well reflected that underlying general-welfare theme: “While the
rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also have
rights; and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful
preservation.”719 As discussed below, the cases considering rail subsidies argued that the
legislature facilitated that happiness and well-being by transferring private property (tax revenue)
to rail corporations. And those courts that questioned the efficacy of such transfers unanimously
deferred to the legislature’s right to advance community interests even as individual rights
suffered.
With temporary gaps when state direct finance slowed, from 1830 to the Civil War
government infrastructure efforts accelerated as government pressed community interests. Even
as Corwin maintained that courts were actively protecting property rights through a budding
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substantive due process jurisprudence, he acknowledged the period’s overarching government
activism. Corwin explained that, “with the revival of revolution abroad and the rise of
transcendentalism at home, and last, but not least, the phenomenal success of the Erie Canal, the
demand went forth for a large governmental programme: for the public construction of canals
and railroads, for free schools, for laws regulating the professions, for anti-liquor legislation, for
universal suffrage and for the abolition of slavery.”720 Government was increasingly aggressive
in pursuing efforts to develop commerce, communication, and social and moral programs.
As Michigan embarked on its early internal improvement projects, discussed in an earlier
chapter, other states employed various mechanisms financially to drive their internal
improvement goals. To understand court responses to those activities, it is worth briefly
reflecting on those efforts to advance infrastructure development. Some measure of government
involvement is in the dollars spent. Of the $137 million nationally spent on railroads before
1843, over a third was public money, much of it as stock purchases or direct subsidies. By 1861,
that public aid exceeded $150 million.721 But public expenditures tell only a portion of the
government-involvement story. State and federal land grants to the railroads equaled about 155
million acres, about 242,000 miles. By way of comparison, that area is larger than France, or
more than double the combined area of Illinois and all the New England states.722 The goal was
not just rail development, but also the economic energy that infrastructure development brings.
Economic historian George Rogers Taylor reflected that “in no other period of American history
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has the government been so active in financing and actually promoting, owning, and controlling
banks and public works including turnpikes, bridges, canals, and railroads.”723 The reality was
that American society employed government power to advance its economic and societal
condition, and the courts stayed out of the way.
Virtually every state participated to varying degrees in supporting rail, and each did so as
part of a general enthusiasm over the benefits rail would bring (or perhaps with a fear of the
consequences of non-participation).724 Henry Carter Adams noted the mob-like frenzy, as
governments entered into their rail development programs with “unbounded enthusiasm, and
projected schemes absolutely absurd in their magnificence.”725 Quoting a North American
Review article of the day, the Handlins related the general attitude regarding government
obligations. ‘“Many things” it was acknowledged, “should no doubt be left to individual
enterprise” but transportation “may and ought to receive a salutary stimulus from well timed
public encouragement.”726 With respect to internal improvements, there was no hard line
between public and private. Internal improvements facilitated commerce, travel, and
communication – core elements of government’s mission.
Having repeatedly lost in the political sphere, objectors ultimately took their case to the
courts. They would claim that government had no power to take their property, in the form of
taxes, and give that property to another private individual, namely corporations. In so arguing,
taxpayers drew upon the high value Americans placed on the sanctity of their property and their
distaste for taxation. The legal claims evolved over time, moving from early objections over tax
fairness, municipal power, and government takings to later objections over individual property
723
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rights and an advocacy of a separation between public and private spheres. It is worth tracing
that development, as evolving antebellum rights claims helped lay the foundation for later
constitutional systems of thought.

Judicial Deference but Percolating Dissatisfaction
Early objectors to government business subsidies relied on takings law, claiming that
government seized their property, in the form of taxes, without offsetting compensation. At first,
courts responded as if takings clauses did apply, but answered that public benefit fulfilled the
compensation requirement.727 Eventually the decisions would reject the applicability of takings
clauses as curbs against government taxing and spending. Courts reasoned that takings related to
a narrow, definable property interest as opposed to a broader tax concern. Moreover, taking
remedies were monetary damages and employing that remedy would require that courts
micromanage taxing and spending activities.
With takings clauses effectively unavailable, complainants challenged the government’s
constitutional taxing authority. This strategy too was ineffective, as courts construed
government power to tax as virtually unlimited. But a gap began to open as courts would
address not only the means of taxation but also the ends of its use – spending. Their decisions
eventually set forth two standards. The means of taxation needed to be applied fairly and the
ends of taxation –expenditures – needed to pursue a public purpose. While both standards were
important, the real battle would concern whether expenditures fit an appropriate public purpose.
The answer in every antebellum case, whether cheerfully or begrudgingly given, was they did.
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After some early efforts to challenge directly the state’s taxing power, litigants focused
on the public purpose requirement. That standard flowed from constitutional provisions and
commonly accepted understandings requiring that legislatures act to advance the community’s
general welfare and safety. The question soon became whether stock subscriptions, most notably
in private railroad corporations, advanced that general welfare. That issue also raised the
question of who decides whether an expenditure enhances the general welfare – the legislature or
the courts.728 Ultimately, the issue concerned the nature of republican governance: When do
minority or individual interests (or rights) trump majority will?
These were not esoteric, philosophical musings. By the 1840s and 50s, states and
municipalities were widely and “freely mortgag[ing] their sovereign credit for pushing public
works.”729 States were taxing to fund stock subscriptions and municipalities were doing so to
support local rail projects. In response, disgruntled taxpayers looked to the courts for relief.
And, contrary to the belief that courts were actively protecting property interests, in the
antebellum period courts uniformly deferred to the legislatures’ judgment and affirmed wealth
transfers from taxpayers to industry.730 Government support for internal improvements was the
major form of wealth transfer in its day, and such transfers were far more substantial,
widespread, and considered, than the few contrary and oft-celebrated cases that voiced – most
often most often in dicta – other opinions.
Little legalistic discussion of government’s role in private industry occurred prior to the
1840s. The discussion concerned the wisdom of those policies, as “the legitimacy of the mix
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corporation was pervasively taken for granted.” 731 The earliest cases to take up the issue
considered public support of railroad’s precursors – turnpike roads and canals. In 1837, the
Virginia Supreme Court in Goddin v Crump confirmed the constitutionality of Richmond’s
subscription to the James River and Kanawha Company, a business incorporated to improve
transportation on the Ohio River.732 John Goddin, a Richmond resident and taxpayer, objected
that his taxes increased $3.90 to help fund a private corporation. When he refused to pay the
increased taxes, the tax collector took “Harry,” Goddin’s slave, to sell him to pay the tax
deficiency. Goodin sought to enjoin the tax collector, and lost.
The case involved a number of issues, including municipal powers, expenditures outside
of the city limits, and uneven tax burdens.733 For our purposes, the importance of the case lay in
the judges’ competing legal philosophies concerning municipal contributions to private entities,
most specifically whether those contributions violated the property rights of non-approving
taxpayers (when a majority of taxpayers had voted to the contrary). Acknowledging that taxes
are collected to advance the public good, the court majority declared the legislature the best
judge of the public good, and deferred. In this, as with almost all other municipal grants to
railroads, the legislature required an approving taxpayer vote, which furthered the court’s belief
about general-welfare advancement. The majority refused to enter what it considered legislative
space, notwithstanding rights complaints. To the judges, popular will prevailed and courts had
no power to veto legislative or popular efforts to advance the general welfare.
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Justice Francis T. Brooke734 disagreed with the court’s analysis, noting that the “great
object [of civil government] is to protect the rights of the minority from the tyranny of the
majority; a tyranny more inflexible and implacable than the tyranny of a single despot.”735
Searching for a constitutional principle upon which to hang his objection, Brooke mentioned
takings, liberty, natural justice, moderation, and temperance. Those principles were to protect
individuals from the loss of their property as a result of government involvement in the private
sphere. Beyond the challenges associated with reliance on extra-constitutional limitations,
Brooke’s reasoning suffered with his suggestion that rail development was a state (not local)
issue, given the wider geography of benefits that rail engendered. Brooke did not discuss why a
state tax was less intrusive on property rights, natural justice, temperance, or moderation than a
local tax, but he did offer the germ of an argument that would later bloom. Brooke submitted
that Richmond could only tax its inhabitants if there was “common interest” between the benefit
to the taxpayer and the proposed expenditures. To grant funds to a private enterprise for a
narrow purpose, Brooke suggested, would not support a “common interest.” The fact that “the
inhabitants might derive some benefit remote in prospect, though the object was a public object”
did not establish that the required common interest existed.736 He did little to expand upon this
thought and it would require an energetic stretch to read him as proposing a test requiring direct
benefits for taxes employed. However, his argument suggested a nexus between the tax and the
benefit – or common interest – was required and, in the case of stock subscriptions, he believed
that connection was missing.
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The arguments voiced in Goddin continued in similar fashion for the next fifteen years.
Court majorities would hold that the role of the legislature was to determine the appropriate use
of taxes to support the general welfare and that courts were ill positioned to reconsider those
determinations. As that was the uniform position, no antebellum supreme court overturned
government subscriptions or grants to transportation companies. To be sure, courts recognized
the risk of “onerous taxation” associated with legislative “indiscriminate prodigality,” in granting
public funds to private corporations.737 Despite this possibility, and the extent of the
questionable investments made, courts declared that the ballot box, and not the courtroom, was
the appropriate place to voice objections to excess taxation and profligate spending.
These courts were loath to step in where American government historically had
“facilitated the social and business intercourse of its people.”738 Canal and rail support were
mere extensions of that historic government/industry affiliation, and the courts agreed that
legislatures were positioned to determine the appropriate means to facilitate trade and affect the
will of the people. Indeed, they had the constitutional obligation to do so. As Chief Justice
Chilton of the Alabama Supreme Court wrote, legislative power “extends to the employment of
all those means and appliances ordinarily adopted, or which may be calculated, to develop the
resources of the State, and add to the aggregate wealth and prosperity of the citizens.” Part of the
legislature’s responsibility included, “providing outlets for commerce; opening up channels of
intercommunication between different parts of the state; improving the social, moral and
physical condition of the people by wholesome police regulations, and by a judicious system of
public instruction as also for the protection, security and perpetuity of our government and
institutions.” From this, the court concluded that the legislature had the “power to tax the owners
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of real estate to aid in the construction of” a railroad.739 Antebellum courts uniformly adopted
this same position. The legislature had the power and the courts could not veto their decisions.740
Where did Michigan courts stand during this period? The antebellum Michigan Supreme
Court did not address the use of tax dollars to support privately held rail development, perhaps
because for much of this period the state owned the major lines. Nonetheless, its views on the
public’s interest in rail success were set forth in its 1852 decision in Swan v Williams. As
discussed earlier, in that case, the court considered whether Michigan’s earlier territorial
government lawfully granted eminent domain powers to the privately held Pontiac Railroad
Company. In approving that grant of power, Chief Justice Martin classified railroads as a
“public agent.” Unlike most other corporations, even fully private railroads were “public in
nature,” with their private profit motive only “incidentally promoted.”741 It is not surprising that
the court found as it did, as rail significantly contributed to Michigan industry and citizenry.
James Wheeler’s study of economic changes in Michigan found that areas serviced by rail
enjoyed a “sudden decline in transport costs” and that industry located along rail lines grew at a
greater pace than those ill- served by rail.742 Given the court’s focus on the effect of the
transactions, it is safe to surmise that, had the court directly addressed the issue, the antebellum
Michigan court would have affirmed legislative power financially to support industry.
Majority deference to legislative power is not the same as agreeing with legislative
judgment. As Pennsylvania Justice Woodward backhandedly noted in 1858, “the constitutional
powers of the legislature are not necessarily as limited as its wisdom.” He bemoaned, but
739
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accepted the limitation that, “The courts often find themselves unable to set aside Acts of
Assembly on constitutional grounds which they would be glad to repeal if they had a
constitutional veto.”743 The people spoke through their legislatures and, in the courts’ views, the
courts lacked the wisdom and power to overturn society’s will. In the end, in the antebellum
period, court majorities were unwilling to expand judicial oversight by shaping constitutional
language to fit their notions of appropriate governance. Accordingly, state courts unanimously
upheld legislative power to employ tax dollars to benefit private infrastructure programs, and
even the dissenters recognized that uniformity.744 Justice Lowrie, one of the dissenters in the
Sharpless v Mayor of Philadelphia (discussed below) later recognized that the “legislators and
courts have everywhere” supported public rail assistance.745 But as they did so, dissenters
pushed back and their objections began to seep into the majorities’ legal reasoning.
It is important to recall that state legislative power was considered unlimited unless
specifically limited by the constitution or, some would argue, accepted natural law limitations.
(In this sense, American state constitutions serve a very different role than does the United States
Constitution.) Accordingly, dissenters’ arguments for legislative limitations required a more
sophisticated and inventive analysis than did the majorities’. To stop what they considered the
economic and political ruin of the nation, the dissenters raised individual rights as a
counterbalance to legislative efforts to enhance the general welfare. That position increasingly
resonated, particularly as tax-supported projects failed to return expected financial results, tax
rates increased, and taxpayers suffered. To tax was to take property. Hence, the courts could
check the legislature and protect property by limiting the purposes to which those taxes were put
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– spending. In doing so, they relied on the underlying philosophy that government could not
take from A and give to B. Taxes taken from A had to benefit A.
And so the dissents weighed in. Railroads were of great value, but public dollars, they
argued, could not lawfully be used to promote private ends when the public benefit was merely
incidental. With that notion of the proper place for taxation, Justice Spaulding in Ohio’s Griffith
v Commissioners of Crawford bemoaned his court’s 1851 refusal to hear the case because he
believed the court should declare all municipal subscriptions in violation of “the essential
principles of liberty and free government . . . and of personal property rights.”746 Iowa’s Justice
Kinney, in his dissent in Dubuque Co v Dubuque and Pacific Railroad, argued that taxes could
only be “based upon public necessity, and proceeds upon the ground that it is essential to the
public welfare and safety.” That court majority’s broad definition of general-welfare standards,
he argued, ultimately would “invade and destroy the rights of the people.” The focus should be
on the individual’s property rights, not the general welfare. “To allow a majority by their vote to
tax a minority, to build railroads, is repugnant to every principle of civil liberty, and tends to
despotism.” Kinney raised the scepter of socialism, fearing that “a bare majority of voters,
destitute of property . . . [would] saddle a tax upon a minority, the only property holders.”747 In
some measure, the dissenters’ thoughts aligned with those voiced by Thoreau in his objection to
taxation to support religious societies. “I . . . do not wish to be regarded as a member of any
incorporated society which I have not joined.”748 Taxpayers not wishing to invest in or grant
gifts to private industry should not, and they argued could not, be forced to do so by those who
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so wished. Such government involvement in private affairs violated the dissenters’ freedom
principles. Community efforts were oppressive to the individual.
Despite their disagreement over legislative and judicial power, both the majority and
dissenting opinions evinced a shift in their approach to rights claims. Increasingly, they
proclaimed individual rights, particularly property rights, as interests against which the
governmental incursions must be weighed. While the shift was gradual and nuanced, courts
increasingly considered rights as personal rather than as collective. As Justice Ranney, speaking
for an 1852 court approving rail subscriptions in Cincinnati, Wilmington, and Zanesville RR
declared, constitutions not only served to define and guide legislative power, “but extend their
protections to the rights and interests of every individual citizen; who has at all times a right to
invoke that protection when these rights and interests are invaded.” Invasion of those rights was
“beyond the power of government.”749 The majorities began to profess these rights, but always
ruled in favor of general-welfare efforts. And, until 1853, did so with little written analysis.
While the majorities deferred, and the dissenters promoted their version of a republicangovernance model, taxpayers clamored as tax burdens heightened. Failing in the political sphere,
those taxpayers increasingly voiced their objections in the courts and, as noted above, claimed
property rights violations. In this context, the Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court in 1849 observed
the increasing “fashion to impeach the action of the legislative bodies, as unconstitutional, when
it happens not to accord with the party’s notion of propriety and abstract right.”750 In that case,
Dysart v M’Williams, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the taxpayers’ governance model
and concluded that even if a legislative act “seems to trespass upon our ideas of natural justice
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and right,” courts could not overturn the legislation without specific constitutional violations.751
Since nothing in the Pennsylvania constitution prohibited subscriptions, taxing individuals to
give the money to a rail corporation was a lawful exercise of state power. Indeed, the court
argued that without government support of industry “a commercial community could scarcely
exist.” 752
The Dysart ruling itself was typical in its day. Soon, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would begin a shift from assumed deference to questioning whether legislative power
extended to transfers of taxpayer wealth to private railroads. In 1853, the court began to question
whether property and abstract rights should check legislative power and, if so, how courts should
insert those issues into its deliberations. The court did so in a matter brought by William
Sharpless, who claimed that Philadelphia’s plan to invest tax dollars in a private railroad violated
his and his co-plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected property rights. In what the court classified
as “beyond all comparison, the most important cause that has ever been” heard by that court, the
court in Sharpless v Mayor of Philadelphia set out a new legal framework upon which future
courts would consider government use of tax dollars to support private industry.753 It is
important to note that it did so with facts and arguments that were substantively identical to those
it, and other jurisdictions, had uniformly ruled insufficient to raise constitutional concerns.
The court’s characterization of the importance of the case was not hyperbole. Growing
tax burdens associated with municipal support of private rail, and the increasing sophistication
and resonance of individual-rights claims, coalesced to prod at least the beginning of
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constitutional change. An author only referred to as “Cecil,” in the lead article of the 1853
American Law Register, (the precursor to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review)
characterized the Sharpless issues as “nothing less than whether the legislature can confer on
municipal authorities unlimited power over the property of every citizen.”754 His assertion that
the case raised issues central to American democracy and individual liberty was well taken. At
the risk of offering a “spoiler,” the court’s opinion in allowing the rail support, in conjunction
with growing public dissatisfaction, would incite a public outcry for constitutional reform. Its
holdings would reach beyond Pennsylvania as both the majority and dissenting opinions would
provide a foundation for later constitutionally based restrictions on legislative power. Because
Sharpless was pivotal, it deserves a close look.

A Deeper Reflection on Rights: The Sharpless Decision
Prior to the plaintiffs’ suit, Pennsylvania’s significant government/industry partnership
“failed notably to evoke legalistic discussion of the proper place of government in economic
life.” 755 As mentioned, just four years before Sharpless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Dysart had asserted that without government subsidies to rail “a commercial community could
scarcely exist.”756 Pennsylvania had employed multiple mechanisms to support industrial growth
but, as a state, had been reticent financially to support rail development. It had shied away from
those investments in fear of the politics of intra-state rivalries and its failed history with other
state-supported organizations. But the need for rail development weighed heavily, as New
York’s Erie Canal threatened to marginalize Philadelphia’s shipping and commercial interests.
In an effort to minimize its losses, while still avoiding the political challenges of state legislative
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decision-making, the state legislature granted municipalities the authority to participate in rail
development. 757
Immediately upon getting such approval, in April 1853 Philadelphia’s common council
proposed to subscribe to 10,000 shares of the Hempfield Rail Road Company paid for by issuing
bonds secured with the city’s credit.758 The opponents of the subscription, “inspired now by a
fervor that was religious in character,”759 voiced their concerns in the political sphere, arguing
that government could not justly take their tax dollars and give those funds to the railroad. An
unmoved city council voted to subscribe four million dollars to the railroad. Thereupon,
Sharpless and three other landholders turned to the courts, seeking to enjoin the subscription as
an unconstitutional redistribution of wealth. To them, the government unlawfully was taking
money from A, the taxpayers, and giving it to B, the railroad. With the court seriously
considering this assertion, Hartz argued, “the constitutionality of the entire mixed enterprise
tradition as it had evolved since the late eighteenth century was thus challenged for the first
time.”760
Business interests were vocal supporters of the subscription. They had been losing trade
to New York because of the state-sponsored Erie Canal. To them, the rail investment would
enhance the general business environment much as roads and canals did. On the other side sat
taxpayers who frequently suffered the displacement, and the certainty of higher taxes, that new
rail lines occasioned.761 They argued that if businesses wanted the rail lines, businesses should
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invest and risk their own capital. To Sharpless and his objecting fellow real estate owners, the
issue was not merely one of self-interest. They claimed they were fighting European socialist
principles, and berated government financial support of industry as the “popular despotism of
Rousseau,” the “arbitrary tyranny vindicated by Hobbes,” and a form of Skidmorian socialism.
Their cause was grounded in “Natural justice,” “public Liberty,” the “Magna Charta,” “private
right,” and “the law of lands.”762
To move the claim to the legal sphere, Sharpless had to pin those concerns to
constitutional limitations on legislative power. Accordingly, his attorney, B. H. Brewster argued
that the subscription violated taxpayer rights to acquire, possess, and protect property under
Article IX of the Pennsylvania Constitution.763 In support of that argument, Brewster protested,
“Men can no longer consider property their own if the majority can get authority from the
legislature to tax, and mortgage without limitation.” Voicing a concern that increasingly would
be heard, Brewster charged that the subscription was “practical agrarianism – this is the doctrine
which men call socialism; it is that which Skidmore and other such, once propagated to the terror
and discredit of the country when they published their immoral and dishonest social and political

irate citizens tore up the track, for which twelve of them went to jail.” Woodford and Woodford, All Our Yesterdays:
194.
762
Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: 118-19. It is not surprising that the argument employed
socialist language. The failed 1848 European Revolutions caused Americans to distinguish their revolution from
those of the Europeans. They believed that the American Revolution “did not endanger private property, and it kept
government interference in people’s lives to a minimum.” The European revolutions, on the other hand, were
radical in purpose. The 1848 Revolutions sparked an American distain for socialist ideas, with newspapers claiming
that socialism would result in miscegenation, the rise of women’s and blacks’ rights, and the dissolution of private
property. Timothy Mason Roberts, Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009). 14, 42-62.
763
Article IX provides, in part, “That the great, and essential principles of liberty and free government may be
recognized and unalterably established, we declare §1 All men are born equally free and independent and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, and of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property.”
§9 “nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property unless by a judgment of his peers or the law of
the land,” and
§10 “nor shall any man’s property be taken or applied to public use without the consent of his
representatives and without just compensation.”

286

sentiments.”764 His argument offered more than political philosophy. Sharpless’ counsel argued
that private capital, not public resources, appropriately determined and responded to economic
need. In so arguing, the plaintiffs proposed to limit legislative power when the exercise of that
power violated economic principles.765 Those principles constitutionally required a free-market,
rather than a mixed-corporate, approach to economic development.766
Counsel for the railroad had historical practice and court rulings on their side. They
presented the long history of government support of industry and, along with counsel for the city,
cited ninety-five Pennsylvania acts from 1796 to 1853 supporting municipal aid to internal
improvements.767 Further, they argued that the state legislature was “entitled to exercise the
whole power of the people, except when its limit is restricted by the express words of the
Constitution.”768 In exercising their subscription power, the state and local legislature sought to
advance the general welfare. They helped address the city’s legitimate commercial need to
facilitate the movement of goods from the Midwest through Philadelphia to American and
European population centers. One needs look no further than the Erie Canal to see the benefits
of government/industry partnership. In essence, the mixed corporate model was an economic
necessity. In a somewhat counterintuitive twist, taxpayers had argued for a version of laissezfaire economics while business had advocated for government involvement in, and ownership of,
industry.
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The majority, speaking through Chief Justice Jeremiah Black, rejected the plaintiffs’
efforts to limit Pennsylvania’s legislative authority. While acknowledging the thread of
reasoning that natural law and vested rights limited legislative power, Black wrote that the court
was “not aware that any State Court has ever held a law to be invalid except where it was clearly
forbidden.” In tandem with the long line of cases following Iredell’s reasoning in Calder, Black
stated that, the courts could invalidate an act “only when it violates the constitution clearly,
palpably, plainly; and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in our minds.” Black
was “thoroughly convinced that the words of the constitution furnish the only test to determine
the validity of a statute.” 769 Accordingly, philosophic arguments about government’s role were
not sufficient grounds upon which to overturn statutes. Courts required specifically enumerated
constitutional limitations.
Black then searched for constititutional language that might limit legislative grants to
privately held businesses. Among other areas, he focused on the legislature’s taxing authority.
Declaring that “a taking of private property for private use . . . is palpably unconstitutional,”
Black observed that constitutional language, including the term “tax,” required interpretation.
He wrote, “I do not mean to assert that every act which the legislature may choose to call a tax
law is constitutional. The whole of a public burden cannot be thrown on a single individual,
under the pretence of taxing him, nor can one county be taxed to pay the debt of another, nor one
portion of the state to pay the debts of the whole states.” After offering that equity principle,
Black advanced that an improper use of taxing authority may be “an attempt to pronounce a
judicial sentence, order or decree,” in violation of the separation of powers. In that sense,
government-required private-to-private transfers were judicial in nature, and efforts by the
legislature to enter the realm would exceed its authority. Accordingly, Black noted that a “taking
769
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of private property for private use,” would be “palpably unconstitutional” and was specifically
prohibited. 770
Black’s most lasting argument was that the ends – the spending of tax dollars – must be
for the public good and not for a private benefit. Black reasoned that if the levy were for private
benefit, the legislation “ceases to be taxation, and it becomes plunder.”771 In so arguing, Black
attached to the constitutional power to tax the requirement of an appropriate spending
component. That reasoning infixed the “public purpose doctrine” into American jurisprudence.
The question then became, what was a public purpose and who got to decide?
With the legal standard set, the court in Sharpless now addressed whether it would
challenge the legislature’s determination that the tax and subscription were in the public interest.
If it did so, the court would have to rule that the legislature’s efforts to advance commerce
through the support of private corporations were, by their nature, unconstitutional transfers
without public purpose (which the court equated with public benefit.) The court declined to do
that. Instead, it accepted broad legislative discretion. “However clear [the court’s] convictions
may be that the system is pernicious and dangerous,” Black argued, “we cannot put it down by
usurping authority which does not belong to us.” Deference would be given, perhaps because
the majority held to the common belief that rail subscriptions enhanced the general welfare.
Black indicated such when he suggested that the legislature was not just empowered, but was
770

Ibid., 167 – 68.
Ibid., 169. In Hallenbech v Hann, Nebraska Supreme Court Justice Crounse took issue with the plunder argument
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required to advance commerce. “To aid, encourage, and stimulate commerce, domestic and
foreign, is a duty of the sovereign, as plain and universally recognized as any other.” 772
Black had advanced three positions regarding the “public purpose” requirement for
constitutional taxation. First, he rejected a negative-governance, night-watchman model in favor
of a government actively contributing to, and shaping economic development. Second, he
submitted that government could employ and finance private actors to promote that economic
development even though the public only indirectly benefited by the expenditure. 773 Third, he
maintained the practice of deferring to legislative judgment even though the results might be
“pernicious and dangerous.” Given those standards, it was unlikely that courts would often
overturn governmental financial support of industry. With this broad definition of public
purpose, the court found the subscription lawful.
One cannot discount the gravity Black afforded practical realities. Aware that any other
outcome would have upset the historic relation among government, business, and the general
welfare, Black noted, “If the works erected by the Commonwealth for the promotion of her
commerce, are not public improvements, then every law relating to them is void; every citizen
may repudiate his share of the state debt, if he pleases, and defend his property by force against a
collector of state taxes.”774 Given the breadth of government involvement in industry, the
benefits that involvement could bring, and the consequences of court interference, the Sharpless
majority granted expansive discretion to the legislature’s judgment. To do otherwise, Black
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suggested, risked rebellion and chaos. The plaintiffs’ claims of right necessarily were
subordinated to public purpose.
The Sharpless majority had walked to the edge of elevating personal rights over generalwelfare concerns, but then halted. Why? Simply put, internal improvements were a major
enterprise of mid-century America because society believed that they were required to advance
the general welfare. As Justice Lowrie noted in his Sharpless dissent, states had a total of about
$60 million invested or proposed in rail-supporting enterprises. That total was equal to one-half
the assessed property value in the entire state of Pennsylvania.775 As significant as that was,
Lowrie’s number was understated. Goodrich’s partial study of rail investments shows that by
1861 government had invested $150 million in private rail companies. Communities put so
many dollars at risk, Goodrich noted, because rail access “was literally a matter of survival.”776
William Sharpless’s challenge therefore threatened a deep, widespread, and largely accepted
public undertaking.777 It is no wonder that the court classified the case as the most important it
had ever heard and that it ruled as it did.
While Black reflected the prevailing view, anti-subscription forces were gaining political
traction. As an indication of the rapidity and depth of shifting public sentiment, at the 1838
Pennsylvania constitutional convention, the debt the state incurred to finance private business
was considered a necessary and welcome investment in business and an effort to limit that debt
to $30 million was defeated as “suicidal.” By the 1857 constitutional convention, perceptions
had changed. That convention adopted a $750,000 cap on public debt, and did so with a
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population and economic base considerably larger than when it rejected the $30 million limit.778
By 1869, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would publicly question whether it had appropriately
applied the public purpose doctrine in Sharpless.779
Legal historians give scant attention to the dissents in Sharpless, with Hartz mistakenly
believing that that the dissenters wrote no opinions and Waldron dedicating only one paragraph
to their writings.780 This is unfortunate. While Black carried the day by launching the public
purpose doctrine, Justices Lowrie and Lewis, writing separately, carried the future by addressing
the issues that would shape that doctrine.
In short, the dissents introduced a shift in the presumptions. Where Black’s opinion (and
all previous opinions) focused first on the public’s need, Lowrie’s dissent focused first on
individual rights – and it did so with an historical flourish. To Lowrie, property rights were the
foundation for stable and free governance and, accordingly, required court protection. Lowrie
sermonized, “it stands written in every age, in almost every year of the history of the Grecian and
Italian cities, democratic, oligarchic, or monarchic . . . [a] disregard of individual rights, was
more than anything else, the cause of their decay.”781 Juxtaposed against those ancient failed
empires, Lowrie placed England whose “whole history . . . is one of continual protest against
government invasion of private rights.” Ultimately professing a laissez-faire model, Lowrie
railed against the 1853 oppression against which individual rights must stand – “socialism” –
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“the very worst form of government.”782 Accordingly, he promoted a system where government
was to “protect individuals in the proper pursuit of their own lawful plans” but was not to
otherwise shape economic decisions.783 Because individual rights and government power cannot
coexist, Lowrie argued that several Pennsylvania constitutional provisions restricted legislative
power to encumber property. Indeed, he argued, “all our American Constitutions” protect
property against legislative overreaching.784
Lewis’s dissent similarly wrestled with concerns over socialism and “Fourier
establishment,” which he declared, “no man can constitutionally be compelled to embark.”785
His dissent called for the impossible, requiring the unanimous consent of the inhabitants paying
taxes for the subscriptions.786 Despite the impossibility of that standard, this respected jurist and
leader of the Democratic Party insisted the diminution of property rights through taxes to support
private industry required specific consent. As had dissenting justices in earlier cases, he
reasoned that objecting taxpayers could not be forced to participate in a corporate society where
they had no rights. The necessary conclusion therefore was that government subscriptions and
republican governance were fundamentally at odds.787 But to Lewis, it was not just about rights
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protection: subscriptions were bad public policy. Perhaps enjoying the luxury of a dissenting
podium, Lewis lectured about his fears of a bankrupt nation.
[W]hen credit shall be exhausted, and the day of payment shall come; when the
bonds, (which are to be issued like other obligations of mere sureties without
making any provision for payment,) shall come to maturity – when the railroad excitement shall subside and reason shall resume her dominion – when
the exhilaration of profuse expenditure shall give place to the gloom to be
produced by the grinding exactions of the tax gatherer, when the rich shall be
impoverished, and the poor shall be cast into prison, – when all classes shall be
involved in millions of debt beyond the means of payment – when individual
industry and enterprise shall cease with the destruction of individual rights –
when the freemen of this Commonwealth shall become the bondmen of
corporations, I shall, if surviving, have the melancholy consolation of knowing
that I have endeavored, to the extent of my feeble abilities, to avert these
calamities from my fellow citizens, and to maintain their rights of property
according to my understanding of the constitution. 788
In voicing his concern over the financial decay threatened by public subscriptions, Lewis
revealed a driving concern. Growing public indebtedness and increased taxation were
threatening economic, social, and political collapse. Taxes were imposed on landholders and,
while their land values may have increased with rail, their ability to pay the increased taxes
without selling or mortgaging that land did not, placing a number of taxpayers into economic
distress and bankruptcy. To Lewis, those pragmatic burdens, as well as the continued violation
of individual rights, required remedy. Government practices and court acquiescence needed to
change. Courts had to step in to limit legislative largess, protect national solvency, and guard
private property. Assuring private property and social welfare required court activism.
Black, Lowrie, and Lewis’ opinions were, in some measure, cut of the same dreary cloth.
Laurie remarked on the staggering sums government had invested in private industry. Black
noted that these investments typically failed (although he applauded government support of
commercial development), and Lewis predicted these investments would launch “grinding
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exactions of the tax gatherer.” A correlation between profligate government spending on the one
hand and moral breakdown and economic ruin on the other ran through each opinion. But the
justices differed on the court’s ability to act. Both Lowrie and Lewis in some measure advocated
advancing individual rights as a means to prohibit government from leading society down an
undesired path. In doing so, they pinned their arguments to constitutional property-protecting
doctrines, including due process, eminent domain, and contract protection. Their objections,
however, were not limited to constitutionally protected rights. To them, public subscriptions
were beyond government authority in some measure because they were unwise.

Emerging Property Protections
Notwithstanding the dissenters’ protests, Black’s argument was grounded in the historical
practices of local governance, state of law, and court precedents in the antebellum era. State and
municipal governments had actively supported industrial development and had done so using
their taxing authority.789 They did so in accord with majority community sentiment790 and, as
Lowrie later noted, with unanimous court approval – or at least unanimous acquiescence. In his
1858 concurrence in Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v Commissioners of Allegheny Country,
Lowrie reflected that while he still believed public subscriptions unconstitutional, he recognized
“that legislators and courts have everywhere expressed contrary views . . . [and] therefore I ought
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to adhere to my own [opinions] with great modesty, if at all.”791 In that same year, the New
York high court declared railroad subscriptions to be in the public interest. Focusing on the
benefit to society, rather than on the aggrieved taxpayer’s property or the nature of the receiving
entity, the court voiced that railroads, “add to the value of property, promote trade, and
contribute to the convenience of the inhabitants of any place.” Government support of railroads
fell within the public purpose.792 On the eve of the Civil War, the rulings were unanimous and
courts considered the matter settled. 793 As 1855 North Carolina Chief Justice Nash noted, “the
power of the legislature to pass the Act [was] too strongly fortified, both by authority and reason,
to be now doubted.”794 Legislatures had the power to employ tax dollars to subscribe to private
corporations.795
Michigan had no reported cases where the court considered the constitutionality of
government support of rail.796 The court, however, did consider the constitutionality of other
legislative efforts to tax and spend in support of the general welfare. In 1853, the Michigan
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Supreme Court considered a Detroit landholder’s complaint that the city unconstitutionally
assessed his property for road repairs. He argued that roads were a general benefit and the city
could not specially tax him for a general good. In rejecting his claim, the court, through Justice
Sanford Green, provided insight into the standards by which the legislature must exercise taxing
authority. The state compensates a taxpayer for his taxes with “the security which the
government affords to his person and property.” The court warned, “taxation, not based upon
any idea of benefit to the person taxed, would be grossly unjust, tyrannical, and oppressive, and
might be characterized as ‘public robbery.’” Nevertheless, this landholder owed the street repair
taxes because the basis for assessment, while not perfect, was reasonable. The court noted that,
“Every general law, however wisely and carefully perfected, will in its practical operation, work
oppression and injustice to some. Equality, like perfection, when applied to man or his works is
a relative term.”797 The court, in an argument that may have resonated twenty years later, argued
that taxpayers must be the primary beneficiaries of their tax dollars. Any other result was
tyrannical.
At the same time, the Michigan court began to weigh the importance of individual rights
in its adjudications. The spark for that philosophy, the court declared, was the 1850
constitutional change. Justice Wing in 1856 referred to this new philosophy: “It manifestly was
the intention of the constitutional convention of 1851 [sic] to surround the rights of individuals
with additional guards, and to place them upon as sound a basis as was consistent with the rights
and necessities of the public.”798 Nevertheless, in Swan v Williams, the court declared that “law
of the land” provisions restricted executive power, not legislative or judicial.799
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In the face of court acquiescence and/or silence, state legislatures across the country
approved of municipal taxation in support of private rail ventures. Goodrich’s study indicates
that the Michigan legislature adopted 28 of its total 30 special acts authorizing local rail aid in
the period 1860-1873 and that from 1860-1865 it authorized the second most (next to Wisconsin)
in the nation. Only two states would cease doing this before the 1860s – Pennsylvania, as a
result of the constitutional amendment passed in the wake of Sharpless, and Iowa. Iowa also
stopped because of constitutional change but, this time, not by the ballots of the legislators or the
people. Iowa stopped by the votes of its Supreme Court justices.
The Iowa court had its chance to affect constitutional change when, in 1862, it
reconsidered (although not acknowledging so) the contentious issue of public subscriptions.
Before that time the Iowa courts, like those of the other states, had affirmed the legal legitimacy
of legislative support of private industry. In Dubuque Co v Dubuque and Pacific Railroad, the
Iowa Supreme Court in 1853, the same year as Sharpless, declared that the state constitution did
not “make the slightest illusion” to prohibitions against state support of industry.800 So pervasive
was the practice that by 1856 Iowa carried over $7 million of public debt in support of
railroads.801 The government’s ability to pledge public credit changed with the court’s 1862
unanimous ruling in State ex rel Burlington and Missouri River Railroad v County of Wapello.
In that case, the court considered the legality of Wapello County’s subscription of $100,000 to
purchase stock in the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad. Refusing to rule narrowly on the
issue of municipal authority, the court broadly assaulted the institution of government support of
800
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private industry, declaring such support unconstitutional. The court rejected the decisions of the
“supreme tribunals of some fourteen or fifteen States” and the longstanding tradition of
government support of industry. Instead, it claimed to decide the case, “upon principle, rather
than authority.”802 Instead of focusing on public welfare interests, as all other courts had, Justice
Ralph Phillips Lowe, speaking for the court, focused on protecting “the great and fundamental
reserved rights of the citizen,” from legislative overreaching, even when an approving vote of the
taxed citizens accompanied that legislation. The rail subscription merely transferred wealth from
one citizen to another.
To the court, the railroad had been incorporated under the state’s general incorporation
law and, therefore, had no legal obligations to serve the public good. Its aim was “the making of
pecuniary profit.” Accordingly, the subscription amounted to taking taxpayer private property
and giving it to a private entity for private use.803 The court considered that a flagrant abuse of
legislative authority. The court based its decision, and sought to distinguish its opinion from the
contrary weight of authority, on the Iowa Bill of Rights provision, which declared, “this
enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others, retained by the people.”
That clause allowed the court to extrapolate its state’s taking clause to prohibit taking private
property for private use. Lowe suggested that Justice Black in Sharpless similarly might have
invalidated the Philadelphia subscription had Pennsylvania such a constitutional clause.804 With
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that vague constitutional language as its foundation, the court declared the bonds uncollectible,
thereby protecting the people from “a step backward toward despotism.”805
Many disagreed with the Iowa court, including the United States Supreme Court. In an
unusual turn, that court rejected the State Supreme Court decision. After noting that Iowa’s
opinion was contrary to those of courts in sixteen states, including an earlier Iowa opinion, the
Supreme Court in Gelpcke v Dubuque dramatically limited the state opinion. Recognizing that it
should defer to Iowa’s interpretations of its own constitution, Justice Noah Swayne, writing for
the court, disdainfully characterized the Wapello reasoning as “in unenviable solitude and
notoriety.” He then grandly proclaimed, “We shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law,
because a State tribunal has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice.” The court then decided
that Iowa must honor all outstanding bonds and agreements, or violate the Contract Clause of the
United States Constitution.806 In some measure, the Court’s disquiet stemmed from the
bondholders’ reliance on recent Iowa court opinions upholding legislative power. In that sense
Gelpcke may have been an equitable decision protecting out-of-state investors against oscillating
state-court positions. Not bullied by the federal Supreme Court, the Iowa Supreme Court held to
its position. While the courts’ reliance on different constitutional provisions allows the holdings
to be reconciled (the U.S. Supreme Court only limited the impact of the Iowa court’s ruling) the
courts’ views of taxation to support private rail development were dramatically at odds.807
The concerns voiced by the Iowa court, and the Pennsylvania voters who modified the
state constitution to prohibit public aid to rail, were also voiced by residents across the nation
Nevertheless, the lure of local rail service, and the threat to a local economy should rail bypass
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its borders, continued as an effective call to action for local municipalities. Accordingly, in 1863
Michigan Governor Austin Blair received “a large number of petitions, memorials, and verbal
applications” for legislation authorizing municipalities to pledge their credit in aid of local rail
construction.” Blair saw value in many of those petitions but cautioned against nonremunatarive
projects, as those would result in oppressive taxation.808 In response to that, and the fervor of the
day, Michigan’s legislature authorized grants of at first 5% and later 10% of municipalities’
assessed property valuation to railroads, subject to an approving vote of the local taxpayers. In
itself, Michigan was not unique, save for the actions of one small community and the writings of
Thomas Cooley. With a case created by the tenacious Salem Township Board, Cooley would
write an opinion that would open the floodgates of judicial review of legislatively authorized
spending to advance the general welfare.

Regulatory Encumbrances and Judicial Deference
Before turning to the Cooley’s combustible writings on taxes and spending, it is
important to review antebellum developments in the related regulatory sphere. Just as
government efforts to support industry resulted in increased taxes, government efforts to regulate
commercial and social activities resulted in burdens on residents’ use and enjoyment of property
and their freedom to contract.809 Those efforts generated efforts to limit legislative regulatory –
or police – powers. The legal history in large measure mimics that of legislative taxing and
spending power, as the underlying question was the same; what is the scope of legislative power?
As mentioned, historians now agree that government regulated industry since colonial
times. Those regulations started early. In 1641, the Massachusetts Bay Colony regulated against
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“unwholesome” beer. It regulated tavern and inn hours, the size and weight of nails, and the
prices charged for public transportation. 810 Massachusetts was not alone; regulation during the
colonial period was widespread. In populated areas, municipalities focused on health and safety
concerns. Governments required chimney inspections and repairs. They required that buildings
be made of brick or stone and that flammables be restricted. Regulations required that residents
clean their streets and some cities, like New York, required residents to provide nighttime
lighting. In regulating business, government focused on prices, inspections, labor and quality
controls, and wharf rules. They regulated the price, size, and quality of breads, and bakers had to
mark their names on each loaf to insure compliance. Some cities confined nuisances, like
slaughterhouses, to particular areas of the town. The impact of the regulations did not mean
residents were hamstrung. While “colonial society often placed the interest of the community
above the economic rights of the individual,” regulations were by no means stringently
enforced.811 That loose enforcement was an attribute of small government and not a rejection of
regulation.
As the population moved west, so did the regulatory mindset. An earlier chapter
discusses regulation in Detroit. As a territory and continuing through the antebellum period,
Michigan’s government regulated the manufacture and sale of wheat and rye flours, buckwheat,
pork, lard, beef, fish, and butter. It set forth rules on packaging, the length of nails, and the
correct placement of hoops on a barrel. It regulated leather production for shoes, the hours that
ferries operated and the rates they could charge. It regulated the number and timing for mill
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owner meetings and it determined the rates mills could charge.812 In sum, regulations were part
of the American psyche of a well-ordered society.
State and local governments enacted most of those regulations. While the Federal
Commerce and Contract Clauses somewhat limited their authority, states enjoyed “police
powers” to advance the health, welfare, and safety of the public. By their nature, those
regulations encumbered property. As Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw noted in
Commonwealth v Alger (1851):
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well
ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and
unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it
may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to
the rights of the community. All property in this commonwealth . . . is derived
directly or indirectly from the government, and held subject to those general
regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare.813
To Shaw, there was no demarcation between public and private. Instead, liberties and rights
were organically connected with the common good and general welfare. Government was a
vehicle to social advancement, not a regulator or impediment. Every state accepted this
interwoven relationship and both courts and the society embraced wide restrictions on property if
those restrictions advanced the community’s health and welfare. All states and municipalities
regulated in an effort to that end.
While society accepted regulation as part of its norms, property remained a potent liberty
interest – it was a foundation of American liberty. Accordingly, protecting private property and
the right to acquire it was a major emphasis of the Revolution and early American government.
Arthur Lee, a revolutionary era diplomat to Spain, Prussia, and France, declared: “The right of
property is the guardian of every other right, and to deprive a people of this, is in fact to deprive
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them of their liberty.”814 From the beginning, control of property was a bulwark against
government intrusion. It not only guaranteed citizens freedom, it was the means to self and
community improvement. James Ely, Jr. wrote, “historically, property ownership was viewed as
establishing the economic basis for freedom from governmental coercion and the enjoyment of
liberty.”815
Notwithstanding that importance, early American government struck a balance on the
side of regulation over property interests. Gordon Wood reflected that, “the sacrifice of the
individual interest to the greater good of the whole formed the essence of republicanism.”816 The
Declaration of Rights in Vermont’s first state constitution declared, “private property ought to be
subservient to public uses, when necessity required it.”817 To be sure, early American
government balanced the individual’s right to enjoy property with the need to regulate in support
of the common welfare. Marc Kruman related that members of Pennsylvania state constitutional
convention discussed limiting the legislature’s taxing authority to require that “the purpose for
which any tax is to be raised ought to appear clearly . . . to be of more service to the community
than the money would be if not collected.” 818 But that balance fell on the side of supporting the
common welfare. In the public economy of early America, Novak commented, “the buying and
selling of goods was intimately bound up with community identity and social order.” He
continued, noting that, “Nothing so important could be left to the invisible laws of a marketplace
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or a public stricture that the buyer should beware.”819 The legislature determined whether
community needs exceeded individual interests and, when it did so, legislated accordingly.
While regulations might seem pervasive, they must be considered with an earlyAmerican mindset. Gautham Rao, in discussing antebellum acceptance of state compulsion to
join posses, explained that citizens freely and willingly sacrificed their time and efforts in
support of state law enforcement in pursuit of the common welfare. Citizens considered their
uncompensated efforts as an attribute of good citizenship.820 Just as citizens embraced
supporting the common welfare by their participation as law enforcement officers, so too did
they accept limitations on their economic freedoms in pursuit of community benefit. In the first
half of the century, most tradesmen did not consider it a burden to apply for a license to trade.
At that time, in many locations, an individual had no “right” to engage in trade. Selling for profit
was a privilege. As such, government could extend or not extend the privilege as it determined
appropriate. Novak noted that in 1827 Maryland it was unlawful for anyone to set up shop
for the purpose of selling by wholesale or retail, or bartering any dry goods,
groceries, spirituous or fermented liquor, imported dried fruit, glass, crockery,
hardware, drugs or medicines, paints, printed books, stationary, saddlery, gold,
silver or plated ware, jewelry, toys, wearing apparel, salted provisions, grain,
meal, flour, timber, tobacco, cotton, leather, hides, lime, wrought or cast iron,
copper or tin, or any other kind of goods, wares or merchandise, foreign or
domestic, without first obtaining a license.
That the law was extended in 1832, and prohibited anyone from selling “with a view to profit”
without a license. Soon other states, including Tennessee, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and
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California enacted similar licensing laws. As a privilege, states regulated traders to advance the
common well-being.821
Accompanying their general agreement that government was to facilitate trade and
legislate for the general welfare, Americans retained a fear of legislative overreaching. Kruman
argued that state constitutional conventions, around revolutionary times, frequently considered
and enacted limitations on legislative authority, in addition to the well-recognized restrictions on
executive authority. He proposed that the declarations of rights and bill of rights attached to
most state constitutions “infused . . . government with the idea of limitation.” Included in the
stated rights was the oft-followed Virginia declaration that all man had “inherent rights” that
government could not take away, including “the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of
acquiring and possessing property.” Kruman submitted that these liberty rights against
government intrusions applied to all aspects of governance, including the legislature.822
Even if the declarations and bills of rights intended limits on legislative prerogatives,
most courts and litigants seemed unable to particularize the basis upon which courts could void
overreaching legislation. Throughout the early nineteenth century, supporters of limited
legislative power over property rights pinned their arguments on Justice Samuel Chase’s 1798
dicta in Calder v Bull. While that case concerned a legislative effort to require a rehearing of a
judicial decree in a probate matter, it also involved serious issues of legislative power.
The opposing arguments in Calder presaged the property/general-welfare debates of the
next century. Justice James Iredell’s dissent declared courts could employ only specifically
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delineated constitutional limitations to check state legislative power.823 He wrote, “It is true, that
some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against natural justice must, in itself, be
void; but I cannot think that, under such a government, any Court of Justice would possess a
power to declare it so.” Iredell also suggested that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not restrict
government regulations that affect property. Finding that “some of the most necessary and
important acts of Legislation are, on the contrary, founded upon the principle, that private rights
must yield to public exigencies,” Iredell argued that “without the possession of this power the
operations of Government would often be obstructed, and society itself would be endangered.”824
Chase took a different approach. Writing for the court, he claimed that courts required no
specific constitutional provision to find legislation unconstitutional. “I cannot subscribe,” Chase
wrote, “to the omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is absolute and without controul;
although its authority should not be expressly restrained by the Constitution, or fundamental law,
of the State.” He continued: “There are certain vital principles in our free Republican
governments, which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative
power; as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for
personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government is established.”
As an example of such an extra constitutional limit on legislative prerogatives, Chase positions,
“a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B. It is against all reason and justice, for a
people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that
they have done it.”825 Chase premised his argument on seventeenth and eighteenth century
theories of a “social compact” wherein government held its power in moral trust and forfeited
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that power when it violated that trust. Chase’s reasoning, while grounded on concerns over
legislative overreaching, suggested that courts have the authority to overturn legislation if a court
determines that the people could not have intended the legislature to act as it did. 826
Chase and Iredell’s dicta portended long-term controversy over the limits on legislative
power. Iredell wrote of the need to legislate for the common welfare, and how such legislation
necessarily encumbers property rights, but that doing so was an appropriate incident of
democratic governance. Chase professed different beliefs. Freedom required individual
property rights and legislative tinkering with those rights undercut that freedom. While state
constitutions might not specifically prohibit legislative acts in violation of fundamental law,
basic republican principles demanded those restrictions. Iredell’s position largely held sway
through the middle portions of the nineteenth century as Chase’s concerns prowled in the
background.
Chief Justice John Marshall would soon revisit the issue of non-enumerated limits on
legislative authority in the 1810 case, Fletcher v Peck. In that case, the court considered the
Georgia legislature’s effort to reverse the bribe-induced land sale of a previous legislature.
Relying in part on the Contract Clause, the court unanimously declared unconstitutional the
efforts to repeal the earlier legislature’s sale. In dicta, Marshall questioned, but never answered,
whether there might be extra-constitutional limitations on legislative power. At first, he
recognized that lacking specific constitutional restrictions, state legislative authority was
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unlimited. He then floated a question that would resonate for many decades: “It may well be
doubted whether the nature of society and government does not prescribe some limits to the
legislative power; and if any be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an
individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation.” He reflected that
the legislature’s power to make property-affecting laws “where the constitution is silent, never
has been, and perhaps never can be, defined strictly.”827 Since the court determined that
Georgia’s effort to rescind the land sale violated constitutional restrictions against ex post facto
laws, impairments of contracts, and bills of attainder, it did not need to discuss further the extraconstitutional concerns. The question remained unanswered but, as with Calder, became dicta
used by property-protecting advocates of legislative limitations.
Calder and Fletcher touched on, but did not address regulatory concerns. Because
regulation was a state issue, state courts would be the primary forums in which American courts
considered the nature and extent of limitations on legislatures. An early challenge to propertyencumbering laws considered an 1826 Mobile, Alabama assize of bread. As in Detroit, that
regulation required that bakers be licensed, that they use wholesome flour, that their bread be of
a government-directed weight, and that it sell at a specified price. Moreover, Mobile required
that bakers mark their initials and the price on each loaf. The city fined Yuille, a Mobile baker,
twenty dollars and had his product condemned for being underweight. Yuille sued, claiming that
the city did not have the right to regulate the sale of bread because those regulations interfered
with his right to pursue a lawful trade. Since the right to trade was a property right, Yuille
argued that the legislation unconstitutionally encumbered his property and that the regulations
were void under the common law. The court found otherwise, stating that the restraints were
appropriate “if such restraint be for the good of the inhabitants.” The regulation fit that goal, as
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society could not rely on the market to provide sufficient quantities or qualities of bread without
government oversight.
By 1826, economists were beginning to challenge the wisdom of such encumbrances on
trade and property and the court took notice of them. Nevertheless, the court deferred to the
legislature’s judgment. “The legislature having full power to pass such laws as deemed
necessary for public good, their acts cannot be impeached on the ground, that they are unwise, or
not in accordance with just and enlightened views of political economy, as understood at the
present day.” Given that deference, and finding that Yuille had a fair trial, the court affirmed the
conviction.828 Yuille was not unusual for its day: the courts routinely affirmed legislatures’
power to act in support of a well-ordered society. 829
Notwithstanding that general acceptance, not all early attacks on property-divesting
legislation were unsuccessful. One notable and representative case came out of North Carolina’s
efforts to democratize its court personnel selection process. The matter started in 1807, when
North Carolina appointed Lawson Henderson as a court clerk who was to hold his office during
good behavior, a right that Henderson intended to retain. Twenty-five years later, in 1832, the
North Carolina legislature enacted a law calling for elections of court clerks. John D. Hoke won
that election and sought to take Henderson’s job. Henderson objected, claiming that he had a
property right in the clerk’s position. He protested that the legislature was taking his property
without due process of law, and the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed.
828

Mayor and Aldermen of Mobile v Yuille, 3 Ala. 137(1841). Such statutes were not uncommon. Bread baking
was considered an essential industry requiring special legislation. A bit over 60 years later, the Supreme Court in
Lochner v New York would find otherwise.
829
Cooley was presumably speaking of Yulle when he argued that if the government had the right to set the price of
bread, “there is nothing in this direction the legislature may not do.” Cooley believed states did not have that power,
but recognized that it was employed by earlier legislatures. As noted below, Cooley advocated finding new meaning
in constitutions to fit current needs. In doing so, he argued that constitutional interpretation required taking “notice
of the steady growth of the free principles which have come from common-law rules and usages, and of their
gradual expansion with the general advance in intelligence and independent thought and action among the people.”
Cooley, "Limits to State Control of Private Business," 251, 269.

310

With the issue of slavery smoldering in the background, the court spoke out on the limits
of legislative power. Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin, writing for the court in Hoke v Henderson,
asserted that property was a linchpin of democratic society. “The great object of society” Ruffin
declared, “is to enable men to appropriate among themselves the things which in their natural
state, were common.” He claimed that laws were designed to protect that property from the
wrongful acts of others, even if those acts were done on behalf of a majority of citizens as
represented by the legislature. “In other words, public liberty requires that private property
should be protected even from the government itself.”
He then looked for a constitutional hook upon which to hang his property-protecting
beliefs and found it in several areas. The North Carolina constitution provided that the state
could not deprive an individual of his property “but by the law of the land.” Since Henderson
had a property right in his clerk position, the legislature could not transfer that right from him to
another individual without a judicial hearing. Because there was no hearing to determine if
Henderson had violated the good conduct provision of his tenure, the legislation was improper.
In essence, Ruffin argued that the proposed taking was procedurally inadequate. By taking
without a trial, the legislature violated separation of power principles. In an argument that would
resonate in later decisions, the Hoke court found that the legislature improperly acted as a court
by passing judgment on Henderson’s conduct in office.830 The court may have considered an
interest wider than that of Lawson Henderson himself. On several occasions, the court likened
Henderson’s loss of property rights to those slave owners would suffer were the legislature to
enact laws limiting their rights. While the Hoke court argued procedural concerns, its unease
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over slavery was manifest. The words spoke procedure but the focus was substantive. Two
decades later Justice Taney voiced similar concerns in Dred Scott.
The oft-cited Taylor v Porter & Ford evidenced a judicial concern over governmentcompelled transfers of property between individuals. In that case, the court considered
legislation that granted eminent domain powers to an individual to build a private access road
over another individual’s land. Acknowledging that “private interests must yield to public
necessity,” the court questioned whether government had the power to compel private-to-private
transfers. Both searching for a grant of legislative power and a specific withholding of power,
the 1843 court concluded that New York’s due process and law of the land clauses prohibited
legislative property transfers without a judicial hearing. Because this was a naked transfer of
property from one person to another with no public benefit, the court declared this enabling
legislation invalid.831
A series of challenges to property-affecting legislation also arose out of New York’s
efforts to modify marriage rights and obligations. In 1848, New York passed legislation granting
women ownership of the property they brought into a marriage or that they acquired during the
marriage. Common-law principles held that property vested in the husband, “as governor of the
family.” In seeking to protect the woman’s rights, the statute divested the husband of that
property. Two cases concerning that law disclose the issues with which courts struggled when
reviewing this legislatively demanded transfer of property from one individual to another.
Shortly after the statute’s enactment, Mary White sued her husband, the ne’er-do-well
Lyman White, to divest him of his use and enjoyment of property bequeathed to her. Mr. White
defended by challenging the constitutionality of the statute. In White v White, the court, through
Justice Mason, ruled in the husband's favor. Since the legislation stripped property rights from
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the husband without a judicial procedure, the law was invalid. The court reasoned that: “If the
legislature can take the property of A. and transfer it to B., they can take A. himself and either
shut him up in prison or put him to death. But none of these things can be done by mere
legislation. There must be due process of law.”832 Few cite the case, perhaps because the court
relied largely on natural law to define due process. Justice Mason argued for extra-constitutional
limitations on the legislature and that courts were not required to rely on specific constitutional
“negatives upon the legislative power.” To Mason, courts could invalidate legislation where the
“exercise of [legislative] power is incompatible with the nature and object of all government, and
is destructive of the great end and aim for which government is instituted, and is subversive of
the fundamental principles upon which all free governments are organized.”833 It is easy to put
too much emphasis on this lightly considered, infrequently cited case. Notwithstanding that
caution, Mason seemed to be suggesting that natural law required that courts review legislation
in light of the underlying purposes of (republican?) governance. Hence, if courts considered
legislation inconsistent with governing structures, those laws were invalid, notwithstanding the
absence of legislative-limiting constitutional language. To Mason and his brethren, the court
was responsible to define the extent and nature of those extra-constitutional limitations. In the
end, the Mason recognized that the court’s decision was anti-democratic and unpopular. The
husband was a “man of idle habits,” was frequently intoxicated, and was an improvident
scoundrel. The common-law was unfair and archaic. Nevertheless, natural law limited
legislative prerogatives, and the legislature could not take property rights from husbands and
give them to wives. The New York Court of Appeals, in Westervelt v Gregg ruled similarly,
finding as Cooley noted that “rights once vested, . . . could not be divested by any subsequent
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change in the law.”834 In other words, laws that divested property rights were beyond the power
of the legislature.
Those cases, and the several like them, are oft cited but too narrow to be representative of
the nature of antebellum regulatory law. That is because in those cases the legislative action
affected person-to-person transfers. The North Carolina law directly transferred Henderson’s
property (good-behavior employment position) to Hoke, and New York’s laws, in one case,
directly transferred land between adjoining landholders and, in another two, a husband’s property
(acquired under common-law coverture rules) to their wives. While the courts’ expansive
language eloquently spoke of natural law, due process, and law of the land, the practical
consequences of the rulings were limited.835 When employed with respect to general regulatory
legislation (or the largest transfers of wealth of the day – railroads), due process and other
constitutional claims met significantly greater obstacles.
As Cooley noted, early nineteenth century government was “present at all times, touching
the citizens for his advantage and direction in all his relations: by his fireside as much as in his
business.”836 Up until 1845, most of that government was local and “took seriously the historical
sensibility of the common law and the aspirations of an ordered commonwealth.”837 In that
sense, early nineteenth-century government regulations largely harmonized with general
sensibilities. That local harmony began to dissipate as state legislatures in the mid 1840s began
to enact statewide alcohol regulations or outright prohibitions. “During the decade of 1846 to
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1856 no fewer than sixteen states passed anti-liquor laws of a more or less drastic character.”838
Those laws resulted in a flurry of litigation and what Novak characterized as the “earliest . . .
definitive statements of both substantive due process and the inalienable police power.”839 In
considering the propriety of the temperance legislation, courts would now address legislative
power, particularly as it affected the individual rights of citizens.

Temperance and Broadening Discontent
As Detroit’s experiences attest, regulating alcohol was an incident of American
government from its earliest days. This stemmed not just from moral concerns, but also from
public health and safety concerns. Between “1790 and 1830 [Americans] drank more alcoholic
beverages per capita than ever before or since.” By 1830, “estimated annual consumption of
hard liquor [was] 9.5 gallons for every American over 14 – plus 30.3 gallons of hard cider and
other in toxicants to total 7.1 gallons of absolute alcohol.” 840 That heavy consumption conflicted
with the magnified morality of the Second Great Awakening and with the health and safety
concerns associated with industrialization, family violence, and pauperism.841 While some may
view the temperance movement as harking back to a purer era, it was quite the opposite. “The
organized temperance movement which emerged in the 1820s, marked by the formation of the
American Temperance Society in 1826, had its roots in the process of industrialization and
commercialization of agriculture; more important, the men and women who fashioned the
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temperance crusade sought to hasten the processes of social and economic change."842 Ronald
Walters and Eric Foner argued that the temperance advocates “had a sense of progress and the
nation’s potential. As they saw it, prosperity, godliness, and political freedom were the fruits of
sobriety. Poverty, damnation, and tyranny were the consequences of intemperance.”843
An indication of the public’s engagement with temperance issues can be gleaned from
theater attendance at plays featuring the challenges of drink. In the 1850s, along with Uncle
Tom’s Cabin, plays promoting temperance “were crowd pleasers with the ability to draw a wider
spectrum of the public than had ever before frequented the theatre.” During that time, wildly
successful temperance plays moved across the country. According to Judith MacArthur’s study,
the plot of one of those plays, The Drunkard, typified the temperance message. In it,
Grasping lawyer Cribbs, the dastardly villain, schemes to have the poor but
beautiful and virtuous Mary Wilson and her widowed mother evicted from
their rose-covered cottage . . . The Noble young heir, Edward, weds Mary and
chases off Cribbs, who revenges himself by luring Edward into an addiction to
drink. Ruined and degraded, the hero flees to the miserable alleys of New
York City, where his ragged and heartbroken but ever-devoted wife and child
follow in search of him. Edward is about to take poison when he is saved by a
reformed drunkard turned philanthropist who administers the pledge of
sobriety. Cribbs’s last-minute attempt to abscond with Edward’s grandfather’s
will is foiled, and the young family is reunited. The final scene is set in their
picturesque cottage, where Edward plays “Home, Sweet Home” on the flute
while the sun sets and the assembled villagers sing.844
The Drunkard was one of several very popular plays used to display the evils of drink and the
redemptive value of family and community, in a dry, sober environment.
To control alcohol consumption, municipalities and, increasingly, states would regulate
the manufacture, sale, and consumption of alcohol. Along with political complaints that those
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laws were too onerous, dissenting residents began to petition courts for relief (most likely as part
of the previously mentioned trend to claim constitutional rights violations). That occasioned a
deeper judicial analysis of the limits of legislative power to regulate and the rights of private
property. At first, efforts to judicially limit legislative power were unavailing. Early courts
referenced natural law and vested rights as counterbalances to legislative authority. In New York
v Morris, the 1835 New York Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Village of
Ogdensburgh’s requirement that grocers have licenses to allow patrons to imbibe on their
premises. Writing for the court, Justice Samuel Nelson began by recognizing that citizens had
“vested rights” that were “sacred and inviolable, even against the plenitude of the Legislative
Department.” After asserting that formidable standard, the court then questioned whether it had
any authority to relieve parties from legislative overreaching. Claiming that it would be
“indelicate and presumptuous” to assume that the legislature would ever overreach, Nelson
softened his earlier promised protection of vested rights. “Vested rights are indefinite terms, and
of extensive signification; not infrequently resorted to when no better argument exists.” The
dictum suggested limits: the ruling found otherwise. After promising robust protection of
property, the court fully retreated from its rhetoric. Nelson declared: “Government was
instituted for the purpose of modifying and regulating these rights with a view to the general
good; and under the Constitution, the mode by which it was thought this great object must be
attained, was left to the wisdom and discretion of the people themselves, acting through the
medium of their representatives.”845 The law was valid. General-welfare needs trumped
property rights and the statute was constitutional.
The Morris court, however, may have been sending a signal. Because of the facts of the
case, the court did not have to take the bold step of invalidating legislation on extra845

New York v Morris, 13 Wend. 325, 328, 329 (1835).

317

constitutional grounds. The regulation at issue limited but did not substantially destroy property.
That fact allowed the court to float a concern, without truly opening Pandora’s Box. The court
was able warn against laws that violated “inherent or inalienable” rights, while still deferring to
the legislature’s judgment.
A few years before Morris, the Massachusetts Supreme Court faced the same issue, but
analyzed it quite differently. In Commonwealth v Blackington, the court faced a claim that a
county’s failure to license a liquor establishment divested the previously licensed individual of
his property interests. Oliver Blackington claimed that the loss of his license was a violation of
his “unalienable rights.” Chief Justice Shaw was surprised by this rights argument as it had not
been raised in the nearly sixty years of state and municipal liquor regulations. He responded by
noting the expansive police powers “to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable orders, laws, statutes and ordinances” to advance the general welfare. Of course
those laws had to be consistent with constitutional restraints. But the police power by its nature
effected property interests, and to invalidate laws on that basis “would be a departure from the
whole policy of the government, from the first settlement of the country.”846 Notwithstanding
constitutional provisions that signaled the importance of property, government regulations to
advance the public’s health, safety, morals, and general welfare were both constitutionally
acceptable and appropriate.
That same term, Shaw wrote the court’s opinion in Commonwealth v Kimbell. In that
case, the petitioner argued that Massachusetts’s regulation of liquor violated Congress’ authority
under the Commerce Clause. Shaw rejected that argument, again stating that government power
necessarily included the authority to regulate “for the peace, safety, health, morals and general
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welfare of the community.”847 That same issue regarding state power in the face of the
Commerce Clause would arise before the United States Supreme Court in 1847 in a series of
matters collectively called the License Cases. In a confusing and disjointed manner, six justices
wrote opinions, with no court opinion issued. The question came down to whether federal space
under the Commerce Clause was so complete as to leave no room for state regulations that,
necessarily, affected interstate commerce. In addressing that issue, the justices reflected on the
nature of state police powers and the historical role of alcohol regulations. Chief Justice Roger
Taney’s oft-cited opinion found that states had the power to regulate, or prohibit altogether,
ardent spirits and could do so even though interstate commerce might be affected. Justice John
McLean “acknowledged [that the] police power of a State extends often to the destruction of
property.” Hence, once the legislature found alcohol was an impediment to the public’s health or
morals, it could regulate or destroy that property.848 Given the rather tepid regulations of the
day, the law seemed clear. Government could regulate alcohol property – to the point of
destroying it – in order to advance general-welfare interests.
Local licensing restrictions marked 1830 and 1840s efforts to limit alcohol sales and
consumption. For each effort, however, enterprising businesses found a response. In his
groundbreaking studies of early American liquor consumption and regulation, William
Rorabaugh related stories of avoidance of those statutes. For example, to avoid Massachusetts’
1838 regulations against the retail sales of spirits “an enterprising liquor dealer painted stripes on
his pig and advertised that for 6¢ a person could see this decorated beast. The viewer also got a
free glass of whiskey.”849 Rorabaugh explained that such easy avoidance led to the repeal of the
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statute, but also to new social and legal efforts to restrict that which many desired – alcohol.
Those restrictions would move from local initiatives (one hundred Massachusetts towns were
legally dry in 1845850) to statewide mandates. With them, the courts would move from
unanimous acceptance of the legislature’s right to regulate, to questions concerning the power to
legislate the destruction of property.
Although the temperance movement had been very successful in reducing the nation’s
alcohol consumption through local laws and social and moral persuasion (consumption had
declined from 7.1 gallons of absolute alcohol to 1.85 by 1845851), by 1850 temperance advocates
pressed for statewide legal changes that would prohibit, or dramatically reduce, alcohol
manufacture and sale.852 They first found success in Maine, driven by temperance advocate and
Portland Mayor, Neal Dow.853 Believing that “the traffic in intoxicating drink tends more to
degradation and impoverishment of the people than all other causes of evil combined,” Dow
advocated, and won, legislative acceptance of the first state prohibition statute in the United
States.854 In the next five years over a dozen states, including Michigan, would pass “Maine
Laws” to restrict or prohibit alcohol consumption. Novak noted that these statutes “marked a
stunning departure in the legal and legislative history of morals and liquor regulation.” He noted
that with these laws, “Power and discretion were summarily taken out of the hands of
communities and local officials and replaced with blanket state-wide legislative bans on a
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remarkably profitable activity . . . that previously enjoyed the sanction of law.”855 Court
challenges to those laws would occasion the first truly substantive due process cases. Courts
would consider whether state legislatures had the authority to make unlawful that which had
always been legal and to make criminals those who had been productive business people and
community leaders and, in doing so, destroy significant property value and rights.
The 1852 Massachusetts legislature limited the manufacture, sale, and use of all
intoxicating liquors. In Fisher v McGirr, the court through Chief Justice Shaw upheld the
legislature’s right, under its police-power authority, to regulate liquor as a nuisance.856 Since
banning nuisances was within the legislature’s authority, alcohol could be completely banned as
an injurious and dangerous object. But there were limits. With the substance of the law in the
legislature’s purview, Shaw looked to the summary procedures through which the law was
enforced. He concluded that the procedures used to regulate must be consistent with due process
guarantees. He asked,
whether the measures, directed and authorized by the statute in question, are so
far inconsistent with the principles of justice, and the established maxims of
jurisprudence, intended for the security of public and private rights, and so
repugnant to the provisions of the Declaration of Rights and constitution of the
Commonwealth, that it was not within the power of the legislature to give them
the force of law, and that they must therefore be held unconstitutional and
void.
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Using that due process standard, the court adjudged inadequate the statute’s delineated
procedures.857 The properties’ value could be legislated away, but only if appropriate procedural
guarantees protected against inappropriate takings and prosecution.858 The Massachusetts
Supreme Court for the first time had invalidated a substantial portion of its state’s legislation.
In the end, the legislature cured the offensive provision and re-enacted the law. In that
case, one can ask why Fisher is so important. Courts had almost without exception accepted
summary actions to remove nuisances and had done so with procedures much like those
invalidated in that case. As Novak pointed out, the situation in Fisher was different because
those regulations were statewide and had rendered valueless (and, perhaps criminal) property
that was previously well accepted. “It was a comprehensive statutory revocation of preexisting
liberties, properties, and rights. It replaced local, discretionary liquor licensing with a formal,
centralized, and uniform system of rules guiding the administrative and judicial conduct of law
enforcement officials throughout the state.”859 While well taken, Novak may not have gone far
enough. One might expect that summary proceedings would still be acceptable where a
previously lawful product now faced uniform acceptance of its danger – like cyclamates, opium,
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or virus-carrying poultry – even if those regulations were harsh and statewide. It appears that the
court took notice of two additional factors. First, there was a strong undercurrent of
dissatisfaction with prohibition laws and, second, the danger in Fisher was not immediate and,
therefore, summary action was not needed. Recent immigrants and a sizeable portion of the
native population accepted alcohol as a cultural norm and took umbrage at what seemed classfocused legislation. Further, unlike other nuisance cases, alcohol violations did not threaten
immediate danger and accordingly did not require immediate remedy. Deeper due process
proceedings had time to work, just as they did in Welch v Stowell, the Michigan case dealing
with destruction of an alleged brothel. Whatever the distinction in Fisher, Shaw’s opinion
offered an additional dynamic. It fenced in legislative discretion on enforcement of state laws.
In doing so, it made enforcement of the prohibition law cumbersome and, for the values
involved, expensive. Hence, while the substance of the law remained intact, the court had
significantly muted its application.
While Massachusetts focused on procedure, a few other jurisdictions addressed more
substantive concerns. To them, the issue was whether the legislature could strip citizens of their
property value by legislating away the worth of heretofore valuable (and lawful) assets. A
number of courts took up the issue, with most finding that state police powers allowed for
property-destroying restrictions. In one of the earlier cases, the Illinois Supreme Court, with
Justice Walter Scates speaking, waxed philosophical about the surrendering of natural rights
upon entering the social state. In that social state, when “private right[s] become injurious,
noxious or offensive to the public good, communities have a right to protection from it; and the
private right becomes subordinate to the public right.” In response to the claim that the
legislation both took property without compensation and impaired contract rights, Scates
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answered, “No property has, in this instance, been entered upon or taken. None are benefited by
the destruction, or rather the suspension, of the rights in question in any other way than citizens
always are when one of their number is forbidden to continue a nuisance.” 860 The legislature
had determined the property created a nuisance; it had legislated to remove the nuisance, and had
been justified in doing so by the needs of the well-ordered society.
Only two courts disagreed with the weight of judicial decisions, with one arguing the
legislature lacked the power and the other determined that the legislature could only act
prospectively.861 In 1855, the Indiana Supreme Court in Beebe v Indiana declared the state’s
recently enacted prohibition on the manufacture and sale of alcohol unconstitutional. Focusing
on limits to legislative power associated with “reserved natural rights,” Justice Samuel Perkins
rejected the propriety of regulations to advance the general welfare and took particular exception
to efforts to limit the consumption of alcohol. He suggested that courts use natural law to limit
regulations advocated by “latitudinarians” who use “the general welfare doctrine” to enact such
destructive legislation as the alien and sedition acts and national bank charters. The notion that
government should advance the general welfare “has been fraught with oppression, and has not
produced, permanently, promised results.” Accordingly, constitutions must be read to limit
legislative prerogatives, and courts had the duty of “securing to the people safety from legislative
aggression.” They should do so irrespective of specific constitutional limitations. To
accomplish that, Perkins proclaimed, courts should employ clauses protecting inalienable rights.
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Those clauses established that citizens did not give up their natural property rights when entering
society.
After setting out the governing philosophy, Perkins turned to the alcohol regulations at
issue. Giving judicial notice to the fact that beer is no more hurtful than “the use of lemonade or
ice cream,” the court honored its obligation to “secure [property] from the invasion of a despotic
legislature” and ruled the liquor restriction unconstitutional.862 In the related Herman v State,
Perkins continued the argument. To the court, the issue was personal freedom. “We lay down
this proposition, then, as applicable to the present case; that the right of liberty and pursuing
happiness secured by the constitution, embraces the right, in each compos mentis individual, of
selecting what he will eat and drink, in short, his beverages . . . If the constitution does not
secure this right to the people, it secures nothing of value.”863 The issue, therefore, was not
about public needs and regulation of commerce. It was about regulating private behavior, which
by its letter the statute did not do, but certainly was the intended result. By flipping the analysis
from regulation of commerce to regulation of individuals, Beebe and Herman had challenged the
long-standing practice and acceptance of legislation to advance general-welfare interest. To
Perkins, freedom, as against majoritarian governance, was paramount. The Indiana Supreme
Court had declared individual rights as paramount, whereas previous courts had declared group
rights as such. In that way, the Indiana court challenged government’s right to legislate to
advance the general welfare and replaced it with a new, individual-rights model. To accomplish
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that, Perkins positioned his court as an active government branch to check an active
legislature.864
Very soon after Illinois and Indiana had ruled, the New York Court of Appeals in the
groundbreaking case Wynehamer v New York, invalidated the retrospective aspects of New
York’s 1855 act for “the prevention of intemperance, pauperism and crime.” Unlike most
similar cases, the court directly took on the question whether the legislature has the power to
destroy the value of property (liquor) consistently with the state constitution’s “due process” and
“law of the land” clauses. With Justice George Comstock writing for the court, the court
reasoned that liquor was entitled to the same property protections as “land, houses or chattels.”
The state had the authority to regulate alcohol property under its police powers. But, the court
argued, the legislation destroyed existing property and that the legislature could not do under the
New York constitution. Perhaps following the logic of New York’s marriage property cases,
Comstock wrote that property “cannot be pronounced worthless or pernicious, and so destroyed
or deprived of its essential attributes.” In a statement signaling the shift to a more individualrights focused jurisprudence, Comstock decried allowing “theories of public good and public
necessity” to be used by “popular majorities” to take property from others. Regardless of
democratic leanings, Comstock argued, “there are some absolute private rights beyond their
reach, and among these the constitution places the right of property.865
Unlike Beebe and Herman, Wynehamer focused on constitutional language, but with a
substantive spin. Comstock wrote, “the true interpretation of the ‘law of the land’ and ‘due
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process of law’ is that where the rights are acquired by the citizen under the existing law, there is
no power in any branch of government to take them away.” With that broad declaration, the
Wynehamer decision invalidated a retroactive application of law – in essence, rejecting Iredell’s
warning that “society itself would be endangered” were legislatures prohibited from restricting
pre-existing property rights.866 Comstock wrote, “Where rights of property are admitted to exist,
the legislature cannot say they shall exist no longer; nor will it make any difference, although a
process and tribunal are appointed to execute the sentence.” What was lawful property yesterday
cannot be made unlawful today. The court let the discussion rest on one question: “Does the
statute under consideration simply regulate, or does it destroy an admitted species of property, in
which millions of value are invested? As this question is answered, the act must stand or fall.”
While remote or consequential diminution of property’s value was constitutionally appropriate,
outright destruction was not. Such destruction “transcends the constitutional limits of the
legislative power.”867 In ruling that destroying property value was by its nature a denial of due
process, the Wynehamer court shifted the discussion from public welfare to private rights. And
if the courts language were taken as literal, the existing private right would always win.
Wynehamer had changed New York’s definition of “due process.” It was no longer just about
process.
In New York’s Morris opinion, the court raised the issue of whether legislation that
destroyed property rights was constitutional. In White and Westervelt, the court determined it
was not, at least insofar as that legislation took property rights from a husband and gave it to his
wife. With Wynehamer, New York had again overturned legislation because it had destroyed a
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property interest. But Wynehamer was more significant. In it, the court relied on the state’s due
process clause, not on amorphous doctrines of natural law or vested rights.
Scholars consider Wynehamer as the first case to rule that courts could employ the due
process clause to invalidate legislation that dispossessed significant property value. In redefining
a constitutional provision to limit legislative authority, the court rejected natural law as grounds
for limiting that authority. Comstock classified as dangerous other courts’ use of “natural rights”
and “high authority” to restrict the legislatures, and believed that employing natural law as a
limit on the legislature could imperil government.868 In doing so, he sought to deny any
connection between due process and natural law. Almost certainly, Comstock was concerned
about the abolitionist arguments that natural law abhorred slavery and that because it was a
higher law, natural law superseded the legislatures’ rights to pass law in support of slavery.
Comstock’s fears were well founded. As mentioned, natural rights beliefs were endemic
in the American psyche. Abolitionists repeatedly argued that those rights prohibited the
enslavement of Africans. As, Howard Graham argued, abolitionists used the terms “due
process” and “natural law” interchangeably in anti-slavery speeches: “For every black letter
usage in the court there were perhaps hundreds of thousands in the press, red school house and
on the stump.” He continued: “Zealots, reformers, and politicians – not jurists – blazed the paths
of substantive due process.”869 The abolitionist argued that state legislatures could not
promulgate slave laws because they lacked the power to pass legislation in violation of natural
rights and due process guarantees. Among the audience of these 1840-1860 reformers sat those
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of the Cooley generation. They would revolutionize due process in the later decades of the
nineteenth century.
Over the next few years, all the states that considered the constitutionality of prohibition
legislation rejected the Wynehamer arguments. One example is indicative of the whole. The
Delaware Supreme Court in State v Allmond considered the constitutionality of a nearly
complete prohibition on alcohol sales. The court, through Chief Justice Samuel Harrington,
ruled that the legislature had nearly unfettered rights to regulate the use of property. Putting
regulation in its historical context of general-welfare enhancement, Harrington wrote:
The Legislature of this State has [regulated property] from the beginning, by
prescribing the modes of acquiring and using, the transfer and disposition of
property of all kinds; and the restriction or prohibition not merely of certain
kinds of property, but of trades, professions and callings; thus regulating not
only property itself but the personal industry and enterprise through which
property is acquired. I refer to the statutes, among the first enacted for the
conveyance of property; the statutes of wills; the intestate laws; all license
laws; laws regulating physicians, surgeons, attornies, millers, ferries and
fisheries; laws regulating the weight and price of breadstuff, and laws
regulating inn-keepers and venders of liquor generally.
With regulation came the risks of unfair burdens. While recognizing that legislatures might be
wrong or corrupt, the court maintained the importance of deference and refused to give the
judiciary veto power over the legislature. “When [legislators] are supposed in any act of
legislation unwisely, or improperly, to restrain what are assumed to be the rights of the people, it
is for the people themselves to correct the evil through legislative repeal, and not by Judicial
usurpation.”
A well-regulated society required limitations on property use, Harrington argued, because
“the subjection of private property in the mode of its enjoyment to the public good, and its
subordination to the general rights liable to be injured by its unrestricted use, is a principle lying
at the foundations of government.” In stating what was then the prevailing social opinion,
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Harrington continued that property encumbrances are “a condition of the social state; the price of
its enjoyment, entering into the very structure of organized society; existing by necessity for its
preservation.” Only after setting forth the historic goals and means of a well-regulated society
did the court address Wynehamer. Almost scoffing, the court asserted that Wynehamer’s
reasoning would require that the court overrule multiple precedents, gut the state’s ability to
employ its police powers, and ignore well-settled practices. The court declined to do that, but
called on the democratic process to remedy any legislative over-reaching.870

Michigan’s Temperance Experience
As discussed in Chapter II, alcohol regulation had been a project of Michigan governance
from its earliest days. Believing that restrictions on access to ardent spirits would moderate the
challenges of drunkenness, pauperism, crime, and family violence and abandonment, local and
state government regulated the alcohol trade. Those efforts were to temper alcohol consumption
(hence the term “temperance”) but not to prohibit consumption. In Michigan, as in the rest of
that nation, most of those regulations concerned licensing alcohol sales. As morals shifted, and
despite a significant drop in consumption, alcohol use took on an increasingly darker hue, with
calls for prohibition rising. As in most of the northern states, religious forces associated with
revivalism helped move Michigan to respond to calls for deeper governmental restrictions. The
story of Augustus Littlejohn and his mid-1840s travels through Michigan, demonstrates the
increasing fervor for an end to alcohol consumption. After his sermons on the evils of drink,
Littlejohn would travel from town to town, putting “King Alcohol” on trial for its crimes against
mankind. In one story,
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At the close of his lectures in Climax, King Alcohol was arraigned before a
proper tribunal, and tried for his crimes. Littlejohn acting as counsel for the
prosecution, some one for the defense. The charges of murder and other
heinous crimes were brought against the old king, and clearly proven. He was
found guilty, and sentenced to be burnt at the stake. The sentence was carried
out. A spot was selected for the place of execution, and a pile of logs reared on
it. The procession was formed at the church, led by Billy Harrison and Jonas
Bailey as executioners, who walked to the music of the death march carrying
between them the “old brown jug,” filled with whisky, representing the
condemned criminal. Reaching the place of execution, a stake was struck into
the pile of logs, the criminal was bound to it, the death sentence was read, the
pile fired, and King Alcohol was burned to death.871
This type of proselytizing occasioned a morality shift from an acceptance that “anyone, even
clergymen, could take an occasional glass and still be considered an exemplar of temperance,” to
one where the Regents of the University of Michigan could justify firing University President
Tappan because he “is accused of having used wine as a beverage. Other Members of the
Faculty merely used it as a tonic.”872 Because of that shift, popular opinion began to see
regulation of alcohol as enabling, rather than regulating, a social evil.
This then was the alcohol debate during Michigan’s 1850 constitutional convention.
Early in the convention, delegates received petitions to prohibit state alcohol licensing.873 Those
petitions, as well as most of the debates, centered on state involvement through licensing rather
than on calls for state prohibition of the alcohol trade. Some argued the state should not sanction
the vice by licensing, some wanted to employ licenses to restrict sales, and a few suggested the
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state should prohibit alcohol altogether. For example, delegate J. Van Vakenburgh passionately
argued, “the welfare of the community demands that something be done by us, to stay the tide of
misery consequent upon this unhallowed traffic.” His answer was to “cut loose our State from
this cruel traffic.” He provided the constitutional language: “The legislature shall have no power
to grant licenses for the sale of ardent spirits or intoxicating drinks, except for mechanical or
medicinal purposes.” His ultimate goal seemed to be limitations on the alcohol trade – he
wished to “avert the progress of a destroyer who has strewn our land with the blood of the dead”
– but his proposal (which largely is the text of the 1850 Constitution) promised no such solution:
it only provided that the state could not license the alcohol sales. Because licensing was used not
just for revenue but as a means of restricting trade, Van Vakenburgh’s proposal lifted all the
state-government restrictions on the manufacture and sales of ardent spirits.874 Perhaps because
of an inability to build consensus on alcohol policy, or because of a lay-convention’s equating
licensing with approval,875 the delegates approved language that accomplished little and,
contrary to their intent, allowed unrestricted alcohol manufacture and sale. It only forbad the
legislature from passing “any act authorizing the grant of a license for the sale of argent spirits or
other intoxicating liquors.”876 The constitution did not speak to the legislature’s power to
prohibit alcohol manufacture or sale. To some of the delegates, however, that silence meant that
the legislature could completely prohibit the trade in alcoholic beverages.
Joseph H. Bagg, a physician and politician from Detroit, was one who believed that
government should withdraw from licensing but should not prohibit alcohol sales. He believed
that moral suasion should and effectively would cull alcoholic excesses. To him, the
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constitutional language supported those who “did not wish the State to give a moral tone to the
traffic.” Perhaps prescient or insightful of the human condition, delegate Bagg warned of
extending temperance efforts to state-coerced prohibition: “You may just as well attempt, in this
Wolverine State, to stop the use of Java and Laguya coffee, of green and black tea – to stem the
Falls of Niagara in a bark canoe – as to put a stop to the use of liquor.”877 Notwithstanding the
warning, and the convention’s disinclination to legislative activism, as part of its move to address
social issues, the legislature would soon turn its attention to the alcohol trade.
In 1851, the legislature abolished its earlier license system but required that sellers of
intoxicating beverages hold bonds to insure payments for liquor related damages. The question
whether that law ran afoul of the constitution soon was litigated. That occurred when, in 1852,
Mrs. Langley sought damages for her alcohol-injured husband, Albert Langley. Mrs. Langley
won her case against John Ergensinger for $68 plus costs of $4.16, for damages Ergensinger
caused by selling liquor to her husband. Ergensinger appealed arguing the 1851 bond
requirement (and the associated liability for alcohol-induced behavior), was constitutionally
impermissible. Consistent with the tenor of the times, the law gave a married woman the power
to recover damages she or her children suffered because of her husband’s alcohol purchases.
Classifying those who sold liquor as “wrongdoers,” the Supreme Court determined that the
legislature had expansive general-welfare powers. “It is the incident of every government,
whether a state or a city, that they have the right to impose restrictions on natural rights when the
exercise of them on a particular mode is found destructive of the morals of all who are subjected
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to their influence.”878 With that broad power, legislatures could subordinate individual interests
(or here, natural rights) in order to accomplish ends advancing morals and safety.
The 1851 statute only set liabilities; it did not restrict alcohol sales. Governor Robert
McClelland continued that debate in 1853 by noting, “every good citizen is in favor of promoting
the cause of temperance by all fair and legitimate means.” Perhaps unwilling to take a position
on an issue that divided the state, he called on the legislature to consult public opinion and
legislate according to the “condition of the State.”879 The legislature similarly was tentative. In
response to continued public pressure in the wake of the Maine laws, the Michigan Legislature in
February 1853 prohibited the manufacture and traffic of intoxicating liquor, but made the law
subject to an approving vote of the people. After that affirmative vote, the Supreme Court
considered two constitutional issues. First, it reviewed whether the legislature could outsource
its legislative powers to a popular vote and second whether the legislature had the power to
regulate away the value of alcohol related properties. The court, in People v Collins, overturned
the law on the first grounds: The legislature could not delegate to the voters legislative power to
enact laws. A number of justices wrote opinions. Justice Abner Pratt found that the delegation
of legislative power to the people undermined representative governance and created “collective
democracy, the most uncertain and dangerous of all governments.” Pratt, and his concurring
brothers, feared a majoritarian juggernaut. To Pratt, the courts must assure representative
governance and avoid majoritarian democracy. Justice Samuel Douglass agreed, arguing that the
legislation could not constitutionally be submitted for a popular vote. His fear, too, was
majoritarian democracy. Stating that governance would be “subjected to the dominion of the
popular majority of the hour,” Douglass argued for the advantages and constitutional necessity of
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representative governance. It protected against “hasty and inconsiderate legislation.”880 The
justices split over whether the legislature had the power to pass the alcohol prohibitions
consistently with constitutional protections of property and prohibitions against state licensing.881
Governor Andrew Parson responded to the court’s decision by acknowledging that “the
people sincerely disagree” about the wisdom of temperance legislation, and also about “the
power, of the Legislature to prohibit the manufacture and sale of spirituous liquors.” His
comments on legislative powers may have been little more than casual, but those concerns
resonated in Michigan (and national) legal circles. In the end, the legislature sided with those
who believed its power expansive. Shortly, Michigan’s legislators would overwhelmingly
approve a new statute to overcome the challenges to which the Collins court objected. Alcohol
manufacture and sale were again illegal in Michigan.
In 1856, the Michigan Supreme Court, in People v Gallagher, considered the
constitutionality of a state law prohibiting the sale and manufacture of liquor. The court, through
Justice David Johnson reviewed Thomas Gallagher’s conviction for the illegal sale of alcohol.
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Gallagher’s counsel argued that natural law prohibited the legislature from enacting propertydestroying legislation. It is worth noting the court’s language, as Gallagher reflected Michigan’s
judicial position prior to Cooley’s ascension to the bench. In framing the dispute as a
Chase/Iredell conflict, the court took pains to approve authorities holding that only express
constitutional provisions limited legislative authority, and that judicial statements to the contrary
were mere dicta. In a decision Andrew McLaughlin stated “admirably presented” the case for
antebellum deference to legislation882, the Gallagher court noted, “It will be observed, as
something peculiar, that in almost all [cases claiming extra-constitutional limitations] . . . the
courts have upheld the particular legislative enactments under consideration.” Because of that,
the court noted, it was “unable to find any case” where a court invalidated a statute on extraconstitutional grounds. Johnson continued by suggesting that courts grandly writing of natural
rights did so only as warnings against future legislatures. He wrote,
They seem to be impressed with the necessity of fortifying themselves in their
conclusions, and that, although they were compelled to give force and effect to
these acts, there might be such a perpetration of legislative wrong, conflicting
with these natural rights, as to challenge the exercise of their judicial power; a
power carefully kept in abeyance to meet any future contingency that might
possibly happen.
Johnson then noted, “the language of” those cases “is subject to some well grounded
criticism.”883
After reviewing the state of the law, and criticizing those courts that espoused grand
natural rights doctrines only to shrink from them in deciding the case, the court tackled a
fundamental question of constitutional jurisprudence: The balance between majoritarian
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governance and restrictions for personal space. The 1855 Michigan court would reject
arguments that courts were actively to check majoritarian excess. Acknowledging, “it may be
true that legislative bodies, acting from temporary impulses, without sufficient time for
discussion and deliberation are more likely to be influenced by the highly excited condition of
the public mind than courts of law,” the court steadfastly rejected judicial interference in the
process. Although “great wrongs may undoubtedly be perpetrated by legislative power,”
Johnson wrote, government required that that power be invested in the people’s representatives,
not the courts.884 Cooley would look at things quite differently. Under his theories,
majoritarianism posed a too severe a threat to republican governance, and therefore required
judicially imposed limits. Where the Gallagher court would look to the democratic process to
check improper legislation, Cooley would look to the courts.
With its standard of review established, the Gallagher court addressed legislative power
to regulate and destroy alcohol property. In short order it rejected arguments that courts were to
“compare the value of this [community] right with the injury which the exercise of it would
inflict upon the public, and strike the balance.” That was the legislature’s role. Because of that,
the court deferred to the legislature and, on a 7 to 1 vote, ruled the prohibition law
constitutional.885
Whether liquor was no different from lemonade or ice cream, as the Beebe court had
suggested, restrictions on its use resulted in a flurry of litigation and, with it, judicial reflection
on the place of property in a well ordered society. That reflection affected other issues as well.
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Perhaps as a precursor to the Slaughter-House litigation, merchants began to question
municipalities’ rights to regulate the location of markets within a city. Cities historically had set
up zones of commerce, consistent with the early American belief that trade was a privilege and
should be controlled and enhanced by government involvement. As part of that effort,
Philadelphia’s city assembly in 1854 sought to purchase land for a city-operated market and to
demolish an older central-market area. Several taxpayers and farmers protested and brought an
action that would end up before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1859, Wartman v
Philadelphia. Chief Justice Jeremiah Black (who also authored the Sharpless opinion), speaking
for the court, voiced the long-standing proposition that government should be intimately
involved in trade, particularly in the creation and regulation of central markets. To do otherwise
“would be an anomaly which at present has no existence among us.” Should the state fail to
allow municipalities to control a central market, it would be an “act of mere tyranny.” Black
went so far as to declare that Pennsylvania nearly required municipalities to regulate citywide
trade and a central market.886 Failure to do so was an abdication of governing responsibility.
Notwithstanding Pennsylvania’s philosophy, other jurisdictions were beginning to follow
a different piper. While Pennsylvania embraced government involvement, Georgia found such
involvement offensive. In the same year as Wartman, and considering nearly identical facts, the
Georgia Supreme Court in Bethune v Hughes voiced near repugnance to central market
regulations.887 James Bethune of Columbus, Georgia, took exception to his conviction for
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selling products outside a legislatively established central market. In reviewing the case, one can
imagine Chief Justice Joseph Lumpkin turning red as he proclaimed for the court that, “let
anything and everything be done, rather than restrict commerce, rather than force and imprison
tradespeople, to coerce them to submit to all kinds of discomfort and inconvenience, not to say
loss, to gratify the selfishness, or avarice, or convenience of a favored few; to be taxed to support
the pomp and parade of a few municipal lords.” Citing the increased irritation of the citizens
over legislated restrictions, Lumpkin determined that the city had overstepped the authority
granted to it by the state legislature and, therefore, the central-market statute was void and the
conviction overturned. But Lumpkin had not finished. He now appealed for a “convention of
the people,” that was “imperiously needed to impose additional restraints upon the powers of the
Legislature.” Shouting “a Bill of Rights is demanded,” the justice proclaimed, “let the sovereign
people convene, and say to the law-making power; thus far shalt thou go and no further.”888
In passionate prose, Black of Pennsylvania and Lumpkin of Georgia expressed
dramatically divergent views of government’s place in advancing a well-ordered society.
Interestingly, in the industrial north, Black advocated active government. In the Deep South,
Lumpkin claimed that “something should be done to arrest this evil.” In between, courts
struggled to determine if there were limitations on the power of government to significantly alter
or destroy property rights.
The United States Supreme Court weighed in, albeit tangentially and in a case seldom
citied for its wisdom or precedential value. Chief Justice Roger Taney, in the 1857 Dred Scott v

who bring in poultry and eggs on their load of wood to wait for hours before they can return to their labors,
remaining around the market exposed to the weather; or, indeed, before they will restrict any person, in this land of
liberty, from selling his cotton, corn, wheat, beef, pork, chickens, or anything else, when he pleases, where he
pleases, and to whomsoever he pleases.” He then urged that the legislature’s power in this area “is exceedingly
questionable.” Bethune v Hughes, 28 Ga. 560, 562-63 (1859 ).
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Sanford decision gave passing reference to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as
limiting Congress’s right to deprive citizens of property. Speaking of enslaved persons as
property, Taney wrote: “And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of
his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular
Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly
be dignified with the name of due process of law.”889 He did not elaborate on what the court
intended nor did he discuss the Supreme Court’s only other reference to due process limitations
on the legislature. That reference had appeared only a few years earlier in Murray v Hoboken
Land and Improvement where the court had defined due process as requiring procedural
guarantees.890 Unlike the few recent state cases that were arguing for a due-process limitation on
legislation hostile to property rights, Taney had few liberty-based arguments to offer. Perhaps
that is why his tendered due process argument lacked elaboration.891
Michigan Justice Johnson in Gallagher, in the regulatory sphere, and Pennsylvania
Justice Lowery in Commonwealth ex re Thomas in the tax and spending sphere, recognized that
antebellum courts almost without exception accepted legislative power extensively to legislate to
advance general-welfare interests. To be sure, opposing voices, either in dissent or in majority
dicta, rumbled as regulations and spending became more onerous. Their oft-mentioned natural
and vested rights offered insecure grounds, as they were ill-defined and threatened unintended
results. Without legal foundations to the contrary, the law settled on supporting legislative action
unless specific constitutional language checked legislative power. Finding legislatures rarely
exceeded those specific limitations, court rulings affirmed legislative actions and judicial review,
while often discussed, rarely resulted in judicial activism. Then again, Cooley had not yet
889
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spoken. When he did, courts would hasten to assert newfound authority to check perceived
majoritarian excesses. That is the subject to which we now turn.
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Chapter VI: Enter Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, and Activist Judicial
Review
The most rigid institutions must, from year to year, yield something to [change];
the most inflexible Constitution, in the light of new and unexpected conditions,
must present new phases and suggest new possibilities. Occasionally, no doubt,
we shall modify the Constitution here and there by formal amendment, but if the
general tendency of the political society shall be the development of a higher
and better national life, the Constitution, the outer framework, cannot possibly
remain altogether stationary.
Thomas M. Cooley
Address before the South Carolina Bar Association, 1886892

A Judicial Shield
In 1870, Michigan’s municipal efforts to finance rail development came to a virtual halt
when the Michigan Supreme Court, with Cooley writing, declared unconstitutional public
financial aid to private rail corporations. Such aid, Cooley reasoned, undermined state
governance and would ultimately result in unjust tax burdens on the weak “taxed to enhance the
profits of the stronger.”893 Instead of narrowly tailoring his opinion, Cooley and his brethren
chose to rule broadly, and did so understanding the opinion would shock the judicial community
that had almost without exception ruled to the contrary. He did so in order to limit the
legislature’s historic discretion over taxing and spending issues. Cooley advanced that courts
were constitutionally responsible to bind legislative tax and spending powers to a court-defined
“public purpose” boundary. Across the nation, courts adopted and expanded on Cooley’s
reasoning. With those courts now reviewing spending purposes, individuals would be able more
effectively to challenge majoritarian and special interest efforts to tax and spend for the general
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welfare. Issues that heretofore had been resolved in the political sphere would now enjoy a
rehearing in the judicial, and a measure of governing power would flow from the legislative to
the judiciary – and from the majority to the individual.
Cooley’s decision analyzed constitutional language that was unchanged from the state’s
and, indeed, nation’s founding. Yet, his interpretation fundamentally challenged, for the first
time, governing activities that similarly harked back to that founding. In doing so, Cooley
rejected historical judicial deference to legislative judgments and classified adherence to those
precedents as “blindly follow[ing] where others have blindly led.”894 Given that the
constitutional language upon which he relied had not changed, and that previous courts had
defined legislative power more broadly than he, one might ask how this great constitutional
scholar could justify narrowing legislative prerogatives and upending established and timehonored constitutional meanings. As discussed below, Cooley embraced that task believing that
courts must refresh constitutional understandings to protect the core principle of American
constitutional structure – republican self-governance. Both the passions of the masses and the
power of the wealthy threatened to subvert the legislative process, and courts must diligently
exercise judicial review to assure that government adhered to the principles of republican
governance, the rule of law, and individual freedoms that were the foundations of American
constitutional government.
Cooley believed that laws and constitutional language were not the emanations of
Olympian ruminations. Instead, they reflected human efforts to address community-faced
challenges. As community needs changed, so too did the application of law in order to respond
to the law’s underlying purposes. For example, due process – originally an assurance of
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individual protections against executive action through legal proceedings – could change to
incorporate protections against legislative actions that encumbered individual rights. Similarly,
public spending to support community development could become constitutionally suspect when
it advanced private interest and power to the detriment of that community. Although Cooley
furnished citations for each of these propositions, he certainly recognized that he was ploughing
new judicial ground and offering new constitutional interpretations. He did so relying on
historical experience – not philosophic musings – and that experience informed his
understanding and shaped his constitutional philosophy.
To Cooley, American state government was at its core not democratic but republican.
Accordingly, he believed that state constitutions limited legislative power in order to check
majoritarian impulses and support the rule of law over popular passions and the coercive
influences of aggregated power.895 His experiences and understanding of Michigan’s
governance taught him the necessity of doing just that. Cooley had witnessed the humbling
results of majoritarian exuberance in building infrastructure; he saw industry exerting its
influence over legislatures and voters to exact public largess in order to advance private gains; he
sat as counsel for a university that, while constitutionally separate, had faced enormous pressures
from a legislature intent on impressing its will; and he watched as the legislature criminalized
previously legal alcohol sales and rendered lawful property contraband. With those disquieting
experiences, Cooley developed a fear of unfettered democracy that would animate much of his
legal thinking.
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Since his early tenure at the University of Michigan Law School, Cooley wrote of the
threat of majoritarian excesses and lauded the virtues of republican governance. In 1868, he
published his most complete advocacy of those beliefs in the aptly named Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American
Union. Most of the limits he addressed in the treatise already were well accepted, including
separations of power, ex post facto laws, and Commerce and Contract Clause limitations. His
impact however concerned two doctrines that, while not completely new, were modified and
argued with a vibrancy and constitutional connectedness that emboldened courts across the
nation to actively limit legislative plenary powers. Those doctrines advanced limits on spending
powers associated with legislative taxing authority and limits on regulatory – or police powers –
associated with “law of the land” and “due process” provisions. To check the legislature, courts
would insert themselves in ways that they rarely had heretofore. They would now determine
which expenditures and which regulations were appropriate and which were beyond legislative
purview. A once seldom-used weapon, courts would now employ judicial review to strike down
legislation they believed went beyond the scope of representative government. His ideas were
combustible and in short order swept the nation. And, to a degree, Cooley would come to regret
the fires he had lit.

A Short Roadmap
Historians now agree that early local and state American governments were characterized
by heavy involvement in and support of commerce. Municipalities granted licenses permitting
individuals to engage in trade. They set up zones where commerce was permitted, established
price structures, and set working rules. Governments subsidized industrial development,
developed transportation infrastructures, and became shareholders in private corporations. As
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importantly, they reframed the common law to encourage business risk taking. The courts
interpreted the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to ensure confidence in commercial
transaction and to allow government to create and support monopolies in exchange for capital
investments. While constitutional interpretations later loosened the hold of monopolies, local
governments accelerated their efforts to develop industry. In short, the antebellum period was
one characterized by a symbiosis between government and industry. The goal was progress and
general-welfare improvement, not one of legislative limitation and exclusionary individualism.
This support and regulation of business required a legal and social system that favored
calls for a well-regulated society against those advocating protecting unencumbered use of
property. While early nineteenth-century governance tended to sacrifice property interests to
general-welfare needs, calls to protect property advanced as industry developed. When
government attempted to regulate industries like liquor, many grew wary of the effects those
regulations would have on personal, property-based freedoms. Further, as government taxed to
support economic development, many questioned government’s right to transfer the people’s
wealth to industry. Despite a rising cacophony of concern, until Constitutional Limitations’
publication, courts set aside those property-protecting arguments in deference to legislatively
supported efforts to regulate society, subsidize industry, and to overcome the burdens of scarce
capital.
The Cooley-inspired revolution would involve two related but distinct governmental
actions: Government promotion and support of industry and government regulation of
commerce. The line between support and regulation is thin and, as Gabriel Kolko noted,
regulation often was disguised as promotion.896 Early government support and regulation of
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industry sprang from a belief that government must legislate to advance the common welfare.
Government was to advance economic development while checking industry’s tendencies to
monopolize and exert undue influence and control. Whereas regulation and support of industry
were born of a common purpose, legislative and judicial treatment of those efforts differed. That
difference was clarified by their constitutional treatment. In supporting industry, government
used its taxing power to subsidize private industrial development. Litigation over those issues
questioned whether the legislature has the power to take from A (the taxpayer) and give to B (the
private business). In the case of regulation, the state sought to create a more orderly society by
controlling social and economic excesses. In challenging regulations, litigants called upon the
courts to determine if the regulation unduly burdened private-property interests. To challenge
those regulations, litigants first employed eminent-domain principles and later due process and
law of the land clauses. Law in those areas developed separately (although courts at times
mingled the logic) and until Cooley (and perhaps after) the courts’ rulings did not fit within a
consistent constitutional framework. While courts frequently confused the niceties, this work
addresses tax and spending separately from regulatory restrictions.
Starting within months of Constitutional Limitation’s publication, courts began to modify
previous standards of due process, taxation, and public purpose to press a more limited
government model. Some courts pushed for an almost laissez-faire approach, giving rise to
arguments that Cooley elevated the individual over the collective, and rights over order.
Cooley’s approach was more subtle. He did not reject all regulation, all property encumbrances,
or all class legislation. Instead, he sought to limit majoritarian impulses and undue influences by
employing constitutional language or inferences to limit government – particularly, but not
exclusively, the legislative branch. At times, individual rights were the principles limiting
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government. Even so, those rights were not hard stops on government action. Rather, courts
now were to insert individual rights into their review of the propriety of legislative action. With
Cooley, courts began the shift from an almost per se acceptance of general-welfare regulation
and spending, to questioning whether laws too significantly intruded in the increasingly
protected private sphere. That trend evidenced a reshaping of American expectations of
government and how the nation’s citizens could best be served in the rapidly industrializing
world. At a minimum, it suggested a more earnest discussion of the place of government in a
liberal democracy.

Cooley, the Courts, and Constitutional Change
Thomas McIntyre Cooley was born on January 6, 1824 as the tenth child of Thomas and
Rachel (Hubbard) Cooley. Theirs was a farming family residing in Attica, New York, not far
from the Erie Canal and within the Burned Over District of the Second Great Awakening. His
parents raised him in a strong Jeffersonian and, later, Jacksonian household. Cooley rejected the
revivalism of the Awakening in favor of what Cooley-scholar Alan Jones called, “moral
individualism” and a faith that the mind “‘correctly cultivated’ could choose the right.” Shortly
after reading law with a former Democratic Party congressman, in 1843 Cooley travelled west to
settle in Chicago but, having run out of funds, settled in Adrian, Michigan. He embraced the
Jacksonian faith in advocating for free speech, trade, labor, and schools. In 1848, he helped
organize the Free Soil Party in Michigan, thereby alienating Democratic Party regulars. In tune
with shifting party affiliations of the day, he edited Democratic newspapers, worked to support
the Wilmot Proviso, and pushed progressive Democratic Party ideas. “His poems expressed
democratic hopes and attacked war and slavery,” and “his editorials defended free trade and free
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public schools as well as attacked monopolies and special incorporation laws.” 897 His public
talks evinced distaste for the challenges associated with railroad, banking, and monopoly power,
as well as advocacy for class legislation. Jones posited that Cooley, in the 1840s and 50s,
supported constitutional limitations on legislative power as a means to avoid favoritism to
acquisitive capitalists.898
The legislature recognized Cooley’s intellect when it appointed him to compile the state’s
statutes in 1857. His success there helped lead to his 1859 appointment as one of the first three
law professors at the University of Michigan Law School. That appointment occasioned his
move from Adrian to Ann Arbor. Because he was the only one moving to Ann Arbor, he
became the law school’s dean. As a law professor, Cooley’s interests focused on legal change
and the underlying purpose of law. “In all that he taught, Cooley emphasized the historical and
cultural origins of law and the social and political aims it is shaped to serve.” In that respect his
position was the antithesis of the later Harvard Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell, who
taught that law was an internally consistent discipline, without regard to the environment in
which it was developed or operated.899
At the 1863 opening exercises at the University of Michigan, Cooley offered a hint of his
constitutional philosophy and its reliance on an active judiciary. In speaking of the legal
profession he commented, “While constitutional and other restraints could be thrown around the
legislative power, there could be none upon the expounders of law save the learning and virtue of
the profession to which they belonged.” The judiciary was to enforce those constitutional
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limitations but, because of the structure of government, the judiciary was not itself subject to
such limitations. Also telling was Cooley’s preference for slow change, as opposed to the rapid
legal changes associated with legislative action. In espousing an affinity for the common law,
Cooley urged, “The lawyer is and should be conservative. However radical the changes he may
desire to make, the lessons of our judicial history admonish him that they can only be brought
about in the slow processes of time.”900 Wearing his academic hat, Cooley had made clear his
preferences: The common law, slow change, and judicial checks on the legislature.
Cooley’s voice was amplified in 1864, when he was elected as a Republican to the State
Supreme Court, a position he would hold for twenty years.901 During his court tenure, Cooley
continued to sit as a faculty member of the law school and, in 1868 at the age of forty-four,
published the first edition of Constitutional Limitations.902 He now sat as dean of his law school,
a state Supreme Court justice, and as the author of the most read legal treatise of its time.
It is no coincidence that Cooley wrote Constitutional Limitations during the era of
Michigan’s second massive public effort to support rail and during the debate and passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment. To Cooley, constitutions limited the power of overzealous legislatures
and courts were empowered and obligated to enforce those limitations. Accordingly, as his
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preface to his first edition suggested, his treatise targeted a wider purpose than a restatement of
the law. It advocated that courts limit legislative overreaching. Speaking of himself in the third
person, Cooley wrote:
he will not attempt to deny – what will probably be sufficiently apparent – that
he has written in full sympathy with all those restraints which the caution of
the fathers has imposed upon the exercise of the powers of government, and
with greater faith in the checks and balances of our republican system, and in
correct conclusions by the general public sentiment, than in a judicious,
prudent, and just exercise of unbridled authority by any one man or body of
men, whether sitting as a legislature or as a court.903
In the guise of a treatise on the current state of the law, Cooley was an admitted advocate. As his
later writings would reveal, Cooley’s greatest constitutional objective was the protection of
republican governance from the forces of excessive political power, whether emanating from the
wealthy few or the populist mass. He believed that specific constitutional language and implied
constitutional meanings protected against the forces subversive to republican governance. The
threats to republican governance changed as society changed. To address that, Cooley submitted
that courts should seek new constitutional understandings when considering current realities.
Those new understandings were informed by constitutional histories and judicial precedent, but
were controlled by the underlying constitutional purpose – republican governance. In that sense,
he advocated an almost common-law-like process of constitutional change. Constitutional
change was to be slow and deliberate; true to constitutional language (as newly understood), but
adjusting to changing realities.
It is difficult to give credence to Cooley’s protest that he “faithfully endeavored to state
the law as it has been settled by the authorities, rather than to present his own views.”904 His
advocacy interest clearly trumped his restatement goals, as would soon become clear through his
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scholarly writings and opinions. Cooley published perhaps the clearest statement of his
intentions ten years after first publishing Constitutional Limitations. In challenging the principle
of stare decisis, Cooley commented, “that it is a very dangerous thing to make by a precedent an
inroad upon one of the fundamental principles of liberty, because precedents tend to beget a habit
of thought and action which leads insensibly in the direction in which they point.” Instead of
using the collective wisdom of previous decisions, Cooley set forth his true standard of
constitutional review. “Every doubtful precedent should therefore be carefully considered, and
never accepted when it will not stand the test of settled rules of right.”905
In rejecting precedent, Cooley necessarily relied on constitutional understandings that
differed from his judicial forbearers. Two possibilities arise. Either previous courts had
misinterpreted the constitution or changing needs required different (often, opposite) applications
of constitutional standards. The difference between these possibilities is fundamental. The first
argues for a static constitution, unmovable from original intents – but merely interpreted wrongly
by a prior court. The second calls for a living constitution, where overarching intentions are
honored but whose meanings shift to accommodate changing needs. Reading him on the face of
his writings, Cooley did not pick one or the other – he picked both. This should not surprise, as
Cooley rejected those who gleaned understandings from philosophic reflections on legal
reasoning or notions of justice. Instead, he advocated reading constitutions with the light cast by
historical understandings of law and experiences of governance. In doing so, he argued for
adherence to constitutional language while advocating for a reconsideration of that language to
respond to historical and current realities.
Attempts to pigeonhole Cooley, therefore, prove difficult (and why opposing counsel
would often both cite Cooley to support their arguments), and explain why a scholarly search for
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a consistent Cooley may be quixotic. Cooley often mouthed adherence to a fixed constitution
and deference to the legislature, but then found new meanings in the constitution to support his
republican-governance agenda. As such, Cooley’s jurisprudence presents a rich, complex, and
often conflicting account. In the end however, despite his sometime protests that constitutions
did not change, Cooley believed that constitutional understandings did change, and that lines
drawn between government and individuals changed as society developed. In other words, the
constitutional edifice evolved with society. And, in response to Cooley’s advocacy, the courts
stood in the center of that evolution.

Scholars Consider Cooley
Because of their focus on federal laws and courts, many historians miss a significant
dynamic of the Cooley-inspired shift toward judicial activism. Cooley’s impact rose from state
courts and only later was it picked up by the federal courts, including the United States Supreme
Court.906 The revolution did not emanate from the reflections of doctrine-driven Supreme Court
justices. Instead, Cooley’s doctrines gained purchase in state courts reviewing government
efforts to address local economic, social, and political issues. Because he was steeped in those
immediate challenges, Cooley was able to seize relatively obscure earlier legislative-limiting
arguments, and frame them into a legal standard that would resonate with similarly situated
courts. Cooley provided the constitutional arguments that allowed courts to address the
pervasive concerns about governing power, economic change, and social displacement in the
906
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years following the Civil War. It was this grounding that allowed Cooley’s standards to
dominate American jurisprudence and governance for the next sixty years.
While most historians give passing tribute to Cooley as a participant in the shift from a
general-welfare approach to what they commonly classify as laissez-faire governance, few have
considered Cooley’s central role in introducing individual rights concerns into judicial
considerations of the limits of legislative and governing power. Though not focusing on Cooley
in his 1940 article, Andrew McLaughlin came closest to capturing Cooley’s importance to the
changing nineteenth-century dynamic. In characterizing Constitutional Limitations, McLaughlin
asserted, “it is doubtful if any other book in our history had an equal influence on the
development of constitutional law, with the exception, perhaps of The Federalists during the first
fifty years after its publication.”907 Phillip Paludan cast Cooley in a similar light, arguing,
Constitutional Limitations would become “America’s second constitution.”908 Cooley provided
the guidebook for a legal and social revolution wherein courts curbed legislative power and
granted individual rights and liberties – particularly property and contract – a central place in
judicial deliberations.
Scholars reviewing Cooley’s work and impact roughly fall into three camps: those who
claimed he advocated laissez-faire jurisprudence and governance, those who defined him as a
conservative, later-day Jacksonian, who feared legislative power when it encumbered personal
rights and liberties, and those who argued Cooley advocated a binary anti-class legislation
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standard. All are grounded in fact and explain an aspect of Cooley’s thinking and his impact.
None, however, explains the rich dynamic of this scholar who eschewed philosophical
jurisprudence in favor of uncovering new constitutional meanings to respond to changing social
and economic needs. Efforts to pigeonhole Cooley into a particular judicial philosophy fail, as
Cooley believed law and constitutionalism must maintain flexibility in the face of changing
needs. His beliefs were well considered, but adaptable, and in an effort to understand the man,
scholars have mistakenly attempted to philosophically plant this experiential thinker.
Clyde Jacobs and Benjamin Twiss led the first school. Both wrote from a post-Great
Depression perch and their works were influenced by the struggles between Cooley-inspired,
limited-government models and the expansive government model of the New Deal.909 Both
painted an almost conspiratorial picture, with Twiss arguing that Cooley “made up many of the
principles out of his own head,” in order to advance monied interests.910 That central argument
fails in two respects. Cooley adapted the arguments of antebellum dicta and dissenting opinions
that argued for limits on legislative power. He did not “make up” his standards. Further, Cooley
was not an advocate for monied interests. To the contrary, he feared that the wealthy class
would co-opt representative governance and his standards were designed to mute their
disproportionate influence on legislators.
Jacobs and Twiss’ works appear to be the result of gleaning Cooley’s intent and meaning
from the limited perspective of his followers’ court opinions. Both works were written without
significant analysis of Cooley’s experiences and the environment in which he wrote his works.
Nevertheless, Jacobs and Twiss held sway over other members of the academy, who similarly
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position Cooley as a laissez-faire advocate. Included in that group are Sidney Fine, Kermit Hall,
Melvin Urofsky and, to an extent, Paul Kens.911 Their characterization of Cooley as a laissezfaire advocate captured Cooley’s concerns over majoritarian excesses (although his larger
concern was legislative favoritism to capital). Those concerns held that majority passions would
drive legislation that dispossessed individual property and undermined the rule of law. The
statutory-law process allowed for such excesses. Because of that, Cooley preferred the results of
the time-tempered reasoning associated with the common law to legislative enactments that were
so often the results of passions, influences, and insufficient thought. However, contrary to the
laissez-faire historians’ positions, Cooley neither espoused nor did other jurists accept a
wholesale shift to laissez-faire governance. As Hurst has noted, “After seventy-five years of
living from day to day amid the surge of an opening continent, we did not suddenly after 1870
become a nation of social philosophers.”912 Contrary to the laissez-faire school, Cooley was not
part of an imagined conspiracy of capitalists intent on molding law to the advantage of the
wealthy and powerful.
Alan Jones rejected the laissez faire explanation of Cooley in favor of arguments that
Cooley advocated a conservative approach to constitutional thinking – the second of the three
schools of thought on Cooley.913 Unlike most historians, Jones appropriately gives credit to
Cooley’s doctrinal roots in Jeffersonian and Jacksonian political thought (although he over
employs this. Cooley was a student of history, but he used that history to inform in opinions, not
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to control them.) Unfortunately, Jones seemed as concerned with restoring Cooley’s reputation
as he was with addressing the intellectual underpinnings of Cooley’s thoughts or the uses to
which those thoughts would be put. Almost apologizing for Cooley’s impact, Jones overstates
Cooley’s proclaimed deference to the legislature. Jones’ argument concerning Cooley’s
conservatism was based in some measure on Jones’ assessment that Cooley adhered to “a
doctrine that history should be the interpreter of constitutional provisions.”914 While Cooley at
times professed such a position, his doctrines responded more to current needs than historical
interpretations. Cooley only held to an historical approach when it fit his desire for legislative
limitations in light of current needs and his beliefs about evolving liberties (discussed below).
Cooley’s public purpose and due process doctrines, while found in earlier legal writings,
almost never prevailed in the antebellum period. His admission that he would not be limited by
precedent with which he took issue (even if it was overwhelming) in itself shows that a
significant portion of Cooley’s principles were neither historically grounded nor conservatively
deferential to legislative power. When he wished to limit the legislature, Cooley tipped his hat to
stare decisis, historical uses of governing power, and deference to the legislatures, but then
decided according to his governing principles. Cooley’s logic called for a judicial veto over the
legislature; a logic that future courts employed with some vigor.
In focusing on Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ideologies, Jones’ work missed the more
immediate and pressing historical influences on Cooley. Cooley’s thoughts were not merely
philosophic or theoretical reflections on early-century politics. They were premised on beliefs in
republican governance and property-protecting principles that increasingly held sway as America
moved through the nineteenth century. Accordingly, any full understanding of the Cooley
revolution requires an analysis of the legal, economic, and political firmament that molded and
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surrounded Cooley. Constitutional Limitations rose to the level of a nineteenth century
Federalist Papers because it resonated with judges and opinion makers steeped in the challenges
suffered during a period of legislative activism, not because he harked back to a more distant era.
Cooley made a conscious effort to look forward, not back, and warned his law students
about focusing on the past rather than looking to the future. In 1863, he urged, “instead of
opposing all change, and living as much as possible in the past” the students “must be awake to
the living present and hopeful of the future.” With his next breath, he challenged those who
clung to a foolish conservativism. “For better or worst must the world be ever changing; and he
who is forever looking backwards and hugging the past to his soul, will find himself insensibly
moving backwards until the darkness of the past is upon him.”915 It was not that the past was
inconsequential: It informed understandings of the present, but did not suggest a conservative
rigidity. Cooley was not a mid-century Jacksonian advocating stagnant constitutionalism or the
resurgence of a bygone era.
Howard Gillman led the third school of thought – offering that Cooley’s concern over
class-legislation was the core of his constitutional thinking. Gillman distilled Cooley’s position
to, “liberty in the private economy and rights to property had to be protected not from
government interference but specifically from class interference attempts by special groups to
use public power to advance private interests.” 916 Gillman’s focus was substantive due process
and the regulatory regime, but his point also applied to Cooley’s tax jurisprudence and his
associated public purpose doctrine. Gillman’s point is well taken, if a bit overbroad. Cooley
adhered to strong equality principles and those principles animated his reasoning. But
915
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regulations and government spending, by their nature, disparately affect individuals and classes
(however defined), and Cooley recognized that the legislature may pass laws with disparate
impacts. He wrote, “The power that legislates for the State at large must determine whether
particular rules shall extend to the whole state and all its citizens or to a part of the State or a
class of its citizens only.” Cooley continued, “The legislature may also deem it desirable to
establish particular rules for the several occupations, and distinctions in the rights, obligations,
and legal capacities of different classes of citizens only.”917 Indeed, in his contribution to the
fourth edition of Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Cooley noted
that due process clauses went far beyond issues of class legislation. Due process clauses, he
argued, protected against “oppressive and tyrannical laws” even though they evenly fell upon
all.918
Because of his concern with oppressive legislation, Cooley specifically rejected
formulaic applications of due process principles. In an article discussing the application of due
process provisions to state regulations, Cooley opined, “And what is due process of law can
never be settled as an abstract question: it has a new phase with every new case, and judicial
history shows that judges differ concerning it at the present day when particular cases arise.”919
Because Cooley cannot be narrowly confined to a formulaic approach, Gillman’s school’s efforts
to squeeze Cooley into a class-legislation corral miss the mark. Cooley’s principles are too
917
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complex, or perhaps too undefined, to allow such categorization. Indeed, one might argue given
his disinclination to employ abstract principles, that Cooley preferred the malleability of a
common-law approach to developing due process understandings. He certainly avoided binaries,
like “class legislation – invalid, general legislation – valid.” This is not to say that Cooley lacked
a constitutional philosophy or that he reviewed each issue de novo. As discussed below, Cooley
advocated adjusting constitutional applications to protect the core principle of constitutional
governance – republican self-governance and the rule of law. As part of that belief, Cooley
argued that courts should limit governmental space as society developed and individual rights
expanded. Before addressing his theory of changing constitutional meanings, we move to the
dispute that most significantly allowed Cooley to voice his philosophy from his judicial bench.

A Common Occurrence and Seedbed for Change: The Detroit & Howell
Railroad
On February 4, 1864, the Michigan legislature passed Special Act 49, the cumbersomely
labeled, An Act to Authorize the Several Townships in the Counties of Livingston, Oakland,
Washtenaw and Wayne to Pledge their Credit, and the County of Livingston to Raise by Tax or
Borrow Money, to Aid in the Construction of a Railroad from Some Point Near the City of
Detroit, to Howell, in the County of Livingston (the Detroit & Howell Act). The act was not
unusual. Of the seventy-one acts passed by the legislature during that session, twelve authorized
municipal aid to railroads and one authorized aid for canal construction and improvements.920
Each of those statutes took taxpayer wealth and redistributed it to private corporations in order to
advance the legislature’s conception of the public welfare.
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During that period, the capital for local rail construction came from three sources,
although the relative amounts differed with each project. Typically, most came from speculating
investors. The second most significant contributions came from wealthy nearby landholders.
The driving motivation for those subscribers was community development, with short-term
direct financial return a problematic hope.921 Promoters heavily focused on wealthy local
residents who would most benefit from the rail’s placement. The last source was public funding.
For example, the Detroit & Howell Act authorized the affected municipalities to pledge up to 5%
of the assessed value of their communities’ real and personal property in aid of local rail
construction. That public funding effort required the authorization of the legislature and then
local taxpayer approval. Local approval was triggered by a written request signed by at least 30
taxpaying electors to the township supervisor. Upon receiving that request, the supervisor would
hold a special election after a 10-day notice period. Municipalities would pay the pledged
amount upon completion of agreed construction and, unlike subscription programs, would not
receive stock in exchange.922
Michigan’s use of local taxes to supplement private ownership was part of a common
national practice. Taxation was justified because the gains from rail development were general
community benefits.923 Government and industry argued that without taxation to spread the
financial burden, non-investing individuals would thrive by allowing investing neighbors to carry
921
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the financial burden. A purely private regime would allow non-investors to enjoy the benefits of
enhanced property values while their generous neighbors carried the financial load.
Notwithstanding the possibility of sizeable tax increases, nationally this public financing
mechanism’s “substantial victory margins testified to firm convictions that property values
would increase, freight charges decrease, and that the investments would prove, at the least in the
long run, to be profitable for the community.”924 But, as Cooley would mockingly note, “Nothing
is so easy as to build railroads if it can be accomplished by dropping votes in a box.”925
Shortly after passage of the Detroit & Howell Act, advocates of the railroad began to
campaign for financial support. Within a month of the law’s passage, the Livingston Democrat
praised the proposed railroad as an economic boon to the area, particularly to the western farmers
ill-served by rail. After presenting a lengthy economic analysis of future increases in property
values and decreases in transportation costs, the writer stated that he was “morally sure that all
the capital we invest in such an improvement would return to us the first year after the
completion of the road." This was not just his opinion. The Detroit Free Press republished the
article, adding “[t]here can be no doubt it is desirable to build this road.”926 Several other papers
would join in the applause.
While the marketing of the Detroit & Howell continued, unseen storm clouds appeared
on the horizon. In 1864, the Michigan Republican Party nominated Cooley to serve on the
state’s Supreme Court. His qualifications were well accepted. Even the Democratic leaning
Michigan Argus believed that “the Republican Committee has made a fortunate selection.”927
Cooley’s opponents did not comment on or seem concerned about his conservative approach to
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law making or his noted advocacy for a restrained legislature. A year earlier, in opening
exercises at the University of Michigan, Cooley had proposed that judicial power “is perhaps
even greater” than the legislature’s because there were “numerous restraints” on the legislature
and no such structural restraints encumbered the courts. Perhaps advocating a common-law (and
court-focused) approach, Cooley offered that changes in government “can only be safely brought
about in the slow processes of time.”928 With slow change and restrained government his goal,
Cooley won the seat and began his tenure on the bench in 1865.
At the same time, Henry Crapo became Michigan’s governor. Crapo disapproved of
municipal support for rail and believed that aid violated the spirit of the 1850 constitutional
restrictions on state involvement in internal improvements. Accordingly, Crapo vetoed
legislation authorizing municipal aid and, in all likelihood, would have vetoed the Detroit &
Howell Act had he been governor when it passed.929 (In 1869, the legislature passed, and the
next governor, Henry P. Baldwin, signed a General Railroad Aid law authorizing municipal
support of rail without specific legislative approval.)
As Cooley donned his judicial robes, and Crapo argued against government debt,
advocates of the Detroit & Howell pressed their case. In 1865, the Livingston Democrat and
Detroit Free Press again advanced an economic analysis in favor of the project. The papers
compared land values and commercial development in unserved areas to those well served by
rail. That comparison demonstrated that, despite the cost, rail presented a significant boon to
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landholders and industry.930 At first, that argument carried the day, as most communities
supported the rail project.
The first signs of trouble arose when Detroit, the area’s largest community, began to balk.
The railroad had started its Detroit efforts with a campaign for private subscriptions. A
committee of the Board of Trade, appointed to solicit those subscriptions, reported in January
1866 that, despite “a very general willingness to acknowledge the importance of the enterprise”
there existed not one private commitment. It seemed that private investments, while good for the
city generally, were not advantageous to private investors. The committee’s requests “were met
with a recital of past experiences in similar investments in rail road or plank road stocks,” all of
which were negative. Targeted investors argued that, instead of appealing to the wealthy, the
committee should solicit those who most benefit – the real estate owners along the proposed
line.931
Those responses raised a challenging issue. At least early on, most rail investors lost
money on their investments, yet the railroads relied on those investments as significant sources
of capital. With direct financial returns often absent, promoters would pitch that enhanced
property values and the secondary benefit of transportation improvements justified local
investments. Those efforts often proved successful. As Taylor noted the “merchants, small
manufacturers, farmers, and professional men living along the proposed route of the new railroad
. . . bought stock in the hope that land values would rise and general business prosperity result
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from improved transportation, not for the most part because they sought safe or profitable
investments for their small savings.”932
As the responses of Detroit’s wealthy demonstrated, pitches to those not along the lines
were less attractive. Few anticipated that private investors in the Detroit & Howell would enjoy
a direct financial return on their investments. The Detroit Free Press acknowledged that,
Not one of these [private investors] will probably ever derive any direct return
from their subscription as an investment, but in the increased prosperity of our
city, in the additional population, in the enlarged sphere of business facilities,
and in the opening up of an important section of our State, and making it
tributary to Detroit, they will all indirectly reap a reward for their enterprise, to
which, perhaps the only drawback will be the feeling that those who would be
more benefited, and who refused to contribute, will derive also the benefit
although they had not the public spirit to aid toward the result.933
Neighboring individuals and companies who refused to subscribe were those most benefited by
the rail line’s development; they would bear no expense but garner all the benefits.
In October 1867, Detroit Mayor Merrill Mills asked the committee to submit a progress
report on its efforts to gain local subscriptions. They were still $75,000 short of their $200,000
goal. Despite the “interests of Detroit [that] positively demand that the road” be built, the
committee reported that among “many of our wealthy citizens who are most benefitted by such
improvements, [hold an] entire indifference to the matter, and an unwillingness to contribute to
its success in any manner.” Notwithstanding its financial shortfall, (and the arguably poor
financial opportunity suggested by private hesitancy to invest) the committee recommended a tax
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assessment, and hence public contribution. They did limit their request to one percent of
assessed property values.934
The mayor and committee had real concerns that the $75,000 shortfall would sink the
project. So important was this rail line, that acting Detroit controller and town notable
Alexander Hamilton Redfield remarked that if the committee could not obtain the remaining
subscription commitments, “he would, rather than see the fair name of Detroit disgraced, depart
from a good old Democratic principle, and put on the screws.”935 Redfield’s concerns went well
beyond Detroit’s image. Failure fully to finance the line could result in moving the line’s
terminus, and its economic benefits, to a different port city, quite possibly the still despised
Toledo, Ohio.936 Toledo had excellent port facilities and some believed the Michigan Southern
line suffered financially because the Erie and Kalamazoo line diverted southern traffic to
Toledo.937 This could happen with the Detroit & Howell. Rail placements were flexible and rail
promoters were known to move their lines when a community refused to subscribe. Frank Elliot
related one such story when he reported that the “piratical promoter” of the Ann Arbor Railroad
Company started building his rail line in an arch around the Forest Hills, Michigan community
until it reversed its refusal to fund his rail line.938
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Being the terminus to the Great Lakes would especially benefit Detroit, as nearly all
Michigan-related products coming from or moving to the east coast and Europe would move
through that location. That benefit, however, required active promotion. As the Detroit Tribune
related, cities like Chicago and Toledo grew because progressive men and government created an
atmosphere for commercial growth. In admonishing Detroit to do likewise, the newspaper
argued, “Let us make good our fair reputation, and remember that it is not location alone, but
energy and farseeing wisdom anticipating the currents of trade and directing them to our profit,
which shall at last determine the future importance of our city.”939 Detroit needed the line not
only in its own right but also to avoid strengthening its southern port-city competitors. If that
required putting the screws to hesitant investors, so be it. Those efforts worked and, by
November 27, the Detroit & Howell had obtained the private subscriptions needed.
Detroit then went to its taxpayers for additional support. The effort promised to be
difficult, with one paper having classified it as “suicidal.”940 A July 1869 vote failed, according
to the Free Press, for want of the railroad’s effort to convince voters of the depth and breadth of
investor support. The paper maintained that taxpayers would assent, but only upon knowing that
those most benefited – the commercial interests and nearby landholders – appropriately paid
their share. “When this is done it will be time enough to talk about help from the citizens of

capital support. Daily Jacksonville Journal, March 14, 1868, quoted in Goodrich, Government Promotion of
American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890: 259.
939
Detroit Tribune cited in Michigan Argus, March 5, 1869, 2. In November of that year, a convention for the
Northern Pacific Railroad discussed, among other things, how to assure that an eastern terminus to the line be placed
in Mackinac, Michigan. William Howard, (a former University of Michigan professor, United States
Representative, chair of the Michigan Republican Party, and railroad land-commissioner) advanced doing whatever
was necessary to locate the terminus there, including public subsidies. Even this federally supported rail program
required local energy and financial support to accomplish community needs. "Northern Pacific Railroad
Convention," 4.
940
"The Detroit and Howell Railroad." Detroit Free Press, November 28, 1867, 2.

367

Detroit.”941 On November 23, 1869, Detroit’s Common Council directed the city clerk to give
notice of a second effort. This proposal sought a $300,000 loan, rather than a grant. If the
railroad failed to pay the underlying bonds, taxpayers would be liable for $210,000. The clerk
gave notice in early December for a January 10, 1870 election.942 This time the measure passed,
but the celebration was muted. A now subdued Detroit Free Press cautioned that the vote could
not be taken as an affirmation of “the principle of granting aid to railways by direct taxation.”
Instead, the proposal passed because the Detroit & Howell was an “exceptional” project.
Warning that public support could result in unwise rail construction, the newspaper cautioned
against overbuilding, particularly in low population areas.943 The bloom was falling off the
railroad rose.
As the Detroit efforts were moving forward, the railroad promoters continued to press for
private investments and public grants along the rest of the line. There is some suggestion that
powerful, entrenched rail interests made this difficult. In September 1869, the Detroit Advertiser
and Tribune argued that the Detroit, Howell & Lansing944 were “not the creations of any great
capitalist or railroad kings.” Instead, it reported, “They owe their existence to the determination
of some of Michigan’s citizens of comparatively moderate means” and that the “work thus far
done upon the line has been accomplished in the face of innumerable embarrassments, of which
the organized resistance of powerful railroad corporations has not been the slightest.”945 The
reviewed record reveals no other statement concerning the forces against the Detroit & Howell,
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and the Detroit Advertiser’s protests may have been mere advocacy. However, there is some
evidence that established railroads begrudged the public support granted to newer lines. In an
ironic twist, the Michigan Central Railroad reported in its 1870 Annual Report that a “multitude
of projected roads, some meritorious, but probably the greater number of but little value” were
being “stimulated . . . by aid from municipalities” as well as by easy money. The Michigan
Central bemoaned this development, claiming that, “the want of merit is by no means the reason
a railroad may not be constructed.”946 Why would the government-created Michigan Central
publish this in its annual report? Those new rail lines, including the Detroit & Howell,
threatened to reduce ridership and freight, thereby undermining the Michigan Central’s
profitability: certainly adequate cause for a campaign against those lines.
Salem, a small, affluent farming community about half way between Detroit and Howell,
was (and is) a township along the Detroit & Howell line. In accordance with the Detroit &
Howell Act, on May 23, 1866, thirty-one taxpaying voters submitted a written request to
Township Supervisor Calvin Wheeler asking for a special meeting of electors to vote on their
proposed 5% of assessed property-value grant to the railroad. The request provided that the aid
only be given should the railroad locate four miles of track and a depot in the township.947 On
June 21, the township posted a notice of a vote on an “unconditional donation” to be held on
June 30, 1866. That notice was only nine days before the vote, not the statutorily required ten
days. On June 30, the voters met in Township Clerk William Mead’s barn and, after some
discussion, cast 257 votes on issuing a “conditional loan.” 78 ballots read “Against Aid for the
946
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Railroad in Salem Township”, 56 read “For Aid for the Railroad in Salem Township”, 42 read
“The Loan – No,” and 81 read “The Loan – Yes.” The township supervisor tabulated the vote as
137 in favor and 120 against. Thereafter, Mead published two resolutions committing township
aid to the rail line, payable upon timely completion of required construction.948
A committee of dissenters formed to continue the struggle against the grant. In answer to
the legal complaints concerning the flawed notice, Washtenaw County Circuit Court Judge
Edwin Lawrence issued a July 4, 1868, injunction prohibiting the township board from issuing
the bonds. In March 1869, the Michigan Legislature responded by sweeping aside the election
improprieties concerning aid to the Detroit & Howell.949 With this, legislatures had twice
approved the project and the voters had approved it once.
After the legislature voted to validate the election, on April 30, 1869, the railroad
petitioned the township supervisor to pay the promised funds. To the railroad’s displeasure, the
township board’s membership recently had changed, with dissenters now in numerical control.950
The new board refused to pay, arguing the election was flawed because of the way the votes
were cast and that the outcome was uncertain. Moreover, it claimed that the railroad had not
completed its work and that the legislature could not legitimize the improper notice. The board
also argued that public grants were unconstitutional. Not satisfied with the board’s explanation,
the railroad applied to the Michigan Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Salem to
pay its obligations.
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As the proceedings moved forward, the railroad’s management threatened to slow or stop
work on the rail line. After discussing the challenges it had faced with Detroit’s grant, company
president T. T. Lyon, of Plymouth Michigan, complained because of “the refusal to deliver the
bonds pledged by the Town of Saline [sic], the company was compelled to check and finally stop
all work upon the line, for the reason that, during the pendency of the suit to compel such
delivery, violating, as it does, the validity of all municipal aid, no use, by anticipation or
otherwise, can be made of the aid pledged by towns.”951 The railroad recognized that Salem had
parented a legal challenge that threatened a widely employed system of rail finance.952
Reports differ over the amount in controversy. It was somewhere between $15,000 and
$18,000, although its potential impact was significantly greater. In response to the railroad’s
petition for a writ of mandamus, Salem would argue that the entire practice of government
financial support of private industry violated taxpayers’ individual constitutional rights. As of
November 30, 1869 (the end of the state’s fiscal year), Michigan municipalities had contributed
$3,567,678 to private rail development.953 The Michigan Supreme Court would now seek
arguments on whether any of those funds were lawfully collected and spent.
Newspapers pressed for a broad decision on public aid.954 Some, like the Michigan
Argus proposed that the court should invalidate public aid “before the towns and cities of the
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State go to their bottom dollar on some wild goose railroad scheme.”955 Others counseled for
continued public efforts. In February 1870, the Ypsilanti Commercial Supplement called on
Salem residents to donate to yet another railroad and to drop the objections to the Detroit &
Howell. It argued, “The fact is that Salem needs both roads. If we lived in the town we should
say, Stop Litigation – do all we reasonably can for the Detroit & Howell road. It is going to be a
good thing for Salem.”956 With the case, the issue would move from the political to the judicial
sphere of government. Availing himself of that opportunity, Cooley would employ the
legislative limiting arguments he published two years earlier in Constitutional Limitations, to
fundamentally alter the balance between the judiciary and the legislature. In doing so, Cooley
would give voice to individual rights claims that had heretofore only been given a cursory
hearing. In time, courts would employ those rights claims to check and challenge what they
construed as legislative activism.

Precedents for a New Doctrine
In Constitutional Limitations, Cooley suggested that each of his legislative limiting
doctrines was grounded on both constitutional language and on court opinions. In many
respects, he stood on solid ground. Constitutions imply and specifically require, for example,
separations of power as well as territorial, Contract Clause, and ex post facto limitations on the
legislature. In those respects, Cooley adhered to, and followed his jurisprudential forbearers. In
support, and pay provisions led to the constitution’s defeat. Paul Finkelman, “The Promise of Equality and the
Limits of Law,” Finkelman and Hershock, The History of Michigan Law, 193-95.
955
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two other areas, Cooley advanced doctrines that had little precedents upon which he could rely:
the first advocated constitutional limitations on both the legislative powers to tax and spend and
the second advanced scrutinizing regulatory laws that encumbered private interest or went
beyond the courts’ understanding of appropriate governance.
Some disagree that Cooley broke with judicial precedent. Corwin and his followers list a
number of cases where courts addressed limits on legislatures, and Cooley employed many of
those decisions. Those cases, however, were slim reeds upon which Cooley (and the Corwinites)
could base doctrines of legislative limitations. Most of those citations contained limits that were
only suggested in dicta. Even then, most of the rulings to which those dicta attached affirmed
legislative power. In the few cases where the court found no legislative authority, those courts
often applied extra-constitutional limitations like natural law and vested rights. As importantly,
with the exception of Wynehamer, those courts denying legislative power faced narrow issues of
private-to-private transfers. And, even in Wynehamer, the court found that the legislature had
the power to regulate prospectively but could not destroy already existing property interests.
Even then, Wynehamer was an outlier – all states but one rejected its reasoning. So, the authority
upon which Cooley could draw in relation to significant property-effecting regulations almost all
line up against judicial restraints on legislative power. In the tax and spending arena, Cooley had
one case out of dozens upon which to rely and the Supreme Court had mocked that court’s
opinion.957 In sum, Cooley had few rulings upon which he could comfortably draw. 958
As discussed in Chapter V, while court rulings significantly favored an expansive
understanding of legislative power to spend and regulate, courts increasingly sought to limit
activist legislative agendas. Cooley could rely on majority opinions in New York’s White v
957
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White and Holmes v Holmes,959 he could parse Black’s language in Sharpless, and perhaps could
rely on North Carolina’s Hoke v Henderson decision.960 He could rely on the dicta of numerous
majorities, while ignoring their legislative-power-affirming decisions. He could also look to
Chase’s dicta in Calder,961 Story’s dicta in Wilkinson v Leland,962 and the dissents of those
arguing for constitutional or extra-constitutional limitations. Or, as he often did, he could look to
holdings whose dicta spoke in grand language but where the holdings affirmed government
power.963 Cooley drew much, and extrapolated expansively on cases challenging private-toprivate transfers. In doing so, he mischaracterized the state of the law, and government’s
antebellum relationship to citizens and commerce. Rather than Cooley’s world of limitations, as
Hartog stated, “in antebellum America formal judicial deference to the legislature remained
959
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constitutional dogma.” Indeed, Hartog noted, “State constitutions in fact were never interpreted
as restricting public initiative that happened incidentally to harm private property.”964
The bottom line was that nearly every court had deferred to the legislative judgment,
even when the result was transferring wealth from A to B. That does not mean, as some like
Daniel Rogers argued, that late-nineteenth century courts engaged in a “wholesale construction
of new property and entrepreneurial rights,” in order to advance a legislative-limiting regime.965
Instead, they relied on earlier pronouncements, and public understanding concerning the
importance of property and property-related rights. In doing so, they corralled the rights-speech
of earlier courts and ignored those courts’ legislative-affirming decisions. Because Cooley did
not hold true to his stated goal of capturing settled law, he was able to advance his interest in
writing in “full sympathy” with enforcing restraints upon the legislature. He did so by
discounting “every doubtful precedent” as he defined them, and advancing positions that would
stand his test of “settled rules of right.”966 He gave courts the constitutional peg for which they
had so long searched. This made Cooley’s philosophy combustible and, along with his notions
of enhanced judicial review, over the next sixty-five years that philosophy would allow courts to
moderate, and at times hinder, community-welfare legislation.

Targeted Constitutionalism
Despite his willingness to cast aside precedents, Cooley was not intent on understanding
or developing law in the vacuum of enlightened reason and philosophical reflection. He felt that
doing so “would only be casting overboard the wisdom of experience, and giving ourselves to
964
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the winds of mere speculative abstractions.” Instead, he considered law in its historical context.
When history reflected the folly of prior actions, or changed circumstances rendered precedents
inapplicable, Cooley advocated legal change. That change was evolutionary. Cooley reflected
“we ourselves with our families and friends and the whole social circle of which we are a part are
and are to be an active and formative element in our legal and political institutions, which we
believe to be perennial, but which are never precisely the same as they come to and are
transmitted by us.”967 Change was constant, and law and government necessarily adjusted to that
change.
Cooley’s recognition of the need to change and to consider the constitution and law in
new lights required a bit of legal conjuring. By popular understanding, a judge’s role was to
apply established law to fact. The suggestion that courts adjusted laws – or constitutions – to
changing circumstances was politically troubling. Perhaps wishing to avoid a political minefield,
Cooley would often voice that constitutional meanings remained constant since their drafting.
For example, his 1885 Michigan, A History of Governments, put forth the general proposition
that written constitutions come “into existence with the understanding and purpose that its
several paragraphs and provisions shall mean forever exactly what they mean when adopted.”
While he allowed for that customary thinking, he admitted to a more complex, realistic and,
perhaps, common-law like approach. He offered that the theory of a set constitution could “only
be true in the general sense.” Constitutions required interpretation and adjustment. This was
because, “No instrument can be the same in meaning to-day and forever, and in all men’s minds.
Its interpretation must take place in light of the facts which preceded and led to it; in the light of
contemporaneous history, and of what was said by the actors and the ends they had in view.”968
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Hence, the key to constitutional interpretation was understanding and holding true to the
document’s overarching intent. He believed that the constitution sought to achieve particular
ends, and adherence to those ends was the obligation of legislatures and courts.
Because the ends were the paramount concern, constitutional language had to be read in
light of changing needs and circumstances. Cooley urged, “as the people change, so does their
written constitution change also: they see it in new lights and with different eyes; events may
have given unexpected illumination to some of its provisions, and what they read one way before
they read a very different way now.”969 To Cooley, this was not a ploy to replace disfavored
interpretations with newly preferred doctrines. Change was a necessary condition of
constitutional governance. In 1886, he submitted:
The most rigid institutions must, from year to year, yield something to
[change]; the most inflexible Constitution, in the light of new and unexpected
conditions, must present new phases and suggest new possibilities.
Occasionally, no doubt, we shall modify the Constitution here and there by
formal amendment, but if the general tendency of the political society shall be
the development of a higher and better national life, the Constitution, the outer
framework, cannot possibly remain altogether stationary.970
In that speech, Cooley was commenting on the national constitution, but his point directly
extended to state constitutions. Needs change, meanings change, and constitutional edifices
must similarly change or risk irrelevance or dangerous inflexibility. Despite his seeming
acceptance of a changing constitution, in the same speech, Cooley voiced the opposite approach.
Waxing poetic, he suggested that “When changes are voluntarily suffered to creep in by ways
[other than amendment], we cultivate a habit of mind which saps the foundation of our
institutions and sets us afloat upon a sea of uncertainty without definite landmarks, where the
most reckless and pushing is likely to be most influential and the most presumptuous.”
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Nevertheless, he argued that constitutions must change to adapt to changing conditions. For
example, in discussing federalism, Cooley stated, “the Federal Constitution though it is the same
in words, is not, as a living and effective instrument, the same today as when it was made.” He
continued, “Indeed, there has never been in the history of the world such a thing as a stationary
constitution.”971 One might ask, therefore, if all constitutions changed, which forces and entities
could change them?
One cannot strictly adhere to the language and original intent of a constitution and
simultaneously redefine its meaning to address changed realities. Yet that is what Cooley
suggested, at least at first blush. He reconciled those positions by focusing on the overarching
goals of the constitution, which he defined as assuring republican governance. In that sense, his
statement that “the outer framework cannot possibly remain stationary” is telling. The
constitutional core remained solid but the mechanisms to protect that core – “the outer
framework” – necessarily changed. This allowed for both constitutional consistency and change.
Cooley warned, “What emergencies may require or demand cannot in advance be foreseen, but
the general obligation to do whatever may be possible to preserve Republican intuitions in their
integrity is plain, and if kept steadily in view will lead to safe results.”972 With that statement,
Cooley disclosed the original intent to which he expected courts to hold true – republican selfgovernance. Since the oppressive forces to which government must respond would change,
judicial review should hold the protection of republican governance as its constitutional lodestar,
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even if that required changes in specific constitutional understandings. In short, constitutional
provisions must be read to affect the target of American government – republican selfgovernance and the rule of law.
This conformed to his historical understanding of governance. As he wrote in 1886,
“Whatever the people, whatever their circumstances, whatever the nature of their institutions, the
one law always present, always making itself felt and acknowledged in history, has been the law
of change.”973 The change which was most evident to Cooley were his Michigan experiences of
legislative missteps in a world that Jones described as “filled with political corruption,
speculative prosperity, privilege seeking special interests and hustling mismanaged cities.”974 As
those forces pressured government, Cooley witnessed little confidence in legislative resistance.
That corrupt world was made all the more dangerous given an ill-considered legislature. In 1876
he wrote,
The average legislator, who can levy taxes, create and fill offices, and then
abolish them, impose restrictions on trade, even to the extent of destroying it –
if he shall please to do so – is slow to believe that there is any law of political
economy operating among those over whom he is set as ruler, which he can
not, or should not, compel to bend and conform to such enactments as the good
of his constituents may demand, and as he may devise for their welfare.975
Because ever more active legislatures were unable to resist corrupting influences, Cooley
accepted the need for more vigilant judicial oversight. In that sense, he may not have been
troubled by the weight of contrary precedent or by arguing that prior constitutional
interpretations were no longer valid. Circumstances modify constitutional meaning, and
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constitutional interpretation must be targeted to limit forces undermining considered republican
governance.976
To Cooley, the best constitutions were written to adjust to the changing societies they
governed. By having a “hold on the past, but which, with a foreseeing eye, prepares the way for
appropriating the lessons of a progressive future,” Cooley offered that written constitutions can
“harmonize the conservative and progressive principles.”977 This did not mean that
constitutional meaning should change with a fluctuating majoritarian will. Cooley believed that
American constitutional interpretation required a consideration of changing circumstances but
not a bending to shifting political and social winds. That was accomplished through judicial
review. American courts both maintained and adjusted constitutional meanings, not the
legislature and not the public. It is important to note that Cooley was not arguing for stagnant
governance. Instead, he sought to harmonize the conservative with the progressive, and would
do so by empowering judiciaries to counterbalance legislative activism. The courts, Cooley
believed, would effect his standard that “no maxim of statesmanship can be wiser than to make
haste slowly.”978
Cooley felt comfortable promoting judicial fencing of legislative activity in part because
he believed those who would limit the legislators – the judges – were cut of richer cloth than
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were legislators.979 He said, “a higher degree of virtue is required to hold the scales of justice
even in the courts than is expected of those who fill our legislative halls.” In part, that was
because of their role as guardians of republican governance and protectors against majoritarian
politics. Cooley offered that the courts were to check enactments responsive to “those temporary
excitements which sometimes sweep over the people.” As the more reflective body, the courts
were to “sit in judgment upon legislative action, and annul whatever is done in excess of rightful
jurisdiction.” And who was to check the courts? Cooley advanced that “no similar restraints
upon the judicial power are practicable. . . . [T]he judiciary must decide upon its own authority,
and the judge must find within his own breast those restraints against hasty and unjust action
which the legislator has in the constitution and the courts.”980 Underlying his confidence was a
belief that judges were not subject to the pressures exerted by the wealthy or the masses in the
same way as legislators were. Later in life, Cooley would come to understand that judges were
subject to different pressures and judicial self-policing held its own challenges. With that
realization, he would come to lament judicial tendencies to substitute their own judgments for
that of the legislature.
Cooley understood that limits on legislative power “were incapable of being precisely
indicated so to preclude mistake or controversy.” This was especially so given that those limits
changed as society changed. Underlying that change was a “steady growth” of “free principles.”
To Cooley, America was moving from a restrictive society to a freer one and, in doing so,
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legislatures would lose their “obnoxious and despotic powers.” That withdrawal of legislative
power effected “permanent modifications of the constitutional systems.” When the reasons for
exercising a particular power were no longer valid, that “questionable” “power should be
considered recalled when the necessity has ceased.” (Here, Cooley used employing tax dollars to
aid mills as his example.) Ultimately, it was the judiciary’s role to determine when a power was
“questionable” or when “necessity has ceased.” In this way, courts could assure the “gradual
expansion” of free principles “with the general advance in intelligence and independent thought
and action among the people.”981 Hence, a legislature once empowered to spend or regulate
could lose that power through the forces of disuse, changed societal needs, or the elevation of
free principles. This then was the force of history speaking. To Cooley, the common law and
constitutional principles consistently were evolving to demand greater freedom and equal rights.
Overzealous legislative regulation and commercial aid violated the expanding command for
freedom, equality, and progress and should be judicially overruled.

A Call to Action: Constitutional Limitations
It may be that no book title better describes its author’s intent than A Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Powers of the States of the American
Union. Cooley set forth to interpret, or perhaps redesign, free government as requiring checks on
the legislature and its advancement of majoritarian and special interests. Those checks came
from several sources but did not necessarily require specific delineation in constitutional
documents. Cooley believed that free government required legislative restraint and the
constitution had “but a few positive restraints upon the legislative power contained in the
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instrument.” Hence, he needed either to find the restraints elsewhere or to draw inferences from
the document. Included in those non-specific restraints were “the ancient limitations” that had
always been on popular and monarchical governments – the common law. Further, limits
“sprang from the very nature of free government.” Accordingly, for example, the legislature
could not encroach on judicial or executive space,982 it could not change any court ruling by
retrospectively defining statutory meaning, and it could not adjust marital or other vested
property rights. The legislature’s efforts could only advance public gain as, “the legislature is to
make laws for the public good, and not for the benefit of individuals. It has control of the public
money, and should provide for disbursing them only for a public purpose.”983 His concern that
majorities or wealth interests might press to advance one group over another led to Cooley’s
concern that liberties required judicial protection from improperly activist legislatures.
In Constitutional Limitations and his other writings, Cooley set forth several basic
principles of American republican governance. Most basically, the sovereign people, through
their constitutions, set forth the powers of governments, both national and state. Thereafter, both
the leaders and those they governed must act within those limitations, even if immediate popular
will is frustrated. In this sense, American legislatures were not like the British Parliament
(wherein sovereignty resided) but were limited to exercising the grants of authority given by the
sovereign people. In the case of the federal legislature, the sovereign people granted only those
enumerated powers found in the federal constitution. State legislatures had no restraints to
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legislative powers save for those withheld by the people as enumerated in the constitutions.
“Without constitutional limitations,” Cooley wrote, “the power [of state legislatures] to make
laws would be absolute.”984 But state legislatures held no such powers as such a prospect was
inimical to republican governance. In 1888, he wrote that legislative power “unless carefully
restrained and limited, is quite likely to prove ‘a power to frame mischief by a law’” and
accordingly constitutions “give special and careful attention to the necessary restraints.” To
Cooley, “There is no legislative omnipotence in America, nor ever likely to be.”985 In creating
government, the sovereign people protected themselves against legislative overreaching by
retaining their rights under various constitutional clauses including the tax, due process, and law
of the land provisions.
Cooley rejected the argument that natural law transcended constitutions or that courts
could invalidate laws because they were unjust or oppressive. Instead, they could invalidate
those improper laws only if it could “be shown that such injustice is prohibited or such rights
guaranteed or protected by the constitution.” However, Cooley allowed for significant judicial
space by suggesting that in the event the constitution contained no specific limits, courts could
find implied limitations. For example, even without a specific provision, it would be
unconstitutional to pass a law requiring a person to give his property to another. Such a law
would not fit within the power to tax because taxation, by definition requires “apportionment”
and that the tax be for a “public purpose.”986 Legislation that went beyond that taxing authority
was outside the constitutional grant to the legislature; and those limitations emanated from the
common law and accepted precedent created by the courts. Cooley considered the common law
to be the embodiment of reason as shaped by the wisdom of time and, connectedly, feared that
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statutory law often suffered from the majoritarian passions of the moment.987 That disposition
was laid bare in his 1887 speech before the Georgia Bar Association, where he voiced the
proverb “With customs we do well, but statutes may undo us.”988
So strong was his faith in the common law that Cooley urged, “constitutions are to be
construed in light of the common law, and of the fact that its rules are still left in force.” This
did not mean that constitutional provisions, or statutes, that claimed to depart from the common
law were to be invalidated. In the event that happened, the drafters’ intent prevailed. Where the
constitution or statute did not directly conflict with the common-law, the courts were to employ
common-law principles to interpret language. To Cooley, this maxim of constitutional
interpretation derived from the common law’s respect for those “maxims of freedom” that
undergirded public and private affairs and the uses of property “from time immemorial.” He
argued that constitutionally guaranteed rights in essence were reiterating common-law
protections. In his 1887 speech before the Georgia Bar Association, Cooley also explained that
the frameworks of American government were based on historical experience and that the
“maxims of liberty” developed under the common law were “embodied in their constitutions as a
protecting armor.”989 In his 1874 opinion in Weimer v Bunbury, Cooley elaborated on the
connection.
The truth is the bill of rights in the American constitutions have not been
drafted for the introduction of new law, but to secure old principles against
abrogation or violation. They are conservatory instruments rather than
reformatory; and they assume that the existing principles of the common law
are ample for the protection of individual rights, when once incorporated in the
fundamental law, and secured against violation.990
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In Constitutional Limitations, he urged that the common law achieved two interrelated ends. It
“protect[ed] the rights and privileges of the individual man,” and checked “arbitrary and
uncontrolled authority.”991
Cooley’s concern was that legislatures were subjected to “those temporary excitements
which sometimes sweep over the people and from which no body of men can at all times be
free.”992 In Constitutional Limitations, Cooley responded to that concern by offering the tools
for lawyers and courts to limit that majoritarian activism. Although the courts could not
invalidate legislation that violated the “spirit” of the constitution, “it does not follow, however,
that in every case the courts . . . must be able to find in the constitution some specific inhibition
which has been disrespected, or some express command which has been disobeyed.”993 While
Cooley did not use the terms “penumbra” or “unwritten constitution” he certainly suggested that
jurists look to the meaning of the document in its entirety. In doing so, they should refer to
declarations of rights and due process clauses as protectors of republican governance and as
limitations (both express and implied) on legislative power. Legislatures were required to
operate within the constitutional guidelines or their legislation would be void.
Cooley’s last general principle was that the constitutions vest the judiciary with the
responsibility to assure that the popular will, as reflected in legislative acts, was consistent with
constitutional principles. In that sense, the court had authority and responsibility to “finally
determine the question of constitutional law.” While courts should exercise this power “with
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reluctance and hesitation,”994 they must employ it to honor their judicial role. The court is a
coequal branch that is neither superior to the executive or the legislature, nor subordinate.
It would be a mistake, to suggest Cooley disdained the legislature. He did not, and
throughout Constitutional Limitations, his articles, speeches, and opinions, Cooley repeatedly
affirmed the role of, and the required deference to, the legislature. For example, after
questioning the Maine prohibition laws, Cooley ended his discussion: “A statute which can do
this must be justified upon the highest reasons of public benefit; but, whether satisfactory or not,
they rest exclusively in the legislative wisdom.”995 Cooley seemed of two minds. First, the
legislature spoke for the people and its decisions required respect but, second, republican
governance required judicially enforced limits on majoritarian impulses. His respect for
(reasoned) popular will and his beliefs concerning the need to check that will to protect
individual rights and republican governance resulted in a complex and dynamic approach to
constitutional law. To Cooley, experience and changing public needs required an evolving legal
and constitutional structure.
It makes sense to pause here to consider the context in which Cooley wrote
Constitutional Limitations. Cooley wrote while the definition of “property” was undergoing
dramatic change. Two cases with very similar facts demonstrate the changing nature of
American property law. In 1843, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Monongahela Navigation v
Coons, evinced the then prevailing notion that property was analogous to an iron bar – either it
existed or it did not. In that case, the plaintiff sought compensation for damage he sustained as a
result of a government-sponsored flooding of his land. The court expressed regret that it was
unable to provide relief despite the wrong suffered by the landholder. It said that the court was
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constrained to accept legislative determinations absent “constitutional restraints on legislative
power.” The plaintiff still owned the land and, accordingly, no taking had occurred and no
compensation was due. While suffering a loss, the court condoled, “the plaintiffs have at least
the miserable good luck to know that they have companions in misfortune.” 996 Because the
court only reflected on the ownership aspect of property, it did not consider the diminished value
of the land, or the forfeited gains that the owner might later enjoy from the use of the land.997
By 1872, that notion of property rights had changed as the courts now recognized the
intangible aspects of ownership. The United States Supreme Court in Pumpelly v Green Bay
Company found that a taking occurred when plaintiff’s land was flooded because the water had
“effectively destroyed or impaired [the land’s] usefulness.” Justice Miller wrote, “There may be
such serious interruptions to the common and necessary use of property as will be equivalent to a
taking within the meaning of the constitution.”998 Because the complainant lost considerable
value, even though no physical taking had occurred, the court ruled that the uncompensated,
publicly authorized, flooding violated due-process principles.
This contemporaneous shift is important, as Cooley advocated that individual rights, most
specifically property rights, limited legislative latitude. They did so not merely because takings
were specifically prohibited or because individual rights limited legislative space. To Cooley,
republican governance, by its nature, respected property and government destruction of that

996

Monongahela Navigation v Coons, 6 Watts & Serg 101, 115 (1843). The court ended its opinion offering “would
that it were in our power to afford them more solid consolation!” The U.S. Supreme Court adhered to this doctrine
in Smith v Washington when it denied compensation for damage done to private land in regrading roads. The Court
argued, “Private interests must yield to public accommodation.” Smith v Corp of Wash., 61 U.S. 135, 149 (1858).
997
Underlying this, and much of the milldam jurisprudence, was the notion that law should support development.
Hall explained that to support commerce, “Legislatures reversed the common law rule that flooding the land of a
neighbor created an injury and that the dam itself was a nuisance. Most acts granted to affected property owners a
right to sue, but only for statutory damages (those damages specified in the statute). If a landowner adjacent to a
mill incurred a loss greater than the statute covered, he had no basis upon which to seek additional damages.” Hall,
The Magic Mirror: 100. See also, Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860: 47-53.
998
Pumpelly v Green Bay Company, 80 U.S. 166, 181, 77 (1872).

388

property struck at the heart of time-honored principles. It follows, therefore, that as property
notions expanded, legislative power contracted. In the temperance context, under the
Monongahela Navigation standard, there was no taking because alcohol manufacturers retained
ownership of their manufacturing property. Under Pumpelly, there probably was a grievous
property loss, as value was greatly diminished: hence, Cooley’s warning that temperance
legislation “must be justified” with the highest level of public benefit. With the move from the
iron bar to the bundle of straw analogy came questions concerning property’s components and
the allowable level of government interference with that property’s value. As the issues
marinated, and courts explored the consequences of the changed property notion, individuals
questioned whether new government regulations and taxes inappropriately took too many stalks
from their property bundle. This would particularly be the case with respect to one’s ownership
– or property – in one’s own labor.999

Protecting Republican Governance
In reflecting back ways in which courts employed Cooley’s due process standards, one
might conclude that Cooley’s class legislation concerns primarily arose from a fear that the
impoverished masses would legislate to deprive the affluent of their property. While that
certainly was a concern, Cooley’s strongest concern over class legislation derived from his fear
of the coercive influence of wealth – not poverty – on legislative judgments. He grounded his
objection to class legislation on his Jacksonian-based egalitarian fears of corporate power and the
propensity of that power to taint representative government. Within that context, Cooley
understood class legislation largely to mean “legislation on behalf of already privileged
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classes.”1000 His Michigan experiences and understandings grounded that concern. Cooley knew
that the wealthy leveraged the political process to exact favors contrary to the general welfare. It
was not just that the affluent enjoyed undue influence that granted them favors; that influence
also kindled an opposition to governance. In his 1879 lectures at Johns Hopkins, Cooley
disclosed his underlying fear: social upheaval. He warned, “poverty is never so much in danger
of becoming the master as when capital unjustly manipulates the legislation of the Country.”
Jones pointed out that this concern was not anti-corporate. Rather, Cooley sought to assure an
equal application of laws where the wealthy could not employ financially derived power to abuse
the public interests.1001 The law was to provide no special privilege, particularly if that law
enhanced concentrated power that would subvert republican governance, liberty interests, or the
general welfare.
Notwithstanding his focus on the coercive nature of wealth, Cooley did not limit his
equality concerns to the machinations of the powerful. At times, Cooley took his equity
principles, and his disinclination for one group to benefit at the cost of another, to an unusual
extreme. That occurred in 1877, when the University of Michigan threatened to increase law
school tuition to help pay for increased medical school expenses. In response, Cooley threatened
to resign from the university, as the actions constituted an inappropriate tax on one group for the
benefit of another, and “violate[d] the spirit of our Constitution and laws.”1002 Justice Campbell
reported that Cooley was so incensed that he became physically ill over the issue. It seems that
the university’s disparate treatment of students created significant anxiety; the taxing of one for
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the benefit of another, and treating similarly situated individuals differently, offended Cooley’s
notions of fairness and propriety.1003 That incident was a microcosm of the revolution Cooley
had unleashed with Constitutional Limitations. That is not to say, however, that Cooley intended
a class-based test or that his target was class legislation. Cooley’s goal was limiting the
legislature and strengthening republican governance. Class legislation may have been a result of
majoritarian excesses – and excess might be an incident of class legislation – but it was not, in
itself, a mark of unconstitutionality. There was no such binary formula, and no line of
demarcation between general and class legislation.
Continuing his argument that legislative limits spring from the nature of free governance,
Cooley turned to limits respecting individual rights. He argued that those rights would limit
legislative action even if constitutions had not specifically withheld power from the legislature.
Arguing that the sovereign people had no legal need “to exact pledges for a due observance of
individual rights from anyone,” Cooley wrote that they nevertheless did so because “the
aggressive tendency of power is such” that the people “deemed it important to repeat the
guaranty” in their constitutions. To Cooley’s understanding, those guarantees were in the “law
of the land” and “due process” clauses.1004 But, unlike the Magna Charta’s focus on the
executive and courts (from which the law of the land language came) Cooley applied law of the
land and due process principles to the legislature. He argued that due process guarantees
protected individuals from unreasonable majoritarian incursions into private interests. Citing
Daniel Webster in his argument before the Supreme Court in Dartmouth College, Cooley wrote
of due process, “The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, and immunities
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under the protection of general rules which govern society.” Cautioning against legislative
overreaching, he warned that, “everything which may pass under the form of an enactment is not
the law of the land.”1005
While very few earlier courts had accepted Webster’s argument, Cooley did, and did so
in a more significant sense than Webster had argued. Cooley expanded due process to direct that
courts overturn laws that were “arbitrary” and of an “unusual nature,” especially as they applied
to taking individual rights. Those rights, Cooley explained when writing the fourth edition of
Story’s Commentaries, were contained in the words “life, liberty, and property.” Those were
“representative terms, and are intended and must be understood to cover every right to which a
member of the body politic is entitled under the law.” The individual’s body was assumed in the
term life. Liberty included the pursuit of happiness, including the right to any legitimate
employment, and incorporated “the negation of arbitrary power in every form which results in a
deprivation of right.”1006 For property, Cooley only cited Justice Story’s language in Wilkinson v
Leland, proclaiming that government could not transfer property from A to B.
Cooley recognized that courts historically had associated due process guarantees with
judicial proceedings associated with executive actions. He understood, however, that active
legislatures could encumber individual interests generally, as executive actions could do so
specifically. Hence, due process guarantees appropriately protected against improper
government actions, from whatever source. His fourth edition of Story’s Commentaries,
advanced that “due process of law in each particular case means such an exertion of the powers
of government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for
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the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the
one being dealt belongs.” Cooley then cited Constitutional Limitations as authority for moving
due process from a right against executive to one against the legislative branch, and government
generally.1007
In Constitutional Limitations, he had extrapolated from the procedural protections
afforded to the individual a need to protect the community with more than procedural guarantees.
“While every man,” he wrote, “has a right to require that his own controversies shall be judged
by the same rules which settle those of his neighbors, the whole community is also entitled at all
times to demand the protection of the ancient principles which shield private rights against
arbitrary interference, even though such interference may be under a rule impartial in its
application.” In doing so, Cooley expanded the terms “due process” and “law of the land” to
create limitations that nearly all courts had rejected just a few years earlier, and he did so arguing
that the protection came not just from constitutional language but also as incidents of free
government.1008 Employing settled maxims of the common law and historic traditions, Cooley
molded a constitutional standard for rejecting “arbitrary” government action, and he did so by
defining constitutional language in ways that fit his limited-government ideals.
In applying that notion, Cooley advocated courts employ due process to protect against
legislative interference with property rights. To his mind, protecting property was tantamount to
protecting freedom. “Government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of
property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body.” He continued, laying the
foundation for his activist court agenda. “The fundamental maxims of a free government seem
to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred.” In
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constitutionalizing his standard, Cooley offered that the people, in granting authority to
government, did not authorize legislative encumbrances on private property. To Cooley, the
people would never grant, “a power so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil
liberty” as would allow legislative authority over property rights. It was up to the courts
vigilantly to protect those rights.1009 In a few sentences, Cooley had set the standard. Property is
the preeminent right and the courts should vigilantly protect that right from legislative
overreaching.
But legislation, by its nature, affects the individual and his/her property. So where may
the legislature act and where may it not? Cooley responded that legislatures had full power to
regulate pursuant to granted police powers. Cooley then cited Shaw’s language in
Commonwealth v Alger and Redfield’s in Thorpe v Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co.1010 In Alger,
Shaw submitted “All property in this Commonwealth is . . . held subject to those general
regulations which are necessary to the common good and welfare.” In Thorpe, Redfield urged
that the regulations could secure “the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the States.”1011
In citing these cases and this language, Cooley accepted that government power could do more
than merely assure that individuals enjoy their property so as not to injure others. Government,
within limits, could regulate to advance social interests. However, legislatures could not use
their police powers to deny “essential rights and privileges.”1012
Cooley furnished no demarcation line between regulations that sat inside or outside of the
legislative sphere. Instead, he relied on judicial discretion. Should government interfere with
property, the courts were to balance “those principles of civil liberty and constitutional deference

1009

Cooley, Constitutional Limitations: 165.
Cooley reiterated this in Story, Commentaries: 671-72.
1011
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations: 573-74.
1012
Ibid., 577.
1010

394

which have become established in our system of law, and not by any rules that pertain to forms
of procedure merely.” No longer were courts limited to procedural review. Cooley, while
voicing deference to legislative judgments and authority, argued for an energized judiciary to act
as the protector of property. 1013 In essence, he inserted the judiciary into the political arena,
granting it the power to determine whether the legislation was so objectionable or arbitrary that
the court should intervene to protect individual rights and liberties. Because, in passing the law
or regulation, the legislature had already determined the act to be reasonable, the court in essence
exercised a veto power over the legislature. Unlike the one exercised by the executive, the
judicial veto could only be overturned by a constitutional amendment or a change of court
doctrine.
Just as government could not undermine an individual’s property rights through
regulation, so too it could not take property in the form of taxes and redistribute it elsewhere.1014
Cooley addressed that concern with his public purpose doctrine. Under that doctrine, any use of
tax dollars not consistent with a “public purpose” was unconstitutional because “taxation having
for its only legitimate object the raising of money for public purposes and the proper needs of
government, the exaction of moneys from the citizens for other purposes is not a proper exercise
of this power, and must therefore be unauthorized.” Taxation for any other purpose “would not
be legislation;” expenditures not connected to a public purpose change the associated
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assessments from taxes to “plunder.”1015 Here again, Cooley professed deference by claiming
that the legislature was “vested with a large discretion which cannot be controlled by the courts,”
and that “the moment a court ventures to substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature . .
. that moment enters upon a field where it is impossible to set limits to its authority.”1016
Cooley’s public purpose discussions in Constitutional Limitations suggested a general
application of his public purpose doctrine – expenditures not for a public purpose were
unconstitutional. In practice, Cooley applied that doctrine only when those expenditures were
tied to a specific tax. In those cases, the challenged tax effected a transfer from the taxpayers
nearly directly to the corporations and did not involve transfers from general revenue funds. One
could, therefore, conclude that Cooley intended to apply his public purpose doctrine narrowly to
near-direct A to B transfers. As explained below, it is unlikely that Cooley so narrowly
construed his doctrine and, certainly, many of his followers adopted no such narrow an
interpretation. Tax dollars necessarily could be spent only to advance a public purpose, or the
legislation was invalid.
By inserting the courts into the tax and spending area by defining “taxes” to
require spending on a “public purpose,” Cooley created his constitutional hook. Claiming
precedent, he employed Sharpless’s requirement that taxes be spent in the public interest.
However, he went much further. Whereas Sharpless looked to the impact of the expenditure,
Cooley looked to the nature of the recipient. The issue was not whether the public enjoyed any
benefit from the entity’s activities. Instead, it was whether there was a direct benefit to the
taxpayers as the result of an exchange of value between the government and the subsidized
industry. If there was not specific value exchanged, then the subsidy was a gift from the
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taxpayers. Since the legislature could not, under its taxing authority, take property from A and
grant it to B, gifts were unconstitutional and “despotic.”1017 Cooley’s later writings would hone
that message. Unless the entity performed specific services for the direct benefit of the
taxpayers, legislative grants to those entities were unconstitutional, notwithstanding significant
ancillary benefits.1018
Cooley recognized that his position on municipal aid was in the distinct minority. In an
effort to distinguish opposing law, he parsed language from some cases suggesting limits where,
frankly, there seemed none. Quoting Talbot v Dent,1019 he advanced that municipalities could
only provide aid when ‘the object to be accomplished is so obviously connected with the
[municipality] and its interests as to conduce obviously and in a special manner to their propriety
and advancement.’” But Talbot affirmed legislative power to aid private rail corporations, as did
the court in Hasbrouck v Milwaukee, a case Cooley similarly employed to question public
support for private rail.1020 Cooley then cited Theodore Sedgwick, intimating that he objected to
taxpayer support of private internal improvement projects. Sedgwick’s challenge was altogether
different. He believed that the responsibility for such support lay with the state, not the
municipality, as the benefits were not limited to municipal boundaries.1021 Recognizing perhaps
that he was being somewhat selective, Cooley mentioned that the recent cases had cast doubt on
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earlier judicial acceptance of legislative power in this area. He then cites Iowa’s Wapello
decision – a case that would shortly be overruled. When speaking of government support of
private industry, Cooley was certainly more concerned with writing “in full sympathy with all
those restraints which the caution of the fathers has imposed upon the exercise of the powers of
government,” than “to state the law as it has been settled by the authorities.” At least in this area,
Cooley the advocate emerged while Cooley the legal repository withdrew.
Cooley wrote Constitutional Limitations as the nation considered the energetic
governance created during the Civil War and reflected on the recent European upheavals. To
Cooley, the power of large government and emerging European socialist philosophies threatened
to undermine American limited government and, with it, individual property rights. Since their
first days, American courts had expressed an eagerness to limit what they construed as illadvised, property-encumbering legislation, but could find no grounds upon which to do so. With
Constitutional Limitations, Cooley provided that hook. In the end, the first edition of
Constitutional Limitations moved governance from a majoritarian to a republican model, and did
so by addressing concerns that had troubled courts since the 1790s but had remained transient
and indefinite until Cooley give them constitutional weight.

From Theory to Practice – Tax and Spending Limits
Cooley’s most immediate impact on American jurisprudence and thinking revolved
around the use of tax dollars to support private industry. Before the ink had dried on
Constitutional Limitations, Chief Justice John Dillon of the Iowa Supreme Court, in Hanson v
Vernon, addressed the constitutionality of an Iowa statute authorizing municipal support of rail
construction. As discussed earlier, the court met in the atmosphere of federal/state divergence
over the meaning of Iowa’s constitution. Like the Pennsylvania Sharpless court, the Iowa court
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recognized the importance of its decision, stating that “with possibly one exception, no question
in the judicial history of the State has arisen which rivals the present in importance.” The court
considered the split in earlier Iowa cases and sided with those that found that government
financial support of rail unconstitutional and beyond the legislature’s taxing authority.
Repeatedly citing Constitutional Limitations, the court found that: “the money demanded of the
citizen is called a tax, it is not such, but is, in fact, a coercive contribution in favor of private
railway corporations, and violative, not only of the general spirit of the Constitution as to the
sacredness of private property, but of that specific provision which declares that no man shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law.” Mimicking Cooley, Dillon explained that
taxes were only to “raise money for public purposes.” Because the public did not own the
railroad, a tax for the railroad’s benefit was not within the legislature’s authority.
Dillon looked at the recipient of government support as either public and “subject to the
unlimited control of the legislature” or as private and not entitled to government largess.
Railroads were private corporations. Dillon accepted Cooley’s public purpose standard, which
required direct benefits in exchange for the subsidy (and thereby rejected Sharpless and the
dominant line of cases). In flourishing style, he wrote: “This opening once made in the barriers
which the Constitution has erected to protect private property, who is so wise as to foretell what
troops of foes may not hereafter enter at the same breach?” To Dillon and the majority, the
courts were vanguards to protect the citizens’ property against a rapacious legislature. In dissent,
Justice Chester Cole cited the opinions of twenty-one state Supreme Courts that disagreed.1022
His opinion carried no weight with his brethren. The Cooley revolution had begun.
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Soon Wisconsin joined in, first in Curtis v Whipple in 1869 and then in Whiting v
Sheboygan and Fond du Lac Railroad in 1870. In Curtis the city sought to subsidize a private
educational facility, but the court invalidated its efforts because the city retained no management
rights over the school. Without that direct connection, the educational benefits to the city were
too tangential to adhere to the public purpose standard.1023 While the Wisconsin court did not
cite Constitutional Limitations in Curtis, it did in Whiting. That case was nearly identical to the
one faced in Pennsylvania in Sharpless and in Iowa in Hanson. Citing Constitutional
Limitations as authority, the court invalidated the public grant to a railroad almost solely because
the railroad was privately held and motivated. The court took pains to distinguish its findings
from earlier approved government expenditures by arguing that earlier cases addressed entities in
part publicly owned.1024 To the Wisconsin and Iowa courts, public purpose turned on ownership,
not public need or benefit – aligning with Cooley’s focus on the recipient of funds.
As Iowa and Wisconsin were hearing Hanson, Curtis, and Whiting, Cooley prepared to
judicially elaborate on his public purpose doctrine. He had his chance in the matter involving
Salem’s refusal to pay the Detroit & Howell Railroad for its work completed pursuant to the
voters’ approval of rail-support bonds. Invoking his public-policy beliefs that government
support for railroads were “diseases in the body politic” that needed to be “arrested by a decision
of the State Supreme Court,”1025 Cooley sought to gain his brethren’s support in the Detroit &
Howell mandamus matter. In a letter to Justice Benjamin Graves, Cooley justified sacrificing his
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position and vote in one case before the court in order to win in the upcoming Detroit & Howell
versus Salem dispute.
In the Detroit paving case I received an opinion from Judge
Christiancy, in which, while waiving the question of proper construction of the
city charter, he holds the assessment void on some grounds which seems to me
entirely untenable. Under the circumstances I have deemed it polite in order to
avoid an equal division of the court to yield on the main question of the
construction of the charter & treat that as settled by the case of Woodbridge vs.
Detroit. If we have got to face that question of railroad bonds we have no
strength to fritter away on division on questions of less magnitude.1026
Cooley was looking to change the relationship between government and industry.1027
Interestingly, Cooley wrote this letter before any briefs had been filed or any arguments tendered
in the case. He had been waiting to constitutionalize his theories and the “railroad bonds” case
presented that opportunity.1028
The Detroit & Howell Railroad and the Board of Trustees of Salem would soon write
their briefs and offer their arguments. Those pleadings furnished a litany of grounds upon which
the justices could respond to the railroad’s petition for a writ of mandamus. Hiram J. Beakes,
employing arguments from Constitutional Limitations, provided the key argument on Salem’s
behalf. He wrote: “The Act of 1864 is not an exercise of ‘legislative power,’ and is therefore,
void, whether it comes within any of the express prohibitions [in the constitution] or not. It is
not a law, but an attempt to license an act of spoliation.” Beakes continued, “To compel A. to
donate or loan his money to B. or to authorize a majority to compel the other citizens to donate
1026
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or loan their property to private corporations or individuals, is not legislation.” Drawing on
Cooley’s underlying concern over the limits on legislative power, Beakes painted an arrestingly
vivid picture: “It is an imperial edict or ukase, inconsistent with the idea of a limited government
– and a fortiori inconsistent with the idea of legislative power in a government whose
sovereignty is divided into independent departments, executive, legislative, and judicial.”1029
Ashley Pond, as counsel for the railroad, responded that the legislature had the power and
wisdom to decide whether an act is for a public purpose – and courts historically had, and
should, defer to those judgments. He then referred to the tradition of government financial
support, citing the state’s salt bounty laws, agricultural societies, educational establishments,
charitable grants, and government supported meetinghouse and church facilities. 1030 Pond had
legal precedent and long-standing government practices on his side. Beakes had Cooley’s ear,
mind, and heart, as Cooley believed that at least some of those government practices and
precedent were either in error or had been delegitimized by experience. Cooley had hinted at his
limitation philosophy in the 1863 University Law School Opening Exercises, developed them in
Constitutional Limitations, and now would implement them in the Salem case.
Although the court could have decided the case on narrow grounds, Cooley embraced the
opportunity judicially to implement his doctrines concerning limited government and the
restrictions on legislative power.1031 Much as he had professed in Constitutional Limitations,
Cooley began by noting it was the legislature’s role to “subserve the general well-being of
society, and advance the present and prospective happiness and prosperity of the people.” He
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then set out to limit that power. Granting almost judicial notice to the wisdom and sanctity of the
marketplace, Cooley pronounced, “a large portion of the most urgent needs of society are
relegated exclusively to the law of demand and supply.” He continued, intimating that the
market and not the government maximized the general welfare. “It is this in its natural
operation, and without the interference of the government, that gives us the proper proportion of
tillers of the soil, artisans, manufacturers, merchants and professional men, and that determines
when and where they shall give to society the benefit of their particular services.” Ignoring the
history of government practice, Cooley offered what reads as a very personal opinion about the
role of government. He denied government’s historical place in the market by claiming separate
spaces between public and private spheres. “However great the need in the direction of any
particular calling, the interference of the government is not tolerated, because, though it might be
supplying a public want, it is considered as invading the domain that belongs exclusively to
private inclination and enterprise.” In so arguing, Cooley assumed a wall between public and
private that never existed. He ignored Michigan government’s role in financially supporting
agriculture, silk, salt, sugar, mining, private education, banking, steam mills, religious
institutions, water pumping, public accommodations, and to some degree, internal
improvements. With respect to internal improvements, Cooley explained that Michigan’s policy
had changed, and that the entities involved were now private. His statement did not clarify
whether it was the shift in ownership that precluded state financial support of rail or a rising wall
between government and private spaces. Claiming that it was “no longer recognized as proper or
politic that the State should supply the means of locomotion,” the state privatized the business
and now was constitutionally prohibited from involvement.1032 However, his sentiment went
beyond the 1850 constitutional ban on state government financial support of industry. Cooley
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believed that powers once enjoyed by government could be lost by disuse or changed
circumstances, even in the absence of formal constitutional amendment. This was because
constitutional language required reinterpretation in light of new realities and among those
realities was the steady growth of rights. Accordingly, constitutional meanings, including the
powers granted to government, changed even as constitutional language remained the same.
New insights concerning the place of government and private industry drove constitutional
understandings more than did the interpretations of earlier judicial eras. With Salem, those new
realities occasioned a new understanding of the term “tax” in order to assure that public revenues
were employed for a public purpose. What had once legitimately been government space was no
longer.
Cooley offered equality principles as a core basis of his thinking, as discriminations in
favor of one occupation “is an invasion of that equality of right and privilege which is a maxim
in State government.” Speaking generally, Cooley offered that all must be treated the same or
the state would subject itself to undue economic influences from the wealthy. Drawing upon his
Jacksonian principles, Cooley offered: “When the State once enters upon the business of
subsidies, we shall not fail to discover that strong and powerful interests are most likely to
control legislation, and that the weaker will be taxed to enhance the profits of the stronger.” By
arguing that “equality of right and privilege” was a “maxim in State government,” Cooley
suggested that the state could show no favorites. 1033 That language in Salem was significantly
more restrictive than Cooley had offered in Constitutional Limitations. In Constitutional
Limitations he had rejected the notion that all unequal legislation was unlawful. Instead, equality
was an aspiration of republican governance. There he had written, “Equality of rights,
privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law, and if special privileges
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are granted, or special burdens or restrictions imposed in any case, it must be presumed that the
legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of
government.”1034 In discussing rail finance, Cooley in Salem exclaimed that favoring “farming
or banking, merchandising or milling, printing or railroading is not legitimate legislation.”1035
Cooley’s Salem opinion was long on aspirational law and short on precedent or firm
maxims. His goal was to advance those limitations that are inherent in the notion of free
government – a restricted, representative legislature with limited powers to undermine individual
rights and liberties. Those principles, however, were not set forth in constitutional text and
Cooley required constitutionally based limitations on legislative power. Here then, Cooley
played the constitutional sleight of hand he offered in Constitutional Limitations. He suggested
that the nature of representative governance itself assumed limitations on legislative power and
that he would read constitutional limitations within that context. He offered that there were
“certain limitations upon [legislative] power, not prescribed in express terms by any
constitutional provision, but inherent in the subject itself, which attend its exercise under all
circumstances, and which are as inflexible and absolute in their restraints as if directly imposed
in the most positive form of words.” The legislature had no absolute authority over taxation and
citizens should contest the exercise of legislative power whenever they believed their rights were
invaded. In determining the propriety of the legislation, courts must consider the government’s
obligation “to advance the present and prospective happiness and prosperity of the people.” In
so arguing, he held true to his philosophy that constitutional meanings shift in order to hold to
American states’ underlying representative-governance foundations. Hence, the multitude of
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cases affirming the previous sixty-five years of government practice were mistaken only in the
context of 1870 constitutional meanings.
In Salem, Cooley set forth to define constitutional language to limit legislative power and
to respect individual rights. He did this by employing the constitution’s tax language. Here, as
the court did in Sharpless, Cooley read into the word “taxes” a requirement that government
collect moneys only for “public purposes.” Collections for any other purpose were not taxes but
rather plunder (taking from A and giving to B), and plunder was unconstitutional.1036 In doing
so, Cooley captured the long-term property rights concerns and gave them constitutional
grounding. But, while property rights were important, Cooley’s underlying focus was legislative
power. Accordingly, in explaining his term “public purpose,” Cooley focused on government’s
space. After explaining that public purpose (and the power to tax) “Has no relation to the
urgency of the public need or to . . . the public benefit which is to follow,” Cooley set down his
limited government objectives by leaning on an historical definition: Public purpose was “a term
of classification to distinguish the objects for which, according to settled usage are left to private
inclination, interest or liberality.”1037
Cooley’s “settled usage” dealt with more advancing republican notions than with
historical practice. Accordingly, powers enjoyed in one era could be “recalled when the
necessity has ceased” to use them.1038 The burdens that Michigan and other states suffered in
consequence of financing rail likely resulted in that “recall” of that governing power. The
changing world of mid and late nineteenth century America, and in particular Michigan, had
forced new understandings of what was “private” and what was “public.” By coupling a narrow
definition of “public purpose” with constitutional “tax” language, Cooley sought to assure that
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which was truly public was addressed, while anything within private space was safe from public
meddling.1039 To Cooley, expanding that private space was part of the “steady growth” of “free
principles.”1040
Despite what some scholars characterized as Cooley’s pro-business grounding, Cooley
was no advocate of corporate power, and in Salem he was driven to deny corporations public
largess. Student notes from Cooley’s lectures on corporations reveal a concern over the
corrosive influence of rail corporations. One student’s notes read, “The source of danger is a few
men having so much moneyed power. . . . They are able to exercise more influence over the
state legislatures than both political parties.”1041 In that sense, the concern over legislative
activism was not so much with majoritarianism as corporate cronyism. That concern was
manifest when Cooley wrote in Salem, “When the State once enters upon the business of
subsidies, we shall not fail to discover that the strong and powerful interests are those most likely
to control legislation, and that the weaker will be taxed to enhance the profits of the stronger.”1042
His concern over disproportionate political power suggested a need to limit the legislature in
order to limit the excesses attendant with corporate wealth. In this respect, individual rights were
not the primary concern; the political system was.
Cooley’s concerns over corporate power were made manifest in later editions of
Constitutional Limitations. By his fourth edition, Cooley had added a critique of Dartmouth
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College. “It is under the protection of [that] decision . . . that the most enormous and
threatening powers in our country have been created; some of the great and wealthy corporations
actually have greater influence in the country at large, and upon the legislation of the country,
than the States to which they owe their existence.” He feared corporate power would undermine
government by demanding, and receiving, “unwise, careless, or corrupt legislation.”1043 Whereas
he seemed to have great trust in the judiciary (as evidenced in his 1863 talk to incoming law
students), he had little confidence in the legislature. It too easily succumbed to the power of
money.
Cooley had accepted Sharpless’ public purpose language but had ruled quite differently.
In a significant deviation from that earlier standard, (but aligning with the recent Iowa and
Wisconsin cases) Cooley looked to the nature of the payee rather than the purpose of the
payment to determine the validity of the transfer. Cooley found that payments to corporations
without direct reciprocal benefits to taxpayers were mere gifts. Gifts, by their nature, were
transfers from A to B. “No principle was older, and none seemed better understood or more
inflexible, than that one man’s property could not be taken under the power of the government
and transferred to another against the will of the owner.”1044 In essence, Cooley required direct
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argument extended beyond direct transfers from A to B. In that example, Cooley displayed his concern over
favoring one industry over others and his related fear of the corrupting influence of wealth. The challenge included
the spending legislation, not simply the tax.
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consideration, or value, from the corporation in exchange for the use of tax dollars on its
behalf.1045 The benefits private rail provided were indirect and could not form the basis of a
public purpose.1046
At the end of his Salem opinion, Cooley recognized that states routinely supported
industry and that the courts affirmed that support. Nevertheless, he argued that there was an
ever-present undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the legislation. Accordingly, Cooley looked to
the dissents as precedent for his groundbreaking limitations. “The best judgment of the legal
profession, so far as I have been able to judge, has always been against the lawfulness of this
species of railroad aid, and there has been a steady and persistent protest which no popular
clamor could silence, against the decisions which support it.” Contrary to his claims in
Constitutional Limitations that he sought to follow the established law, Cooley continued, “This
protest has of late been growing stronger instead of fainter, and if the recent decisions alone are
regarded, the authority is clearly with the protest.” Those recent cases, Hanson, Curtis, and
Whiting, relied upon Constitutional Limitations as the basis for their decisions. As if in an
Escher drawing, Cooley now relied upon those cases as precedent to support his Salem opinion
and for the shift occasioned by Constitutional Limitations. In the end, Cooley accepted that he
was breaking new ground by refusing to have the court “shut our eyes to the principle and

That concern was similarly voiced in his discussion of tariffs in his General Principles of Constitutional
Law. There, Cooley objected to legislation that intended to indirectly transfer wealth through tariffs. He wrote, “A
tax on imports, therefore, the purpose of which is, not to raise a revenue, but to discourage and indirectly prohibit
some particular import for the benefit of some home manufacture, may well be questioned as being merely
colorable, and therefore not warranted by constitutional principles.” Thomas McIntyre Cooley, The General
Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1880). 57.
1045
See, Robert Olender, “ A Legacy of Limitations: Thomas M Cooley, Public Purpose and the General Welfare,”
33 Michigan Historical Review 1 (2007), People ex rel. The Detroit and Howell Railroad Co v Township Board of
Salem, 488-89.
1046
It may be significant that Cooley twice moved his family in order to reap the promised benefits of incoming rail.
In both cases, the promise exceeded the reward. In 1850, he moved to Coldwater, Michigan, hoping to enhance his
legal practice as the Michigan Southern arrived. In 1853, he moved to Toledo to take advantage of the benefits of
newly located rail. In both cases, he left frustrated over the lack of benefits, although his exit from Toledo may have
also been connected to political losses he suffered.
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blindly follow where others have blindly led.”1047 The long-standing practice of government
financial aid to railroads was now invalid, based on constitutional tax language that had been in
place during the entirety of the government-support regime.1048
Why did Cooley take what had previously been an argument in the political field and
constitutionalize it in the legal realm? His 1885 Michigan, A History of Governments, suggests
that Cooley employed constitutional doctrine to achieve ends unattainable in the political sphere.
Cooley wrote Constitutional Limitations, Salem, and his other legislative-limiting writings in a
time of great government expansion. In 1885, he reflected on the national government’s growing
involvement in spheres Cooley believed should be private or within the states’ purview. After
bemoaning how the Civil War had resulted in changed constitutional understandings that allowed
the destruction of state banks, the federal imposition of authority during Reconstruction, and
protective tariffs favoring industries, Cooley focused on government spending. He wrote of
“liberal pensions,” creating a class of people who would exercise power at the expense of the
state. He warned against the gifts of land and funds to railroads, and the expansion of federal
postal operations. He warned against the “mighty army” of federal office holders, “an army
greater in number than that which Wellington at Waterloo changed the history the world, greater
than that which Mead won the decisive victory at Gettysburg.” Cooley’s challenge was that the
constitution as written allowed for such “evils.” In his last sentence of this reflective book,
Cooley concluded that “only time and the patient and persevering labors of the statesmen and
patriots will suffice to eradicate,” those engrafted evils of government excesses.1049 It is not
1047

Cooley, Constitutional Limitations: 493-94.
After the Salem opinion, the legislature proposed a constitutional amendment to allow municipal aid to railroads.
The effort failed but the vote suggests an interesting perspective on public/private enterprises. With a few
exceptions, communities already served by rail, many of them with the support of local public funding, voted
against further public aid. Unserved communities voted to amend the constitution and allow taxpayer support of rail
development. Elliott, When the Railroad was King: 32-33.
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clear whether Cooley included courts in his call to statesmen and patriots. Whether he did or
not, he expected that judges would labor to limit legislatures in an effort to assure republican
governance and the associated respect for individual rights. In order to accomplish that, his work
proposed that the judiciary find new constitutional meanings to address changing societal and
governance needs. By doing so, the courts could protect the state and nation against the excesses
of legislative power that had undermined Michigan and were undermining the nation.

The Response to Salem
It had been the practice in Michigan to grant support to rail, and Salem occasioned broad
discussion. Public reaction was mixed with some applauding the court’s actions and some
critiquing it. On July 27, 1870, Governor Baldwin called the legislature to extraordinary session
to deal with the economic and legal challenges created by Salem. He maintained that bonds “for
the larger part [were] held by persons of moderate or small means,” notably the aged, women
and orphan children. While the court may have invalidated the law, he argued moral obligations
compelled bond payment. To fulfill that requirement, Baldwin called for a constitutional
amendment to allow municipal ratification of the bonds.1050 The legislature passed that
amendment but the voters did not.
In March 1871, Detroit’s mayor and common council petitioned the state treasurer to
return the $300,000s of bonds the city had sent the state pursuant to the now unconstitutional
law. The treasurer refused, claiming it would not release the bonds back until three years had
passed. To defuse the situation, William Wesson, the president of the Detroit, Howell &
Lansing, wrote in the Detroit Tribune that the railroad would not claim the bonds and,
accordingly, the city faced no risk. Notwithstanding the loss of public financing, construction
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continued. Wesson reported that the railroad was “engaged in rapidly constructing the road in
accordance with the condition under which the bonds were voted.”1051 Although the law now
precluded government support of rail, the Detroit, Howell & Lansing continued to collect on the
bonds that had been sold. As noted below, it could collect on those bonds pursuant to the United
States Constitution’s Contract Clause as enforced by the federal courts. As the 1919 Michigan
Railroad Commission Report noted, the Salem and Bay City opinions marked “the end of active
campaigns for local municipal aid and donations to railroads, although for many years thereafter
it is found that occasional public aids were given, sometimes under circumstances designed to
evade the limitations of the law.”1052
Almost immediately after Cooley handed down the Salem opinion, fellow University of
Michigan Law faculty member, Charles Kent, cautioned against the adoption of Cooley’s
standard. Basing much of his critique on the principle that courts must uphold state legislation
unless it violates a specific constitutional restriction, Kent accused Cooley of elevating his
“unsupported philosophical theories as to the proper limits of government power against the
popular will.” After noting the ahistorical nature of Cooley’s public purpose doctrine, Kent
focused on the disruption that the doctrine and its associated judicial activism would cause. “If
money cannot be raised by taxation in favor of private corporations, of course public property
cannot be given to such corporations.” He continued, “All laws giving bounties to any particular
industries, are void. All tariffs for the sake of protection come under the same head. All gifts by
the state to churches or private schools are void. The homesteads given to actual settlers are still
the property of the United States.” This academic colleague of Cooley continued, noting the
revolutionary results that would logically extend from Cooley’s public purpose doctrine.
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“Neither do we see how, consistently with this principle, it is possible to justify the exemption
from taxation of churches, libraries, and private school property. The principle carried out fully
would destroy a considerable portion of the legislation of almost every state in the Union, as well
as a large share of that of the United States.”1053 Kent was right; were one to extrapolate
Cooley’s doctrine to a laissez-faire governance approach then, by and large, that would have
happened. While some courts moved in that direction, more employed Cooley’s philosophy to
limit but not totally restrict legislative activism, and mostly when the government or regulatory
activity significantly encumbered individual rights or liberties.
Cooley advanced his arguments, writing in Bay City v State Treasurer that due process
guarantees invalidated state support of rail development. “To take a man’s property from him
under pretense of taxation, for a purpose for which taxation is not admissible, is not due process
of law, but is an unlawful confiscation.”1054 While Cooley attached the public purpose doctrine
to due process, most other courts did not. They premised their invalidation of legislation on the
implied definition of tax as requiring a public purpose.
Bay City was significant in one other respect. In it, Cooley used the state’s disastrous rail
history as grounds for constitutionally prohibiting improvident legislation. Noting the state’s
“bitter experience of the evils of” government internal improvements, Cooley argued, “a settled
conviction fastened itself upon the minds of our people that works of internal improvement
should be private enterprises.” Although the 1850 constitution only prohibited state aid, and all
other jurisdictions had ruled that such state prohibitions did not preclude municipal aid, Cooley
suggested otherwise. He would read the 1850 constitution not by its specific limits, but rather
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“from the public history of the times.”1055 Circumstances both before and after the constitution’s
drafting influenced Cooley’s constitutional interpretation. The overarching constitutional goal
drove the momentary interpretation of constitutional language.
With Constitutional Limitations and Salem as its foundation, a legislative-limiting,
property-protecting undercurrent became prevalent. In nearly every state, courts increasingly
protected property and invalidated state expenditures in support of the general welfare. At first,
litigants focused on challenging business subsidies. For example, in 1872, the Maine Supreme
Court in Allan v Inhabitants of Jay invalidated legislation granting tax abatements and financial
support to construct a sawmill and a grinding mill in the town. The court, fearing the tyranny of
legislative majorities, protested that the state should not interfere in the market. Instead,
investors should determine the best use of capital. “Those who by industry and economy have
become capitalist are more likely to invest it well than those who, having gained none, have none
to lose.” It then classified government support of industry “communism incipient, if not
perfected.”1056 In 1873, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that Boston could not issue
bonds to assist downtown businesses to rebuild after a sizeable portion burned down, finding the
benefit to the city “incidental.”1057
While rapid, the move to limit legislatures was not uniform, especially in those cases
considering rail subscriptions or donations. Because of the historic support given by
government, courts struggled with invalidating those time-honored activities. Early on, the
Kansas Supreme Court took exception to Cooley’s public purpose doctrine as defined in Iowa’s
Hanson and Michigan’s Salem opinions. In an opinion almost mocking those recent cases, the
court offered in Commissioners of Leavenworth County v Miller (a rail-aid case) that historically
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“The power of governments and governmental organizations to make donations, has been
exercised ever since governments were instituted, and, we presume, always will be.” It then
went on to list federal, state, and local donations to advance the general welfare or to reward
individual behavior. In chastening the Hanson and Salem courts, the court offered the Wisconsin
and Michigan courts were “forgetting of course that such donations as are everywhere admitted
to be legal, are nearly always given to private corporations or to private individuals.” The court
then suggested that Cooley and his followers wished to “startle the world” with “new truth,” but
such action should await constitutional amendment, and not be subject to new constitutional
constructions.1058
Though the Kansas justices, and most other courts, did not accept Cooley’s doctrine as it
applied to rail support, they took note in ways unusual for a distinctly minority position. In
1873, through the case of Harcourt v Good, Justice Moses B. Walker of the Texas Supreme
Court weighed in. Recognizing that “the profound learning and ability of Judge Cooley” did “for
a time shake the confidence both of the bench and bar in the correctness of the doctrine
previously maintained with such unanimity,” Walker looked for a counter opinion to “restore the
equilibrium of the judicial mind.” He found it in a federal circuit court opinion in Talcott v City
of Pinegrove (discussed below). So pleased was he that standard government practices were
constitutionally upheld by the federal court, that he asked his brethren on the court whether he
could “have a copy of the [Talcott] opinion published in a forthcoming volume” of the court’s
reports. He then listed the cases affirming legislative power financially to aid private industry
and the courts’ obligation to defer to legislative judgments concerning that aid. Walker listed
ninety-five rulings from twenty-four states, each finding government support of private industry
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constitutionally permissible. It is footnoted below in its entirety.1059 After citing the authority
contrary to Cooley, Walker dismissed Salem as “very logical and profound reasoning upon a
false premise.”1060

1059

The following cases were listed in Harcourt v Good, 39 Tex. 455, 472-75 (1873)., to establish the weight of
cases supporting government’s power to subsidize private industry.
“Alabama, 3 cases. --1854, Stein v. Mayor of Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; 1857, Mayor of Wetumpka v. Winter,
29 Ala. 651 (plank road case); 1860, Gibbons v. Mobile, etc. R. R. Co. 36 Ala. 410.
California, 7 cases. --1859, Pattison v. Supervisors of Yuba County, 13 Cal. 175; 1860, Hobart v.
Supervisors of Butler County, 17 Cal. 23; [26] 1863, Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379; 1864, French v. Techmaker,
24 Cal. 518; People v. Coon, 25 Cal. 635; 1865, People v. Supervisors of San Francisco, 27 Cal. 655; Stockton and
V. R. R. v. Stockton.
Connecticut, 2 cases. --1843, Bridgeport v. Housatonic Railroad Company, 15 Conn. 475; 1860, Society of
Savings v. New London, 29 Conn. 174.
Delaware, 1 case. --1847, Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479.
Florida, 1 case. --1852, Cotton v. County Commissioner of Leon, 6 Fla. 610.
Georgia, 2 cases. --1857, Winn v. Macon, 21 Ga. 275; 1857, Powers v. Inferior Court of Dougherty
County, 23 Ga. 65.
Illinois, 10 cases. --1851, Ryder v. Alton, etc. R. R. Co. 13 Ill. 516; 1858, Prettyman v. Supervisors of
Tazewell Co. 19 Ill. 406; 1859, Robertson v. City of Rockford et al. 21 Ill. 451; 1860, Johnson v. Stark Co. 24 Ill.
75; 1860, Perkins v. Lewis, 24 Ill. 208; 1861, Butler v. Dunham, 27 Ill. 474; 1862, Clarke v. Supervisors, etc. 27 Ill.
305; 1862, Piatt v. People, 29 Ill. 54; King v. Wilson, 3 Chic. L. N.; 1872, Chicago, etc. R. W. Co. v. Smith,
decision just rendered in Supreme Court for northern division of Illinois, not yet reported.
Indiana, 5 cases. --1857, City of Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74; 1860, Evansville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Evansville,
15 Ind. 395; 1862, The Commissioners, etc. v. Bright, 18 Ind. 93; 1864, City of Aurora v. West, 22 Ind. 88; S. M.
and B. R. R. v. Geiger, 34 Ind.
Iowa, 8 cases. --1853, Dubuque and Pacific R. R. Co. v. Dubuque, 4 Greene 1; 1854, State v. Bissell, 4 G.
Greene, 328; 1857, Clapp v. Cedar Co. 5 Clarke (Iowa) 15; 1858, Ring v. Johnson Co. 6 Iowa 265; 1858, McMillen
v. Boyles, 6 Iowa 304; 1858, McMillen v. Lee Co. 6 Iowa 391; 1859, Whitaker v. Johnson Co. 10 Iowa 161; Stewart
v. Supervisors of Polk County, late case reported in pamphlet.
Kansas, 1 case. --1871, County Commissioners v. Miller.
Kentucky, 4 cases. --1849, Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Mon. 526; 1850, Justices, etc. v. Turnpike Co. 11 B. Mon.
143; [28] 1852, Slack et al. v. Maysville, etc. [474] R. R. Co. 13 B. Mon. 1; 1859, Maddox v. Graham, 2 Metc. 56.
Louisiana, 4 cases. --1853, New Orleans, etc. Co. v. McDonough, 8 La. Ann. 341; 1856, Parker v. Scogin,
11 La. Ann. 649; 1856, Vicksburg, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ouachita, 11 La. Ann. 629; 1854, New Orleans v. Graihle, 9 La.
Ann. 561.
Maine, 1 case. --1860, Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507.
Mississippi, 1 case. --Strickland v. Mississippi, etc. R. R. Co. cited as of 21 (or 27) Miss. 209, and as 1849.
Missouri, 2 cases. --1856, City of St. Louis v. Alexandria, 23 Mo. 483; 1867, St. Joseph Railroad v.
Buchanan Co. Ct. 39 Mo. 485.
New York, 9 cases. --1857, Grant v. Carter, 24 Barb. 232; 1857, Benson v. Mayor of Albany, 24 Barb. 248;
1857, Clark v. City of Rochester, 24 Barb. 446; 1858, Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome, 18 N.Y. 38; 1859, Gould
v. Town of Venice, 29 Barb. 442; 1861, Starin v. Genoa, 23 N.Y. 439; 1864, Clarke v. City of Rochester, 28 N.Y.
605; [29] 1865, People v. Mitchell, 45 Barb. 208; 1866, People v. Mitchell, 35 N.Y. 551.
North Carolina, 2 cases. --1855, Taylor v. Newberne (a navigation case), 2 Jones Eq. 141; 1858, Caldwell
v. The Justices, etc. 4 Jones Eq. 323.
Ohio, 12 cases. --1852, Cincinnati, etc. R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77; 1852, R. W. v.
Township Treasurer of Christian Township, 1 Ohio St. 105; 1853, Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; 1853, Thompson
v. Kelly, 2 Ohio St. 647; 1857, State v. Van Horne, 7 Ohio St. 327; 1858, State v. Union Township, 8 Ohio St. 394;
1861, State, etc. v. Commissioners Hancock Co. 12 Ohio St. 596; 1863, Knox v. Nichols, 14 Ohio St. 260; 1863,
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Classifying Cooley’s Salem opinion as exhibiting “a boldness which is really sublime,”
Nebraska Justice Lorenzo Crunse warned in Hallenbeck v Hann, that Cooley’s uncovering
unenumerated and novel limitations on legislative power was “most dangerous.” Cooley’s
notion of “inherent” limits associated with free governments inappropriately allowed judges “to
destroy legislation which does not square with their views.”1061 Soon Iowa would reverse its
earlier opinions and join those courts affirming legislative power to support private rail
development. In Stewart v Supervisors of Polk County, the Iowa court would revisit its postHanson’s trail of cases in the wake of an 1870 effort of the legislature to “re-assert[] the power
denied them.” Classifying Hanson’s language concerning legislative power to authorize public
aid as “only dictum,” the court relied on the “overwhelming weight of authority” to affirm
legislative power to aid rail development.1062 By the end of the 1870’s, only Wisconsin and
Michigan held public support of private rail unconstitutional.

Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio St. 472; 1863, State v. Goshen, 14 Ohio St. 569; Griffith v. Co. Commissioners, 20
Ohio App. 1; [475] Bloomington R. R. v. Gaiger (April, 1871, vol. 4 of Law Times, State Reps. p. 98).
Pennsylvania, 7 cases. --1846, Harvey v. Lord, 3 Pa. 331; 1849, Commonwealth v. M'Williams (turnpike
case), 11 Pa. 61; [30] 1853, Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147; 1853, Moers v. The City of Reading, 21
Pa. 188; 1858, Commonwealth v. County Commissioners, 32 Pa. 218; 1861, Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, 41 Pa.
278; 1862, Commonwealth v. Perkins et al. 43 Pa. 400.
South Carolina, 1 case. --1857, State v. Charleston, 10 Rich. 491.
Tennessee, 2 cases. --1848, Nichols v. Nashville, 9 Humph. 572; 1854, L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Davidson
County, 1 Sneed 637.
Texas, 1 case. -- San Antonio v. Jones, 28 Tex. 19.
Vermont, 3 cases. --1837, Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh 120; 1846, Harrison Justices v. Holland, 3 Gratt. 247;
Cadis et al. v. Town of Swanton, late case not reported.
Wisconsin, 3 cases. --1859, Clark v. City of Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; 1860, Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195;
1860, Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470.
Only one of our own cases is referred to by Judge Emmons, but this is by no means the only time that the
question has been before this court. San Antonio v. Jones, 28 Tex. 19; [31] San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex. 405; and
San Antonio v. Gould, 34 Tex. 49, are all cases which uphold the power of municipal corporations, when properly
authorized by the legislature, to loan their credit and subscribe to the capital stock of railroad corporations.”
Notably, there were no Michigan cases in the extensive list.
1060
Ibid., 471-72, 77.
1061
Hallenbeck v Hann, 406.
1062
The court said that Hanson’s issue concerned the lack of state legislative approval of municipal actions. The
dissent took great exception, quoting the language of Hanson and the seven subsequent Iowa cases to establish that
the court specifically had ruled government financial support of private rail corporations unconstitutional. Stewart
v Board of Supervisors, 30 Iowa 9, 11, 29, 31-37 (1870). (Emphasis in original.)
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Federal Consideration of Cooley
Soon, federal courts would become involved in the fallout of Cooley’s invalidation of
bond obligations, specifically in response to Bay City v State Treasurer. That was the matter
where Cooley tied his public-purpose doctrine to due process guarantees. Circuit Court Judge
Halmer H. Emmons scornfully attacked the Salem and Bay City decisions in 1872 in Talcott v
City of Pinegrove, classifying Cooley’s opinions and positions as “a deliberate and conscientious
disregard of the most learned, numerous and persuasive body of opinions ever before given upon
any one subject in the whole history of our constitutional law.”1063 Painting Cooley as a legal
scoundrel, Emmons declined to believe Cooley suffered from a mere misconception of the law.
On a point-by-point basis, he attacked Cooley’s recast of law to fit his political philosophies.
Cooley’s notion of a clear line between government and private entities (particularly in transport
and communication) had no legal or historical basis and was contrary to established law in every
jurisdiction, including Michigan. Emmons declared that Cooley’s position was “intentionally
revolutionary in doctrine.” Perhaps referring to Cooley’s claim in Constitutional Limitations that
he was merely restating the law, Emmons continued his attack, claiming that Cooley’s writing,
“asserts independence of precedents, and expressly condemns the old conservative idea of stare
decisis.”1064

Interestingly, the Stewart court at length cited Michigan’s s v Williams (see footnotes 458 and 753, supra)
to establish that railroads were public utilities and that the work of the corporation defines its public or private
nature. Ibid., 22-23.
1063
Emmons listed 90 cases from 25 states, “all sustaining the doctrines overlooked or overruled by the Supreme
Court of Michigan.” Later in the opinion, Emmons declared of Cooley’s opinions: “it seems to us but a mockery of
precedent - - a rejection of all the sources from which alone a lawyer can learn the law - - it is rendering worse than
useless, all our libraries and professional diligence, which can only mislead by their teachings, if, in these
conditions, a majority of a court will assume to say that it has no doubt whatever that all this practical action is a
mistake and a blunder, and that all this judicial decision is ignorance and misapprehension.” Talcott v Township of
Pine Grove, 2 F. Cas. 652, 658-59, 67-68 (1872).
1064
Ibid., 657.
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Before the United States Supreme Court could review Talcott, it addressed the 1869
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Whiting v Sheboygan and Fond du Lac Railroad, which
invalidated legislation authorizing municipal support of private rail corporations. Once again,
the Supreme Court would shrug aside a state court interpretation of its constitution and laws.
Justice William Strong, for the majority, offered that the use of tax dollars for rail was a “matter
of public concern.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court could set standards different from the state
courts, as the issue was a question of “general law.” Strong continued, “The nature of taxation,
what uses are public and what are private, and the extent of unrestricted legislative power, are
matters which, like questions of commercial law, no State court can conclusively determine for
us.” Rejecting ownership as the starting point in its public/private considerations, the court
boldly asserted, “It is not seriously denied that a railroad, though constructed and owned by a
private corporation, is a matter of public concern,” and reflected on the historical government
responsibility to support highways, including rail. While the court accepted that “the taxing
power of the State extends no further than to raise money for a public use,” and favorably cited
Constitutional Limitations in doing so, it refused to go as far as Cooley had in Salem. Instead,
the court specifically rejected Cooley’s ownership test for public purpose. “While, then, it might
be true that ownership of property may sometimes bear upon the question whether the uses of
property are public, it is not the test.”1065
With its review of Emmons’ Talcott opinion, the Supreme Court would consider a matter
directly related to Cooley’s application of state tax and due process constitutional language as
limitations on legislative power. Again, the Supreme Court failed to defer to state court
judgments about its own laws. Instead, it critiqued Cooley’s logic and noted that the due process
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language upon which Cooley relied involved criminal actors “confined to judicial proceedings.”
It addressed Michigan’s (and the nation’s) historic public support of rail development and the
fact that the constitution did not forbid municipalities from supporting rail until they were
“judicially denied” from doing so in 1870. After setting forth the history of government activity
in the transportation sphere, the court addressed the core issue – Cooley’s public purpose
doctrine. On a basic level, the court agreed that taxes must be for a public purpose but then it
looked to the public gain, rather than the nature of the entity receiving public funding. With that
change of focus, the court stated, “the public character of such works cannot be doubted.”
Poetically, the court mused, “Where [railroads] go they animate the sources of prosperity, and
minister to the growth of cities and towns within the sphere of their influence.” Classifying the
Bay City and Salem opinions as “not satisfactory” and in the distinct minority, the court
employed the Contract Clause to compel payment of the bonds.1066
All of the cases that rejected Salem’s reasoning as it applied to railroads did so by looking
at the public benefits derived through rail transportation. In doing so, they viewed public
purpose in a fundamentally different fashion than did Cooley. Cooley looked to both the nature
of the receiving entity and whether the public benefit derived from the expenditure was direct or
incidental. If the entity was private, and it provided no direct exchange of value, the expenditure
unlawfully favored that recipient over others. Hence, he wrote, “the money, when raised, is to
benefit a private corporation; to add to its funds to improve its property; and the benefit to the
public is to be secondary or incidental,” then the grant is not a public purpose and the tax is
unconstitutional.1067 In considering one of the most important industries of the day – railroads –
all jurisdictions save Michigan and Wisconsin maintained their historic deference to legislative
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judgments concerning general-welfare spending. As Goodrich noted of the 1870s, “Whatever
general views were held on the role of government intervention, the local authorities in many
parts of the country found no compelling doctrinal arguments to deter them from investing in the
railroads which they considered necessary for the development of their areas.”1068 Simply,
community self interest muted theoretical arguments that would advance public/private
separation. In the area then predominating the economy – rail transportation – government was
the most useful (if some felt inappropriate) tool toward general-welfare advancement. And
courts demurred. However, that deference would not hold in other areas of government financial
aid.
A safe conclusion from the Supreme Court’s Talcott and Olcott opinions would be that
courts sought to protect bona fide note holders from judicial oscillation. Having purchased
public bonds under a legal regime allowing those bonds, courts could no more invalidate the
bonds by a challenge to constitutional standards than a legislature could through post-issuance
legislation. That interpretation would prove incorrect or at least no longer compelling with the
Court’s 1875 opinion in Loan Association v Topeka. With that case, the Supreme Court largely
embraced Cooley’s public purpose doctrine, at least in the non-rail sphere, when it invalidated a
law funding the relocation of an iron works company. Miller wrote,
To lay with one hand the power of government on the property of the citizen,
and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private
enterprises, and build up private fortunes, is none the less robbery because it is
done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is
a decree under legislative forms.
Contrary to much of the logic of Talcott and Olcott, Miller offered that, “the right to contract
must be limited by the right to tax, and if in the given case no tax can lawfully be levied to pay
the debt, the contract itself is void for want of authority to make it.” With that, the Contract
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Clause related argument failed, bona-fide holders lost their constitutional protection, and
Gelpcke became ineffective.1069 Although lacking focus, Miller’s opinion advocated limited
government and, by extension, the need to limit majority power. He argued that the “theory of
our governments, State and National, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere.”
Since “taxation is the most liable to abuse,” courts must review the purpose for which taxing
power is employed.1070 In doing so, the Court expanded judicial power while contracting
legislative power. Arguably, however, Loan Association was narrowly decided. Like Salem, it
dealt with a specific tax designed to transfer funds from one individual to another.
Underlying much of the early post-Salem public-purpose decisions was a concern over
rights but, in large measure, those rights were viewed in the context of republican governance
concerns. In Loan Association, Miller wrote of free government and rights in the same breath:
There are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential
nature of all free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights,
without which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected by
all governments entitled to the name. No court, for instance, would hesitate to
declare void a statute which enacted that A. and B. who were husband and wife
to each other should be so no longer, but that A. should thereafter be the
husband of C., and B. the wife of D. Or which should enact that the homestead
now owned by A. should no longer be his, but should henceforth be the
property of B.1071
This Loan Association section cited three pages of Constitutional Limitations. The first dealt
with limitations that “spring from the very nature of free government”; the second dealt with
restriction on legislative incursions into the judicial sphere; the third dealt with taxation and the
proper role of government. Each example involved individual rights, but none relied on rights as
its exclusive basis for limiting legislative power. This is not to suggest that property rights were
unimportant. They were a central focus of the court’s concern. Nevertheless, property rights
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were not the reason a legislature, for example, could not change marriage relations. That
incapacity issued from inherent limits on republican-legislative power. Violations of property
rights were an aspect of impermissible government action, not a cause; a reading of the cases
suggests many courts construed commercially related legislative activism as constitutionally
impermissible without reference to its property-intruding consequences. To Cooley and these
courts, a dominant issue was limitations on legislative power notwithstanding rights impairment.
The constitutional basis of Loan Association was the legislative taxing authority. Almost
ruefully, Miller acknowledged that most jurisdictions held that aid to private railroads fit a public
purpose.1072 He then addressed the doctrine as it applied to other areas of government assistance
to private industry. At first blush, he did not go as far as Cooley in demanding direct,
consideration-like benefits for grants to private industry. Instead, Miller listed a series of factors
for courts to determine if legislative spending adhered to the public purpose requirement. Those
focused on customary practice and actions required to support government operations. After that
seemingly wide berth, however, the court began to narrow its standard. Custom was gleaned
from court approvals rather than historical state activities. That allowed the court to frame its
custom to disallow financial support of a bridge company. In declaring the legislation
unconstitutional, Miller declared that such support was no different from governmental
assistance to “the merchant, the mechanic, the innkeeper, the banker, the builder, [or] the
steamboat operator.” But each of those industries historically had received government largess.
This suggests one of three possibilities. Miller may have not known of the historic role of
government in financially supporting industry – an unlikely prospect. He may have considered
the volumes of cases supporting legislative power to spend as wrongly decided. Or, most likely,
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he accepted a notion of constitutional change, the steady growth of “free principles,” and
“recalled” power that Cooley advanced. What was previously acceptable became illegitimate
when the necessity of government action ceased. Miller did not specifically embrace that idea,
but new constitutional meanings underlie much of his argument.
The changed philosophy evidenced in Loan Association demonstrated an increasing
judicial willingness to impose its governing vision over the legislative. In doing so, the court
ruled that the historic practice of public support for rail development was constitutionally
appropriate, whereas the historic practice of supporting bridge construction and operation was
not. Whatever one’s belief concerning the wisdom of those policies, it is hard to find
constitutional language that distinguishes legislative authority between the two. Instead, as
Lucas Powe, Jr., argued, the cases “seem governed by no higher principle than the
implementation of the Court’s perception of sound public policy.”1073 In at least one respect, the
Cooley doctrines had permeated; courts would now review legislation to determine if spending
fit the court’s notion of limited government and legislative power.
Although outwardly not adopting Cooley’s direct benefit test, Miller offered that courts
should read Loan Association in light of two recent cases: Allen v Inhabitants of Jay and Lowell
v Boston. Those cases “adjudicated by courts of the highest character” provided the judicial
basis for judging what constituted a public purpose.1074 (Miller could not cite Salem without
overruling Talcott). If those cases proved the basis for understanding public purpose, then the
Supreme Court adopted the Cooley standard, as both state courts had looked to the nature of the
beneficiary of the funds to determine if the legislation was valid rather than the public benefit
from their services.
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In Allen, the Maine Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of a Jay Township loan
to a steam sawmill to locate in the town.1075 The residents approved a $10,000 loan in aid of the
mill pursuant to authority granted by the Maine legislature. The court ruled that the legislature
lacked the power to authorize that municipal action. While not specifically delineating the
nature of its public-purpose test, the court’s reasoning suggests adherence to the Cooley direct
benefit standard. As Cooley did, the court focused on the nature of the recipient and not the
societal gain from the expenditure. In that sense, it had moved away from the Sharpless and
Talcott standards to Cooley’s more stringent standard.
The Allen case is interesting in another respect. In it, the Maine court moved from the
previous judicial concern with the power of accumulated wealth to a concern that the masses
would strip the wealthy of property. The court suggested that because capitalists demonstrated
greater wisdom, they were entitled to constitutional protections against majoritarian impulses.
“Capital naturally seeks the best investment, or its owners do. Those who by industry and
economy have become capitalist are more likely to invest it than those who, having gained
nothing, have nothing to lose.” Immediately after offering that capitalists knew better where to
invest than did legislators or the public, the court elevated successful capitalists in the eyes of the
law. “The sagacity shown in the acquisition of capital is best fitted to control its disposition.” In
dignifying the successful entrepreneur in this way, the court effectively claimed that these
property owners should not be subject to the will of “an irresponsible majority.”1076 After
celebrating the wisdom of the successful capitalist, the court revealed its concern. “It is
communism incipient, if not perfected.” With that fear in mind, the court ruled that the
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legislature lacked the power to promote private development with tax dollars. It employed the
Cooley standard when it ruled that those actions necessarily offered only indirect benefits and
were therefore unconstitutional. The court thereupon took the additional step of tying tax
financing of private projects to violations of individual property rights. It proclaimed, “All
security of private rights, all protection of private property is at an end, when one is compelled to
raise money to loan at the will of others.”1077 With the court touting the wisdom of the capitalist,
and fearing the rapacious majority, the court ruled the popular vote and state legislation
unconstitutional. To this, Supreme Court Justice Miller tacitly agreed in Loan Association when
he advanced the Maine court as “of the highest character.”1078
The second case Miller touted is interesting in light of the limits it employed. In 1873,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court considered whether bonds issued to help rebuild Boston’s
downtown in the aftermath of a devastating fire were within the legislature’s taxing authority.
With Cooley in the background, the court voiced Massachusetts’ new standard: “The promotion
of the interests of the individuals, either in respect of property or business, although it may result
incidentally in the advancement of the public welfare, is, in its essential character, a private and
not public object.” Sounding as Cooley had, the court offered, “It is the essential character of the
direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity.” Public funds must work, “to
purposes and objects alone which the government was established to promote, to wit, public uses
and public service.”1079 Ignored by the court was Massachusetts’ historic support for multiple
facets of industry, agriculture, and social development.1080 The 1873 court held to this new
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standard however “certain and great the resulting good to the public” the funds would be to
rebuilding downtown Boston. That good was only an “incidental advantage to the public” and
therefore constitutionally impermissible. Clearly, the Cooley standard prevailed.1081
Underlying the referenced state court decisions, and that of Loan Association, was the
notion that courts must now intervene to check legislation that redistributed wealth. Whether
Loan Association be read as employing an amorphous standard of historic public benefit, or
Cooley’s direct benefit standard, the United States Supreme Court in 1875 accepted limitations
on historical legislative space, and did so by imposing limits on the legislature that all antebellum
courts had rejected. Judicial activism would now seek to check what it considered majoritarian,
legislative activism. In doing so, courts pressed against legislation that redistributed income. As
an intrinsic offshoot, the public-purpose cases helped lay a foundation for the substantive due
process jurisprudence that would soon follow. Powe correctly noted this when he argued that the
“attitudes displayed in municipal bond cases were far more likely to assist the development of
substantive due process than the dicta so often relied upon by commentators as demonstrating a
convincing progression toward the ultimate concept.”1082
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With Constitutional Limitations and Salem as their foundation, the legislative limiting
and its associated property-protecting undercurrents became judicially dominant.1083 In nearly
every state, courts became increasingly active in reviewing and limiting legislative efforts to
advance general-welfare concerns. Those concerns transcended their support of private
businesses. Any public funds given without consideration – or direct public benefit – were
constitutionally suspect. With the legislature’s historical spending role now under assault, courts
would employ Cooley’s public-purpose doctrine to test the propriety of aid to schools, public
employees, cultural institutions, and private persons. It is worth reviewing several cases for a
flavor of how courts responded, and then to consider how Cooley viewed judicial application of
his public purpose doctrine.
In response to a request from the Maine legislature for a legal opinion on its power to
enable “towns by gifts of money or loans or bonds, to assist individuals or corporations to
establish or carry on manufacturing,” the Maine Supreme Court in 1871 in multiple opinions
offered that such transfers were constitutionally barred. Employing taking, due process, law of
the land, and public purpose language, the justices largely agreed that wealth transfers through
taxation would destroy individual security and property rights. This was so whether the transfer
was to a corporation or to a farmer or to a tradesman.1084 The court followed that opinion in
1872 with Allen v Inhabitants of Jay, mentioned above.
The Michigan Supreme Court ruled in 1889, in John Clee v. William Sanders, that the
city of Fenton’s efforts to support a stave mill by donating funds to drain a marsh and to
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construct docks and harbors unconstitutionally appropriated public funds for a private purpose.
The court rejected as obfuscation “too plain for discussion” the city’s argument that government
assistance to drain marshes was an appropriate government activity.1085 Similarly, in 1900 the
court found in Michigan Sugar v. Auditor General that legislative efforts to facilitate sugar-beet
manufacturing in Michigan were unconstitutional. The state legislature lacked the power “to
authorize a tax for private purposes” and sugar refining was neither a legitimate “government
end” nor a business “the State itself” could carry on. The court ruled that, even though the
industry had taken action and expended funds in good-faith reliance on this legislation, Michigan
Sugar could not be paid because the legislation was unconstitutional. The court declared that it
could hold the sugar subsidy “void whether it comes within any of the express provisions of the
Constitution or not,” but continued that the law violated the court’s definition of the takings
clause and the tax provisions under the public purpose doctrine. Relying on Salem, the court
asserted that to find otherwise would ultimately result in “strong and powerful interests”
controlling legislation to the detriment of the weaker and unconnected.1086 Cooley’s historical
views had helped create an overarching constitutional principle—government assistance to
industry threatened democratic governance and was unconstitutional unless there was a direct
benefit to the taxpayers.
In 1875, the Kansas Supreme Court moved out of the purely commercial realm in State
ex re James Griffith v Osawkee Township. In the wake of an 1874 severe drought and crop
failure, Osawkee Township voters approved a $6,000 bond to provide loans to farmers, which
James Griffith and William Armistead sought to enjoin. Recognizing government’s role in
supporting the indigent, the court undertook to determine how much farmers must suffer before
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they could receive public aid. Not satisfied with both the legislature’s and citizens’ popular vote,
and despite a judicial recognition that farmers suffered from dire conditions, the court
determined that the farmers’ poverty was insufficiently deep to allow public support. “It is
strictly speaking, the pauper, and not the poor man, who has a claim on public charity. It is not
one who is in want merely, but one who being in want is unable to prevent or remove such want.
There is an idea of helplessness as well as destitution.” In ruling the relief unconstitutional, the
court inserted itself as the arbiter of the historic legislative decision over a community’s
responsibility to mitigate suffering. The court went a step further, claiming review power over
the legislature’s judgment over the best means of support. In response to the claim that a small
amount of current relief would avoid significant future obligations, the court argued, “though this
calamity is great and though by reason thereof it may seem wise to appropriate out of the public
funds a little now to guard against the risk of future want, yet the principle is dangerous and
unsound.” In a remarkable way, the court had removed the discretion from the legislature and
the voting public to determine how to resolve a future problem. Instead, the court cautioned,
“Let the doorways to taxation be opened, not merely to the relief of the present and actual
distress, but in anticipation of and to guard against future want, and who can declare the result.”
Because the efforts to avoid penurious want were indirect (seeds instead of food), the legislation
was unconstitutional.1087
Concerns over class legislation seemed to permeate the decision. The court declared its
distaste for legislation that “taxes the whole community to assist one class” – in this case,
destitute farmers. That explanation is troublesome, as any beneficiaries of legislation not
addressing the whole are by their nature a class. Provide schools, you benefit the class of
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schoolchildren; help the truly destitute, you support the poor.1088 Therefore, class was a method
of distinction, not an underlying principle. That underlying principle was one of republican
governance where a majority could not transfer to themselves the property of a minority. Steps
in that direction proved troubling and, therefore, justified judicial intervention.
Soon Cooley’s public purpose doctrine moved to prohibiting other forms of government
support. A few examples are illustrative. In 1898, a Missouri statute providing funding for
need-based scholarships was challenged as an unconstitutional taking. Quoting Cooley’s
Constitutional Limitations and a number of its progeny, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled the
scholarship program unconstitutional. Citing Salem, the court found irrelevant the recognized
benefit of education to the public welfare. Instead, the court considered the nature of the
recipients – in this case private persons with no obligation to the state – and historic
governmental obligations. Because the scholarship program had no historical roots, the court
found the program beyond legislative authority. The state could support universities as a whole,
but it could not target individuals for special aid. To do so smacked of “paternalism,” and
paternalism was antagonistic to self-government and “pernicious in its tendencies.” The court
further found that Missouri’s 1875 constitution was designed “to curb the power of those clothed
with authority to legislate in behalf of favored classes.” The court claimed that use of tax dollars
to support scholarships was not in “the character of our government.” 1089 In an almost Alice-inWonderland fashion, the court defined poor students as favored because the legislature had
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determined to support their education. Because they were now favored, state aid was
unconstitutional.
Three more cases are worth noting, as they show how far Cooley’s public-purpose
doctrine extended to limit government efforts to assist indigent people and to support the public
welfare. The South Carolina Supreme Court in 1907 in Aetna Fire Insurance Co. v. Jones
considered a statute that taxed insurance premiums to provide for injured firefighters and the
widows of firefighters as well as, in some cases, to offer pensions to retired firefighters. The
court found that the state lacked the authority to tax for these benefits. The payments were gifts
and without consideration. While the legislation advanced a benevolent purpose, the court found
that the constitutionally required “public purpose seems to be lacking.” 1090 The firefighters’
value to society was unquestioned, and the court acknowledged that such a program of taxation
could help to create a professional firefighting force. However, those gains were tangential to
the pensions and benefits and, therefore, unconstitutional.
In 1906, the Ohio Supreme Court in Auditor of Lucas County v. State nullified legislation
designed to “provide relief for the worthy blind.” The court was reviewing a legislative grant to
blind individuals who had no property or means of support. In finding an “inherent limitation”
on the legislature’s power to tax for other than a public purpose, the court determined that the aid
provided only incidental public benefit. Invalidating the legislation, the court ruled that it would
not be “wise or constitutional to select out a class, having some particular physical infirmity, and
then confer a bounty upon individuals of that class.” Relying on Constitutional Limitations and a
line of cases relying on the public purpose doctrine, the court found that while supporting
institutions for the blind was appropriate as a historically sanctioned form of aid to the poor,
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novel methods of support, like direct subsidies, were “without precedent” and
unconstitutional.1091 Because there was no direct benefit to taxpayers, and no historical
precedent, aid to the indigent blind was unacceptable. In following Cooley, the Ohio court
limited general-welfare legislation to existing programs, proscribing novel efforts as
unconstitutional gifts to the needy.
By considering the nature of the recipient, Cooley’s public-purpose doctrine also blocked
legislative efforts to provide effectively for the general welfare. In 1885 a group of Detroit
residents organized the Detroit Museum of Art, pursuant to legislation encouraging the
cultivation of art. Although the museum corporation was private, the museum’s obligations to
the city were extensive. The corporation granted its real estate to Detroit and the city enjoyed
minority representation on the corporation’s board of directors, whose express statutory object
was to “open its building and art collection to the general public.”1092 Nevertheless, in 1915 the
Michigan Supreme Court in Detroit Museum of Art v. Engel ruled that public efforts to promote
art through a private corporation were unconstitutional. Basing its decision almost exclusively
on the private nature of the corporation, the court revealed its purpose, to protect “the people
against reckless and extravagant use of public funds.”1093 Although admission to the museum
was free, and the city’s common council declared the museum within the public interest, the
court, fearing a lavish legislature, struck down the ordinance as beyond the constitutional
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prerogatives of government. Seeing itself as the protector of the public purse, the Michigan
Supreme Court stopped the city from legislating for what the court recognized as an obvious
public interest.1094 It furthered Cooley’s constitutional principle with a stated desire to protect
against majority extravagance at taxpayer expense. Courts, in their efforts to protect property,
now acted as shields against popularly supported social-welfare legislation.1095
Cooley’s public-purpose doctrine had been significantly born out of a concern that
government support of industry resulted in “careless and corrupt” legislation on behalf of the
wealthy. But Cooley’s principles had quickly mutated to include a good deal more, and indeed
to undermine Cooley’s original focus on corporate power. Using the public-purpose doctrine,
courts would routinely challenge legislative efforts to support the common good. These
challenges increasingly had little to do with fears of undue corporate influence. Rather, courts
sought to protect the wealthy from the “irresponsible majority.” The effect was to relieve
corporations of tax burdens in support of the common welfare within the historical meaning of
the “public purpose.”
Cooley had delivered the constitutional pretext the courts needed to protect property and
to act as a super legislature where judges could determine level of need and acceptability of
general-welfare legislation. Individual property, in the form of tax dollars, could not be given to
another without a direct exchange of value. Justice Chase’s view in Calder v Bull had gained
greater purchase, and his anti-majoritarian philosophy had gained judicial adherents. Courts had
found a constitutional basis upon which to limit the legislatures’ right to take property from A
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and give it to B. They found that the people did not “entrust a Legislature with SUCH power,”
and that the limitation was found in the constitutions.1096
So, what did Cooley think of the application of his public purpose doctrine. He seemed
torn, accepting some rulings as appropriately invalidating transfers of wealth to private purposes.
Reviewing a number of cases quickly, he wrote in 1880, that some of the properly struck down
laws included,
A tax levied to aid private parties or corporations to establish themselves in
business as manufacturers; a tax the proceeds of which are to be loaned out to
individuals who have suffered from a great fire; a tax to supply with provisions
and seed such farmers as have lost their crops; a tax to build a dam which at
discretion is to be devoted to private purposes; a tax to refund moneys to
individuals which they have paid to relieve themselves from an impending
military draft; and so on.
Because the public benefit for these expenditures were the same as the public would receive
from any industry or individual efforts, each tax was unconstitutional. On the other hand, he
seemed to disagree with cases that invalidated pay bounties and pensions. Accordingly, he
suggested that cases invalidating widowers’ pensions, or compensated firefighters, were wrongly
decided. Notwithstanding earlier language that broadly applied his public purpose doctrine to
government transfers of wealth to private parties, in 1880 Cooley suggested that if the favored
treatment was given with no associated direct tax (the funds come from general revenues), then
the spending is constitutional, even if ill advised. “The remedies for such cases,” he offered,
“can only be administered through the elections.”1097 One explanation for this seeming shift may
have been the broadened application his principles endured as courts substituted judicial
judgment for that of the legislature. As discussed below, Cooley’s concern may not have been as
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much with the specific application of his standard as with the substitution of judicial judgment
for that of the legislature. That concern would manifest itself with the substantive due process
revolution he helped generate and to which we now turn.

Inserting Private Rights to Limit Regulatory Power
While Cooley’s impact in changing the public spending paradigm was considerable, his
impact on government’s ability to regulate industry was perhaps more significant. Cooley wrote
Constitutional Limitations as the states were ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment and his first
edition only touches on the Amendment, but he did address it as the editor of the fourth edition
of Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. Cooley wrote of the
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses that they “must have the same end as the others
already existing” in state constitutions. In that sense, Cooley did not believe that the amendment
changed the federal structure or that it modified state police powers. Instead, he felt the
Fourteenth’s due process and equal protection language restated existing safeguards covered by
state constitutions. To him, they offered a welcome repetition. Cooley noted that protections of
individual rights “cannot be too frequently declared nor too many forms of words; nor is it
possible to guard too vigilantly against encroachments of power, nor to watch with too lively a
suspicion the propensity of persons in authority to break through the ‘cobweb chains of paper
constitutions.’”1098 Time-honored common-law and republican protections were now restated in
the federal constitution just as they were explicitly or implicitly contained in state constitutions.
Given his limited-government focus, Cooley rejected the argument that the Fourteenth
advanced an activist federal government or that it granted federal authority to regulate. Instead,
it reiterated existing restrictions. Cooley would reflect that limited governance belief in a later
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letter to Christopher Tiedeman where he stated that he “cannot recognize any necessity of
twisting and turning Constitutional clauses away from their plain meaning in order to bring
doubtful power within the grant of the powers to the federal government.” 1099 The Fourteenth
Amendment did not authorize activist government. It was to support limited government – just
as the identical language did at the state level.
Others would similarly accept that the state and federal due process provisions restricted
legislative space. Jurists and scholars soon employed Constitutional Limitations’ principles to
define the Fourteenth Amendment as demanding restrictions on state police powers and the
governments’ rights to regulate. Employing that clause, corporate “counsel turned to
Constitutional Limitations to argue that their clients might not be deprived of liberty or property
without due process of law” . . . and “the bench cited the same book to agree with them to strike
down state regulative laws.”1100 Because state and local governments enacted the vast majority
of regulations, litigants argued that those laws violated state due process and law of the land
clauses. At the same time, they would raise Fourteenth Amendment challenges, allowing for
federal court review. Cooley’s argument that federal and state due process language must be
read consistently gained purchase. Due process was to limit government, primarily legislative,
excesses.
Referencing Wynehamer, Cooley employed his oft-quoted “Due process of law in each
particular case means, such an exertion of powers of government as settled maxims of law
sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as the maxims
prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs.” However, Wynehamer did
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not offer a “settled maxim of law” – it was an outlier, with nearly all state higher courts rejecting
its reasoning. And Cooley knew that, but consistently with his notion of modified constitutional
meanings, Wynehamer held true to a deeper constitutional imperative – limited republican
government. In proclaiming that such limits were a settled maxim of law, Cooley added a
substantive perch to an accepted procedural podium. Consistently with his notion of a steady
growth of free principles, Cooley believed that legislative regulatory power was at its weakest as
legislative actions increasingly burdened private rights. When burdens on individual rights
intensified, it was the duty of the court to consider whether the legislature had exceeded its
authority. The courts were to assert judicial authority over rights encumbered by the legislature
just as they had historically done so concerning rights encumbered by the executive. Hence his
advocacy that,
While every man has a right to require that his own controversies shall be
judged by the same rules which settle those of his neighbors, the whole
community is also entitled at all times to demand the protection of the ancient
principles which shield private rights against arbitrary interference, even
though such interference may be under a rule impartial in its application.1101
To accomplish that, Cooley would read due process and law of the land clauses as shields against
what he and other jurists considered the later-nineteenth century threats to republican
governance, the rule of law, and individual rights. Those threats came from a legislature too
pliable to monied interests and majoritarian will. That expansion of constitutional meaning and
judicial space would ignite a governing tempest. Referencing Cooley and his associates’ impact,
Twiss contended that they “contributed to a constitutional revolution paralleling the industrial
revolution which was then taking place.”1102
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Much has been written about later nineteenth century judicial activism and this work will
only touch the surface of those rulings. Notwithstanding that, it is worth highlighting some of
those matters, especially as some led to a regretful Cooley. Cooley’s due process influence was
first felt in the developing “liberty of contract” jurisprudence. Under this standard, individuals
and corporations had a property right to contract without government interference.1103 The
liberty of contract principle furthered the push towards a negative-governance, laissez-faire
governance by giving businesses and individuals the right to contract concerning their property
interests – for example wages, hours, and collective-bargaining rights – without government
interference. That constitutionalization began in earnest with Cooley, although earlier jurists had
foreshadowed the ideas. For example, in 1859, Michigan Chief Justice George Martin, writing
in Michigan Central Railroad v Hale, ruled that individuals had the right to contract away rights
even if deep public-policy interest weighed to the contrary. When considering the parties’ power
to contract away common-carrier liability standards, the court ruled, “paramount considerations
of public policy” allowed “every man the right to regulate his own affairs, in his own way, and to
make such contracts respecting his property as he may regard to be advantageous.” Personal
contract rights could now trump common-law standards. There was a limitation, however. The
1859 Hale court stated that the legislature could “tie the hands” of the parties and prohibit such
contracts.1104
Of course, the legislature could only tie hands when it had the constitutional power to do
so. Cooley’s due process standards would limit that legislative hand-tying authority, particularly
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where legislation impacted individual liberties and rights. In one of his most frequently quoted
and most significant passages, he wrote, “The doubt might also arise whether a regulation made
for any one class of citizens, entirely arbitrary in its character, and restricting their rights,
privileges, or legal capacities in a manner before unknown to the law, could be sustained,
notwithstanding its generality.” He then framed the substantive due process revolution that
would soon follow:
if the legislature should undertake to provide that persons following some
specified lawful trade or employment should not have capacity to make
contracts, or to receive conveyances, or to build such houses as others were
allowed to erect, or in any other way to make such use of their property as was
permissible to others, it can scarcely be doubted that the act would transcend
the due bounds of legislative power, even if it did not come in conflict with
express constitutional provisions. The man or the class forbidden the
acquisition or enjoyment of property in the manner permitted to the community
at large would be deprived of liberty in particulars of primary importance to his
or their ‘pursuit of happiness.1105
With the ahistorical “it can scarcely be doubted,” Cooley declared that property, liberty, and
pursuit of happiness interests limit legislative power. Before that declaration, courts almost
never found that such legislation had “transcend[ed] the due bounds of legislative power.” With
Cooley, the rules changed.
Cooley did allow that the states had police powers to regulate the health, safety, morals,
and general welfare of the community. The question was how far a legislature could go within
that context as, theoretically, all regulation would be under some definition of police powers.
After discussing the need to regulate dangerous activities, unsafe conditions, and nuisances,
Cooley in Constitutional Limitations turned to the subject that had so recently vexed legislatures
and courts – alcohol prohibitions. And he did so in irresolute fashion. While nineteen of twentyone state courts approved the legislatures’ severe restrictions on alcohol, Cooley at first focused
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on limiting such authority. He expressed concern over such legislative attempts, saying,
“Perhaps there is no instance in which the power of the legislature to make such regulations as
may destroy the value of property, without compensation to the owner, appears in a more
striking light than in the case of these statutes.” Troubled over the value destruction of
previously lawful property, Cooley offered, “The trade in alcoholic drinks being lawful, and the
capital employed in it being fully protected by law, the legislature then steps in, and, by an
enactment based on general reasons of public utility, annihilates the traffic, destroys altogether
the employment, and reduces to a nominal value of the property on hand.” After bemoaning
criminalizing behavior that was recently lawful and destroying previously valued property,
Cooley set the standard of review: the legislation “must be justified upon the highest reasons of
public benefit.” Having offered his standard, Cooley demurred by claiming that the validity of
such laws rested “exclusively in the legislative wisdom.”1106 Cooley never ruled on temperance
legislation and his likely decision is subject to debate. He might have deferred to the legislature
or might have sided with parties claiming the law unconstitutionally encumbered their property
rights.
Whether he really would have deferred to the legislature or not, those courts following
his lead frequently refused to do so. Instead, they exerted their independent judgment over the
wisdom of property-destroying legislation, and that did not take long after Constitutional
Limitation’s publication. In 1872, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in affirming the right to
regulate slaughterhouses, cautioned that it would step in if the legislature went too far in its
regulations. Mimicking Cooley, the court offered: “The law will not allow rights of property to
be invaded under the guise of a police regulation for the preservation of health or the protection
against a threatened nuisance; and when it appears that such is not the real object and purpose of
1106
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the regulation, courts will interfere to protect the rights of the citizen.”1107 The court started
down this path of questioning legislative motivation notwithstanding Massachusetts’s historic
practice of government regulation of tanneries and slaughterhouses.1108
The next year, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on Constitutional Limitations as the basis
for overturning legislation that limited a cemetery’s use of its land for burial purposes. In Lake
View v Rose Hill Cemetery, the court considered whether the legislature had the constitutional
authority to impose restrictions on property uses that were authorized in the cemetery’s corporate
charter. Citing Cooley’s newly published work, the majority stated that it was unwilling “to
concede the existence of an indefinable power, superior to the constitution, that may be invoked
whenever the legislature may deem the public exigency may require it, by which a party may be
capriciously deprived of his property or its use, without compensation, whether such property
consists of franchises or tangible forms of property.” The court continued: “under the power to
regulate, the State cannot deprive the citizen of the lawful use of his property, if it does not
injuriously affect or damage others.” 1109 In essence, the court found that police powers only
allow for correcting abuses and by extension could only be employed when an “overruling
necessity” or danger threatened. Invoking Cooley, the court subordinated concerns over the
general welfare to the nether regions, or at least to the complete discretion of the court.
Although the legislature could determine when and how to abate nuisances, without explanation,
the court found “there must necessarily be constitutional limits on that power.” Hence, it was up
to the courts to determine if the legislation improperly encumbered essential rights and
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privileges.1110 Without using the term “due process,” the Illinois court was the first postConstitutional Limitations court to declare a regulation unconstitutional because the legislature
encumbered property rights.
Although the court relied on Cooley, Cooley may not have gone as far as did the Illinois
court. In Constitutional Limitations, Cooley acknowledged that under legislative police powers
“churchyards which, found by the advance of urban population, to be detrimental to the public
health, or in danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery
purposes.” Cooley was advocating a more nuanced approach than that employed by the Illinois
court. He would balance the legislative judgment concerning the public’s health and safety
against the property and contract interests (or rights) of the individual. Hence, he approvingly
discussed cemetery restrictions along with flammable building and gunpowder laws, beach and
waterway restriction, and poisonous drug and dangerous animal limits.1111 Legislatures would
not stop regulating despite rulings like Rose Hill Cemetery, but would do so within increasingly
unclear limits. The courts would not offer identifiable limits and Cooley suggested there could
be no firm boundary delineating public and private spaces. Rather, he believed that legislative
power waned as private interests advanced. And that balance changed as society developed, with
private space advancing over the public, particularly as economies advanced and history
disclosed the foibles of government intervention.
At about the same time that the Illinois court struck down the cemetery legislation, the
United States Supreme Court opened the due process floodgates with its rulings in the SlaughterHouse Cases. In 1869, the Louisiana legislature passed a law requiring New Orleans
slaughterhouses to locate in an area of the city owned and controlled by the Crescent City Live-
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Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company. They could not continue operations outside that
zone. A number of butchers and associations sued, in part claiming that the legislature did not
have the constitutional authority to create a monopoly or dispossess them of their property. The
case ultimately landed in the United States Supreme Court. The court now had occasion to issue
its first ruling on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision addressed a number of legal issues but, for the purposes of this paper, only
those portions devoted to constitutional limitations on legislative power will be addressed. The
majority opinion, written by Justice Samuel Miller, rejected the argument that due process rights
restricted state property regulation. Noting that virtually all state constitutions and the Federal
Fifth Amendment contained due process clauses nearly identical to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s, Miller relied on precedent to limit due process to its historical procedural place.
“It is sufficient to say that under no construction of that provision that we have ever seen, or in
any that we deem admissible, can the restraint imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the
exercise of their trade . . . be held to be a deprivation of property within the meaning of this
provision.” State police powers allowed for “all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.”1112 While the court overstated
the case when it claimed there was no authority for limiting state action under due process
clauses, it certainly followed the vast weight of authority.
The dissent, however, saw the Fourteenth as more than a restatement of procedurally
defined state due process provisions. In doing so, they would adopt many of the arguments of
plaintiffs’ counsel. John Campbell, a former member of the court, who had resigned his seat
when his home state of Alabama left the Union, argued that the newly enacted due process
clause, along with the privilege and immunities and equal protection clauses, protected persons
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from legislative interference with their property rights. In 1869, at the district court level, he
proclaimed in oral argument,
On our part we assert that it is against the common right, that it is contrary to
the common law, which gives to every man a property in his person and a right
to employ that in every lawful trade. We say that those great inherent and
natural rights which are proclaimed in all our constitutions and lie at the
foundation of all our liberties, that they have had a constitutional sanction; that
they are engrafted in the bills of rights in this State, and that they are written in
the amendment of the Constitution.1113
Thereafter, Campbell incorporated Cooley repeatedly in his arguments. In his briefs before the
United States Supreme Court, Campbell premised most of his argument on the impropriety of
government-created monopoly. Erroneously citing Cooley as support, he argued that all
American legislatures only have as much authority as specifically delegated to them. Campbell
then focused on the express and implied limitations found in the federal and Louisiana
constitutions. Again quoting Constitutional Limitations, Campbell argued that constitutions
should be interpreted to protect individual rights, including the right to property.1114 The
dissenters in Slaughter-House listened intently.
Although never citing Constitutional Limitations, Justice Field’s dissent followed much
of Cooley’s reasoning.1115 Like Cooley, he argued that state-created monopolies “encroach upon
the liberty of citizens to acquire property and pursue happiness.” Picking up on Cooley’s class
legislation argument, Field continued, stating that laws that limit avocations must burden
“equally upon all others of the same age, sex and condition.”1116 Like Cooley, Field also
incorporated common-law principles into his constitutional edifice. To him, the common law
1113
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prohibited government from granting monopolies and enacting unequal legislation, like the
Louisiana law. Field argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities
language gave constitutional effect to the common law and the inalienable rights of the
Declaration.
Field concluded his opinion by stressing the importance of protecting property and in
particular labor. In a frequently cited footnote quoting Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations,
Field wrote:
‘The property which every man has in his own labor,’ says Adam Smith, ‘as it
is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and
inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of
his own hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in
what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain
violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the
just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to
employ him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it
hinders the others from employing whom they think proper.’1117
Coming out of the Civil War, and fresh on the ending of slavery, Field and his dissenting
brethren focused on equality and labor freedoms. In doing so, they incorporated arguments
employed by Cooley including concerns over class legislation, excess regulation, and court
power. Whether Field premised his argument on Constitutional Limitations or independently
developed a similar line of reasoning, he pushed Cooley’s arguments forward as the due process
revolution developed. While Field focused on privileges and immunities, future courts would
blend Field’s words with Cooley’s due process arguments to limit legislative power to regulate.
With Cooley’s ideas now bolstered by the Slaughterhouse dissents, courts would accelerate their
efforts to limit legislatures, just as legislatures were accelerating their efforts to involve
government in the commercial sphere.
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Ronald Labbe and Jonathan Lurie in their work The Slaughterhouse Cases implied that
Cooley supported the majority opinion, which rejected the use of due process as a check on
legislative authority. Instead, they posited that Cooley would have approved of Louisiana’s
legislation because its goal was consistent with public health and good order.1118 Unfortunately,
like Alan Jones, Labbe and Lurie rely on Cooley’s general statements rather than considering his
deeper antipathy to active governance. Cooley demonstrated that, and his distaste for the
Slaughterhouse majority opinion, when in 1878, he published “Limits to State Control of Private
Business.” In that article, Cooley expressed his aversion to any connection between government
and monopolies, wages, or prices and, in particular, the Slaughterhouse legislation.
In the troublous days immediately following the war, when the passions of the
people were so inflamed on questions growing out of the civil conflict as to
preclude any careful supervision of legislation by the general public, the
Legislature of Louisiana granted to a corporate body the exclusive privilege for
twenty-five years of slaughtering cattle in New Orleans and its immediate
vicinity, limiting their charges it is true but making them sufficiently liberal.
Suggesting a litany of horrors, Cooley opined that, “If the legislature could lawfully create this
monopoly, why not create a similar monopoly of warehousing?” “And if they did create one,”
he continued, “what should prevent their fixing the rates as high as they have ever been fixed by
individual warehousemen?” From there, Cooley turned to his targeted-constitutionalism
argument: If historically, government endeavors failed or were no longer justified by
circumstance, then the legislature’s power to engage in those activities was withdrawn. It was
here he offered that a power to “assist in the establishment and support of mills” required in
earlier days “should be considered recalled when the necessity has ceased.” Along with that
recall, was a further recall of the power to regulate. Cooley offered, “When the power to aid
mills by taxation is gone, such exceptional power to regulate as must have sprung from it should
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be considered recalled also.” Further, although earlier government regulated wages (Cooley
incorrectly suggests this ended in the colonial period) those powers were “abandoned or
recalled” by disuse. Cooley then offered that the due process clauses “should be understood as
protecting the liberty of employment with the same jealous care with which they protect against
unlawful confinement behind bolts and bars.” 1119 Accordingly, changed circumstances changed
constitutional meanings. What was once within legislative purview was no longer. The question
of whether a power was still constitutional, however, only arose when the legislature sought to
employ that power. Therefore, Cooley’s argument about disuse of the power really meant
something quite different. It meant that, notwithstanding the legislature’s belief to the contrary,
the custodian of constitutional limits had decided that circumstances no longer allowed use of
previously exerted powers. That custodian was the courts.
In basing his standard on the effectiveness of government programs and their impact on
private spaces, Cooley advanced a fluid due process test. By doing so, he necessarily rejected
doctrinaire laissez-faire and class-legislation approaches. The constitutionality of a government
program, like Cooley’s proffered mills, was based on whether those projects made sense in
relation to the burdens imposed at the time they were proposed. Given that fluid test, the mill
taxes of the early nineteenth century would constitutionally become too burdensome later in the
century as a result of expanded capital availability and/or the historical lessons of the
government overspending. Social and economic changes demanded such modifications. The
“steady growth of free principles” required an adjustment of legislative space through a
“permanent modification of the constitutional system.” Price regulations, for example could be
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undertaken if government power could be “harmonized with the general principles of free
government,” so they were not absolutely forbidden but, rather, were allowable at times and
unconstitutional at others. While Cooley believed those regulations would rarely pass muster he
noted that they might be acceptable according to the conditions of the time.1120 In other words,
legislative authority adjusted to circumstance. That fluidity required judicial balancing of the
need to defer to the legislature’s judgment concerning general welfare needs, the historical
effectiveness of government action, and the impact government activity had on individual
interests. Accordingly, no set formula defined Cooley, as constitutional interpretation must
change to assure the protection of limited, republican governance.
State courts moved more quickly to accept the Cooley standards than did the federal
courts.1121 Using the Slaughterhouse dissents and Constitutional Limitations as foundations,
they began to reverse regulations where they found those acts unreasonable. Among the first
was New York. Disregarding an 1884, New York City regulation prohibiting the manufacture of
cigars in tenement houses, Peter Jacobs worked with tobacco in a four-floor tenement house that
he shared with his wife and two children, and three other families. After being convicted for
violating the ordinance, Jacobs sued, claiming that the statute deprived him of property in
violation of due process. The court unanimously agreed with him in In the Matter of the
Application of Peter Jacobs. In doing so, the court accepted an expansive definition of property
and determined that restrictions on “the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live
and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling and to pursue any lawful
trade or avocation” were liberty interests protected by due process guarantees. Relying on
Cooley, the court determined it was the judiciary’s place to review legislation to assure that it did
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not encumber property or liberty interests beyond the narrow bounds of the state’s police power.
The court’s language is telling, as it suggests an activist judiciary and a subordinate, or at least
tame, legislature.
Immediately after it had suggested the legislature had the authority to determine which
regulations would support health, welfare, safety, and general-welfare concerns, Justice Earl
offered, “the determination of the legislature is not final or conclusive. If it passes an act
ostensibly for the public health, and thereby destroys or takes away the property of a citizen, or
interferes with his personal liberty, then it is for the courts to scrutinize the act and see whether it
really relates to and is convenient and appropriate to promote the public health.” Accordingly,
the court was not only to decide whether the legislature really intended to promote a policing
purpose but it was also to decide if the regulation effectively accomplished that end. It was to
balance the infringement against the gain. After asking, “What possible relation can
cigarmaking in any building have to the health of the general public?” the court declared the law
in violation of due process guarantees, unconstitutional, and void.1122
In Jacobs, a court for the first time grouped Cooley’s concerns over economic liberty,
class legislation, and restrictions on police power together to declare a law in violation with
substantive due process guarantees. That a New York court would lead is not surprising.
Cooley’s work had constitutionalized New York’s early property-protecting jurisprudence. The
concern expressed in White, Wynehamer, and Morris now had a constitutional doctrine on which
to grow.
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Soon the substantive due process revolution moved to Pennsylvania, a state that, in
Sharpless and Wartman, had embraced government involvement in commerce or, at a minimum,
had affirmed broad legislative powers. The controversy involved Pennsylvania’s steel industry.
Steel and iron mill owners often paid mill workers according to the weight of the product they
produced. Pennsylvania had legislated that a “ton” equaled 2000 pounds, but the mill owner, in
the case of Godcharles v Wigeman (1886), had set work rules defining a ton as 2240 pounds. An
employee claimed that the higher weight definition resulted in a loss of wages and litigation
ensued. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in favor of the employer, finding that the state
could not enforce weights and measure regulations in the face of contracts to the contrary. In an
extremely short opinion, the court determined that the legislation was “utterly unconstitutional
and void, inasmuch as by them an attempt has been made by the legislature to do what, in this
country, cannot be done; that is, prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own
contracts.” Despite the employee’s concern he was being swindled, the court sought to protect
his right to be free of legislative protection. “The Act is an infringement alike of the right of the
employer and the employee; more than this, it is an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a
legislative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a
citizen of the United States.”1123 In an eight-sentence opinion, and without discussing any
constitutional provision or the historic role of government in setting weights and measure
standards, the Pennsylvania court ruled that those state laws could be disregarded by employers
and employees.
Soon the West Virginia Supreme Court invalidated a statute requiring mine owners to
pay their employees in United States currency. The court, in State v Goodwill (1889) based its
decision on two Cooley inspired principles: First, the act constituted class legislation where “the
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rights and privileges of certain specified employers are abridged while others of the same class
are left free.” Second, the legislation violated the due process and privileges and immunities
clauses by taking private property. Citing Justice Field’s dissent in Slaughterhouse, the court
determined that requiring payment in currency violated contract rights and “the enjoyment or
deprivation of these rights and privileges, constitutes the essential distinction between freedom
and slavery; between liberty and oppression.” Accordingly, employees and employers had a
constitutional right to set pay in any format they chose.1124 In a nearly identical 1893 Missouri
case, State v Loomis, the court revealed its concern over pay legislation. After relying heavily on
Constitutional Limitations, the court raised the specter of socialism. It declared the requirement
that employees be paid in United States currency unlawful because it “introduce[d] a system of
state paternalism which is at war with the fundamental principles of our government, and, as we
have before said, are not due process of law.”1125
In 1891, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v Perry considered a state
law that prohibited employers from withholding garment workers’ wages for imperfect weaving.
Although the statute provided for alternative means to charge employees for unacceptable work,
the court found that the parties could contract to avoid the state mandated procedures. The court
declared the wage and process legislation unconstitutional because it constituted class legislation
in violation of state constitutional property rights and contract guarantees. The case is of
particular interest because of the dissent by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Holmes questioned the
majority’s seeming willingness to bend the constitution to fit their economic model.
What words of the United States or State Constitution are relied on? . . . So
far as has been pointed out to me, I do not see that it interferes with the right of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property any more than the laws against
usury or gaming. In truth, I do not think that that clause of the Bill of Rights
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has any application. It might be urged, perhaps, that the power to make
reasonable laws impliedly prohibits the making of unreasonable ones, and that
this law is unreasonable. If I assume that this construction of the Constitution
is correct, and that, speaking as a political economist, I should agree in
condemning the law, still I should not be willing or think myself authorized to
overturn legislation on that ground, unless I thought that an honest difference
of opinion was impossible, or pretty nearly so.1126
Holmes was raising a concern he would later voice while on the United States Supreme Court;
the constitution did not presume that the courts would void legislation with which they had
substantive disagreement. Holmes’ dissent sobered neither the Massachusetts court nor,
apparently, other courts. State courts would increasingly void legislation as violating due
process guarantees, claiming that they constituted class legislation, inhibited the rights to
contract, took property, or were in some way unjust.1127
For example, in response to an 1891 state act requiring the weekly payment of wages, the
Illinois Supreme Court in 1893 elevated contract rights over state interest to assure payment to
wage earners. The legislation addressed the practice of several industries, including coal mines,
to withhold a portion of employee pay until corporate economic conditions improved. The
Braceville Coal Company claimed that the law violated the state’s due process guarantees by
depriving the company and its employees of their contract rights. Moreover, the company
claimed that the act was improper class legislation and an interference with laissez-faire
economic rights. In Braceville Coal v Illinois, the court sided with the corporation. As in
previous cases, the court defined labor as property but it went a step further, perhaps stating what
others had implied. The court declared, “the privilege of contracting is both a liberty and a
property right.” Citing Constitutional Limitations at length, Justice Shope scolded the legislature
over its class legislation and listed the industries to which the legislation did not apply. He then
1126

Commonwealth v Perry, 115 Mass. 117, 124 (1891)
See, Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts, 64-97 and Fine, Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State, 127-164
for a more complete analysis.
1127

453

offered, “The right to contract necessarily includes the right to fix the price at which labor will be
performed and the mode and time of payment. Each is an essential element of the right to
contract, and whosoever is restricted in either as the same is enjoyed by the community at large,
is deprived of liberty and property.”1128 Liberty, contract rights, and property were fused and
protected by due process principles. Constitutional Limitations had lit the intellectual fuse and
undermined legislative prerogatives to act in support of the common welfare. Notions of
negative governance and legislative limitations had trumped majority will.
The Godcharles, Goodwill, Loomis, and Braceville Coal decisions evidenced a move
from a concern about the undue influence of the wealthy on the legislative process, to a concern
that majoritarian impulses would undermine wealth. Public concerns over weights and
measures, currency regulations, and pay guarantees melted in the face of individualistic notions
of contract – even though those notions were contrary to long-standing public policies. In a
relatively short time, state courts had applied Cooley’s reasoning to limit legislation in support of
the general welfare. State courts embraced Cooley’s call to action and they sacrificed timehonored principles respecting stare decisis and deference to the legislature at the altar of property
and contract rights. With Cooley’s declaration that “government can scarcely be deemed to be
free, where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will of the legislative body,”
as their clarion call,1129 state courts elevated property rights and contract liberties to a preeminent
position. In doing so, they almost certainly believed their rulings were consistent with “the
general advance in intelligence and independent thought and action among the people” that
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Cooley spoke of as an historical force.1130 Those courts accepted Cooley’s notion that free
principles could only expand if courts could shrink legislative prerogatives.
While most litigation arose in state courts, plaintiffs increasingly complained that
regulations also violated federal due process guarantees. When they lost at the state level,
litigants could then appeal to the federal courts. The U. S. Supreme Court’s frustration over
those actions revealed itself in the 1878 case of Davidson v New Orleans. In that case, the
plaintiffs objected that a property assessment to drain swamps constituted a deprivation of
property in violation of due process. Both parties cited Cooley to support their arguments
concerning legislative power. Justice Miller, writing for the court, seemed perplexed by the
sudden rush of litigation concerning due process rights. After stating that the “prohibition
against depriving the citizen or subject of his life, liberty or property without due process of law,
is not new in the constitutional history,” Miller declared “the docket of this court is crowded with
cases in which we are asked to hold that the State courts and State legislatures have deprived
their own citizens of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” He classified as a
“strange misconception” the efforts of “every unsuccessful litigant” in state courts to challenge
the merits of state legislation.
After scratching his judicial head, Miller wrote that the court was disinclined to set forth
the specific scope of the federal due process guarantees. Instead, he suggested that the courts
come to that definition gradually.1131 Justice Bradley concurred in the result, but was dissatisfied
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with the court’s hesitation to define due process. He declared that a law violated those
constitutional principles if it were “arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust.”1132 To him, courts were to
sit in judgment over laws to assure they met the judges’ standard of fairness. The court was
moving from a procedural definition to a substantive one.
The federal courts would accept Bradley’s principles, albeit a bit more slowly. As in
Slaughterhouse, until the closing days of the nineteenth century, dissents drove the substantive
due-process discussion. Three years after Slaughterhouse the court had the opportunity to
consider whether due process limited legislative prerogatives. In Munn v Illinois, the court again
approved regulation of trade, this time the regulation of rail and grain elevator rates.1133 Counsel
for both sides relied on Constitutional Limitations in their arguments and, consistent with
Cooley’s underlying balance of public and private interests, Chief Justice Waite’s majority
opinion held that grain elevators were a “business in which the whole public had a direct and
positive interest,” and accordingly the regulations were appropriate. State legislatures could
issue pricing regulations for those entities pursuant to their police powers. According to the
majority, those powers included regulating for “the public good.” By noting a distinction
between public and private corporations, the court may have been signaling that it would have
ruled differently if the industry had operated in the private sphere. Once the elevator and rail
industries were adjudged to be “public,” the majority rejected any notion of judicial oversight
regarding the reasonableness of regulations. That oversight was left to the democratic process
and the ballot box.
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Justice Fields again dissented, but this time with only one justice joining. He found, in
part, that the regulations deprived the businesses of property in the form of potential profits in
violation of due process. In doing so, Field acknowledged a widened consideration of
“property.” Arguing, “All that is beneficial in property arises from its use and, the fruits of that
use,” Field offered that the due process clause necessarily protected property beyond mere
“deprivation of title and possession.” Field went as far as to argue for a nearly complete
rejection of regulations that restrict property use. “If the legislature of a State, under pretense of
providing for the public good, or for any other reason, can determine, against the consent of the
owner, the uses to which private property shall be devoted, or the prices which the owner shall
receive for its uses, it can deprive him of the property as completely as by a special act for its
confiscation or destruction.”1134 Field relied on Pumpelly as support for including intangible
interests as part of property. The property bundle of straw was expanding, and government
power, under Field’s equation, was contracting.
Whereas previous courts had employed the term “police powers” to define government
actions, specifically those of the legislature, Field treated the term as a limitation on legislative
power. In employing the term, Field argued that police power was limited to advancing the
“peace, good order, morals, and health of the community.” As in his Slaughterhouse dissent,
Field did not include concerns over the general welfare in his calculation and derisively referred
to the broad definition of police power as “an undefined and irresponsible element of
government.” Accordingly, Field limited the legislative regulatory sphere essentially to sic utere
tuo ut alenum non laedas (use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of
another), and price regulations had no place in that (and presumably, neither did general-welfare
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regulations.)1135 Field’s position, therefore, either rejected the mass of antebellum rulings that
broadly construed legislative power or, as Cooley might have argued, found that changed
circumstances demanded new constitutional meanings in order to protect core republicangovernance principles.
It should not surprise that Cooley expressed concern over the Munn majority’s
characterization that grain elevators were “affected with the public interest.” In his 1878 fourth
edition of Constitutional Limitations, Cooley noted, much as he had in Salem, “The public have
an interest in every business in which an individual offers his wares, his merchandise, his
services, or his accommodations to the public; but his offer does not place him at the mercy of
the public in respect to charges and prices.” Recognizing that government historically had
regulated some prices, Cooley offered that a business was affected with the public interest only if
1) it required a state license or franchise for the privilege of operating, 2) the state rendered
business assistance to the entity, 3) the public granted public property or easements for the
business’ use, or 4) the government granted exclusive privileges in exchange for business
obligations to the public.1136 Cooley suggested licenses only were limiting where they had been
historically part of governance – like taverns, lotteries, and entertainment. The legislature
enacted the grain elevator licensing requirement only as part of its challenged pricing limits, and
that did not meet Cooley’s test.1137 Although in portions of his fourth edition of Constitutional
Limitations Cooley favorably cited Munn, in other portions he objected to the wide berth given in
that case to legislative power to advance general-welfare interests. That being said, Cooley did
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not adopt Field’s almost per se rejection of any pricing regulations or, extrapolating a bit, any
regulation not specifically tied to public safety health or morals.
Munn dealt with pricing regulations, something Cooley suggested was “commonly
supposed” to be “inconsistent with constitutional liberty.” What then of legislative power over
other regulations? Here Cooley added little in his fourth edition, despite the increasing struggle
over the issue. Almost identically with his first edition, Cooley offered that regulations
advancing public safety, health, and morals were well within the historic and constitutional
purview of legislatures. Market regulations were acceptable as they were “deemed important for
the public convenience and protection.”1138 As to the extent of legislative power to regulate for
the general welfare – Cooley offered nothing new. Instead, as in the first edition, he avoided the
issue by stating that his general list of appropriate regulations was “more than sufficient to
illustrate the pervading nature of this power, and we need not weary the reader with further
enumeration.”1139
Why the evasiveness and why the failure to elaborate on the specific limits assumed in
the due process clauses? It may have been that Cooley was satisfied deferring to the growing
body of judicial decisions on matter. It may have been that, as a chronicler of decisions, he was
leery of offering more than general statements of law. He may also have been loath to tacitly
critique his judicial brethren by offering differing standards than they were contemporaneously
pressing. While all of those reasons may have some validity, underlying much of Cooley’s
reticence was a notion that the due process restrictions of his day might become inappropriate or
insufficient for future courts. This “law of change” required that later courts retain the flexibility
to respond to threats to republican governance and, with it, to allow for the “steady growth” of
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free principles. As Cooley noted in 1886, “What emergencies may require or demand cannot in
advance be foreseen, but the general obligation to do whatever may be possible to preserve
Republican intuitions in their integrity is plain, and if kept steadily in view will lead to safe
results.”1140 As threats to republican institutions changed, so too did the limitations required by
and allowed for under the due process banner. Accordingly, due process language could not
stand as defined, unalterable barriers. Instead, due process clauses were flexible instruments to
achieve Cooley’s target – republican governance.

Briefly, an Aftermath
Just as Miller suggested in Davidson, the federal courts would gradually consider the
scope of due process. That effort would eventually elevate the minority position to the majority.
In 1897, the United States Supreme Court fully embraced the substantive due process concept in
Allgeyer v Louisiana. Using reasoning that mimicked Constitutional Limitations, the court
combined the notions of liberty of contract, laissez-faire economics, and class legislation to
arrive at its due process definition. Justice Rufus Peckham wrote for the court that due process
“is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to
be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.” Peckham softened that powerful language, however,
when he clarified late in the opinion that “it may be conceded that this right to contract in
relation to persons or property or to do business within the jurisdiction of the State may be
regulated and sometimes prohibited when the contracts or business conflict with the policy of the
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State.” In that sense, the court allowed some level of intrusion into individual rights. In essence,
therefore, Peckham offered a balancing test, and the facts in Allgeyer argued for a balance on the
side of individual contract rights. 1141 In the end, the court was on board, using due process as
the sword with which to strike down undesired legislation.
Using due process guarantees contained in state constitutions, the Fifth Amendment and
the Fourteenth Amendment, the courts turned Jacksonian principles on their head. The
Jacksonian scourges of a free society – corporations – were now the liberty protectors of the new
age. Ironically, Cooley considered those Jacksonian principles as central to his propertyprotecting beliefs. Now, however, Cooley and those who followed him considered limitations on
corporate power as encumbrances on freedom and in violation of life, liberty, property, and due
process.
As has been discussed, the Cooley inspired revolution propelled property to the
preeminent liberty-protecting interest of late-nineteenth century America. Laissez-faire
constitutionalism replaced the previous general-welfare paradigm and the individual’s interest
became primary over that of groups. As part of that shift, Americans increasingly feared that
European social doctrines would undermine American liberties. John F. Dillon, the former Chief
Justice of the Iowa Supreme court, and one of the first champions of constitutional limitations on
legislative power, reflected that concern in a January 1895 speech before the New York Bar
Association. He related that property rights formed the very foundation of American society.
He feared that the general-welfare legislation, unions, and various “communists, socialists, [and]
anarchists” were engaging in “combined attacks” on America’s “social fabric” and “fundamental
principles.” His strongest concern was the “socialistic” attacks on property through legislated
taxation, and he classified “the States’ power of taxation” as “the most insidious, specious and
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therefore, dangerous” attacks on America. Dillon continued, protesting progressive income taxes
that may be “designed as a forced contribution from the rich to benefit the poor and as a means
of distributing the rich man’s property among the rest of the community.1142 It should be
recalled that Dillon was the first judicially to embrace Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations and
its public purpose doctrines. Democracy seemed to offer grave threats, as the masses could
divest the wealthy of their property. Missing in Dillon’s analysis was a concern that the wealthy
would exert undue influence on legislatures to further their acquisitive aims. The concern that
had most significantly animated Cooley seemed inconsequential to a Dillon concerned about
protecting property from the ravenous masses.
Dillon was no malcontent nor was he alone in his concern. Respected attorneys and
scholars were speaking and writing against government “paternalism” and the efforts to restrict
individual free action. Sidney Fine, in Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare, provided
numerous examples of the prevailing concerns.1143 For example, John Randolph Tucker in a
speech before the 1892 American Bar Association meeting warned that, “The evils which infest
and menace our country will be crushed by the free and unbound and independent manhood of
the American people, unhelped and unhindered by paternal care of their governments. This must
be done or liberty will perish.” Others raised the alarm of paternal government, each expressing
concerns that government legislation would undermine liberty and property rights. 1144 While
their position did not rely specifically on Cooley, their ideas emerged from Constitutional
Limitations and its resultant elevation of property interests and law – but, in a very significant
way, they had ignored Cooley’s central point.
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A Hint of Regret?
Cooley maintained that constitutional provisions should be interpreted in order to
facilitate republican governance. At its core, the issue was not about individual rights. As Jones
noted, Cooley’s “dominant concern was the republic, not property rights.”1145 It was about
protecting the governing structure from undue influences and inappropriate pressures. Rights
were a part of that, but they were not immutable or unchanging forces. Rather, they expanded
with the steady advance of free principles. Where Dillon and his intellectual brethren suggested
firmer limits on activities encumbering property and contract, Cooley held to no such stringent
standard.
So what did Cooley think about the developments in the due process and public purpose
revolutions he had fathered? As mentioned, Cooley respected the legislative role and called for
the courts to protect republican governance by assuring that legislatures did not inappropriately
respond to undue pressures. In Constitutional Limitations and in a number of opinions, Cooley
voiced the need for courts to defer to legislative judgments and to avoid replacing factual
judgments of the court for those of the legislature. Yet his standards called for a strong court
presence. He could do that because, at least early on, he believed judges were more
contemplative and less subject to popular passions than were legislators. Because of that, courts
did not require the oversight that the legislature did.
As courts became more active, and increasingly invalidated legislation, Cooley began to
question his earlier thoughts. In 1884, he bemoaned Michigan’s and other courts’ recent
tendency to usurp legislative power by improperly substituting judicial judgments for that of the
legislature. In State v Iron Cliffs Company, a case considering the constitutionality of a statute
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dealing with the sale of tax-delinquent property, Cooley reminded his brethren that courts “have
no supervisory power in respect of legislation,” and that the courts could not invalidate
legislation “however unwise or impolitic” it might be. This admonition was necessary not only
because court rulings offered the final word but because the courts had been overstepping their
bounds. Cooley offered, “There is ground for the belief that sometimes statutes have been
annulled by courts on objections that purported to be ground in the constitution, but which, if
plainly stated, would resolve themselves into this: that the judges did not like the legislation.”
Cooley then called on the courts to “assign reasons” that were “sound and substantial” when
overturning legislation.1146 Notwithstanding that call, in 1868 Cooley had invited such judicial
activism when he urged judges to invalidate legislation in order to “shield private rights against
arbitrary interference.” By doing so, he had helped open the door for courts to mold
constitutional clauses – most particularly due process and tax – in ways earlier courts had been
loath to adopt. By advocating a search for new constitutional meanings, Cooley invited the
result he now feared.
The court in Iron Cliffs evenly split. The lower court then sided with Justices Campbell
and Sherwood, who voted to invalidate the tax measure as contrary to due process guarantees.
On appeal from that decision, Cooley continued his protest against what had become a regular
practice of invalidating unfavorable legislation under due process clauses. Throwing up his
judicial hands, Cooley offered, “Personally I have little care how this case shall be decided; but it
seems to me that that on the constitutional question the Court is drifting to this position: That
those statutes are constitutional which suit us, and those are void which do not.”1147 Ironically,
Sherwood’s opinion claiming the law violated due process sounded much like Constitutional
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Limitations. He offered that fundamental (and natural) laws protected private property through
due process clauses. Those protections existed in the common law and were made express in the
written constitution.
The case was primarily procedural, as the court debated over the judicial process required
concerning administrative findings. But the justices’ dispute concerned the legislature’s power
to change property rights, with Cooley’s brethren arguing that as a constitutional right, property
was protected against legislative encumbrance. Cooley had unleashed a judicial torrent – in
some measure satisfying his legislative-limiting, republican governance objective. In some
measure, they were overreaching. One wonders what Cooley thought of his earlier faith in
judicial temperament and discretion.
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Chapter VII: Historical Forces and Constitutional Change
As our institutions expand the citizen will be subjected to new restraints for the
protection of new rights which were either not clearly perceived before, or
which have sprung from new conditions.
Thomas M. Cooley
Sunday Chronicle, August 4, 18891148
To Cooley, Michigan’s history provided essential lessons for the entire nation. Given its
experiences under foreign flags, and then under various territorial and state governing structures,
Cooley believed that his state was both a significant contributor to and was influenced by the
“remarkable changes” that had “so greatly affected [the] constitutional questions and political
habits of mind and tendencies of the American people.” To chronicle that contribution to
national development, Cooley published his Michigan, A History of Governments while a
member of the history department at the University of Michigan. In it, Cooley explored how
Michigan’s social, economic, and political developments had driven changes in thinking about
the place of government in the evolving American nation. While interesting in their own right,
Cooley reflected that those changes altered constitutional understandings and governing
structures. He wrote, “But as the people change, so does their written constitution change also:
they see it in new lights and with different eyes; events may have given unexpected illumination
to some of its provisions and what they read one way before they read a very different way
now.”1149 If, as Cooley argued, constitutional interpretations could change with changing
circumstances, then government actions that were valid earlier may be invalid later and,
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conversely, what was earlier forbidden could later be allowed. It is not enough, therefore, only
to study the changing jurisprudential landscape. Instead, an understanding of changed
constitutional principles requires an appreciation of the circumstances that drove courts to revise
constitutional meanings and governing space. Only then can one appreciate why Cooley argued
that early governments could financially support private mills but later governments could not.
There can be little doubt that Cooley was particularly knowledgeable about, and shaped
by, Michigan’s history. His opinions evidence great respect for historical lessons, his articles
spoke of historical events that shaped law and constitutional interpretations, and he was a
member of the history faculty at the University of Michigan. He knew of and understood the
struggles of Michigan’s pioneers and settlers, the harsh environment they inhabited, and
challenges presented by the absence of a protecting government. He considered government
planning and intervention providential in the wake of the 1805 fire, even as that intervention
demanded changed property rights. While believing the early colonial-like government was
necessary, Cooley noted that the Northwest Ordinance imposed a government “neither derived
from the people governed nor responsible to them.”1150 Particularly under the Hull and
Woodward administration, that government was unresponsive to community needs. Instead, its
leaders answered to distant rulers in the nation’s capital. Only when Cass became governor, and
the people could elect at least some of their representatives, did Michigan accelerate its
advancement to statehood and national relevance. Throughout his discussion of Territorial
Michigan, Cooley focused on the need for governance responsible to the people. He bristled at
the Jacksonian spoils system that undermined self-governance and he celebrated active
governance that redesigned cities, relieved hunger, and educated the young. Those scholars who
suggest Cooley advocated laissez-faire governance or a handcuffed legislature ignore his
1150

Ibid., 146.

467

historical writings and understandings. By relying on the uses others later made of his doctrines,
they miss that Cooley was neither an advocate for the wealthy nor an adversary of the common
man. In an 1889 speech to the North Dakota Constitutional Convention, Cooley advocated for
legislative power to meet “all evils” that could be reached by “proper legislation” under
American constitutional governance.1151 He was a forward thinking jurist, who advanced
governance responsive to changed circumstances.
At the same time, Cooley was not a proponent of unchecked democratic governance.
Michigan’s failed efforts to develop internal improvements and the associated fiscal
embarrassments seared their way into his political and legal thinking. In his opinions and other
writings, Cooley lamented the “debris of our airy castles” created when democratic impulses
foolishly ignored economic realities. To Cooley, however, such failure did more than send a
cautionary note to future generations. In his landmark Salem opinion, Cooley suggested that
such failures resulted in the withdrawal of legislative powers once enjoyed. In other words,
experience demanded a changed constitutional structure. He drew that adjusted governing
structure from new meanings found in constitutional text. To Cooley, it was “no longer
recognized as proper or politic” that government should supply rail services. Instead, those
services were “remitted to the care of private industry,” and could no longer be publically
funded.1152 Significantly, the democratic process did not make that decision and, indeed, the
legislature and voters repeatedly disagreed with those urging caution or withdrawing power; the
state legislature had twice approved Salem’s grant, the people of Salem had once authorized it,
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and communities across the state and nation had routinely authorized rail subsidies. In
Michigan, only Cooley’s court majority and those losing in the political arena believed that it
was “no longer recognized as proper or politic” to financially support private industry.
Nevertheless, courts enjoy the final constitutional word (short of a formal amendment).
Employing that power, Cooley imposed his notion of flexibly interpreting constitutional clauses
to protect his constitutional target – limited republican governance. With Salem, he found new
meaning implied in the constitution’s tax language and in Bay City, he judicially found new
meaning in the due process language. In the end, previously misused power (perhaps along with
chanced economic conditions) changed governing prerogatives. Governing space retreated as
the forces of history pressed for expanded private space.
Cooley’s primary republican concern was that the wealthy and influential would drive
legislation to enhance their position at the expense of the less powerful and that doing so
undermined the ideals of republican governance. He witnessed firsthand as homeopathic special
interests advanced the unauthorized expansion of legislative power to promote their own
commercial interests. He sat as a legal advisor to the University as the legislature responded to
those special interests (and those of the public generally) by shunning constitutional barriers in
order to commandeer a sister branch’s constitutional space. Cooley believed that the framers had
erected those barriers to assure a “steadiness in plan and conservatism in management, and place
the university beyond the dangers that might spring from popular excitements and prejudices,
and from political overturns.”1153 Fiscal challenges suffered in the wake of the Civil War
undermined the University’s ability to parry legislative efforts to exert control. In the end, the
school’s administration capitulated, or at least compromised its independence, fearing that failure
to do so risked the University’s continued vitality and perhaps existence. While Cooley’s beliefs
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concerning homeopathic medicine are unknown, he certainly was concerned about the
University’s struggles as it sought to maintain academic control in the face of powerful
legislative impulses. The legislature was overstepping regardless of the wisdom of its policy
preferences, and it was doing so in response to pressures that constitutional structures were
intended to mute.
As the legislature began to flex its muscles vis a vis the University, Cooley witnessed
another significant legislative effort to expand its reach. Multiple states, including Michigan,
were enacting temperance legislation, which effectively rendered valueless property that had
previously been of substantial value and commercial importance. In response to these “Maine
laws,” state courts across the nation considered whether legislatures could divest citizens of their
previously lawful property. Most significantly, the New York court found that such destruction
of property violated that state’s due process clause. In so ruling, New York expanded due
process protections beyond their previous focus on procedural guarantees. The court extended
the clause to protect against legislative actions that significantly encumbered rights – most
particularly, property rights.
Multiple jurisdictions, including Michigan, disagreed with the New York court, and
continued their long-term expansive definition of legislative space. Even as they affirmed
legislative power, several courts, and multiple dissenters, expressed concern that the legislature’s
efforts so deeply to regulate were unwise and distressing. While declaring this was a political
issue best left to the legislature and voters, many seemingly yearned for a constitutional peg upon
which they could review significant rights-affecting legislation. To Cooley, the Maine laws
presented yet another example of distressing legislative activism.
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The 1850 Michigan Constitution stripped the state legislature of its power to finance rail,
but it could not strip the state of its need for an expanded and effective transportation and
communication network. In response to that need, the legislature once again searched for, and
found, a way to respond to public and private pressures. In Michigan, as in other states, the
legislature authorized municipalities to grant funds to private rail corporations where the state
could not. The practice of supporting private internal improvement corporations was
widespread. Since 1830, in one form or another, governments had been investing in rail and,
since that time, disgruntled residents had sought judicial relief from the taxes associated with
such government spending. At its core, their argument was that the legislature lacked the power
to take their property, in the form of taxes, and give that property to other private parties. Unable
to find clear and concise limits on such legislative action, all antebellum courts affirmed their
legislature’s power financially to support private industry, particularly rail.
A reading of scholarly works suggests a different judicial dynamic. Perhaps in an effort
to cull an inevitable timeline to later legislative limitations, scholars have sought to find
significance in court dicta and the relative few that challenged legislative plenary power. When
employing dicta, courts would denounce legislative overreaching but then affirm the legislature’s
actions. In those few cases where they invalidated property transfers, the courts were either
protecting court power – pursuant to separation principles – or responding to private, person-toperson transfers. Unlike the later Cooley-inspired rulings, those cases largely were not about
government power. Rather, they were about which governing branch had jurisdiction. Notably,
in the most significant wealth-transfer cases of the era – rail subsidies – courts uniformly
affirmed legislative power. The bottom line is that prior to Cooley, courts deferred to legislative
judgments concerning taxing, spending, and wealth transfers.
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With one exception, those transfers remained valid until 1868 and the publication of
Cooley’s, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power
of the States of the American Union. In it, Cooley offered that state constitutions expressly or
implicitly limited legislative power to tax, spend, and regulate. Through Constitutional
Limitations and his further writings, speeches, and judicial opinions, Cooley unveiled his
underlying premise that American constitutions were at their core, dedicated to the maintenance
of republican, limited-government. In order to achieve that goal, courts were to search for new
constitutional understandings and limit legislative activities when laws unduly encumbered
advancing individual liberty interests. To be sure rights, particularly property rights, were
always considered limitations on government overreaching. But, prior to Cooley, courts almost
always deferred to legislative judgments, even when individual rights were encumbered. Cooley
would encourage courts to protect and advance individual rights, largely in order to assure the
promise of republican governance.
To Cooley, legislatures veered off their allowed constitutional course when, typically
responding to undue pressures, they enacted unwise, uneven, or oppressive legislation. Unlike
many who would follow his lead, Cooley believed that the wealthy elite most threatened
legislative wisdom. Although a supporter of rail development, Cooley disapproved of the
common practice of municipal financial support of private industry. To Cooley, those practices
had been proven dangerous and subversive to republican governance and therefore were not
valid exercises of legislative power. This was especially so as corporations influenced
legislatures to coerce wealth transfers from objecting taxpayers to those corporate, private hands.
As Cooley noted, once the state “enters upon the business of subsidies, we shall not fail to
discover that strong and powerful interests are most likely to control legislation, and that the
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weaker will be taxed to enhance the profits of the stronger.”1154 Because of a history of
government failures, and because the wealthy were subverting the legislative process for their
own ends, Cooley demanded that courts review those enactments to assure legislatures honored
republican values and systems.
As an historian, Cooley believed that society’s need for government changed with social,
economic, and political developments. Accordingly, republican values not only demanded
legislation free from undue influences, but also required a respect for the natural growth of free
principles. Because of that, a court response to the same question could be different in 1870 than
it was in 1850. Hence, earlier acceptable public support of a mill would no longer be acceptable
when the need or wisdom for doing so was absent. Governing power shifts with need,
experience, and circumstance – and when the legislatures erred in their assessments, the courts
were there to set them on the appropriate path.
Surely, Cooley knew that his doctrine invested considerable authority in the judiciary. At
first, he seemed unconcerned. To him, courts were immune from the coercive influences of
wealth and popular passions. Hence, judges could act as dispassionate referees, involving
themselves in those cases where the legislature had ignored historical experience or had acted in
ways that unduly encumbered free principles. When that happened, the courts were flexibly to
seek new constitutional meanings to guard the core principles of republican governance.
Because of his respect for the legislature and belief that they were well suited to their
constitutional role as problem solvers, and his faith in a well-trained and neutral judiciary,
Cooley believed his theories would cautiously be employed. Unfortunately, he found that his
judicial followers became activist in their efforts to limit the legislature. Instead of allowing
progressive, considered legislation, a number of courts sought to enforce doctrinaire laissez-faire
1154
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or anti-class legislation policies. In doing so, they undermined the very republican principles
Cooley held dear. By suggesting the means to check legislative overreaching, Cooley had
created the means to handcuff legitimate legislative action. Late in his judicial career, in 1884
and again in 1885, Cooley publically bemoaned that practice of substituting judicial views for
those of the legislature. While his critiques were rare, Cooley understood that courts were
undermining much of his intentions. In checking legislative power, Cooley had opened the door
to enhanced judicial power that, unfortunately, lacked the dispassionate, agenda-free reflection
he sought in limited, republican governance.
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